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This thesis is concerned with the role played by the Christian scholar ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī in 
theologizing in the Islamic milieu of the ‘Abbasids in the 9th century. His Kitāb al-Burhān, one 
of his only two surviving works, will therefore be thoroughly studied from two perspectives: 
the Islamic perspective as it is found in contemporary anti-Christian polemical texts; and the 
Christian perspective, through a comparison of ‘Ammār’s treatise with the works of Arab 
Christian theologians of his day. The present study aims at demonstrating the level of 
translatability of Christian theology into the Islamic intellectual milieu, as ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī saw 
it. It is therefore natural that we should examine Kitāb al-Burhān as an example of 
“contextualized” theology in Dār al-Islām. ‘Ammār’s Burhān stands a witness to the 
numerous attempts made by Arab Christians to reconcile their heritage (the world of Islam) 
with their inheritance (Christian theology). Such a reconciliation is essential for the future 
existence of Arab Christians, particularly in the Arab World.  
The present study is divided into three major sections, each presenting a particular 
perspective: the first is a historical overview of ‘Ammār’s context. It includes Chapter One, 
which examines the socio-political milieu of Eastern Christians at the advent of Islam, and 
the beginning of Christian Arabic theology; and Chapter Two, which explores the life and 
works of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, and examines the history of scholarship on Kitāb al-Burhān.  
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The heart of the present study is Section Two, i.e. the theological perspective, which 
offers a systematic and critical analysis of the content of Kitāb al-Burhān. This starts with 
Chapter Three, where ‘Ammār’s arguments concerning the true religion and the reasons for 
accepting the Christian religion are closely examined. Chapter Four offers an analysis of 
‘Ammār’s presentation of God’s existence, God’s book, i.e., refuting the allegation of 
corruption, and God’s nature, i.e. the Trinity. And Chapter Five presents ‘Ammār’s 
Christological views, scrutinizing with critical attention discussions on the unity of Christ, his 
incarnation, cross and crucifixion. Chapter Six offers a discussion on the sacraments of 
baptism and the Eucharist. And finally, in this section, Chapter Seven presents a theological 
presentation of ‘Ammār’s views on some aspects of Eschatology, i.e. eating and drinking in 
the afterlife.  
Section Three contains Chapter Eight, which investigates the place of ‘Ammār. 
Finally, the appendix offers for the first time an English translation of Kitāb al-Burhān. 
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Note on Scripture Translations  
Unless otherwise noted, all biblical citations are taken from the Revised Standard Version 
and all qur’ānic citations are from Yūsuf ‘Alī’s translation.  
 
Arabic Transliteration Table  
 
ا ’ د d ض ḍ ك k  
ب b ذ dh ط ṭ ل l 
ت t ر r ظ ẓ م m 
ث th ز z ع ‘ ن n 
ج j س s غ gh ـﻫ h 
ح ḥ ش sh ف f و w 
خ kh ص ṣ ق q ي y 
      
The short vowels are represented as follows:  
a fatḥah 
i kasrah 
u  ḍammah  
 





The diphthongs are represented as follows:  
ay (َي ـ)  
aw (َو ـ) 
 
The final hā’ is represented by “ah.”
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Unquestionably, without a careful reading of medieval Arabic treatises, studies on Christian-
Muslim dialogue become inadequate attempts to describe the nature and questions with 
which Christians and Muslims were struggling. Early texts occupy a major importance in this 
endeavor, as they acquaint modern scholars with the first issues raised among Christians 
and Muslims. Texts from the ninth century are of particularly great importance, given their 
milieu, namely, the formative period of the ‘Abbasid renaissance 750-860 AD. Several 
corpora have been studied, and as a result many Arabic texts have been translated into 
modern languages such as German, French and English. Consequently, theologians such as 
Theodore abū Qurrah and abū Rā’iṭah al-Tikrītī have become well-known to Western 
scholarship.  
However, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s Kitāb al-Burhān remains to a great extent unknown. This 
current study fills this gap, and this is what makes this dissertation a foundational work. The 
thesis will provide an exhaustive theological analysis of Kitāb al-Burān, as well as a complete 
English translation thereof. This groundbreaking work will assuredly provide future scholars 
with an opportunity to extend their understanding of Christian-Muslim theological encounters 
during the second part of the ninth century. Similarly, the English translation of ‘Ammār’s 
treatise will open a door for many to carry out further studies. None of this was possible 
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before the appearance of the present dissertation. Furthermore, we have succeeded in 
consulting the Charfeh MS—which was not accessible to many scholars who have worked 
on Kitāb al-Burhān in the past; it is an epitome to the only other known MS, which is in 
London.  
 
Methodology and Limitation 
In presenting this theological analysis, we will divide the topics covered in Kitāb al-Burhān 
into five major sections: Religion, God, Christ, the Sacraments, and Eschatology. Our plan is 
to provide a brief overview of the way Muslim polemicists viewed each of them, followed by 
an analysis of ‘Ammār’s arguments to assess his position and, finally, each topic will be 
critically evaluated. Our methodology is to provide a close critical reading of the text, 
identifying its main theological themes, and to assess its arguments in the context of 
Christian-Muslim conversation.   
Our main resource for this study is the British Library MS, referred to hereafter as BL 
MS, which contains Kitāb al-Burhān; this is the manuscript Michel Hayek edited and 
published in 1977, as we shall discuss later. Other references will also be made, as 
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appropriate, to the Charfeh MS—especially when significant textual or theological additions 
are found. Hayek’s edition will be referred to as “Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses.”1 
The current study is limited in its scope, as it is fundamentally concerned with the 
Islamic milieu of ‘Ammār. That is to say, we shall not spend much time on attempts to 
examine ‘Ammār’s arguments in light of current theological conversations between Christians 
and Muslims. Rather, our main focus will be on providing a theological analysis of his Kitāb 
al-Burhān as an attempt to answer certain Islamic objections to Christianity in the ninth 
century.  
In order to do this, one must consider the situation of Christians at the advent of 
Islam.  
 
Christians at the Advent of Islam 
In order to better understand ‛Ammār al-Baṣrī’s milieu, and to depict the development of what 
became known as Dār al-Islām, it is necessary to consider the situation of Christians in the 
East at the advent of Islam. The focus of this section, therefore, is twofold: to examine first 
the internal theological and cultural differences within the Christian community, and second 
the new reality as Islam began to impact the Eastern world.  
                                               
1 Michel Hayek, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī: Apologie et controverses (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq), 1977.  
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By the middle of the fifth century, Eastern Christian communities were divided due to 
their differing doctrinal positions, as well as for cultural reasons. The Melkites, the Jacobites, 
and the “Nestorians” were the main sects. The term “Melkite” may well be Semitic in origin, 
since the Arabic word “malik” means “royal” or “king,” and it was this church that was 
supported by the state. According to historians, the intervention of the emperor in the affairs 
of the Melkite Church is well-documented.2 With the backing of the Byzantine Empire, the 
Melkite Church sometimes harassed non-Melkite Christians, after the refusal of the latter to 
adopt the Christological formulae of Chalcedon (451). Among those who suffered 
persecution were the West Syrians, the followers of Jacob Baradaeus (d. 578), and the 
Copts of Egypt. Both groups were later referred to as “Monophysites.” The Coptic Orthodox 
Church, as the national church of Egypt, has maintained its loyalty to the Alexandrian 
theologians, particularly Athanasius (b. c. 296-373) and Cyril of Alexandria (b. c. 375-444). 
The Coptic Church was and is non-Chalcedonian.  
The third group of Christians, the “Nestorians,” were anathematized and persecuted 
and fled the known territories of the Byzantine Empire, establishing themselves in Persia. In 
this remote location, the “Nestorians” removed themselves from the reach of the imperial 
                                               
2 See Salwa B. Ṣāliḥ al-‘Āyib, al-Masīḥiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah wa-Taṭāwurātuha (Bayrūt: Dār al-
Ṭalī‘ah, 1989), 26-42.      
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wrath of Byzantium,3 where, it has been argued, they were considered to comprise the 
“second state religion.”4  
It has been argued that in Persia both the “Nestorians” and the Jacobites enjoyed a 
“status of legality which they had never enjoyed with Byzantium.”5 There, interestingly 
enough, the “Nestorian” Church was successful in its mission: several missionary 
delegations were sent out to central Asia, reaching the Mongols and as far as China,6 where 
the “Nestorian” Tablet was erected in 781 during the Tang Dynasty (618-907).7 Perhaps this 
was possible because the “Nestorian” Church assured the Persian Empire that it had no 
political aspirations, for it was not a state-church.  
Christological expressions and views about the union of Christ (i.e., the unity of his 
divine and human nature), were the critical cause of schisms in the early Church.8 Eastern 
Christians agreed that Christ was the Word of God incarnate, and that he appeared in human 
form; the real issue was how the two natures of Christ existed in one person. How was the 
                                               
3 Robert B. Betts, Christians in the Arab East: A Political Study (Athens: Lycabettus Press, 
1975), 4. 
4 ʻAzīz ʻAṭiyya, A History of Eastern Christianity (London: Methuen & Co Ltd., 1968), 193; cf. 
Nīqūlā Ziyādeh, al-Masīḥiyyah wal-ʻArab (Dimashq: Qadmus lil-Nashr wal-Tawzīʻ, 2000), 200-202. 
5  Ibid., 20.   
6 Edmon Rabbāt, “al-Masiḥiyyūn fīl-Sharq qabl al-Islām” in al-Masiḥiyyūn al-‘Arab, ed. Elias 
Khoury (Bayrūt: Mu’assasat al-Abḥāth al-‘Arabiyyah, 1986), 19. 
7 Ephrem Yousif, al-Falāsifah wal-Mutarjimūn al-Suryān, trans. Sham‘ūn Kūsā (al-Qāhirah: al-
Markaz al-Qawmī lil-Tarjamah, 2010), 264-265.  
8 Ibid., 16.   
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divine Λόγος united in the body of Jesus of Nazareth? Did Christ have two natures, equally 
united in him? In 451, the Council of Chalcedon was called upon to solve this issue. Yet, as it 
presented its proposed “solution,” it in fact caused the first “great schism of the Apostolic 
Church.”9 While the Melkite Church accepted the formula that asserted the two natures of 
Christ, Christ being both divine and human, yet without confusion, or division, or separation, 
or change, other Christians rejected this formula. The “solution” was dismissed by the 
Alexandrian theologians, who saw it as the extreme opposite of the “Nestorian heresy,” 
which had earlier been condemned at the Council of Ephesus 431. Instead, they maintained 
the view that in Christ the two natures had become one person. Ultimately, those Christians 
who rejected Chalcedonian Christology, found themselves under the persecution of the 
Byzantine state-church.10 Nonetheless, it would be an oversimplification to assume that 
theology or doctrine was the only reason for such a division and fierce struggle. Naturally, 
theological differences were to be blamed for some enmity, but it is indeed necessary to 
keep in mind that the three Christian communities existed in three culturally different regions, 
and it seems that nationalism played some role in dividing them, for while the Melkite Church 
was the emperor’s church, both the Coptic Church in Egypt and the Syrian Church were 
                                               
9 ʻAzīz ʻAṭiyya, A History of Eastern Christianity, 69.   
10 Edmon Rabbāt, “al-Masiḥiyyūn fīl-Sharq,” 20. In fact, the three terms referring to the 
Christian communities in the Middle East prior to the advent of Islam are no longer descriptive of any 
theological positions, and most Eastern Christians do not use the terms that used to be employed.  
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national churches.11 Culture shapes the way one expresses faith, and this was perhaps what 
happened with the Chalcedonian and non-Calcedonian Christians before Islam. As 
Zhuravsky clearly argues, philosophical and political factors deepened the division. Certain 
political and cultural agendas were also in play, with each group of Eastern Christians 
representing a distinctive people and a specific language, which in turn influenced the local 
expression of Christianity.12 The Melkite Church used Greek as its liturgical language while 
the “Monophysite [Church]…had become the focus of anti-Greek feeling both among the 
Copts or native Egyptians and among the Jacobites of Syria…13” Needless to say, Greek 
was the language of earlier theological formulations: it was the language used in the 
theological decision of the Council of Nicaea and at Chalcedon.  
This was the situation of Eastern Christianity at the eve of Islam. When Islam took over 
much of the East, Eastern Christians found themselves subjugated under a new military 
power. At first, they seem to have regarded Islam as merely the newest invader in their long 
history of successive conquerors. They expected the Muslims to remain for a period, and 
                                               
11 Seppo Rissanen, Theological Encounter of Oriental Christians with Islam during the Early 
‘Abbasīd Rule (Åbo, Finland: Åbo Akademi University Press, 1993), 39; cf. Robert B. Betts, Christians 
in the Arab East, 1-7.       
12 A.V. Zhuravsky, al-Islām wal-Masīḥiyyah, trans. into Arabic by Khalaf M. al-Jarrād (Kuwait: 
al-Majlis al-Waṭani lil-Thaqāfah wal-Funūn wal-Ādāb, 1990), 177; cf. Nīqūlā Ziyādeh, al-Masīḥiiyyah 
wal-ʻArab, 222. 
13 William M. Watt, Muslim-Christian Encounters: Perceptions and Misperceptions (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 1.  
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then to be defeated by a new, superior power. The Persians, with their long struggle against 
the Romans, were presumably the most likely candidates. Perhaps this is why Griffith 
maintains that when Christians first encountered Islam they initially saw it as a political rather 
than a religious challenge.14 But, as “[c]hurches, monasteries…schools, towns and cities all 
came under Muslim rule,”15 as Islam became more and more established, and when the 
number of converts increased, the new world order posed several challenges for Christians 
in the East. It became evident that Islam was there to stay.16 This realization was confirmed 
as much of the population rapidly converted to Islam, and the cities of Alexandria, Antioch 
and Jerusalem, which had all been major Christian centers, fell to the Muslim armies. In fact, 
“[a]ll three sees often remained vacant or the patriarch resided in Constantinople.”17 
As early as the seventh century, Christians living under Islam started to produce 
apocalyptic literature, such as the apocalypses of Pseudo-Athanasius,18 John the Less, and 
                                               
14 Sidney Griffith, “Answering the Call of the Minaret: Christian Apologetics in the World of 
Islam,” in Redefining Christian Identity: Cultural Interaction in the Middle East since the Rise of Islam, 
ed. van J. J. Genkil, et al., Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 134 (Leuven, Belgium: Uitgeverij Peeters 
en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2005), 92. 
15 David Thomas, “Arab Christianity,” in The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity, ed. 
Ken Parry (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 8.  
16 Seppo Rissanen, Theological Encounter, 38. 
17 Ibid., 37. 
18 See Francisco Javier Martinez, “Pseudo-Methodius, and Pseudo-Athanasius. Eastern 
Christian Apocalyptic in the Early Muslim Period” (Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 
Washington, D.C. 1985).  
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Pseudo-Methodius.19 To be sure, such types of literature evaluated Islam as a tool of 
punishment by which God would purify the Church20—a perspective commonly found 
throughout apocalyptic literature, even before the advent of Islam.  
However, this apocalyptic literature did not change the new reality, nor did it attempt to 
relate to Islam, or to develop into an Arabic Christian theology which could, in turn, be used 
to initiate conversations with Muslims. Recognizing this, Christians began to adopt a different 
approach, which later resulted in intellectual interactions and theological encounters with 
Islam: they began to write their theological treatises in Arabic, the new lingua franca. Most of 
these writings were concerned with apologetics, although some were polemical in nature.  
This type of literature was much needed because Muslims, on both a scholarly and a 
day-to-day level, demanded proof of the credibility of the Christian faith. Before investigating 
Arabic Christian theology in general and the theology of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī in particular, it is 
necessary to look at the way Islam treated Christians in the newly conquered lands. This will 
provide an understanding of the socio-political context in which such theology was 
composed, an understanding of which is crucial for an appreciation of the theological 
                                               
19 John C. Lamoreaux, “Early Eastern Christian Responses to Islam,” in Medieval Christian 
Perceptions of Islam, ed. John Victor Tolan (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1996), 19.   
20 Ibid. 
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treatises of the Arab Christians.21 We turn then to examine how Christians were treated in 
Dār al-Islam. 
   
The Dhimmīs  
Before the rise of Islam, there were Christian communities in the Arabian Peninsula. Many 
tribes and kingdoms, such as Kindah, Kalb, Ghassān and kham, were well established in the 
Christian faith.22 Numerous historians argue that there were many Arab Christians even in 
Mecca!23   
In seeking to understand Muḥammad’s treatment of the dhimmīs, viz., the Jews, 
Christians, and the Ṣābians,24 it must be emphasized that two distinct attitudes are recorded 
                                               
21 These compositions were not produced in ivory towers, but rather at the courts of the 
caliphs, as in the case of Timothy I before al-Mahdī, and abū Qurrah before al-Ma’mūn! 
22 Mattias Schulz, “Fortress in the Sky: Buried Christian Empire Casts New Light on Early 
Islam,” trans. Christopher Sultan. Der Spiegel, 21 December, 2012. Available at:  
[http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/buried-christian-empire-in-yemen-casts-new-light-on-early-
islam-a-874048.html], Accessed on 21 December, 2012.  
23 See Kenneth Cragg, The Arab Christian: A History in the Middle East (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), 31-51; cf. the classic study by John Spencer Trimingham, 
Christianity among the Arabs in Pre-Islamic Times (London: Longman, 1979), and Georges C. 
Anawati, al-Masīḥiiyyah wal-Ḥaḍārah al-ʻArabiyyah (Bayrūt: al-Mu’assasah al-ʻArabiyyah lil-Dirāsāt 
wal-Nashr, 1900).  
24 Sūrah 2:62; 5:69; 22:17; cf. abū Yūsuf Yaʻqūb ibn-Ibrāhīm, Kitāb al-Kharāj (al-Qāhirah: al-
Maṭabʻah al-Salafiyyah wa-Maktabatuhā, 1933), 128; Adam Mez, al-Ḥaḍārah al-Islāmiyyah fīl-Qarn al-
Rābiʻ al-Hijrī, trans. Muḥammad ʻabd al-Hādī abū Rīdah (al-Qāhirah: al-Markaz al-Qawmī lil-Tarjamah, 
2010), 55-60. 
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in the Qur’ān.25 On one hand, the prophet of Islam praised Christians, as being the people 
closest to Muslims, in contrast with the Jews, with whom he was not so pleased, perhaps 
due to the opposition he had experienced from them in the early days of his prophethood, 
which would naturally lead to the Jews being depicted as hostile towards the Muslims.26 
Khoury argues that one of the significant qur’ānic references is sūrah 5:85.27 Add to this 
reference some other qur’ānic verses that praise the practices and character of Christians, 
who seem to have been “ranked at almost the same level as Muslims.”28  
However, later in his life, Muḥammad seems to have denied major Christian teachings, 
and even attacked them.29 He opposed the Christian belief that Jesus is God’s Son (sūrah 
9:30), “denounced the dogma of the Trinity (4:17), and pointed to the division of the 
Christians amongst themselves (5:14).”30 Further criticisms are mentioned concerning 
                                               
25 Al-‘Āyib mentions that the Qur’ān deals with Christians and Christianity in 117 verses, in 23 
sūrahs. See Salwa B. Ṣāliḥ al-‘Āyib, al-Masīḥiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah, 103.   
26 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 10-11. 
27 George Khoury, “The Advent of Islam and Arab Christians” (Catholic Information Network, 
January 17, 1997). Available at: 
[http://www.cin.org/bushra/mag1196/0896khou.html]. Accessed 25 October 2010. 
28 David Thomas, “Arab Christianity,” 6.    
29 Heribert Busse, Usus al-Ḥiwār fīl-Qurʼān al-Karīm: Dirāsah fī ʻAlāqat al-Islām bil-Yahūdiyyah 
wal-Masīḥiyyah, trans. Aḥmad Maḥmūd Huwaydī (al-Qāhirah: al-Majlis al-Aʻlā lil-Thaqāfah, 2005), 87-
91. 
30 See Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in 
the World of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 13. 
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specific Christian practices, such as the direction of prayer, monastic life, and clergy.31 
Moreover, the Qur’ān itself contains some disparaging remarks and criticism regarding 
Christians (sūrah 5:51; 9:34), who, according to the qur’ānic text, are “misled into false 
beliefs…teach wrong things…and have abandoned God’s promise.”32 Of course, the “false 
beliefs” criticized in the Qur’ān are the fundamental Christian doctrines, such as the Trinity, 
the incarnation, the crucifixion, and the divinity of Christ. The Qur’ān makes several 
references to Jesus as a mere man, a messenger from God, who is to be likened to Adam, 
as a created being. Further, according to the qur’ānic text, Christ was not put to death on the 
cross, but rather it “seemed so to his followers.”33 These doctrines were, and still are, the 
classical Muslim objections raised against the Christian faith. Arab Christian theologians 
wrote almost exclusively on such issues, and Christian-Muslim dialogue has always 
struggled with these topics.  
These two contradictory approaches towards non-believers may have been the reason 
why Muḥammad dealt with the Christians of the Peninsula using two different methods, i.e. 
with appreciation and with harsh criticism. To put it differently, Salwa B. Ṣaliḥ al-‘Āyib seems 
to have been correct in concluding that Muḥammad approached Arab Christians in two 
                                               
31 Salwa B. Ṣāliḥ al-‘Āyib, al-Masīḥiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah, 116-119. 
32 David Thomas, “Arab Christianity,” 6; cf. Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 9.    
33 Sūrah 4: 157ff.  
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different ways: diplomatically and militarily.34 He approached some tribes using the sword, 
such as the Christians of Dawmat al-Jandal, and those living on the borders of the Fertile 
Crescent, while others, such as the Christians of Najrān,35 received delegations to discuss 
theological issues.36 On the whole, however, it seems historically accurate to maintain that 
Muḥammad settled his relations with the dhimmīs by treaties,37 whereby they were allowed to 
pay money in exchange for protection by the Muslims if they would submit to the Islamic 
regime.38 The jizyah was one of two options put before the dhimmīs, the alternative being 
conversion.39 Adherents of other religions not acknowledged by the Qur’ān were offered 
either conversion to Islam or death.40 Lewis puts it this way:  
The Prophet’s relations with Christian tribes and settlements in the northern 
Ḥijaz, and later in southern Arabia, were in general regulated by 
agreements…By its [the agreement] terms the Christians were permitted to 
practice their religion and run their own affairs, on condition that they paid a 
                                               
34 Salwa B. Ṣāliḥ al-‘Āyib, al-Masīḥiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah, 127.   
35 See Muḥammad M. Sa‘ad-al-Din, al-‘Aysh al-Mushtarak al-Islāmī al-Masīḥī fī Ẓill al-Dawlah 
al-Islāmiyyah: Shahādah min al-Tārīkh, al-Masīḥiyyah wal-Islām fīl-Ḥiwār wal-Taʻāwun, 15 (Jūniyah: al-
Maktabah al-Būlusiyyah, 2001), 27.  
36 Salwa B. Ṣāliḥ al-‘Āyib, al-Masīḥiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah, 127.   
37 Robert B. Betts, Christians in the Arab East, 8. See, for example, the text of the Najrān 
treaty recorded in abū Yūsuf Yaʻqūb ibn Ibrāhīm, Kitāb al-Kharāj (al-Qāhirah: al-Maṭabʻah al-
Salafiyyah wa-Maktabatuhā, 1933), 72-73.    
38 Samir Khalil, “The Christian Communities: Active Members of Arab Society throughout 
History,” in Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: The Challenge of the Future, ed. Andrea 
Pacini (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 69.    
39 Mark Cohen, Bayna al-Hilāl wal-Ṣalīb: Waḍʻ al-Yahūd fil-Qurūn al-Wuṣṭā, trans. Islam Dia 
and Moʻez Khalafāwi, (Köln: Al-Kamel, 2007), 183-191. 
40 See Balqīs al-Ruzayqī, al-Islām fīl-Madīnah (Bayrūt: Dār al-Ṭalī’ah, 2007), 238-242.  
 14 
fixed tribute, gave hospitality to the Prophet’s representatives, provided supplies 
to the Muslims in time of war, and refrained from usury.41 
 
Nevertheless, the Qur’ān, in speaking of the jizyah, is ambiguous, for the text says that the 
dhimmīs must pay “‛an yadin wa-hum ṣāghirūn” (sūrah 9: 29).42 The wording of this verse has 
regularly been taken to mean that humiliation and abasement are to be associated with the 
process of paying the jizyah.43 This humiliation is prescribed in part because Islam sees non-
Muslims as people who have rejected the truth revealed by God in Islam, and who must 
therefore always be reminded of their wrong choice and its social and religious 
consequences. Consequently, the “jizyah was not only a tax but also a symbolic expression 
of subordination.”44 The manner of payment of the jizyah demonstrates the way the emirs 
and governors used it as an opportunity to show superiority over the Christians and the 
Jews. This may well explain “‛an yadin wa-hum ṣāghirūn.”45  
“Christians and Jews could only avoid the payment of the poll tax, which remained in 
force until the reforms of 1839 in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and in 1855 in 
                                               
41 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 11. 
42 “Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath 
been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) 
of the People of the Book, until they pay the jizyah with willing submission, and feel themselves 
subdued.”  
43 Wilyam al-Khāzin, al-Ḥaḍārah al-ʻAbbāsiyyah (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 1992), 162.  
44 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 14. 
45 A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects: A Critical Study of the Covenant 
of ‘Umar (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1970), 227. 
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Egypt, by converting to Islam.”46 Unsurprisingly, then, there were Christians who could not 
endure the stigma of humiliation and subordination and, not wanting to give up their social 
and economic status, sought “refuge…by adopting Islam and joining the dominant faith of the 
community.”47  
All in all, it seems safe to conclude that the two paradoxical attitudes found in the 
qur’ānic text regarding the dhimmīs played a major role in allowing the Christian community 
in Dār al-Islām sometimes to enjoy a peaceful existence, with no persecution, and at other 
times, as under al-Mutawakkil, to suffer horrendously. Arab Christians thus had to live with 
the reality that their circumstances were insecure and could change overnight. This 
alternating treatment might be attributed to the inconsistency found in the text of the Qur’ān, 
the military situation of the Muslim state, or the mood of the caliph. The Arab Christian 
community became increasingly vulnerable as their numbers decreased, and their 
participation in the state was progressively limited. They became second-class citizens in 
countries that had once been their “homeland.”    
                                               
46 Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam (London: Tauris, 
1997), 22. 
47 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 18. Lewis says, “The practice of employing non-Muslims 
was and remained almost universal—for pragmatic rather than theoretical reasons. They [the dhimmīs] 
were useful, and that was enough.” Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 30; cf. John C. Lamoreaux, 
“Early Eastern Christian Responses to Islam,” 6-8.  
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‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb’s Covenant, or the Pact of ‘Umar, with the dhimmīs demonstrates 
the early situation of the dhimmīs, especially Christians, under the first caliphs.48 It is a 
document that officially regulated the relationship between the Muslim state and its non-
Muslim subjects.49 The text of the Pact was a letter written by the Christians in Syria in which 
they laid out their terms of surrender to the conquering Muslim troops. Though it has been 
argued that the text of the Covenant did not receive its final form under ‛Umar I (c. 586-644), 
but rather was developed later, under the ‛Abbasids,50 it offers a detailed picture of the 
context of Arab Christians in Dār al-Islām.51  
The main objection to the authenticity of this document is raised by A.S. Tritton, in his 
classic study The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects. He argues that it is not likely that 
the Christians whose lands were subjugated would have put forward terms of surrender; 
                                               
48 Both ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyyah and al-Ṭurṭūshī provide the whole text of the Pact. See 
Muḥammad ibn abī Bakr ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyyah, Aḥkām ahl al-Dhimmah (al-Dammām: Ramādī lil-
Nashr, 1997); Muḥammad ibn al-Walīd al-Ṭurṭūshī, Sirāj al-Mulūk (al-Qāhirah: al-Dār al-Miṣriyyah al-
Lubnāniyyah, 1994). For the English text, see Bernard Lewis, ed. and trans., Islam from the Prophet 
Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, vol. 2 (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1974), 217-219.     
49 See Mark Cohen, Bayna al-Hilāl wal-Ṣalīb, 151-182. 
50 George Khoury, “Theodore abū Qurrah (c. 750-820): Translation and Critical Analysis of His 
Treatise on the Existence of the Creator and on the True Religion” (Ph.D. diss., Graduate Theological 
Union, California, 1991), 27; cf. Thomas Hurst, “The Syriac Letters of Timothy I (727-823): A Study in 
Christian Muslim Controversy” (Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 1986), 
240.  
51 See Moritz Steinschneider, Adab al-Jadal wal-Difāʻ fil-ʻArabiyyah bayna al-Muslimīn wal-
Masīḥiyyīn wal-Yahūd, trans. Ṣalāḥ ʻabd al-ʻAzīz Maḥjūb (al-Qāhirah: al-Majlis al-Aʻlā lil-Thaqāfah, 
2005), 195-212.     
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however, it would be accurate to say that it was the Muslims, the conquerors, who enjoyed 
the power and thus, could set forth their own terms to be followed by the Christians.52 The 
other objection relates to the language of the Pact. Tritton says, “Nor is it likely that Syrian 
Christians in the seventh century, who knew no Arabic and undertook not to study the 
Qur’ān, would echo its language and provisions so faithfully.”53 This objection can be 
answered if one considers the fact that Arabic had been a common language among many 
Christians even before the rise of Islam. In fact, there are historical records of Christians in 
Syria and Iraq being Arabs.54 Thus, Christians who were originally “Arabs” could have helped 
in the compilation process of the Pact.55 This explanation, however, would need more 
historical investigation as the nature of the relationship between the Christians who were 
originally “Arabs” and those who were “Arabized” by the advent of Islam still awaits further 
research. Lewis, while questioning the attribution of the document to ‛Umar I, admits that it 
may have undergone some fabrication, and argues that the Pact represented a strategy for 
differentiating between Muslims and non-Muslims.56 ‘Umar’s Covenant was intended to 
                                               
52 A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs, 8-9.   
53 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 25. 
54 Ḥassan ibn Ṭalāl, al-Masīḥiyyah fīl-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī (‘Ammān: al-Ma‘had al-Malakī lil-Dirāsāt 
al-Dīniyyah, 1995), 90.  
55 See Louis Cheikho, Shu‘arā’ al-Naṣrāniyyah (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 1967). 
56 See Albrecht Noth, “Problems of Differentiation between Muslims and Non-Muslims: Re-
reading the ‘Ordinances of Umar’,” in Muslims and Others in Early Islamic Society, vol. 18, ed. Robert 
Hoyland (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 103-124.   
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prevent the dhimmīs from attaining any high positions and to ensure that they had limited 
power, keeping them in a state of humiliation.57 The Covenant prohibited them from 
performing any functions that were regarded as noble, and especially from holding political 
positions.58 Christians were totally banned from jobs where they could exercise authority over 
Muslims59 and the Covenant also limited their religious freedom to a great extent. Many 
churches were either ruined or converted into mosques.60 Even translating Christian 
materials into Arabic was sometimes banned, for Christian Arabic materials were believed to 
constitute a threat to Muslims because they might lead to conversion from Islam to 
Christianity. Conversion to Christianity or Judaism was, therefore, forbidden and its 
punishment was death.61 The day-to-day life of the dhimmīs was also full of challenges. They 
could not join the army, nor could they own weapons. Of course, not carrying weapons in a 
society where everyone had a weapon for self-defense made the dhimmīs vulnerable and left 
them “at the mercy of anyone who chose to attack…there is always a sense of danger, as 
                                               
57 Samir Khalil, “The Christian Communities,” 72; cf. Wilyam al-Khāzin, al-Ḥaḍārah al-
ʻAbbāsiyyah, 166.  
58 Mūsā Makhkhūl, al-Ḥaḍārah al-Suryāniyyah Ḥaḍārah ʻĀlamiyyah: Dawr al-Suryān fīl-
Nahḍah al-ʻArabiyyah al-Ūlā: al-ʻAṣr al-Umawī wal-ʻAṣr al-ʻAbbāsī (Bayrūt: Bīsān lil-Nashr wal-Tawzīʻ 
wal-Iʻlām, 2009), 436-438. 
59 A.V. Zhuravsky, al-Islām wal-Masīḥiyyah, 183.   
60 Ibid., 73.  
61 Amāl Qarāmī, Qaḍiyyat al-Riddah fīl-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Ḥadīth (Tūnis: Dār al-Janūb lil-Nashr, 
1996), 23-28. See also Aḥmad Ṣubḥī Manṣūr, Ḥadd al-Riddah: Dirāsah Uṣūliyyah Tārīkhiyyah (al-
Qāhirah: Ṭībah lil-Dirāsāt wal-Nashr, 1993). For a different argument, see ʻabd al-ʻAzīz Jāwīsh, al-
Islām Dīn al-Fiṭrah wal-Ḥurriyyah (al-Qāhirah: al-Zahrāʼ lil-Iʻlām al-ʻArabī, 1987), 160-162.   
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well as inferiority…”62 In fact, the root of the word, dhimmī, “dhamma” means to blame, to find 
blameworthy, to dispraise, to find at fault, or to rebuke.63 Thus the designation of Christians 
and others as dhimmīs is definitely significant.64  
 
The Umayyad Caliphate and the Dhimmīs  
The Umayyad agenda dealt not only with Christians and Jews, but also included all non-Arab 
subjects in the newly established Muslim empire.65 As Griffith has stated, it was the policy of 
the Umayyad caliphs, and particularly that of ‛abd al-Malik (r. 685-705), to assimilate the 
conquered territories of the Eastern patriarchates into publicly recognizable Islamic centers.66 
This policy obviously succeeded, for there was rapid conversion to Islam by non-Muslims.67 
Under the Umayyad caliphs’ rule, many Christians lost their prominent positions in the 
                                               
62 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 36. 
63 Ismāʻīl ibn Ḥammāz al-Jawharī, Kitāb Tāj al-Lughah wa-Ṣiḥāḥ al-‘Arabiyyah (al-Qāhirah: 
Maṭbaʻat Bulāq, 1945), 287.   
64 The Muslims’ control over the dhimmīs even affected their clothing and manners. They 
could not wear the same clothes as Muslims, nor could they wear what they wanted, being assigned a 
specific color and having their clothing choices restricted in numerous details. Ringing the bells, 
nāqūs, of their churches and sharing their faith with Muslims was prohibited. These regulations were 
made more severe and were strictly enforced whenever Muslim troops were defeated by the 
Byzantine armies.        
65 Sidney Griffith, “Comparative Religion in the Apologetics of the First Christian Arabic 
Theologians,” in The Beginning of Christian Theology in Arabic: Muslim-Christian Encounters in the 
Early Islamic Period (Vermont: Ashgate, 2002), 63.  
66 Sidney Griffith, “The Monks of Palestine and the Growth of Christian Literature in Arabic,” 
Muslim World 78 (January 1988), 2. 
67 Sidney Griffith, “Comparative Religion,” 63. 
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caliphate and were replaced by Muslim officials. This process of Arabization or Islamization 
was lengthy but successful. But, it must be noted, as G.R. Hawting argues, that “although 
often connected, Islamization and Arabization in this period were not necessarily 
simultaneous processes, and not all the regions under Umayyad rule were affected by them 
to the same extent or at the same speed.”68  
Some other “Umayyad caliphs later had crosses on public display destroyed, and 
replaced the image of the cross on coins with a simple pillar”69 and the name of the 
Byzantine emperor engraved on the coins was replaced by the Muslim shahādah. During this 
same era, the Dome of the Rock mosque was constructed in Jerusalem in 691.70 This event, 
in particular, was a “supreme moment of Arabicization.”71 The mosque, built on the site of the 
Christian patriarchal seat, sent a strong message to Christians that a powerful suppression 
was at hand. The intent of the choice of Jerusalem as the mosque location, and the qur’ānic 
calligraphy within the mosque, which spoke against the Trinity and Christology,72 should not 
be misread. The calligraphy contains “five groups of short phrases, each emphasizing the 
                                               
68 EI2, CD-Rom edition, s.v. “Umayyads;” cf. Wafīk Naṣry, ed., abū Qurrah and al-Ma’mūn: al-
Mujādalah, PAC, vol. 23 (Bayrūt: CEDRAC, 2010), 404.   
69 David Thomas, “Arab Christianity,” 9.   
70 Sidney Griffith, “The Monks of Palestine,” 2. 
71 Kenneth Cragg, The Arab Christian, 52.   
72 Ibid., 53-54.   
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unity and the absolute unrivalled power of God, that He has no offspring…”73 ‘Abd al-Malik’s 
victory over Jerusalem and his creation of the mosque presented him as the victorious caliph 
who was successful in suppressing his stubborn opponents.74  
During the reign of ‘Umar II (r. 717-720), the caliph himself was concerned and 
distressed that non-Muslims held high official positions. In a letter, he stated that Muslims are 
“the best nation that was created…We will not give to their subjects authority over any one of 
them…”75 Muslims, as a result, replaced non-Muslims, and it was reported to the caliph that 
none of the Coptic officials remained in his office.76 Thus, all secretaries and officials in Egypt 
who were not Muslims were dismissed as Muslims were appointed in their place.77 ‘Umar II 
went further to impose tougher restrictions, or to use Lewis’ apt term, “disabilities,”78 not only 
on the religious lives of Christians, but also upon their daily lives. If a Muslim killed a non-
Muslim, he was not sentenced to death but was liable to pay a fine, but if a Christian killed a 
                                               
73 Andrew Rippin, Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices (London: Routledge, 2005), 
69.   
74 David Thomas, “Arab Christianity,” 9; cf. Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 15.  
75 A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs, 21.       
76 George Khoury, “Theodore abū Qurrah,” 24; cf. Maḥmūd al-Ḥuwayrī, Miṣr fīl-ʻUṣūr al-Wūsṭā 
(al-Qāhirah: ‘Ayn lil-Dirāsāt, 2003), 73-75. 
77 Mīshīl Yatīm, and Ignace Dick, Tārīkh al-Kanīsah al-Sharqiyyah wa-Ahamm Aḥdāth al-
Kanīsah al-Gharbiyyah (Bayrūt: al-Maktabah al-Būlusiyyah, 1991), 169; cf. abū Sayf Yūsuf, al-Aqbāṭ 
wal-Qawmiyyah al-ʻArabiyyah: Dirāsah Istiṭlāʻiyyah (Bayrūt, Markaz Dirāsạ̄t al-Waḥdah al-ʻArabiyyah, 
2011), 69-84. 
78 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 22.   
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Muslim, the sentence was death. Furthermore, Christians could not pray aloud or sound their 
clappers, and they were not allowed to bear witness, in a legal sense, against Muslims.79  
It is worth noting that, during the Umayyad caliphate, Yūḥannā al-Dimishqī, (c. 660-c. 
750), the son and grandson of key people in Damascus politics, withdrew from public life to 
the monastery of Mar Sabas. Al-Dimishqī became the first church father to make reference to 
Islam in his Fountain of Wisdom. His well-known classification of the new religion as the 
“Heresy of the Ishmaelites” shows some knowledge of the Qur’ān.80  
The process of Arabization under the Umayyads gained ground as people started to 
adopt the Arabic language as their own. It became necessary for Christians of the East to 
learn and use this new language in order to be able to communicate with the new local 
authorities, and maintain their legitimacy within society. Islam became a lifestyle that affected 
all practices. What could be called an “Islamic world” came into existence as Islam started to 
shape the many facets of life. Even the times of the day were marked by the names of the 
Muslim obligatory prayers.81       
 
 
                                               
79 George Khoury, “Theodore abū Qurrah,” 25.   
80 David Thomas, “Arab Christianity,” 9; cf. Daniel J. Sahas, John of Damascus on Islam 
(Leiden: Brill, 1972).  
81 For more discussion, see Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 14-17.  
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The ‘Abbasid Caliphate and the Dhimmīs  
Although it is true that Christians were discriminated against, it is equally true that under the 
‛Abbasids, Christian scholars, translators, and physicians achieved great prominence. As 
pioneers of various sciences, their contributions to the ‛Abbasid intellectual revolution were 
remarkable.82 Arabic-speaking Christians, particularly those of Syriac background, knew 
several languages and were also heirs to a rich theological heritage. They were the main 
channel by which Greek and Syriac literature was translated and introduced into Arabic, thus 
helping to establish the ‛Abbasid renaissance.83 This fundamental role is widely 
acknowledged and accepted by scholars without dispute.84 The role played by Arabic-
speaking Christians at Bayt al-Ḥikmah85 is essential to the understanding of all the academic 
achievements of the ‛Abbasids.86 Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq (808-873) will always be remembered as 
the pioneer of Arab translators and is renowned for his translations from Greek into Arabic.87 
His works included translations of Plato, Aristotle, Galen, Hippocrates and the Neo-
                                               
82 See ʻĀṭif al-ʻIrāqī, al-Falsafah al-ʻArabiyyah (al-Qāhirah: Longman, 2003), 28-37. 
83 See Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Al-Fayyūmī, Tārīkh al-Falsafah al-Islāmiyyah fīl-Mashriq (Bayrūt: 
Dār al-Jīl, 1999), 73-84. 
84 Ḥassan ibn Ṭalāl, al-Masīḥiyyah fīl-ʻĀlam al-ʻArabī, 93; cf. Ephrem Yousif, al-Falāsifah wal-
Mutarjimūn, 165-197.  
85 Mūsā Makhkhūl, al-Ḥaḍārah al-Suryāniyyah, 583-588. 
86 Mīshīl Yatīm, and Ignace Dick, Tārīkh al-Kanīsah, 171; cf. Suhayl Qāshā, Tārīkh al-Turāth 
al-ʻArabī al-Masīḥī (Jūniyah: Manshūrāt al-Rusul, 2003), 239-256. 
87 See Nīqūlā Ziyādeh, al-Masīḥiyyah wal-ʻArab, 201, cf. Mūsā Makhkhūl, al-Ḥaḍārah al-
Suryāniyyah, 552-564.  
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Platonists.88 Samir Khalil points out that 90 percent of Greek philosophical works known at 
the time were translated by Arabic-speaking Christians.89  
Quṣtā ibn Lūqā (820-912), a Melkite from B‛alabak and a famous physician, was asked 
by a certain Muslim governor to accompany him to Mecca to provide medical assistance, if 
needed. He was unable to go, but he did write a book, al-Risālah fī Tadbīr Safar al-Ḥajj 
(Medical Regime for Pilgrims to Mecca)90 and thus became the first, and probably the only, 
Christian to write on the Muslim Ḥajj! These contributions, needless to say, gave the 
Christian community some privileges. Their achievements and scholastic expertise gave 
cause for them to be admired, and praised91 and, therefore, allowed to occupy high positions 
in the caliphate.92  
However, even though Arab Christians were allowed to occupy such positions, they 
were always reminded that they were not “fully accepted as part of that society.”93 The 
‛Abbasids, like the Umayyads before them, were also concerned about the inclusion of non-
                                               
88 See Suhayl Qāshā, Tārīkh al-Turāth al-ʻArabī, 383-388, cf. Mūsā Makhkhūl, al-Ḥaḍārah al-
Suryāniyyah, 465-482. 
89 Samir Khalil, Dawr al-Masīḥiyyīn al-Thaqafī fīl-ʻĀlam al-ʻArabī, vol. 1 (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 
2004), 27-28.  
90 See Bos Gerrit, Qusṭā ibn-Lūqā’s Medical Regime for the Pilgrims to Mecca: The Risāla fī 
Tadbīr Safar al-Ḥajj. Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 11 (Leiden: Brill, 1992); cf. Suhayl 
Qāshā, Tārīkh al-Turāth al-ʻArabī, 208-211.    
91 David Thomas, “Arab Christianity,” 12.   
92 Ibid., 11.   
93 Ibid., 12.  
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Muslim subjects of the caliphate. The caliphate attracted, and later included, many non-
Muslims, especially in the East as they looked eastwards, in contrast to the Umayyads who 
had concentrated on Damascus. Historians have always argued that this inclusion was the 
solid achievement of the ‛Abbasid caliphate.94  
Abū Ja‘far al-Manṣūr (r. 754-775), in 756, “forbade Christians to build new churches, to 
display the cross in public, or to speak about religions with Muslims. In 757, he imposed 
taxes on monks, even on those who lived as hermits.”95 Further, in 759, following ‘Umar II’s 
model, he removed all Christians from their jobs in the treasury and, in 766, removed the 
crosses from the tops of the churches. Many Christian leaders, such as the Melkite Patriarch 
Theodoret, Patriarch Georges, and the “Nestorian” Catholicos James, were put in prison.96  
During the reign of al-Mahdī (775-785), the persecution of Christians escalated. Forced 
conversion was encouraged. Al-Mahdī forced the tribe of Tanukhids in Aleppo, which 
amounted to five thousand fighters, to convert to Islam.97 Further, due to his anger at a 
defeat by the Byzantine army, he sent “troops to Homs in Syria, to have all the Christians 
abjure their faith.”98  
                                               
94 Thomas Hurst, “The Syriac Letters,” 236.   
95 George Khoury, “The Advent of Islam.”   
96 Ibid.    
97 Youssef Courbage, and Philippe Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam, 11.   
98 George Khoury, “The Advent of Islam.”   
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Harūn al-Rashīd (r. 786-809), who followed some of the policies of ‘Umar II, 
demolished churches that had been erected after the advent of Islam. He also forced 
Christians to “wear stipulated clothes.”99 Under his son al-Ma’mūn (r. 813-833), particularly in 
814, Christians in Syria and Palestine were heavily persecuted and many of them fled to 
Cyprus and into other Byzantine territories.100 Paradoxically, perhaps echoing the two 
different attitudes presented in the Qur’ān, this same caliph al-Ma’mūn had great interest in 
science and translations, and had several Christians working for him at Bayt al-Ḥikmah.101   
It was al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-861), however, who issued the edict against the dhimmīs. 
His formulation of anti-Christian law caused a “vehement persecution of Christians.”102 
According to this law, Christians were forced to wear honey-colored hoods and girdles and to 
“affix a wooden image of devils to their houses, level their graves even with the ground, ride 
only mules and asses with wooden saddles marked by two pomegranate-like balls on the 
cantle.”103 He further issued “orders to destroy…churches which were newly built and to take 
                                               
99 Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam, 24.   
100 George Khoury, “The Advent of Islam.” 
101 See Aḥmad Farīd Rifāʻī, ʻAṣr al-Ma’mūn, vol. 1 (al-Qāhirah: al-Hay’ah al-Miṣriyyah al-
ʻĀmmah lil-Kitāb, 1997), 295-299, cf. Samīr Maḥmūd al-Durūbī, al-Tarjamah wal-Taʻrīb bayna al-
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103 Muḥammad abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī: Tārīkh al-Rusul wal-Mulūk, 
Dhakhā’ir al-ʻArab, vol. 5 (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻlmiyyah, 2001), 318; cf. ‘Izz al-Dīn ibn al-Athīr, al-
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the tenth part of their (Christians) houses. If the place was large enough, it was to be made 
into a mosque.”104 He dismissed all Christians from his administration105 and non-Muslims 
were not allowed to perform government service.106 Ultimately, it was he who “called a halt to 
the public scholastic disputations…on the grounds that they were disruptive of the good of 
the society.”107 This end was due, in part, to the public aspect of the theological discussions 
and the high profile of non-Muslims who participated in them.108 It would be fair to conclude 
that persecution was a clear mark of al-Mutawakkil’s caliphate.109 
 
Christians and Islamification: An Evaluation 
It can be argued that, after the advent of Islam, the reality of Eastern Christianity changed 
once and for all. Yet, Christians showed a great degree of flexibility in the face of their new 
context. This enculturation included adopting Arabic as a liturgical and theological language. 
Furthermore, Arabic-speaking Christians began to compose theological writings in Arabic, 
making them accessible to their fellow Christians.  
                                               
104 Bernard Lewis, ed. and trans., Islam from the Prophet Muhammad, 224-225.  
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107 Sidney Griffith, “Faith and Reason in Christian Kalām: Theodore abū Qūrrah on Discerning 
the True Religion,” in Christian Arabic Apologetics During the ‘Abbasīd Period (750-1258), ed. Samir 
Khalil and Jørgen S. Nielsen (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 1.  
108 Ibid. 
109 A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs, 231; cf. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Tārīkh al-Khulafā’ (al-Qāhirah: 
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It would be easy to conclude that the new Islamic empire mistreated the Christians of 
the East, seizing their lands, while subjecting them to severe sociological regulations as 
outlined in the Pact of ‘Umar. This judgment can be justified from some historical 
resources—some of which are Muslim. On the other hand, as noted, some Christians 
enjoyed tolerance and acceptance at the courts of the caliphs and emirs. Such examples can 
be seen as indications of the tolerance of the young Islamic state towards the dhimmīs. 
Support for this view is seen in the fundamental role that Christians played in building Arab 
civilization. This view is likewise corroborated by historical resources—some of which are 
Christian. This latter view is mainly propounded by contemporary Arabic-speaking Islamists. 
Fahmī Huwaydī, in his study Muwaṭinūn lā Dhimmiyyūn: Mawqiʻ Ghayr al-Muslimīn fī 
Mujtamaʻ al-Muslimīn, argues that the main reason for the drafting of the Pact of ‛Umar is not 
to be found in Islam, but in the historical situation following the Crusades, and again after the 
fall of Baghdād, when Christians welcomed the victorious Mongols. In both situations, he 
claims, Muslims had to “guard themselves from the conspiracies of the Christians.”110 
However, he fails to address the issue of the regulations that were imposed upon the 
Christians of the East prior to the Crusades and the fall of Baghdād, instead calling them 
                                               
110 Fahmī Huwaydī, Muwaṭinūn lā Dhimmīyūn: Mawqiʻ Ghayr al-Muslimīn fī Mujtamaʻ al-
Muslimīn (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Shurūq, 1985), 212; cf. Suhayl Qāshā, Tārīkh Naṣārā al-ʻIrāq (Bayrūt: Dār 
al-Rāfidayn lil-Ṭibāʻah wal-Nashr wal-Tawzīʻ, 2010), 258-273, 281.  
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“later insertions” or “additions.”111 Others have maintained that the Pact was a “holy 
responsibility” which later took the form of a legal relationship between Muslims and non-
Muslims,112 while yet others claim that the Pact did not cause any humiliation to the Christian 
community.113 Majid Khadduri even argues that the Christian community “favorably” 
welcomed the terms of the Pact!114             
The truth, it seems, is somewhere in the middle, and therefore a balanced approach 
must be taken in order to understand the extensive history between the two communities. 
Clearly, the new reality of the Eastern Christians brought limitations and disabilities. Their 
reality was full of struggles, yet the greatest struggle was not, one could argue, to follow the 
restrictions of the new context, as much as it was a struggle to re-define their theological 
identity in a way that would make sense to both the intellectual and the common Muslim. 
They sought to understand and make themselves understood. It was a fight to legitimate 
their “being” as a people with credible beliefs and good morals.     
Moreover, not all caliphs were equally aggressive towards Eastern Christians. There is 
no comparison, for example, between the treatment of Eastern Christians under al-Ma’mūn 
                                               
111 Ibid., 211.   
112 See Maḥmoud M. Ayoub, “Dhimmah in the Qur’an and Hadith,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 5 
(1983): 172-182.   
113 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1955), 185.  
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and al-Mutawakkil. It is almost impossible to pinpoint what can be called a “standard” 
condition under which Eastern Christians lived. The state of affairs for the Christians was 
totally dependent on the mind or “temper” of the caliph. This was the reality Arabic-speaking 
Christians came to expect.  
The fate of Eastern Christianity has been compared to the lost island of Atlantis, given 
that, within one hundred years or less, Islam took hold of Christian centers in the 
Mediterranean basin.115 This unfortunate judgment, however, does not do justice to the 
continuing witness and fervent presence throughout history of the Arabic-speaking church in 
the world of Islam. It is a church that has lived and borne witness and proved to be a genuine 
part of the life of the East. It is true that Eastern Christianity lost its political and social power 
due to the advent of Islam, but, as Ignace Dick has pointed out, it was able to stand firm for 
that long period of time, maintaining its liturgical traditions, theology, life and witness, and 
thus it is worthy of all praise and appreciation.116 
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CHAPTER TWO: Who is ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī? 
The Life and Works of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī  
Little is known about ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī. Given his nisbah, it is assumed that he was from 
Baṣrah, but the dates of his birth and death are unknown. We can only speculate using the 
imprecise historical allusions and data found within his Kitāb al-Burhān. 
Graf uses a reference made by al-Muʼtaman ibn al-ʻAssāl that places ‘Ammār after 
Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq,117 to argue that ‘Ammār lived sometime between the tenth and thirteenth 
centuries. However, all other modern scholars in this field rely on Michel Hayek’s arguments, 
which place ‘Ammār in the ninth century. While Graf merely relies on al-Muʼtaman’s 
reference, Michel Hayek goes to great pains to explain his reasoning, establishing four 
proofs. While the first proofs are inconclusive, the four together form a strong argument for 
placing ‘Ammār in the ninth century. 
 First, Hayek notes that ‘Ammār dedicates his book, Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, to 
an unnamed caliph, and suggests that this might indicate the period when the book was 
written. However, Hayek realizes that this is not conclusive as this method of dedicating 
books was not uncommon in ‘Ammār’s day. Second, Hayek considers that the battle 
mentioned by ‘Ammār concerning a war waged due to the cry of a woman is the battle of 
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1947), 210.  
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Amorium in 838, where al-Mu‘taṣim defeated the Byzantine army.118 Historical sources speak 
of mighty armies led by the caliph himself as he sought to defeat the Byzantine army at 
Amorium. The battle lasted fifty five days, and al-Mu‘taṣim was able to take the strongholds 
of the doomed city.119 Hayek notes that, if this were correct, it would prove that ‘Ammār lived 
close to, or shortly after, the time of the battle. However, Hayek does not consider this 
conclusive either.120 Third, Hayek notes that we rarely find references to the doctrine of the 
eternity of the Qur’ān in Kitāb al-Burhān. According to Hayek, this is strong proof that ‘Ammār 
lived during the reign of al-Ma’mūn and al-Mu‘taṣim, when the doctrine of the createdness of 
the Qur’ān was widely accepted.121 Fourth, Hayek draws attention to Kitāb al-Fihrist by ibn al-
Nadīm, where there is a reference to a book by abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf122 written against 
‘Ammār the Christian.123 Since al-‘Allāf died in 840/841, it follows that his refutation of 
‘Ammār’s arguments must have been composed during the first quarter of the ninth century, 
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most probably during the years 818-819—when al-‘Allāf left Baṣrah.124 If this is correct, it 
becomes reasonable to conclude that ‘Ammār must have composed his works in the early 
years of the ninth century. Alternatively, al-‘Allāf might have refuted ‘Ammār’s works when he 
was in Baghdād. This would place ‘Ammār sometime before the year 840, when al-‘Allāf 
died. This would have meant that al-‘Allāf’s book of refutation was short, since he would have 
been eighty five years old at the time.125 
 Hayek also notes that the two Greek works by Aristotle that are mentioned in Kitāb 
al-Burhān126 were translated into Arabic by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq. Ḥunayn died in 873.127 This 
suggests that ‘Ammār must have lived during or after Ḥunayn’s lifetime, but this argument is 
inconclusive since it is also possible that ‘Ammār did not use a translation, but read the 
original Greek.  
However, Hayek’s dating of ‘Ammār is strengthened when we consider a reference to 
‘Ammār by Yūḥannā ibn Sūrus. Yūḥannā was an Arabic-speaking theologian who lived in 
Cairo, during the last decade of the eleventh century or the early part of the twelfth century. 
He composed three books: Kitāb al-‘Ilm wal-‘Amal (Book of Theory and Practice),128 Kitāb 
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Ifhām ba‘d al-Istibhām (Understanding after Ambiguity), and Kitāb al-Tabyīn ba‘d al-Shakk 
(Demonstration after Doubt).129 Yūḥannā shows some knowledge of “Nestorian” and 
Jacobite theologians, and actually mentions ‘Ammār by name.130 This conclusively places 
‘Ammār before the time of Yūḥannā ibn Sūrus, that is before the eleventh century, and 
consequently proves that Graf’s dating of ‘Ammār between the tenth and thirteenth centuries 
is too broad and too late.131   
Further, we do know that ‘Ammār’s works were known and appreciated in Cairo in 
the 13th century. Al-Muʼtaman ibn al-ʻAssāl quotes ‘Ammār in his Kitāb Majmūʻ Uṣūl al-Dīn 
wa-Masmūʻ Maḥṣūl al-Yaqīn, utilizing and praising ‘Ammār’s arguments on the Trinity.132 
In a word, ‘Ammār witnessed the formative period of the Abbasids, which led the 
world of Islam to its golden age. On the one hand, he was in all probability a contemporary of 
prominent Christian theologians such as abū Qurrah and abū Rā’iṭah and thus he is one of 
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the first generation of Christian theologians to take Islam seriously, and to theologize in the 
midst of the Islamic context. On the other hand, he was a contemporary of well-known 
Muslim figures, as evident in the follwing: 
…[T]he scholar and founder of the Ḥanbalī school of law…Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal 
(780-855) and the Muslim philosopher abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (c.800-870) are 
associated with this area, along with Mu‘tazila, who had emerged as the 
dominant school of Islamic thought at this time and had formed two branches 
in Baṣra and Baghdād under the leadership of abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf 
(d.c.840) and Bishr ibn al-Mu‘tamir (d.825) respectively.133  
 
 
Theological Corpus: Genre, Topics and Audience 
‘Ammār left behind two treatises: Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah (The Book of Answers and 
Questions), and Kitāb al-Burhān fīl-Dīn ‘alā Siyāqat al-Tadbīr al-Ilāhī (The Book of the Proof 
of Religion concerning the Divine Economy).134 Hayek places Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah 
first, as it contains an implicit reference to the reign of al-Ma’mūn in 813. ‘Ammār praises the 
caliph, who is much concerned with “advancement of argumentation concerning” religious 
discussions.135 To support this view, Hayek appeals to the note found in the Kitāb al-Burhān 
to the battle of Amorium in 838. That is to say that it is probable that Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-
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Ajwibah was composed first and that al-‘Allāf may have responded to it before he left Baṣrah 
in 818/819; consequently Kitāb al-Burhān is placed second, shortly after the battle of 
Amorium in 838. The two works are found in one single manuscript in the Arabic collection at 
the British Library. As per its colophon, the BL MS was copied in Cairo on the fourteenth of 
Hator 1014 AM; that is: Sunday the seventeenth of November 1297 AD.  
This thesis will focus primarily on Kitāb al-Burhān, but it will be helpful to present a 
brief overview of ‘Ammār’s other treatise, as it helps us understand the framework of 
‘Ammār’s theology. Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah is divided into four parts, in which the 
classical Islamic objections to the Christian faith are answered. They are: 
1. God and the world (28 questions and answers);  
2. The correctness of the Gospel (14 questions and answers); 
3. The Trinity (9 questions and answers);  
4. The Incarnation (51 questions and answers).  
 
Griffith correctly notices that the questions “are phrased in the familiar, conditional style 
of the Islamic ‘Ilm al-kalām, with the ‘question’ being the protasis of the statement, and the 
‘answer’ its apodosis.”136 Most of the 102 questions and answers are also found in a different 
format in Kitāb al-Burhān, which is an abbreviated version of ‘Ammār’s larger work, Kitāb al-
Masā’il wal-Ajwibah. In other words, Kitāb al-Burhān presents the main issues that are dealt 
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with at length in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah. It may have served as a “quick” reference to 
aid the Christian community of ‘Ammār’s time in their daily theological conversations with 
Muslims. 
 Writing with clarity, ‘Ammār has no ambiguity in his words, which allows his agenda 
and purpose to be understood. He proposes not only to help the Christian community by 
providing “proof” of Christianity’s credibility, but also to eliminate certain misunderstandings 
between Christians and Muslims. He states this clearly:  
We now come to what they find distasteful137 when we say that Christ is the 
Son of God. They beleaguered people with this by telling them about us that 
we say that God took for Himself a female companion and a son from her. 
God is far too exalted for that. When we mention that God has manifested His 
economy in a body like ours, they distort it by making us say that He 
descended into the womb of Mary and limited Himself in her. When we 
mention that Christ was crucified, they distort this understanding to say that 
we impute weakness to God’s [character]. And when we mention baptism, and 
taking the Eucharist as the Body and Blood of Christ, and our belief that our 
reward in the lasting world is not found in sexual intercourse or food and drink, 
they oppose us.138 
 
It is not surprising, then, that ‘Ammār would choose to focus his discussion on 
explaining these Christian doctrines, given the Islamic misunderstanding and challenges. 
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Clearly, therefore, ‘Ammār’s audience would be twofold: those who raise the questions and 
those who are to answer them. He is evidently addressing both communities: the Muslims 
and his fellow Christians. His ultimate hope is to provide “proof” of credibility to those who 
demand it. Thus, he not only deliberately chooses to borrow a qur’ānic term to name his 
treatise (since the Qur’ān [sūrah 2:111], challenges Christians and Jews to provide their 
burhān or proof of credibility if their religious claims are to be seen as correct), but also 
literally quotes sūrah 2:111 in answering question seventeenth in the fourth section of Kitāb 
al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah!139  
 
Kitāb al-Burhān: A History of Scholarship 
As indicated in the colophon of BL MS, Kitāb al-Burhān was copied in Cairo during the 
thirteenth century by a Coptic scribe, in al-Jūdariyyah, close to al-Mu‘iz li-Dīn Allāh al-Faṭimī 
Street.140 The exact location where the manuscript was copied is uncertain, as the colophon 
contains some illegible words. However, the colophon does refer to the house of a certain 
Elīsaḥ, ﺢﺴـﻴﻟا; most probably a corruption of Elisha. This is followed by an undotted word 
which could be read as ﺲﻴـﻔﻨﻟا, the Honorable. This may have been a description of the 
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house, namely, the distinguished house of Elisha; or it may have been a reference to the 
honorable Elisha!   
Before we proceed with our own analysis of Kitāb al-Burhān, it is appropriate that we 
review in chronological order the various scholarly studies of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s treatises.   
 
Al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assāl, (d. c. 1265) 
Al-Ṣafī was a member of the prominent al-‘Assāl Egyptian family, in the thirteenth century.141 
He played a major role with his brothers in what is known as the Coptic renaissance of the 
Middle Ages. Al-Ṣafī was particularly talented in summarizing theological works. Many 
homilies and patristic works were epitomized by him, which made them widely accessible to 
a Coptic readership.142 Al-Ṣafī condensed both of ‘Ammār’s works. His epitome of Kitāb al-
Burhān is housed at the Monastery of Charfeh in Lebanon. We were granted access to a 
copy, and were thus able to compare it with the text of the BL MS. The Charfeh epitome is 
clearly legible, and provides considerable help in understanding ‘Ammār. As we shall 
demonstrate in our discussion on the existence of God, it would seem that al-Ṣafī had a 
complete copy of ‘Ammār’s Kitāb al-Burhān at his disposal. In the opening section of the 
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manuscript, al-Ṣafī acknowledges his theological differences with ‘Ammār’s “Nestorian” 
position, and clearly indicates that the epitome will avoid such “Nestorian” views in an 
attempt to make the text ecumenically acceptable—a task at which al-Ṣafī brilliantly 
succeeded.   
 
Michel Hayek (1977)        
Michel Hayek was a Lebanese theologian and novelist, and a talented writer.143 In 1961, he 
published al-Masīḥ fīl-Islām in which he draws a complete picture of Christ as seen in Islam. 
Hayek was the first scholar to introduce ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī to the modern reader, publishing 
‘Ammār’s two treatises from the BL MS in 1977. Hayek provided a seventy page introduction 
in French, which is also followed by a technical Arabic-French lexicon covering the major 
part of the vocabulary used in ‘Ammār’s two extant works. It is noteworthy that Hayek’s 
edition of ‘Ammār’s treatises includes both a French and an Arabic introduction. The latter is 
a summary of the former.144 This French introduction was first published in ISCH in 1976.145 
Hayek’s work is sometimes inaccurate in its reading of the BL MS, and it does not 
                                               
143 See David Kerr, “‘He Walked in the Path of the Prophets,’ toward Christian Theological 
Recognition of the Prophethood of Muhammad,” in Christian-Muslim Encounters, ed. Yvonne Y. 
Haddad and Wadi Z. Haddad (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), 431-433.  
144 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 7, footnote 1.  
145 Michel Hayek, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue 
arabe, ou deux apologies du christianisme,” in ISCH 2 (1976), 69-133. 
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consider variant readings found in the Charfeh MS.146 However, his analysis is indispensable 
in any scholarly attempt to understand ‘Ammār’s thought, being the first academic attempt to 
read and analyze ‘Ammār’s works in modern times. Unfortunately, his pioneer work 
neglected to add titles and subtitles to the published text, making it difficult at times for the 
reader to follow the main idea of the text, especially given the change in the use of language 
between the ninth and twentieth centuries. Therefore, there is a need for a new edition of 
‘Ammār’s works; preferably one that will include a comparison between the text of the BL MS 
and the Charfeh MS.  
Further, it was appropriate that Hayek should provide a French translation of 
‘Ammār’s treatises, given his competency in French and the nature of the series,147 which 
had published numerous mediaeval texts accompanied with French or English translations. 
However, no translation into English was provided. This is our primary motivation for creating 
an English translation of Kitāb al-Burhān as an appendix to this study.   
 
Sidney H. Griffith (1980, 1983) 
Griffith has written two articles dealing specifically with ‘Ammār: “The Concept of al-
                                               
146 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 9, footnote 2.  
147 Recherches: Nouvelle série. B, Orient chrétien.  
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Uqnūm in ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s Apology for the Doctrine of the Trinity,”148 and “‘Ammār al-
Baṣrī’s Kitāb al-Burhān: Christian Kalām in the First Abbasid Century.”149 The first article, as 
the title indicates, deals directly with the Trinitarian formulations that ‘Ammār employed, 
particularly his use of the Syriac term “Uqnūm.” Griffith notes that ‘Ammār may have been 
influenced by the Book of the Scholion by Bār Konī,150 and especially by Bār Konī’s 
arguments against Islam. Griffith believes that ‘Ammār sought to convey the concept of the 
Trinity by using terms that had been developed primarily by contemporary Mu‘tazilī thinkers, 
and especially by abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf. Griffith concluded his lengthy discussion by 
observing that ‘Ammār offered the Arabicized form of the Syriac word as a possible 
explanation of the Trinity.151 
 Griffith’s article was the first to discuss ‘Ammār at length in the English language. It 
lacks, however, an appreciation of the theological tension which ‘Ammār surely felt as he 
attempted to communicate the classical word “Uqnūm” to his interlocutor. Griffith does not 
                                               
148 Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm in ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s Apology for the Doctrine of 
the Trinity,” in Actes du premier congrès international d'études arabes chrétiennes, ed. Samir Khalil, 
Goslar, September 1980 (Orientalia Christiana Analecta 218), Rome: PISO, 1982, 169-191. 
149 See Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s Kitāb al-Burhān: Christian Kalām in the First 
‘Abbāsid Century.” Le Muséon, 96 (1983): 145-181. 
150 Addai Scher, Theodor Bar-Konī Liber Scholiorum, CSCO, vol. 55 and 69 (Paris: E 
Typographeo Reipublicae, 1910), and Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī Livre des 
Scolies, CSCO, vol. 432 (Louvain: Peeters, 1982), 175; cf. Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 
43. 
151 Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 191.  
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present ‘Ammār as someone who must have struggled in his attempts to explain a complex 
reality and thus repeatedly used different terms to try to convey the “Uqnūm.” 
 Three years later, Griffith wrote another lengthy article on ‘Ammār, this time covering 
a wide range of topics found in Kitāb al-Burhān. The article has a fine introduction to the 
historical setting of Kitāb al-Burhān, followed by a theological analysis of major issues raised 
by ‘Ammār. Griffith’s analysis is comprehensive, but not exhaustive. He indicates that such 
deep analysis was done by Michel Hayek in the introduction to Kitāb al-Burhān published in 
Lebanon in 1977, and that he did not see it fitting to offer a repetitive analysis. This 
reluctance made for a short article and resulted in limited coverage of such sections as 
‘Ammār’s discussions on the Eucharist, and Eating and Drinking in the hereafter. 
 Griffith also writes about ‘Ammār in his article “Comparative Religion in the 
Apologetics of the First Christian Arabic Theologians.”152 As the title indicates, the article 
explores the ways in which early Arab Christian theologians such as ‘Ammār contended that 
their faith was the true religion in face of opposing doctrines.153     
 
                                               
152 Sidney Griffith, “Comparative Religion, 63-87. 
153 See Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 169-191. 
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Ivor Mark Beaumont, (2003, 2005)  
In 2003, Mark Beaumont published his first article on ‘Ammār: “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the 
Incarnation,” in Christians at the Heart of Islamic Rule: Church Life and Scholarship in 
‘Abbasid Iraq.154 This article was a paper that had initially been presented at the fourth 4th 
Woodbrooke-Mingana Symposium on Arab Christianity and Islam held at Woodbrooke 
Quaker Study Center in Selly Oak, Birmingham, in 2001. Beaumont offers a short analysis of 
‘Ammār’s presentation of the incarnation, based almost entirely on Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-
Ajwibah. Beaumont’s presentation, although brief, offers a fair analysis of ‘Ammār’s answers 
to the questions and objections that had risen to challenge the “impossible” concept of the 
incarnation.  
In 2005, the fifth Mingana Symposium on Arab Christianity and Islam was again held 
at Woodbrooke Quaker Study Center in Selly Oak, and Beaumont delivered another paper, 
“‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Alleged Corruption of the Gospels.”155 The paper was later 
published in The Bible in Arab Christianity in 2007. Beaumont offers an analysis of ‘Ammār’s 
Christian and Muslim context with regard to the issue of the Gospel’s corruption. Beaumont 
                                               
154 Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Incarnation,” in Christians at the Heart of Islamic 
Rule: Church Life and Scholarship in ʻAbbasid Iraq, HCMR, vol. 1, ed. David Thomas (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 2003), 55-62.  
155 Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Alleged Corruption of the Gospels,” in The Bible 
in Arab Christianity, The History of Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 6, ed. David Thomas (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 2007): 241-274.  
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suggests that Timothy I had an impact on ‘Ammār’s apology,156 and that ‘Ammār may also 
have had in mind certain accusations raised in the writings of al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm. 
Beaumont’s presentation is divided into two sections: ‘Ammār’s refutation as recorded in 
Kitāb al-Burhān, and ‘Ammār’s refutation in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah. Beaumont 
concludes by arguing that ‘Ammār’s defense of the authenticity of the Gospels “was more 
extensive than comparable treatments by any of his known Christian contemporaries in the 
early Abbasid period.”157  
Beaumont’s two articles make worthwhile reading, and the second, especially, 
provides an adequate analysis of ‘Ammār’s view of the Christian Gospel. Beaumont has also 
published Christology in Dialogue with Muslims, a version of his doctoral dissertation at the 
Open University, Oxford Center for Mission Studies,158 which provides a more extensive and 
comprehensive study. In this work, Beaumont compares Christian explanations of 
Christology—some by contemporaries of ‘Ammār, such as abū Qurrah and abū Rāi’ṭah—
and others as held by modern theologians such as Kenneth Cragg and Hans Küng.159 
                                               
156 See in this regard Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 22.  
157 Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Alleged Corruption,” 255.  
158 Mark Beaumont, “Christology in Dialogue with Muslims: A Critical Analysis of Christian 
Presentations of Christ for Muslims from the Ninth and Twentieth Centuries” (Ph.D. diss., Open 
University: Oxford Centre for Mission Studies, 2003).  
159 See Mark Beaumont, Christology in Dialogue with Muslims: A Critical Analysis of Christian 
Presentations of Christ for Muslims from the Ninth and Twentieth Centuries (Milton Keynes, UK: 
Paternoster, 2005). 
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Other Academic Works 
References to ‘Ammār appear in other academic articles, although ‘Ammār is not the focus 
of these works. Therefore, we will only refer to them in this thesis when their contributions 
are relevant to our discussion of ‘Ammār’s theological position. Authors of these articles 
include scholars such as: David Thomas, Gabriel S. Reynolds, Mark N. Swanson, Samir 
Khalil, and Sandra T. Keating. 
 
Scholarship on Kitāb al-Burhān: An Evaluation  
All of these scholarly studies are fine works, attempting to draw a picture of the intellectual 
content and context of ‘Ammār’s Kitāb al-Burhān. Yet none of them has offered a thorough 
or comprehensive analysis of ‘Ammār’s theological presuppositions and arguments as laid 
out in his Burhān. Rather, these scholars each approached ‘Ammār’s text through a specific 
lens, such as classifying him as a Mutakallim. We will show that this does not do justice to 
‘Ammār’s main goal of defending his theological views against Islamic accusations.  
Further, none of the above mentioned scholars had access to al-Ṣafī’s epitome, 
which helps clarify some difficulties in the BL MS and provides insight into the missing 
section where ‘Ammār offers his explanation for the spread and acceptance of Islam. In our 
exploration of many sections of al-Burhān, this study will provide a comparison between the 
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BL MS and that of the Charfeh Monastery. Further, our English translation of Kitāb al-Burhān 
is the first attempt to provide the English-speaking world with access to ‘Ammār’s words and 
thoughts.  
 It is our hope that this ninth century text can still speak today to enrich the never-
ending theological conversation between Muslims and Christians. 
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SECTION TWO:  A THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
CHAPTER THREE: Kitāb al-Burhān: a Topical and Theological Analysis  
 
Having studied ‘Ammār’s socio-political milieu and the history of scholarship concerning 
Kitāb al-Burhān, we now move to examine its content. Our aim in this section is to 
understand the ways in which ‘Ammār defended his position in the face of the objections that 
were primarily raised by his Muslim interlocutor.  
 The choice of topics discussed in ‘Ammār’s Burhān is significant. Indeed, the 
subjects he tackled have been standard in almost all theological discussions between 
Christians and Muslims, and one can even argue that these topics are still standard issues 
found in any Christian-Muslim conversation. Although the topics stem from the points of 
contention between Islam and Christianity, they nonetheless also form the backbone of 
theological studies in general. Topics such as the Trinity and the incarnation are 
indispensable in any theologizing.  
 Since, however, our concern is only with Christian theology within the Dār al-Islām, 
we must remember that ‘Ammār’s theological agenda was decided for him. And therefore, 
we ask: “How does he answer questions raised almost exclusively by Muslim thinkers?” 
Naturally, this leads us to examine his Kitāb al-Burhān from a theological perspective.  
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The Proofs of the True Religion 
‘Ammār’s discussion is set against the background of the pluralistic cultures of Mesopotamia 
and its diverse religious groups. There was a pressing need for the Christian community of 
‘Ammār’s time to prove the truth of their position in the face of opposition from other 
religions, particularly Islam. It is within this context that ‘Ammār seeks to demonstrate the 
credibility of the whole of Christianity and its practices. How, then, does ‘Ammār defend and 
explain Christian theology in his pluralistic setting, while facing particular opposition and 
restrictions by the Muslim majority?  
 ‘Ammār’s presupposition is straightforward: “Truth is single.”160 He first establishes 
that there is but one God. It then follows that the religion that God desires for humanity must 
also be one:161 there is no room for religious plurality.162 ‘Ammār also proposes that this 
religion must be revealed by God, and therefore he stresses that it is God’s relationship with 
humanity that has resulted in the emergence of one true faith. According to ‘Ammār, one 
cannot know the truth by relying on uncritical tradition; rather, it is more fitting for humans to 
rely on reason and logic in order to know the true religion.  
                                               
160 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 27. MS Charfeh folio 105a reads:  
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161 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 50. 
162 See Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, “Neglected Aspects of Medieval Muslim Polemics against 
Christianity,” The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 89, no. 1 (Jan., 1996), 67-70.  
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Thus, ‘Ammār identifies the strategy by which the religion of God is to be known: the 
true religion is discerned through reason. However, it should be noted that, while he argues 
for the validity of reason in discerning the true religion, ‘Ammār’s also believes in God’s self-
revelation. Furthermore, he believes that this God has character and personality, so that it is 
necessary to examine God’s attributes as part of the process of discerning the true religion. 
He propounds three proofs, each of which assumes the existence of God and God’s 
involvement in the affairs of the world. 
 
The First Proof: God is Wise and Generous 
‘Ammār begins his argument with the then common view of God’s motivation in creating the 
world. Arabic-speaking theologians and Mu‘tazilī thinkers such as abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf,163 
believed that the generosity of God was the foundational reason for God’s creative acts. God 
did not create out of need, but rather out of generosity.164 This generosity is closely related to 
God’s power and wisdom. God created and sustains all the conflicting elements of the world, 
and by his amazing power keeps all the elements in perfect order and place. Likewise, the 
creation of the intricate human body demonstrates the wisdom of God. All of these givens, 
                                               
163 Al-Ash‘arī, abū al-Ḥasan ʻAlī ibn Ismāʻīl, Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn wa-Ikhtilāf al-Muṣallīn, ed. 
Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʻabd al-Ḥamīd (al-Qāhirah: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah, 1969), 182.  
164 Ibid., 236, cf. Dominique Sourdel, al-Islām fīl-ʻUṣūr al-Wusṭā, trans. ʻAlī Muqallad (Bayrūt: 
Dār al-Tanwīr, 1983), 93-100. 
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‘Ammār concludes, attest to a significant fact: God, being wise, will not destroy creation; 
rather, God will bring all its incompleteness to total fulfillment. Only fools destroy what they 
create.165 Even when death occurs, it should not be seen as the ultimate end. Death, 
according to ‘Ammār, is a manifestation of the body’s corruption. Even death, he contends, 
has a role in the restoration of creation and its progress towards completion.166 
‘Ammār explains this incongruity in human experience by giving examples from 
nature. Corruption that leads to fulfillment is like soaking a seed to make it softer and larger. 
This process includes the “corruption” of the seed as it spoils in the water. Or, it is like 
people who break the ground and dig it up to make it useful for others. Destruction takes 
place in order to bring forth growth. These illustrations help explain the teaching that the God 
who created humanity would never destroy it, despite its corruption.167  
Given this sure hope and the fact that God is generous, ‘Ammār concludes that 
God’s divine plan must have been disclosed in a book by which God provides a source of 
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knowledge.168 When generation after generation keeps this book, they become joyful, 
knowing that death is not their ultimate end.169 Elsewhere, as we shall see in the discourse 
on the incarnation, this same concept is used to prove that God’s incarnation in Christ is a 
credible belief. It is likely that ‘Ammār makes frequent appeals to this concept of God’s 
generosity since it is a viewpoint that was shared by his Muslim counterparts. As we shall 
see in our discussion on the Trinity, utilizing shared doctrines as a starting point is a 
common polemical strategy for ‘Ammār.      
 
The Second Proof: God’s Demand for Morality 
The second criterion of the true religion concerns the moral standards that God set for 
humans. ‘Ammār argues that people are created with a tendency to cause harm to one 
other. For this reason, God has ordered them to love one another. These commands are 
meant to function as a control, preventing people from killing each other. However, humans 
could only know God’s moral code through a book in which these divine demands of love are 
put forward. After all, knowledge of God is not innate and humans cannot discern the ways 
of God by themselves. Thus, there is an obvious need for a direct revelation from God—a 
                                               
168 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 161.  
169 Ibid., 162. 
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revelation that tells of God’s commands and prohibitions.170 It will ultimately lead people to 
receive rewards from God, which is exactly the point of the third proof.  
Evidently, ‘Ammār believes that God’s revelation must be written. It is not enough to 
believe that God is revealed in nature or historical events. A textual revelation is 
indispensable. This point shows that ‘Ammār believes that neither natural revelation nor 
reason is an adequate means for knowing God. It is possible that ‘Ammār was using this as 
a strategy, preparing the way for later arguments that would refute the accusation of tahrīf. 
Since God is the ultimate source of the Christian scriptures, there can then be no doubt that 
it is authentic, and thus its tahrīf is not possible.   
 
The Third Proof: God’s Reward for the Godly   
The third indication of the true religion concerns the manner in which humans respond to 
divine commands. Prayer, ‘Ammār points out, is useful to humans because they receive 
things they have requested from God. As a result, they become joyful, seeing their needs 
met and having their problems solved. This joy is more abundant than the joy they would feel 
if or when they were granted things from God without asking in vigilant supplication. ‘Ammār 
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Masīḥiyyah wal-Islām fīl-Ḥiwār wal-Taʻāwun, 22 (Jūniyah: al-Maktabah al-Būlusiyyah, 2004), 163-164.  
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indicates that people are more appreciative of that for which they work.171  
 In setting forth his three proofs or criteria of the true religion, we see that ‘Ammār 
does not start with the concept of natural revelation. Rather, God is ‘Ammār’s starting point. 
This will later serve as an advantageous foundation when he sets forth his argument that 
Christianity is God’s religion which has been revealed in God’s book.  
 Interestingly, we note that these three criteria for knowing the true religion are 
basically the same as those put forth by abū Qurrah in Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq wal-Dīn al-
Qawīm, that is: the attributes of God, the permitted and the forbidden and, finally, reward and 
punishment.172 This might indicate that the threefold argument had been in common use in 
Christian-Muslim theological discussions, and that theologians felt free to adapt it as needed. 
The main difference, however, between abū Qurrah and ‘Ammār in the utilization of this 
argument is that the former structured all his Maymar around the argument, whereas 







                                               
171 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 26. 
172 See Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq wal-Dīn al-Qawīm li-Thāwdhūrus abī Qurrah, 
PAC, vol. 3 (Jūniyah: al-Maktabah al-Būlusiyyah, 1982).  
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Discerning the True Religion 
 
Having outlined the three proofs, ‘Ammār concludes that only one religion can be true, be 
pleasing to God and meet the divine demands.173 Yet he realizes that there are in fact 
multiple religions in existence, each claiming to be the correct one that comes from God. In 
response to this dilemma, ‘Ammār sets forth the criteria by which religions can be evaluated. 
He maintains:  
Therefore it is clear that God has a religion pleasing to Him on earth for all of 
his creation. And we have seen that there are many religions and the followers 
of each religion claim that it is the religion of God. So we must put them on the 
same level, and be careful about relying on anything of theirs unless the 
argument seems correct to us, and that it is the religion of God, and then we 
will believe in it and accept it and drop whatever is not it.174 
 
Each criterion that ‘Ammār establishes pertains either to miracles or to the presence 
of rational evidence. That is, religions are known to be either true or false by the testimony of 
miracles, and sound judgment. People disagree “about their religions, [and are] divided in 
their sects, each claiming that his religion is the religion of God, and that what contradicts it 
is not from God. And we know that there is one religion of God among all of them,”175 but 
without miracles and sound judgment to show which one is of God it becomes irrational to 
accept the claims of one group and reject the other. However, states ‘Ammār, it is equally 
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irrational and impossible to accept all religions, given their contradictory claims.176 The 
presence of miraculous signs therefore becomes an important criterion in discerning the true 
religion. 
As we shall see at the end of this discussion, ‘Ammār varies in his dependence on 
reason and reasonable proofs. In one section, it becomes clear that he is teaching the 
importance of relying on reason as a means of distinguishing true knowledge from false, 
while at other times, he dismisses the adequacy of reason and instead introduces reliance 
on the compelling proof of miracles and signs. This is not a contradiction in ‘Ammār’s 
thought. Rather, he seems to be testing each argument or proof on his audience, and using 
each idea where it is most convincing. So, for example, at one point it seems more useful to 
argue for the importance of reason over tradition. However, at another point, ‘Ammār will 
dismiss the legitimacy and competence of reason in discerning the true religion. This 
“alternation” is justifiable, given the complexity of Kitāb al-Burhān and the diversity of topics 
under discussion. 
         
The Cessation of Miracles 
‘Ammār argues that miracles are one means by which the true religion can be identified, but 
                                               
176 Ibid. 
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then he immediately considers the fact that such miracles and great signs have ceased.177 
According to his argument, there are only two possible explanations for this situation. Either 
God, knowing that people need miracles to differentiate between religious claims, decided 
nonetheless to remove “evident signs of His religion and the certainty of the proof of it;”178 or, 
God first established a religion through great miracles but once the religion had been 
established in the world, decided that the miracles were no longer needed or utilized.179  
‘Ammār evaluates these two options, arguing that the first is inconceivable because it 
would mean that God is no longer a God who guides people to truth. The second option 
must, therefore, be true: that is, the main reason for the cessation of miracles is that miracles 
have fulfilled their purpose by having established the religion of God. Having completed their 
task in a specific time and context, miracles have ceased to be.  
This viewpoint is not well received. The ‘Ammār’s imaginary opponent argues for the 
possibility of knowing the true religion of God and the revealed book apart from miracles. 
The argument put forth by the opponent is based on a deep trust in the judgment of the 
human mind. The opponent makes it clear that, if humans think critically as they judge 
between religions, they can certainly come to the knowledge of the true religion, and thus 
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leave the false ones.180  
This imaginary opponent is most likely a Mu‘tazilī thinker of the day, who gave reason 
the ultimate authority in distinguishing truth, to the extent that many contemporary Mu‘tazilīs 
dismissed the value of miracles and even denied the miracles attributed to Muḥammad.181 
To them, miracles were not reasonable; rather they were believed to be “beyond reason.” 
According to their view, miracles were not an appropriate means of determining truth or 
discerning between religions, since reason is the ultimate and most reliable means for 
knowing the truth. Later Mu‘tazilī thinkers took a different position.  
‘Ammār is dissatisfied with this perspective, objecting that not all people are of sound 
mind, nor does everyone have the intellectual capacity to differentiate between true and 
false religions.182 Thus, his opponents are demanding that people exceed their intellectual 
capacities. This, ‘Ammār argues, is like throwing people into the sea without providing any 
means for them to cross it. In short, this would be cruel, given that most people are not 
intellectual. His opponent not only requires a great deal from people, but indeed makes it 
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182 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī” 162.  
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impossible for the average person to know the true religion because the means by which the 
truth is known is not available to them. Additionally, reason alone is shown to be insufficient 
since even great intellectuals disagree among themselves. It follows that they too would 
select different religions and textual revelations as true if they had to judge without the 
testimony of miracles. According to ‘Ammār, it is therefore just and proper that miracles 
provide the compelling, decisive proof in discerning the true religion for both intellectuals and 
the common person.                 
‘Ammār is pointed in his argument: God does not ask too much from people, but 
rather reveals the religion that pleases Godself by supporting it with the compelling proof of 
miracles performed at the hands of the apostles.183 In doing so, God shows fairness so that 
everyone, including the intellectual elite and the common people, is given the same proof.184 
Thus, all have an equal chance to discern the true religion, since God does not display 
favoritism. To demonstrate this equality, God has granted that truth be grasped by sight and 
reason, and has made miracles compelling for both types of people.  
Having made this point, ‘Ammār critically examines contemporary religions for their 
motivations and their claims to the miraculous. His fundamental assessment is that a religion 
that uses any earthly cause in its establishment cannot be of God. As we shall see later, he 
                                               
183 Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 97.  
184 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 28.  
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will use this point to argue for the credibility of Christianity.    
It is likely that ‘Ammār directs his words, at least in part, to his fellow Christians. They 
must have felt great pressure from the adherents of other religions, and particularly of Islam, 
so his review and censure of all other religions was needed. However, his critique of Islam is 
considerably longer than that of other religions, presumably because it was the main rival 
faith. We shall see this broad censure again in his discussion on the acceptance of 
Christianity. This apologetic strategy of critiquing all religions was necessary, enabling him to 
avoid the charge of blaspheming against Islam, while refuting the claims of Islam by 
implication.  
 
Religions Examined:  
Judaism  
The first religion examined by ‘Ammār is Judaism, which he calls the “religion of the 
Torah.”185 Judaism was made as a “special religion,” since God was not pleased with it as a 
religion for all of humanity.186 ‘Ammār argues that since Judaism was localized under one 
king, in one land, and within one kingdom, it was obviously not intended to be a universal 
                                               
185 Ibid., 30. ‘Ammār is unique in calling Judaism “the religion of the Torah.” See Paul Khoury, 
Mafhūm al-Dīn, 257-258.  
186 Ibid. 
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religion. Having one unique religion established and growing in one specific region 
necessarily means that it was not the religion that pleased God.187 According to ‘Ammār's 
argument against Judaism is simple: God stopped performing miracles within Judaism when 
the complete sacrificial system of the Old Testament was abolished.  
In a further analysis of Judaism, ‘Ammār sets forth five earthly means by which a 
religion may spread. They are: the sword; bribery and payment; ethnocentricity; approval; 
and collusion. These reasons are important to ‘Ammār’s argument, since his conclusion will 
be that only Christianity has been established by the hand of God, rather than by any of 
these means. ‘Ammār’s strategy is obvious: he examines all religions in light of the five 
earthly means.  
With regard to the sword, ‘Ammār believes that Judaism, having been a local religion 
that spread in only one country under the leadership of a king, was thereby spread under the 
threat of the sword. The subjects of the Jewish king were obedient to him in all of his 
religious opinions. With regard to bribery and payment, ‘Ammār starts his argument by 
reminding his readers of Israel’s time of slavery in Egypt.188 Unfortunately, the BL MS is 
                                               
187 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 38. When we look at al-Ṣafī’s epitome, we 
learn that tribalism gives an opportunity for the religion to become corrupted. In folio 107a, al-Ṣafī 
states that, since the Children of Israel were one under one king, they were subjected to apostasy, 
being forced by the king to worship other gods, just as King “Bukht Naṣṣar,” i.e., Nebuchadnezzar, 
king of Babylon in 604 BC, forced his people to worship an idol.   
188 See Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 163. 
 62 
corrupt here, and it misses a whole page where ‘Ammār continues his examination of 
Judaism, and evidently criticizes Islam by insinuation. 
‘Ammār’s criticism of Judaism as a localized religion will be utilized equally against 
Islam, for, according to ‘Ammār, Islam is a local religion, whose adherents are to be found in 
one kingdom, subject to one king. 
  
Zoroastrianism 
The BL MS does not include ‘Ammār’s evaluation of the spread of Zoroastrianism, but the 
Charfeh MS has a short discourse found in folios 107b-108b. According to al-Ṣafī, ‘Ammār 
dismisses the truth claims of Zoroastrianism, identifying the involvement of the five earthly 
means in its growth. For example, the dualism taught by Zoroaster appeals to the human 
mind, as it provides solutions for human problems. ‘Ammār states, “Zoroaster out of his 
clever trickery called for something that [the human] mind finds helpful.”189 Thus, 
Zoroastrianism, according to ‘Ammār, gave room for human desires, which ultimately gave it 
acceptance. ‘Ammār even accuses Zoroaster of performing magic tricks in order to convince 
people of his message.190 Further, ‘Ammār asserts that, according to the adherents of 
                                               
189 Charfeh MS folio 107b. 
190 Cf. Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, vol. 432 (Louvain: Peeters, 
1982), 220. 
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Zoroastrianism, Zoroaster himself did not perform any miracles by which life was given to a 




Another religion ‘Ammār examines is “the religion of Mani.”191 According to ‘Ammār, Mani’s 
thinking is similar to that of Zoroaster. Further, Mani did not perform any miracles, but rather 
forced his views on his adherents. This clearly indicates that it is not the religion with which 
God is pleased. According to abū Qurrah, the followers of Mani are also called Ẓanādiqah,192 
and they claim to be “the only true Christians.”193 Zindīq is a Persian word that made its way 
into the Arabic language, and in many cases was synonymous with “heretic.”194 Although this 
is not the meaning ‘Ammār has in mind, he nevertheless believed that they did not possess 
the truth. 
                                               
191 Manichaeism was a dualistic religion founded by Mani (Manes), who lived between 216 
and 276 AD. Manichaeism is composed of a mixture of Zoroastrian dualism, Babylonian folklore 
religions, and Buddhist ethics, as well as some Christian teachings. 
192 See Muḥammad ‘abd al-Ḥamīd Ḥamad, al-Zandaqah wal-Zanādiqah: Tārīkh wa Fikr 
(Dimashq: Dār al-Ṭalī‘ah al-Jadīdah, 1999), 37-58; and ʻAṭwān Ḥusayn, al-Zandaqah wal-Shu‘ūbiyyah 
fīl-ʻAṣr al-ʻAbbāsī al-Awwal (Bayrūt: Dār al-Jīl, 1984), 11-25. Cf. F.C. De Blois, “Zindīk,” EI2. 
193 Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 205. See also Samuel Lieu, Manichaeism in 
Mesopotamia and the Roman East, Religions in the Graeco-Roman world, vol. 118 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1999).  
194 F. C. de Blois, “Zindīk,” EI2.  
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Marcionism 
Marcionism is associated with Marcion, bishop of Sinope in Pontus (c. 85-160 AD). Marcion 
was condemned as a heretic, having rejected the Old Testament and denied the incarnation 
of God in the person of Jesus Christ.195 According to abū Qurrah, Marcion’s followers argued 
that they possessed the true Gospel, and that Marcion himself had the right key to its 
interpretation.196 ‘Ammār objects to their beliefs and finds the five earthly means by which a 
religion is spread to be prevalent in Marcionism. Within such religion, there can be no truth, 
he concludes.  
 
Bārdaiṣānism   
Bārdaiṣānism is associated with Bār Daiṣān (b. 154 AD), who was a Christian from 
Mesopotamia.197 Bār Daiṣān, or in the Arabicized form ‘Ammār used, ibn Daiṣān, was a 
Syrian who had mixed Christian teachings with occult beliefs. He had been influenced by 
Gnosticism and, as a result, came to deny the bodily resurrection of Christ.198  Bardaiṣānism 
has no truth as the aforementioned five means could be discerned in its founding.    
                                               
195 Cf. Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 227. 
196 Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 208-209. 
197 Mūsā Makhkhūl, al-Ḥaḍārah al-Suryāniyyah, 361-372.  
198 Cf. Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 229-230. 
 65 
Islam 
The missing folios of the BL MS purportedly examine the first two explanations for the 
spread of an untrue religion in connection with Islam: the sword, bribery, and payment. It can 
only be deduced from the rest of ‘Ammār’s argument that his assessment of Islam is not 
positive. He speaks of people being compelled by the sword to convert to Islam.199 However, 
the actual text of the BL MS starts with an ambiguous mention of Ḥamzah ibn ‘abd al-
Muṭṭalib in relation to his role in the spread of Islam, and uses this as an example of 
ethnocentricity.200 Next, ‘Ammār examines the role of approval, indicating that people who 
heard the message preached by Muḥammad could have been swayed favorably since he 
offered them “the greed of the world.”201   
In contrast to any Islamic claim to the miraculous, ‘Ammār points out that the Qur’ān 
itself states that Muḥammad had been challenged to perform miracles like the prophets 
before him, but failed to perform any.   
‘Ammār’s proof texts are sūrah 6:109202 and 17:59.203 These two verses confirm 
                                               
199 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 31.  
200 The paternal uncle of the Prophet of Islam. He converted to Islam and became one of its 
bravest men, especially at the Battle of Badr. See G.M. Meredith-Owens, “Ḥamzah ibn ‘abd al-
Muṭṭalib,” EI2.  
201 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 31. 
202 “They swear their strongest oaths by God, that if a sign came to them, by it they would 
believe. Say: they will not believe.” Instead we confound their hearts and their minds that they do not 
believe in the first instance.” 
 66 
‘Ammār’s assertion that the claim of miracles associated with the spread of Islam are not 
substantiated, and that even Muḥammad himself failed to demonstrate equality with other 
prophets such as Moses, whose messages were supported with great wonders. ‘Ammār 
argues that, according to these verses, Muḥammad did not perform any miracles, and that 
they indicate instead that only God controls the occurrence of mighty signs and miracles.  
The first verse reports that people asked Muḥammad to bring forth proofs of the 
authenticity of his call, just as Moses, ‘Īsā, and other prophets did. According to Muqātil ibn 
Sulaymān, two men—‘abd Allah ibn al-Mughirah and al-Ḥarith ibn Hishām ibn al-Mughirah—
challenged Muḥammad to make water spring out of the ground, but Muḥammad did not.204 
The context of this verse is the story of the qur’ānic prophet, Ṣāliḥ, who was challenged by 
the people to display a sign from God by making a specifically described camel come out of 
a rock. The people promised that, if the camel appeared from the rock, they would believe in 
God. Ṣāliḥ succeeded and then warned the people that it was “God’s camel”205 sent to them 
as a sign, and that they should therefore not slaughter it. The people, however, broke their 
                                                                                                                                                   
203 “And we refrain from sending the signs, only because the men of former generations 
treated them as false: We sent the she-camel to the Thamūd to open their eyes, but they treated her 
wrongfully: We only send the Signs by way of terror.” 
204 Adel Théodore Khoury, “al-Islām fī Minzār al-Lāhūt al-Masīḥī,” in al-ʻAqīdah al-Masīḥiyyah 
fī Liqāʼ maʻa al-Islām, al-Masīḥiyyah wal-Islām fīl-Ḥiwār wal-Taʻāwun, 16, ed. Andreas Bsteh and Adel 
Théodore Khoury (Jūniyah: al-Maktabah al-Būlusiyyah, 2002), 281.  
205 See sūrah 11:64.   
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word and killed the camel,206 thus incurring the wrath of God.207   
 In his argument, ‘Ammār uses the context of this story to his own advantage, pointing 
out that, even according to the testimony of the Qur’ān itself, Muḥammad was not a miracle 
worker, unlike prophets who preceded him. ‘Ammār then appeals to sūrah 17:59, where, 
according to al-Ṭabarī, the people had asked Muḥammad to turn rocks into gold. Muḥammad 
assured them that the performance of miracles is totally in God’s hand.  
Not only does ‘Ammār see this verse as a refutation of Muḥammad’s call as a 
prophet, but he also brings in proofs from qur’ānic commentators to corroborate that 
Muḥammad did not perform miracles. ‘Ammār quotes ‘abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās,208 (d. 687), who, 
according to ‘Ammār “was a witness to the situation,”209 who stated that the Jews, the 
Christians, and the polytheists challenged Muḥammad to perform miracles, but he did not. 
How interesting, then, to see that nowhere in the commentary of ibn ‘Abbās do we find this 
challenge mentioned in association with this particular verse! The closest mention is when 
                                               
206 See sūrah 7:77. 
207 Sayyid al-Kīlānī, Fī Mawkib al-Nabyyīn, vol. 1 (al-Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1984), 166-169.   
208 See Theodor Nöldeke, Tārīkh al-Qurʼān, trans. Georges Tamer (Köln: Al-Kamel, 2008), 
383-389. 
209 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 32. ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās, (d. 687 AD), is called 
“the doctor” or father of qur’ānic exegesis. He is an authority on exegesis, especially among Sunni 
Muslims. His well-known tafsīr is a respected source of interpretation. The English version has been 
made available by Mokrane Guezzou. See al-Fīrūzābādī, Muḥammad ibn Ya‘qūb, Tafsīr ibn ‘Abbās., 
trans. Mokrane Guezzou (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2008); cf. Laura Veccia Vaglieri, “‘abd Allāh ibn 
‘Abbās,” EI2.  
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ibn ‘Abbās indicates that some “people” challenged the prophets of Islam.210 Another 
qur’ānic commentator, Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, mentions some kuffār, polytheists, in the same 
regard.211  
It would seem, then, that ‘Ammār is manipulating the interpretation of this text to his 
own advantage. He introduces a new question into the text, which in turn challenges the 
truth claims of Islam and its prophet. In doing so, ‘Ammār is asking a question which was 
likely common within his Christian community where Muḥammad’s mission was doubted 
simply because it did not include miracles as proof of its trustworthiness.212 However, an 
implied attack on Muḥammad himself lies behind ‘Ammār’s words concerning the falseness 
of Islam. ‘Ammār believes that prophets such as Moses performed miracles. However, 
Muḥammad did not perform any, which means that, since Muḥammad’s mission was not 
supported by miracles, it is to be deduced that he was not a prophet. ‘Ammār’s view of 
Muḥammad is unambiguous, yet it was not possible for him to state it explicitly. Almost all 
Christian Arabic literature of his time, with the exception of al-Kindī, either avoided speaking 
                                               
210 Mokrane Guezzou, ‘abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās, Tanwīr al-Miqbās min Tafsīr ibn ‘Abbās, The 
Royal Aal-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. Available at:  
[http://www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=2&tTafsirNo=73&tSoraNo=6&tAyahNo=109&tDisplay=
yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=2], Accessed 01/01/2011.    
211 Muqātil ibn Sulaymān al-Balkhī, al-Tafsīr, The Royal Aal-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. 
Available at: 
[http://www.altafsir.com/Tafasir.asp?tMadhNo=2&tTafsirNo=67&tSoraNo=6&tAyahNo=109&tDisplay=
yes&UserProfile=0&LanguageId=1], Accessed 01/01/2011.  
212 Adel Théodore Khoury, “al-Islām fī Minzār al-Lāhūt,” 280.  
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of Muḥammad or spoke in a vague manner about his mission. ‘Ammār follows the same 
course. He does not even mention the name Muḥammad per se, but it is unmistakable that 
he denies the validity of Muḥammad’s prophethood.    
 
Proofs of the True Religion: An Evaluation 
Based on the aforementioned arguments, ‘Ammār confidently deduces that none of these 
other religions can be called the religion of God, since they were not accomplished or 
accompanied by miracles, nor were they established apart from any earthly motivation. 
However, up to this point in his argument, ‘Ammār has not named the true religion. 
Therefore, the next section of Kitāb al-Burhān is devoted to a discussion of Christianity in 
relation to the earthly motivations used to spread a religious message. It is clear that he 
believes that Christianity, having been established by the compulsion of miracles, been 
accepted apart from any earthly motivations, and having been spread amongst all nations 
must therefore be the true religion.      
 ‘Ammār’s arguments are based on the use of reason. He clearly sets forth the 
argument that, since there are many religious claims, the use of reason, together with 
supportive evidence, can be of great importance. Surprisingly and abruptly, however, he 
departs from reason based arguments to use scriptural revelation to prove that Christianity is 
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the true religion. Why then is his appeal to reason so brief? It cannot be due to ‘Ammār’s 
lack of skill in argumentation. Indeed, based on the internal witness of Kitāb al-Burhān, it is 
obvious that ‘Ammār is familiar with Greek philosophical works and their intellectual 
content.213 Presumably, his succinct use of reason based arguments served ‘Ammār’s 
overall purpose in establishing the truth of his Christian position over against the Islamic 
claims of finality. To counter such claims, ‘Ammār needed to develop a strategy by which he 
could circumvent them without offering clear opposition to Islamic doctrine. The secure way 
is therefore to establish an argument whose outward words seem acceptable to Christians 
and Muslims, yet whose implicit references undermine the claims of Islam, and even call into 
question Muḥammad’s prophethood.214  
‘Ammār establishes his argument by rejecting the grounds on which Islamic claims of 
truth are based. Thus he appeals to the use of reason, and, in fact, praises such use. 
According to him, reliance on tradition is ignorance. Further, by challenging religious 
arguments based on tradition, ‘Ammār shows great confidence in reason as a reliable 
means by which truth is known and true religion is ultimately recognized. Yet, reliance on 
reason can only take him so far before he, as a Christian theologian, needs to depend on the 
witness of revelation. In the same section of Kitāb al-Burhān where ‘Ammār argues for the 
                                               
213 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 22-23. 
214 See Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 104-105. 
 71 
use of reason, he proceeds to write about a revelatory text in which God’s plans for 
humanity. It seems that ‘Ammār trusted the testimony of reason to a certain extent, yet 
revelation still comprised a major element of his epistemology, since it ultimately comes from 
God. While respecting the role of reason, ‘Ammār has more trust in the revealed truth. This 
will be demonstrated in the following section where ‘Ammār writes about the acceptance of 
the Christian religion. 
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Concerning the Acceptance of the Christian Religion 
Immediately after discussing the means by which different religions spread and the reasons 
they were accepted, ‘Ammār argues that no such earthly explanations could account for the 
spread of Christianity.215 Instead, he states that miracles and mighty signs were the sole 
basis for its acceptance.216 We shall now turn to consider how ‘Ammār developed this view, 
and examine his conclusions in light of the Christian-Muslim intellectual milieu.  
‘Ammār’s claim is not prefaced with any arguments, nor does he prepare his readers 
by refuting any other viewpoints or claims. Rather, his views are stated directly and bluntly. 
When it is noted that the first word in this section is ﺎـّﻣأ, as for, the reader immediately 
anticipates what ‘Ammār is actually going to propose. According to Arabic grammar, ﺎّﻣأ is a 
corroborative and partitive particle, ﻞﻴﺼـﻔﺗ ةادأ,217 which is primarily used to denote a 
differentiation between nouns. Presumably, ‘Ammār is differentiating between all previously 
discussed religions and Christianity in order to argue for the truthfulness of the latter. Thus, 
the use of the particle signifies the distinction or dissimilarity that ‘Ammār is asserting. He 
maintains that all other religions can be explained by human considerations, while 
Christianity alone is unique in its divine origins.  
                                               
215 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 51. 
216 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 33.  
217 Edward W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, Derived from the Best and the Most Copious 
Eastern Sources (London: Williams and Norgate, 1863), 93. 
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At this point, we turn to examine ‘Ammār’s explanation of the natural spread of false 
religions and his contrasting defense of Christianity.  
 
Collusion   
‘Ammār starts his argument by pointing to the universality of Christianity vis-à-vis the 
localized nature of other religions. He asserts that Christianity was not found in only one 
nation, where only one language was spoken, but rather, was universal. In contrast to this, 
he claims that almost all other religions are localized within one nation or ethnic group and 
language. As examples, he points to Judaism, which was under one king, and 
Zoroastrianism which was known in only one country.218    
In this way, ‘Ammār indirectly refers to Islam as a religion that was founded in only 
one nation. He warns that Islam, which he called “the religion which was after this,”  يﺬﻟا ﻦّﻳﺪﻟا
ﻚﻟذ ﺪﻌﺑ, was not immune from the dangers associated with being limited to “one” nation.219 In 
making his argument, ‘Ammār repeats the word “one” eight times in just five lines of the BL 
                                               
218 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 32. Al-Kindī also makes reference to Zoroaster’s 
book. See William Muir, The Apology of al-Kindy: Written at the Court of Al Mâmûn in Defence of 
Christianity against Islam; with an Essay on Its Age and Authorship Read Before the Royal Asiatic 
Society (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1882), 43.   
219 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 32. Al-Ṣafī speaks of the last religion, ﺮـﻴﺧﻷا ﻦﻳﺪﻟا, 
Charfeh MS folio 110a. 
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MS.220 By this unmissable repetition, he powerfully stresses that localization and singularity 
of language or ethnicity undermines any claim to truth. Indeed, ‘Ammār argues that this 
limited range leaves any religion vulnerable, for the doctrine of any religion that is based in 
only one place can easily be corrupted.  
Conversely, ‘Ammār argues that when a universal religion has not been spread 
under compulsion, its reliability is assured because any distortion that might take place in 
one area will not pervade all other locations. This is exactly the case with Christianity: it is 
found in all kingdoms to the ends of the earth. It is found among the people of the east and 
the west, and among the Khūzī and the Yemenis.221 This, ‘Ammār infers, was not the case 
with the Islamic religion.  
                                               
220 BL MS folio 8b.  
221 According to the BL MS, they are ـﻟاو يﺰﺤﻟاﯩ ﻰـﻤـ . The immediate context does not support 
any literal translation of the first word as it appears. The second word is not dotted, but if we add 
appropriate dots, it could mean either “Yemen” or “Yemenis.” It seems convincing, however, to read 
the first word as ّيّﺰـُﺨﻟا, the Khūzī. The Khūzī, formerly known as Arabistān, is the south-western 
region of Iran, bordering Baṣrah. Khūzistān is al-Ahwāz in modern day. After the Islamic invasion of 
the region the Arabs called the city Sūq al-Ahwāz. The Elamite Kingdom was established in 
Khūzistān, with Sūsah (Susiana) as its capital city. The region was also known as the land of Khūz. 
Presumably, Christianity reached Khūzistān as early as the first century, for we read in the Book of 
Acts that people from Elam were among those who were present in Jerusalem on the Day of 
Pentecost, listening to Peter preaching (Acts 2:9). The fact that Khūz is located to the north of Baṣrah 
seems to support ‘Ammār’s argument that Christianity spread to the ends of the earth. The immediate 
context speaks of the West, the East, the Khūz (North) and the Yemenis (South). R.M. Savory 
“Khuzistan” EI2; Wilhelm Baum, “The Age of the Arabs: 560-1258,” in The Church of the East: A 
Concise History, ed. Wilhelm Baum and Winkler Dietmar (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 8; Svat 
Soucek, “Arabistan or Khuzistan” in Iranian Studies, vol. 17, issue 2/3 (1984): 195-213, 196. 
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Furthermore, Islam had, in effect, imposed a new language on the non-Arab people 
who did not know Arabic.222 ‘Ammār here utilizes the Islamic concept of taklīf, presumably 
having in mind the text of sūrah 2: 286 “On no soul doth Allah place a burden [ukallifu] 
greater than it can bear.” This concept denotes a law or a difficult order imposed on people 
by God.223 This burden, ‘Ammār seems to argue, does not support the case for the 
universality of Islam, for its spread entailed the difficult task of learning Arabic. By contrast, 
the Christian faith was accepted in many nations, among people speaking diverse 
languages, and even within countries that were at war with each other.  
‘Ammār then examines six unacceptable reasons for conversion, while proving that 
Christianity is innocent of all of them. ‘Ammār does not include collusion among these six, for 
he has already examined it and shown that it did not apply in the case of Christianity. 
‘Ammār’s ultimate point is that, since none of these false motivations apply to Christianity, it 
must be the true religion.224  
These reasons are 1) the sword; 2) bribery and cajolery; 3) ethnocentricity; 4) 
personal preference; 5) permissiveness; and 6) illusions of sorcery.  
 
                                               
222 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 131.  
223 D. Gimaret, “taklīf,” EI2. 
224 Ibid., 33. 
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The Sword 
According to ‘Ammār, Christianity clearly forbids the use of the sword. Thus, it is illogical to 
accuse Christians of compelling conversion by the sword, since those who preached Christ 
forbade the sword and in their writings condemned its use.225 According to ‘Ammār, Judaism 
commended its use. Likewise, Islam, having used the sword, did not condemn it, but praised 
the power of the sword since it had been the means for their successful invasion and 
occupation of new territories. By contrast, ‘Ammār states that the acceptance and spread of 
Christianity could not be attributed to the sword, and he then gives his proofs. First, the 
Gospel does not praise the sword; second, the nations accepted a Gospel that forbade the 
sword; and third, the nations, despite their differences and animosities, all agree that the 
early preachers of Christianity did not use the power of the sword. Likewise, according to 
‘Ammār’s argument, it should be remembered that the first preachers of the Gospel were 
poor fishermen, who were powerless and without any earthly prestige.226 They had neither 
power nor glory to give to people.227 They only offered their “poverty and counsel to their 
followers to cultivate penury in this world.”228  
                                               
225 Ibid. 
226 See Yūḥannā al-Dimishqī, al-Ma’at Maqālah fīl-Imān al-Urthūdhuksī, trans. Adrīyānūs 
Shakkūr (Bayrūt: al-Maktabah al-Būlusīyah, 1991), 219. 
227 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 34. 
228 Sidney Griffith, “Comparative Religion,” 77. 
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To strengthen this argument, ‘Ammār emphasizes that the message of the early 
Christian preachers opposed human ambition to acquire power and wealth. Since such a 
message would not please kings or royalty, it is clear that kings accepted the Gospel only on 
account of compelling miracles and great wonders. In fact, both Jews and Muslims testified 
that the apostles of Christ preached peace. So when these groups attempted to malign the 
disciples, they could only accuse them of performing miracles through “magical tricks.”229 
Thus, according to ‘Ammār, the testimony of the Jews, the Magi and the Muslims makes it 
clear that those who first preached the Gospel did not use the sword. ‘Ammār calls such a 
witness a “world witness.”230  
It is important to note that ‘Ammār’s discussion of the sword never directly describes 
Islam as being a religion of the sword. A close reading of his words shows that he is not 
willing to risk such a bold accusation against the Islamic empire. Instead, he refers to Islamic 
armies as political movements that needed the power of the sword in their wars against 
other nations.231 This does not necessarily mean that he thought that the religion of Islam 
was being spread by the power of the sword, but neither does it mean otherwise! ‘Ammār 
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cleverly leaves this sentence vague and open to the interpretation of the reader.  
In all likelihood, the dhimmī regulations were in force during ‘Ammār’s time, and 
anything that could have been interpreted as blasphemy against Islam would have met with 
severe punishment.232 Landron speaks of a discussion between the caliph ‘abd al-Malik and 
a certain “Nestorian” Christian leader. The caliph asked the Christian for his opinion on 
Islam, calling it “the religion of the Arabs.” The Christian maintained that Islam was a religion 
that was established by the sword, without any divine signs or mighty wonders, unlike 
Christianity. Upon hearing this, the caliph became enraged, and ordered his soldiers to cut 
out the man’s tongue. However, others interceded and he was set free on condition that he 
would never appear in the presence of the caliph again.233  
To safeguard against offering forthright criticisms of Islam, ‘Ammār chose to include 
Judaism in his discussion of the sword. This device seems unique to ‘Ammār. Other Arabic-
speaking Christian apologists openly referred to the role of the sword in Islam, but ‘Ammār, 
by including Judaism, suggests to the reader that he is not directing his criticism against 
Islam. Rather, the focus of his argument is that political power played no role in the spread of 
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Christianity.234  
Nevertheless, ‘Ammār may actually have had some specific Islamic groups in mind 
when he spoke of those who used the sword to compel conversion. We are told by al-Ash‘arī 
that some Mu‘tazilah and al-Khawārij allowed the use of the sword in spreading “truthful 
teachings” and in removing the “people of fallacy.”235 However, it is impossible to confirm 
that ‘Ammār was directing his words against these groups.   
 
 
Bribery and Cajolery 
 
‘Ammār’s description of Christ’s disciples as poor fishermen directly relates to the issue of 
bribery and payment and paves the way for his defense against any allegations that the 
apostles seduced people by offering power or money. ‘Ammār points out that poor fishermen 
could not have offered any worldly incentives to the average person. Their only compelling 
“force” was mighty miracles.236 ‘Ammār makes it plain that those who first preached 
Christianity were in no position to offer gifts for, as he said, “the head of the apostles”237 
affirmed to the sick man at Jerusalem that the apostles had neither silver nor gold. The only 
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thing he could offer was healing in the name of Jesus. This is a reference to Peter’s healing 
of the crippled man as recorded in Acts 3:6.238  
 
Ethnocentricity 
‘Ammār also maintains that Christianity clearly had no ethnocentric bias. Such an allegation 
was barely worthy of refutation. In a few words, he states that Christianity had been 
accepted worldwide, and not just by the Jews who were of the same ethnic group as Jesus. 
Only if Jews had been Christianity’s sole followers could it be accused of ethnocentricity.239 
‘Ammār was convinced that racial pride or exclusivity played no part whatsoever in the 
spread of Christianity.240 
Yet, beneath these words there seems to be a hidden allusion to Islam. According to 
‘Ammār, any religion whose adherents are of the same race as its founder is liable to 
develop a sense of ethnic superiority. This line of thinking may have been an indirect attack 
on Islam. Support for this conclusion comes from the end of the missing part of BL MS, 
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where ‘Ammār speaks of the Muslim hero, Ḥamzah ibn ‘abd al-Muṭṭalib.241 In other words, it 
seems that ‘Ammār turned the pride of “Arabness” against Islam, as “Arabness” meant that a 
certain ethnic group identified with the call of one of their own. Universality and “Arabness” 
are irreconcilable. In contrast, many nations and different races followed Christ.242 In fact, 
‘Ammār manipulated the Arabic word for ethnocentricity, ﺐﺼﻌﺘﻟا, to indicate that people from 
different races were in fact related to Christ through a different type of ethnocentricity or 
loyalty, that of submission and worship.243   
This apologetic argument seems to have been common at that time. Abū Qurrah’s 
On the Confirmation of the Holy Law of Moses uses the same line of thought. Abū Qurrah, 
however, employs this argument against his Jewish interlocutor, who had claimed that 
Christianity might have spread among the nations due to ethnic loyalty. Abū Qurrah rebuts 
this allegation, arguing that ethnocentricity is clearly evident in Judaism, which, as he puts it, 
“followed Moses out of ethnic loyalty.”244    
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‘Ammār goes to great lengths to demonstrate that Christianity does not have an easily-
accepted system of beliefs. Indeed, he argues, Christianity demands that people believe in 
difficult doctrines, inconceivable to most people.245 These teachings are not naturally 
acceptable to the human mind, and they cannot be understood by the average person.246 Or, 
to use al-Ṣafī’s words, these teachings are full of “estrangement and are distasteful.”247  
‘Ammār then lists ten Christian doctrines that are challenging for people to believe: 1) 
the Virgin birth; 2) the perpetual virginity of Mary; 3) the divine Sonship of Christ; 4) the cross 
of the Son of God; 5) the resurrection of Christ; 6) the ascension of Christ into heaven; 7) the 
second coming of Christ; 8) the worship of a crucified Christ; 9) an eternal life that is not 
devoted to physical pleasures; and, perhaps most perplexing and difficult, 10) the Trinity.248 
These teachings, according to Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, are hard to believe and could be 
considered as despicable and obscure.249  
Here ‘Ammār and abū Qurrah pursue similar lines of argument. Both apologists 
summarize the main Christian doctrines, showing how difficult they are for the mind to grasp, 
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as ‘Ammār puts it; or challenging to the average mind, as abū Qurrah argues.250 
‘Ammār concludes that Christianity “resisted the wisdom of the wise”251 and outlines 
the doctrines that go against what human reason would favor. Furthermore, Christianity 
resists the human lust for sensual pleasure, and instead stresses the importance of prayer 
and fasting.252 ‘Ammār makes it clear that Christianity is difficult for the “whole” person. On 
the intellectual level, it is difficult because it proposes teachings that are paradoxical—
teachings that in fact contradict reason.253 Likewise, on a practical level, Christian doctrines 
require a strict lifestyle that is intensely focused on denying lusts and fleshly desires and 
pursuing vigilant prayer and fasting.  
‘Ammār sought to block all possible suggestion that Christianity had been accepted 
on the basis of its easy appeal. This allegation is totally invalidated by the doctrines and 
disciplines of Christianity.254 Both mind and body must face the challenging nature of 
Christianity; thereby leaving no room for human approval.  
In a closely related argument, ‘Ammār denies the allegation of human approval by 
pointing to the stigma of worshipping the cross. Worshipping the cross does not bring any 
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honor in people’s eyes.255 Rather, it is a source of shameful humiliation.256 Why would 
‘Ammār argue this, given that in his discussion on the cross, as we shall see, he taught that 
the cross is not shameful but a “grace from God”?257 To answer this question, it is useful to 
consider ‘Ammār’s social context. The “shame of the cross” in this section refers to the 
Islamic view, not to the Christian understanding that the “shame of the cross” exhibits the 
power of God. In other words, ‘Ammār suggests that, from a Muslim perspective, it would be 
absurd to think that approval played any role in the spread of Christianity. Similar views are 
presented by abū Qurrah, who argues that, since most of Christ’s moral teachings are 
difficult to follow, the desire for approval cannot be associated with the spread of 
Christianity.258   
All of the ten doctrines ‘Ammār lists, with the exception of the doctrine of the 
perpetual virginity of Mary, are discussed in Kitāb al-Burhān. It would seem, then, that 
‘Ammār believes these difficult and off-putting doctrines to be of great importance and 
worthy of discussion and vindication. Further, as we shall see in the discussion on divine 
unity, ‘Ammār plainly states that these same doctrines are those to which Muslim polemicists 
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most object.259 In effect, ‘Ammār had to discuss these theological issues, since disputes with 
Muslim polemicists had already shaped the agenda, pre-determining the issues to be 
addressed.  
However, ‘Ammār also uses this list to indirectly challenge Islam. He refers to the 
tenth doctrine concerning the Trinity as “the sum of these [doctrines], their perfection and 
completion.”260 ‘Ammār argues that the teaching of the Trinity could not be invented by the 
human imagination. The Arabic verb used is عﺮـﺘﺨﻳ. By contrast, in a clear reference to 
Manichaeism, he notes that the human mind might “invent” the concept of dualism and, 
likewise, the oneness of God might also be “invented” by the natural mind, since the 
universe attests to the fact that there must be one God.  
This point is clearly made in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, where ‘Ammār describes 
the oneness of God as taught in Islam (though the reference to Islam is indirect, as “kalām of 
those who claim things”).261 Evidently, he does not dismiss all Islamic teaching on the 
oneness of God; rather, he seems to acknowledge that it contains some truth. Indeed, in 
‘Ammār’s opening words on the Trinity, he does not object to the doctrine of the oneness of 
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God per se, but rather objects to the Islamic understanding of it.262 He aims at “correcting” 
the Islamic view.263  
However, it should be noted that his use of the verb “عﺮﺘﺨﻳ” is an indirect reference to 
the source of Islamic teachings. ‘Ammār is thereby suggesting that Islamic teachings were 
not given by God, but “invented by the human mind.”264 Such language is certainly 
polemical, but it might be justified given the genre of Kitāb al-Burhān and the broader context 
of Christian-Muslim conversation during ‘Ammār’s time. This anti-Islamic polemical intention 
was understood and confirmed by al-Ṣafī, who summarizes various Islamic teachings and 
then re-states ‘Ammār’s message as follows: “Unlike those to whom it was said that it 
suffices them to have faith or to do pilgrimage, or simply to ask for forgiveness in words, or 
[to hope for] intercession on the final day.”265 
 
Permissiveness  
‘Ammār argues that religions might be readily accepted if they allowed people to satisfy their 
fleshly desires. He maintains that, if the teachings made few demands, people would follow 
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that religion; and conversely, when the moral code was demanding, people would not 
naturally be motivated to accept it. ‘Ammār describes men’s sexual enjoyment of women as 
the ultimate lust and an innate drive, which God put within people so they would bear 
children. This strong lust manifested itself in the life of many prophets and figures in the Old 
Testament. ‘Ammār refers to Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, with whom David had 
an affair (2 Samuel 11); to Solomon’s problems with foreign wives (I Kings 11:1-9); and to 
Samson’s encounter with Delilah, which ultimately led to his death at the hands of his 
enemies (Judges 16). ‘Ammār also refers to Ammon, son of David, who raped his sister 
Tamar, as recorded in 2 Samuel 13. Then, ‘Ammār mentions the caliph al-Mu‘taṣim, who 
destroyed Amorium in 838 AD.266 ‘Ammār, however, in relating the story of the battle of 
Amorium, gives it a twist to fit the purpose of this section of Kitāb al-Burhān. He manipulates 
the context of the battle, saying that al-Mu‘taṣim was driven by his desire to rescue a woman 
who was in distress in Amorium.267 According to ‘Ammār, this, in addition to the 
aforementioned biblical stories shows, the power of sexual lust.268 All these men, ‘Ammār 
then asserts, were defeated by their love for women and their desire for sexual pleasure.269    
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Acknowledging the severity of this problem of lust, ‘Ammār asserts that Christianity 
does not seek to satisfy such uncontrolled sexual desires.270 “There is no religion under the 
sun that prohibits desire more, and destroys pleasure more and has more restrictive 
commands than the Christian religion.”271 These restrictions and prohibitions, he says, are 
displayed in the lives of monks, hermits, and celibates, who are totally devoted to prayer and 
fasting. All these groups willingly abandon the pleasures of food, drink and sex. The power 
that enables such self-discipline demonstrates the divine source of Christianity. If Christianity 
had spread because it permitted pleasure, monks and celibates would never have gained 
followers. In the Charfeh MS, al-Ṣafī also adds monasticism as another sign of the 
authenticity of the Christian religion. Al-Ṣafī maintains that, while Judaism and Islam banned 
monastic life and practices, Christianity encouraged them.272 All of these arguments are 
implicit comparisons between Christian and Islamic practices. ‘Ammār does not mention the 
words “Islam” or “Muslim,” but he clearly has Islam in mind as he indicates that Christianity 
does not permit fleshly pleasures, but rather encourages its adherents to lead a strict and 
even ascetic lifestyle.  
‘Ammār also emphasizes that Christianity teaches that a man can only marry one 
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wife. Even when the wife is terminally ill, the husband has no right to abandon her and marry 
another.273 These teachings, ‘Ammār concludes, run totally counter to the allegation that the 
popularity of Christianity can be attributed to permission of pleasure.274  
 In his arguments, ‘Ammār again takes the opportunity to indirectly oppose Islam. It 
would have sufficed to refer to David, Solomon, Samson, and al-Mu‘taṣim. So, when we note 
the two main points of ‘Ammār’s argument in regard to permissiveness as being 1) sexual 
pleasure is a strong lust, and 2) Christianity insists on one wife, we are able to discern his 
polemical intention vis-à-vis Islam. Without actually stating it, he implies that the Islamic 
teaching and practice of polygamy contributed significantly to Islam’s rapid increase. Of 
course, ‘Ammār does not explicitly say that! Yet there can be no doubt that his words are 
carefully constructed as a counterattack against Islamic objections to certain Christian 
teachings. 
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 These thoughts can also be found in the apology of al-Kindī, who argues that a major 
reason for Islam’s large number of adherents is that it permits behavior previously deemed 
unacceptable. With the advent of Islam, many new liberties, such as polygamy and power 
were granted to people.275  
 
Illusions of Sorcery 
Last of all, ‘Ammār lists magical tricks or illusions of sorcery as another example of an 
illegitimate incentive for conversion. However, he distinguishes between magic or sorcery, 
and the mighty miracles performed by the first preachers of Christianity. The apostles had 
healed chronic illnesses, blindness, one-eyedness, and similar hard-to-heal sickness.276 He 
argues that, had the apostles offered no real solutions to such conditions, but merely words, 
people would have exposed their deception. He likens this to people’s curiosity when 
watching acts of incantation.277 If people discover the tricks behind such acts, they expose 
those who perform them. But this was not the case; rather, people received true healing at 
the hands of those who preached Christianity. In fact, as ‘Ammār shows, people never 
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questioned the power the apostles displayed and never attributed their powers to sorcery. 
Rather, it was evident that when people demanded that the apostles accompany their words 
with mighty deeds, they were overwhelmed by the irrefutable proof of the truth of the 
apostles’ preaching.278 In a word, these collected proofs support the claim that the preaching 
of the apostles was not accompanied by any magical tricks or fantasies of sorcery.279  
 
Acceptance of the Christian Religion: An Evaluation 
‘Ammār’s arguments regarding the credibility of the Christian faith, particularly the six 
reasons he discussed, were not new within the larger body of apologetic literature written by 
Arab Christians. There are close similarities between these arguments and those of Timothy 
I, al-Kindī, abū Ra’iṭah and others.280 Certainly, the context in which these apologists lived 
                                               
278 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 40.  
279 Having examined all the possibilities, ‘Ammār reaches the conclusion that: “The argument 
has compelled us, seeing the absence from the Christian religion of earthly reasons which might have 
established it, to the conclusion that it was accepted and established by clear miracles from God, and 
His true signs have spread throughout all the different nations.” Michel Hayek, Apologie et 
controverses, 40. 
280 Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 205; cf. Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de 
Théodore Aboucara, 71, 260; Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth” in the Early Islamic 
Period: the Christian Apologies of abū Rā’iṭah, HCMR, vol. 4 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2006), 82; William 
Muir, The Apology of al-Kindy, 48; Louis Cheikho, et al., Vingt traités théologiques d’auteurs arabes 
chrétiens, IXe-XIIIe siècle (Bayrūt: Imprimerie Catholique, 1920), 134-144. This text is found in Carl 
Bezold, M.J. de Goeje, and Theodor Nöldeke, Orientalische Studien: Theodor Nöldeke zum 
siebzigsten Geburtstag, März 1906 (Gieszen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1906), 284-287; Gianmaria 
Gianazza, ed., Īlīyā II: Kitāb Ūṣūl al-Dīn, vol. 2, PAC, vol. 18, (Bayrūt: CEDRAC, 2005), 315-319; 
 92 
shaped their treatises and the style of their various arguments. Given that the context did not 
significantly change throughout these few centuries, it is no surprise that they depended on 
each other’s arguments as they wrote their treatises. All of them had the same theological 
preoccupation.281 However, “‘Ammār’s genius here in the Kitāb al-Burhān…lies in his 
synthesis of elements which are common to himself, to abū Qurrah and to abū Rā’iṭah and 
others among the Christian apologists.”282  
When this section of Kitāb al-Burhān is compared with a short treatise written by abū 
Qurrah, published as an appendix to Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq wal-Dīn al-Qawīm,283 we find 
not only that the same number of reasons for accepting religions are listed, but that the 
structure of the arguments is almost identical.284 Moreover, many details are also the same. 
For example, in listing the ten Christian doctrines that are difficult for the human mind to 
accept, those ‘Ammār discusses are exactly the same as those referred to by abū Qurrah.285 
Likewise, both give the example of sexual permissiveness as a non-spiritual reason for 
people to accept a religion.          
What is more, both apologists develop very similar analogies to support their 
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arguments. Griffith notes this, stating that “the overall structure of the general apologetic 
enterprise [of abū Qurrah and ‘Ammār] is the same in both authors.”286 When abū Qurrah 
writes of a man who invented a new religion, and then composed a religious book to support 
his claims, he seems to have had Muḥammad in mind, for the words of the analogy clearly 
match Muḥammad’s mission. When abū Qurrah speaks of a noble man who embarked on a 
mission to call people to worship God, he describes him bestowing on people “gifts, honor 
[positions], and nobility in this world.”287 Further, that man spoke of attributes of God that 
would be easy for people’s minds to comprehend—attributes that abū Qurrah indicates had 
been previously known.288 However, abū Qurrah clearly dismisses the credibility of that 
man’s mission, stating instead that “he [that man] has no acceptable argument by which his 
religion is confirmed.”289 Of course, these references are indirect, but within the larger scope 
of Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq wal-Dīn al-Qawīm, it is not unreasonable to apply these words 
to Muḥammad.  
‘Ammār’s use of this analogy is slightly different. He writes of a man who had created 
a new religion. This man wrote a book for those who had been told that he performed 
miracles. However, having discovered for themselves that this man was a liar and that he 
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had never performed miracles, people did not even accept a letter of that book.290 Again, 
these references to “that man” suggest a reference to ‘Ammār’s opinion of Muḥammad’s 
scripture and religion.   
As we consider ‘Ammār’s arguments concerning the various false reasons why 
people might accept a religion, as well as his words on the credibility of Christianity, we 
notice that he appeals to the past in order to interpret the present. That is, he looks back at 
the early days of Christianity, at the methods employed by the apostles of Christ and the 
miracles they performed, in order to defend and validate the present existence of 
Christianity. He does this in a context where Christians were under tremendous pressure to 
convert, as they were faced with the rapid expansion of Islam all around them.  
‘Ammār believes that the compelling proof of Christianity that was provided by 
miracles could not be challenged. Muslims, Jews and all people, as well as the Gospel itself, 
testified that mighty wonders had accompanied the spread of Christianity. The apostles, who 
were “poor fishermen,”291 or “weak fishermen,”292 or “underprivileged fishermen,”293 and who 
“had no power or sword,”294 could not have offered anything to their audience except great 
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miracles demonstrating the truthfulness of their preaching. While ‘Ammār firmly believed that 
the miracles did in fact testify to the truth of Christianity, the growth of Islam and the 
intellectual challenges it presented seem to have been the main reason for the writing of this 
section of Kitāb al-Burhān. It has been argued elsewhere that the purpose of such literature 
was to “strengthen the Christians’ own sense of their religion’s credibility, in spite of the 
Muslims’ claim to the contrary.”295  
 Given this state of affairs, we must be careful in our classification of this section of 
Kitāb al-Burhān. In his article, “Comparative Religion in the Apologetics of the First Christian 
Arabic Theologians,” Griffith seeks to prove that ‘Ammār, abū Qurrah and abū Rā’iṭah are 
caught up in the study of “comparative religions.”296 Their preoccupation led these apologists 
to write treatises comparing their own confessional doctrines with contemporary religions 
such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Marcionism, and Islam. Griffith cites abū 
Qurrah’s Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq wal-Dīn al-Qawīm and the current section of ‘Ammār’s 
Kitāb al-Burhān as examples of Christian apologists who used their religious context to their 
advantage in providing support to their fellow Christians.297 
                                               
295 Sidney Griffith, “Comparative Religion,” 63. 
296 See Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 81-85.  
297 Sidney Griffith, “Faith and Reason in Christian Kalām: Theodore abū Qurrah on Discerning 
the True Religion,” in Christian Arabic Apologetics during the Abbasid Period (750-1258), ed. Samir 
Khalil and Jørgen Nielsen (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 11, 26. 
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 This explanation, however, seems to ignore the immediate context of Kitāb al-
Burhān. ‘Ammār’s goal is not so much to compare Christianity with other religions, as to 
prove that Christianity is the true religion in the face of Islam’s claim to be God’s final self-
revelation through Muḥammad.298 Faced with the very real danger of being accused of 
blasphemy against the Qur’ān or Muḥammad, ‘Ammār devises the shrewd strategy of 
including other religions in his comparison, so that the reader cannot accuse him of 
blaspheming or dismissing Islam. However, it is evident to his readers, whether 
contemporary or modern, that Islam is indisputably the target of his arguments.  
It is most probable that ‘Ammār, with his extensive knowledge of Islam and its 
scripture, was familiar with texts such as sūrah 3:19, where we read: “The religion before 
God is Islam;” and sūrah 3:85: “If anyone desires a religion other than Islam, never will it be 
accepted of him; and in the hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost.” Such 
verses, which directly address the issue of non-Islamic religions, may well have been in 
‘Ammār’s mind as he composed this section of Kitāb al-Burhān. However, it was impossible 
for him to refute these verses directly. So, he and his contemporary Christian apologists 
devised the strategy of attacking Islam’s claims to finality indirectly, without explicitly 
                                               
298 Seyyed H. Nasr, “Comments on a Few Theological Issues in Islamic-Christian Dialogue,” 
in Christian-Muslim Encounters, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad and Wadi Z. Haddad (Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 1995), 459-460. 
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speaking against Islam or the Qur’ān.299 This is not to deny the challenge presented by the 
presence of a multiplicity of religions in Baṣrah, but to conclude that ‘Ammār was writing 
about “comparative religions” seems to read a modern concern into a very particular 
historical context.   
Griffith’s conclusions also lead him to argue that Christian apologists in the ‘Abbasid 
period made great use of “Neoplatonic philosophical principles”300 and that they primarily 
appealed to the claims of logic and reason, vis-à-vis the Muslim’s appeal to the revelation of 
God, i.e., the Qur’ān. This view suggests that Islamic attacks were not based on 
philosophical discussion, and also assumes that Christian apologists such as ‘Ammār made 
minimal reference to scriptural arguments. Once again it must be noted that the dhimmī 
regulations that were probably in force in ‘Ammār’s time did not allow Christians to speak 
negatively of the Qur’ān or Muḥammad.301 Therefore, the only possible way for ‘Ammār to 
proceed was to employ philosophical concepts, not because he was a philosopher, but 
because, as an apologist, he would wish to make use of all available methods. His appeal to 
philosophical concepts must be seen in this light.  
                                               
299 In this regard, it is also noteworthy that abū Qurrah shows familiarity with the text of the 
aforementioned sūrah 3 in Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq in his discussion of the Islamic claim to finality. 
Abū Qurrah was told, “No religion but Islam.” This suggests that the Muslim belief in the finality of 
Islam was an argument used in Muslim anti-Christian polemics. See Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-
Khāliq, 210. 
300 Sidney Griffith, “Comparative Religion,” 67.  
301 A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs, 12.  
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As we previously noted in our discussion on the proofs of the true religion, ‘Ammār 
rejects total dependence on reason as the means for attaining truth, given that humans do 
not all enjoy equal intelligence. The proof of miracles, however, would meet the needs of all 
people, no matter what their intellectual capacities.302 Furthermore, trying to prove that 
Christianity is a true religion by using biblical references would seem invalid to his 
interlocutor, given the Islamic accusation of taḥrīf. It would have been useless for ‘Ammār to 
appeal only to biblical verses and events to support his view that Christianity is credible and 
trustworthy, when the Christian scriptures were dismissed as totally inaccurate. The 
intellectual milieu of the ‘Abbasid caliphate set before him specific topics, together with 
limitations on what he could say, while further handicapping him by claiming his scriptures 
were corrupt. ‘Ammār therefore depended heavily on using an approach that would not face 
immediate rejection, i.e., the use of reason.  
 This discussion on the true religion and the reasons for accepting Christianity 
naturally leads us to consider ‘Ammār’s view of the existence of God. There is an 
indissoluble connection between God’s existence and God’s religion. Next for consideration, 
therefore, are ‘Ammār’s proofs of God’s existence and his methodology in addressing the 
topic of the Trinity (in contrast to his Muslim counterpart who uses arguments concerning the 
                                               
302 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 27. 
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existence of God to refute the Trinity), and a discussion on whether or not God’s existence is 
indeed Trinitarian. 
 100 
CHAPTER FOUR: Discourses on the Doctrine of God 
On the Proof of the Existence of God 
‘Ammār provides proofs of the existence of God by using rational arguments and appeals to 
Greek philosophy. He cites Plato and Aristotle, briefly utilizing their arguments from design to 
prove the existence of God—an approach commonly used by other Greek philosophers.303 
According to ‘Ammār, God is seen in the universe through the natural phenomena, which 
testify to God’s existence and providence, ﻪﻘﻠﺧ ﺪﻫاﻮﺷ. This providence is manifested in that 
wild beasts that are able to kill people are kept away from humans. The very fact that such 
animals have destructive powers puts fear in people’s hearts and, as a result, they come to 
the realization that their ultimate hope and security is not to be found in this perishable and 
fragile life; rather, it is eternity that provides full security.304 Thus, ‘Ammār concludes, this 
state of affairs works in full accordance with a divine plan whereby humans are urged to 
seek the life of bliss, where death does not occur, and tribulations are not found.305  
 ‘Ammār appeals again to Plato and Aristotle when he seeks to vindicate the oneness 
of God, stating that most peoples and religions have agreed that God is one. ‘Ammār 
indicates that the “three communities, which are the largest religions—I mean the Christians, 
                                               
303 See Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 41-42; cf. Michel Hayek, Apologie et 
controverses, 136. 
304 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 22. 
305 Ibid. 
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the Jews and the Muslims, unanimously bear witness, despite their differences, that God is 
one.”306 However, the Magi and the followers of Mani take a slightly different position, he 
writes.307 Nevertheless, “people throughout the whole world, whether Christians, Muslims, 
Jews, Magians, unbelievers, philosophers, or worshippers of idols, have agreed, without 
meeting together or conferring, about the oneness of the essence of God.”308  
That being said, we must raise an important question: Why does ‘Ammār choose to 
start Kitāb al-Burhān with such a prolegomenon, given that the primary audiences of his 
book already believe in one God? True, their understandings of God’s oneness differ, as we 
shall discuss in the discourse on the Trinity. However, neither Christians nor Muslims deny 
the existence of God. To answer this question we must consider ‘Ammār’s immediate 
context of the Mu‘tazilah. Almost all Mu‘tazilī and other philosophers wrote on the existence 
of God. For example, al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm wrote the treatise On the Proof of the Existence 
of God.309 Abrahamov lists many Mu‘tazilī thinkers who followed in the footsteps of al-Qāsim 
                                               
306 Ibid. It is indeed interesting to note the use of the same view recorded in a short treatise by 
the “Nestorian” Īlīyā Patriarch of Nisibin, (d. 1049 AD). The Patriarch concludes that, if the wild beasts 
and similar animals had full power over humans, human life would have ended immediately. Paul 
Sbath, Vingt traits philosophiques, 82-86.     
307 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 22.  
308 Ibid., 23. 
309 Binyamin Abrahamov, al-Qāsim B. Ibrāhīm on the Proof of God’s Existence, Islamic 
Philosophy and Theology, vol. 5 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990). 
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ibn Ibrāhīm by proving the existence of God using the argument from design.310 However, it 
was van Ess who raised the same question of intention in connection with abū al-Hudhayl al-
‘Allāf’s discussion on God’s existence, also acknowledging that almost all Mu‘tazilī thinkers 
wrote treatises proving the existence of God. Van Ess argues that what really matters to 
such Mu‘tazilī thinkers is not simply the argument about God’s existence; but rather their 
intention in using it. That is to say, the argument on God’s existence was employed to serve 
a certain purpose in the mind of the writer. In the case of abū al-Hudhayl, the argument was 
aimed at the worshippers of fate and the Iranian dualists against whom the treatise was 
composed. “Abū al-Hudhayl…does not want to prove the existence of God, in which his 
opponents themselves in some way believed; he rather presupposes it, in order to infer from 
it the temporality of the world.”311 This same answer applies to ‘Ammār, who writes this 
section of Kitāb al-Burhān not to refute dualists so much as to defend Christian doctrines 
against certain Islamic objections. His intention in proving the existence of God is therefore 
twofold.  
First, in starting his Burhān with such a prolegomenon ‘Ammār displays his intellectual 
equality with his Mu‘tazilī counterparts, by similarly composing a treatise on God’s 
                                               
310 Ibid., 2-4.  
311 Josef van Ess, “Early Islamic Theologians on the Existence of God,” in Islam and the 
Medieval West: Aspects of Intercultural Relations, ed. Khalil I. Semann (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1980), 66.  
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existence.312 Additionally, in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, his intellectual equality is clearly 
demonstrated, for ‘Ammār devotes most of the opening sections to answering questions 
raised by dualists, this being the same audience as that addressed by abū al-Hudhayl. 
‘Ammār shows great interest in refuting dualistic beliefs concerning the eternity of the world, 
dedicating questions one through six of Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah to this topic. It is also 
noteworthy that similar arguments to ‘Ammār’s are found within Yūḥannā al-Dimishqī’s al-
Ma’at Maqālah. Al-Dimishqī speaks of three proofs for God’s existence: the proof from 
design, the proof from providence in the affairs of creation, and the proof of providence in the 
affairs of the cosmos.313 Abū Qurrah uses this same argument in Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 
arguing from design to show that God exists and that God is the ultimate power who holds 
the elements of the universe together.314 Such proofs continued to be relevant to Arab 
Christian theologians. Indeed, the Jacobite Dāniyāl ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (fourteenth century) put 
forth the same arguments.315 
Second, ‘Ammār reveals his intent by deriving the doctrine of the oneness of God from 
the proof of God’s existence. This is where his genius is revealed. Muslim mutakallimūn 
                                               
312 Josef van Ess, “Early Islamic Theologians,” 65.  
313 Yūḥannā al-Dimishqī, al-Ma’at Maqālah, 57-58.  
314 Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 173-198.  
315 Paul Sbath, Vingt traités philosophiques, 148-149. 
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employed arguments concerning the existence of God in order to refute the Trinity,316 while 
‘Ammār utilizes the same teaching in order to assure his opposing mutakallūm that 
Christians are indeed believers in one God, although he goes on to use it to prove the 
doctrine of the Trinity.317 Here, he is not merely making an apologetic point; rather, he is 
establishing common ground with his interlocutor. Thus, ‘Ammār clearly wishes his readers 
to understand that Christians are monotheists, and he considers it important to make this 
point by using the existence of God as proof of God’s oneness—a theme which his Muslim 
counterpart definitely accepts. And on such common ground, ‘Ammār then proceeds to 
assert the Christian position on God’s oneness. This, as we shall see, will be more fully 
expounded in the discourse on the Trinity. 
 
The Discourse on the Gospels 
We now examine ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s position on the trustworthiness of the Christian 
scriptures, as it appears in his refutation of the Muslim accusation of taḥrīf. First, the 
traditional Islamic view of taḥrīf will be briefly discussed, followed by an analysis of ‘Ammār’s 
polemical response, which seems to indicate an originality of thought in the field of Christian 
polemics during the ‘Abbasid caliphate. Concluding remarks will follow.  
                                               
316 Binyamin Abrahamov, al-Qāsim B. Ibrāhīm, 17.  
317 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 22.  
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The Muslim View of the Christian Scriptures: An Overview  
The Qur’ān teaches that the Torah and the Injīl have the same source as the Qur’ān, that is 
the Mother of the Book.318 God revealed the Torah to Mūsā; the Injīl was given to ‘Īsā; and, 
finally, the last and most complete revelation, the Qur’ān, was revealed to Muḥammad. The 
expectation, then, is that these books, which come from one source, will not disagree on any 
given issue, especially tawḥīd, and the predictions of the coming of Muḥammad. This also 
means that Muslims expect the Gospel to convey the same meaning as the Qur’ān.319  
The Qur’ān, however, refers explicitly to the issue of taḥrīf in the Torah and the 
Christian scriptures; see sūrah 2:75-79; 4:46; 5:13; 5:41. Adang indicates that, according to 
the Qur’ān:  
The Israelites and/or the Jews are accused of confounding the truth with vanity 
(S. 2:24; 3:71), or concealing the truth (e.g., S. 3:187); hiding part of the Book 
(S. 6:91); subtitling words (S. 2:59; 7:162); twisting their tongues when reciting 
the Book (S. 3:78).320 
                                               
318 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, “Taḥrīf,” in EI2; cf. al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī fīl-Radd ʻala al-Naṣāra: 
ilā Nihāyat al-Qarn al-Rābi‘ (Tūnis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyyah lil-Nashr, 1986), 405-426; cf. Ignazio Di 
Matteo, “‘Taḥrīf’ od alterazione della Bibbia secondo i musulmani,” Bessarione 26 (1922), 223-260.  
319 Of course, these concepts of inspiration fundamentally differ, and this poses a real 
problem for the Islamic understanding of Christian scriptures. See al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 424.   
320 Camilla Adang, Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible: from ibn Rabban to ibn 
Ḥazm Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science, vol. 22 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 223; cf. Gordon 
Nickel, “Early Muslim Accusations of Taḥrīf: Muqātil ibn Sulaymān’s Commentary on Key Qur’anic 
Verses,” in The Bible in Arab Christianity, HCMR, vol. 6, ed. David Thomas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2007), 
207-223. It is interesting to note that these same verses are still being used by Muslim scholars in 
their refutation of the Christian religion. See al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 414. Keating writes: “The 
Qur’ān places the blame for error in the scriptures of Christians and Jews on those who were 
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From as early as the time of ibn al-Layth321 to the time of the “Nestorian” Christian ‘Alī 
ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī, who converted to Islam at the age of seventy,322 Muslim scholars took 
great pains to utilize certain biblical verses to support Muḥammad’s prophethood,323 using 
linguistic, historical and textual arguments to prove their point. ‘Alī ibn Rabban, for instance, 
as a former Christian, was arguably more familiar than the others with the text of the Bible 
and its possible different interpretations.324 In Kitāb al-Dīn wal-Dawlah, he bases his 
argument on the Syriac roots of specific words. The outstanding example is seen in his 
interpretation of Psalm 48:1-2325, where, on the basis of his analysis of the Syriac root and its 
                                                                                                                                                   
entrusted with preserving the revelations. While numerous references do not make clear who is 
directly responsible—in several places it is simply stated that the Torah and Gospel have been 
changed—the Qur’ān most often identifies the Jews as the source of the distortions in the scriptures.” 
Sandra Keating, “Refuting the Charge of Taḥrīf: abū Rā’īṭah (d. ca. 835), and his “First Risala on the 
Holy Trinity,” in Ideas, Images, and Methods of Portrayal: Insights into Classical Arabic Literature and 
Islam, ed. Sabastian Güenther (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2005), 43. 
321 Ibn al-Layth was commissioned by Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 764-809) to write to Constantine IV 
(r. 780-797), inviting him to convert to Islam. 
322 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, eds, “Ar-Radd ‘alā-n-Naṣārā de al-Ṭabarī,” Mélanges de 
l’Université Saint Joseph 36 (1959), 7. 
323 See Jane Dammen McAuliffe, “The Prediction and Prefiguration of Muḥammad” in Bible 
and Qurʼān: Essays in Scriptural Intertextuality, ed. John Reeves (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2004), 107-131. 
See also Sidney Griffith, “The Prophet Muhammad, his Scripture and his Message according to the 
Christian Apologies in Arabic and Syriac from the First Abbasid Century” in Vie du prophète Mahomet, 
ed. T. Fahd, Colloque de Strasbourg 1980 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), 141.  
324 ‘Alī ibn Rabban shows great knowledge of the content of the Bible, and he employs many 
biblical verses to support his views, giving their exact reference. He then argues that Christians have 
“altered” twenty thousand verses from the Gospel that speak of Jesus as merely human. See I.A. 
Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 7. 
325 “Great is the LORD and greatly to be praised in the city of our God! His holy mountain, 
beautiful in elevation, is the joy of all the earth, Mount Zion, in the far north, the city of the great King.”  
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Arabic translation, he concludes that Muḥammad was indeed mentioned in the Bible.326  
Similarly, al-Mahdī seemed quite convinced of a similar argument and even gives 
specific references from the scriptures which, according to him, point to the coming of 
Muḥammad. But Christians, he alleges, have veiled these references in order to deny 
Muḥammad.327   
Generally speaking, Muslim scholars have identified two different types of taḥrīf in the 
Christian scriptures: taḥrīf al-Naṣṣ and taḥrīf al-Ma‘ānī.328 The first is the deliberate alteration 
of the text in such a way that it becomes different from the original;329 and the second, which 
was more prevalent in early Muslim exegesis,330 is the text was misinterpreted, such that the 
original meaning of the text is not conveyed or is misrepresented in order to prove a point of 
view.331 This opinion was held by one of the leading Muslims of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī’s time, al-
                                               
326 Camilla Adang, Muslim Writers,144-145; cf. al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 415-416. See ʻAlī 
ibn-Rabban aṭ-Ṭabarī, The Book of Religion and Empire: A Semi-Official Defence and Exposition of 
Islam, trans. Alphonse Mingana (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1922), 86; cf. 58-92.  
327 Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, Woodbrooke Studies: Christian 
Documents in Syriac, Arabic, and Garshuni, ed. and trans. with a Critical Apparatus, vol. 2, 1-162 
(Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons Limited, 1928), 36. 
328 See Adel Théodore Khoury, “al-Islām fī Minzār al-Lāhūt,” 330-331. 
329 See sūrah 5:38. 
330 Gordon Nickel, “Early Muslim Accusations of taḥrīf,” 222.    
331 Theodore Pulcini and Gary Laderman, Exegesis as Polemical Discourse: ibn Ḥazm on 
Jewish and Christian Scriptures (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 16. In fact, there is some ambiguity 
in the qur’ānic references to the corruption of the scriptures, for the Qur’ān does not really indicate the 
type of corruption that allegedly took place. Was it in the text of the Torah and Injīl, or was it only in 
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Qāsīm ibn Ibrāhīm in his Radd.332 However, this position implies that there are also 
numerous authentic segments remaining in the Gospels.333 ‘Ammār shows some 
acquaintance with these accusations, and, as we shall discuss later, dismisses both types of 
accusation and indeed, rejects the whole concept of taḥrīf as a clear impossibility.  
 
‘Ammār’s Arguments: the Structure  
In his response to the issue of taḥrīf, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī imagines a conversation or debate 
with a Muslim accuser. He begins with the presupposition that, as previously argued, the 
Christian religion has been established through wondrous miracles. There had been no 
earthly incentive or use of swords. Rather, those who had embraced Christianity had done 
so by divine compulsion through signs, تﺎـﻳﻵﺎﺑ ﷲ ﻦـﻣ ٌﺮـﻬﻗ. It followed, then, that the written 
Gospel that had been instrumental in the spread of Christianity was also confirmed on the 
basis of the same compulsion. This necessitated that the Gospel be true, and that full trust 
be given to its content.  
                                                                                                                                                   
the way people interpreted the scriptures? Up until today, we note that this ambiguity has given 
Arabic-speaking Christians an opportunity to defend the authenticity of their scriptures.       
332 Ignazio di Matteo, ed. and trans., “Confutazione contro i Cristiani dello zaydita al-Qasim b. 
Ibrahim,” Rivista degli Studi Orientali, 9 (1921), 321; cf. the new edition by Imām Ḥanafī ‘abd Allāh, Ar-
Radd ‘alā-n-Naṣārā: Rasā’il al-Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Ismā‘īl al-Rassī, 2 (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-
Āfāq al-‘Arabiyyah, 2000), 44. 
333 See Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Alleged Corruption,” 248-249. The sayings 
of Jesus, in particular, were seen “as largely authentic.” Mark Beaumont, “Muslim Readings of John’s 
Gospel in the ‘Abbasid Period,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 19, no. 2 (2008), 180.    
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‘Ammār agrees with his interlocutor that there are various interpretations of the 
Christian scriptures, but notes that this does not mean that the text has been altered. Rather, 
the very existence of different interpretations is a strong argument against those who accuse 
the scriptures of having been corrupted, for if they had been corrupted, ‘Ammār argues, it 
would be natural to expect all interpretations to agree.  
The interlocutor also finds the differences between the Gospel accounts to be further 
proof of corruption. ‘Ammār immediately raises the issue of the purpose that these 
corruptions would have served. What was it that the compilers of the Gospel would wish to 
hide? Did they want to attribute greatness to Christ? If this were the case, they would have 
omitted all the passages that speak of his human limitations. Or, perhaps they wanted to 
belittle him? If so, why would they compile the Gospel in the first place? Or, perhaps they 
wished to omit all the difficult sayings and expectations, and only affirm those that would be 
easy to follow. If so, they could have omitted the importance of leading a disciplined life of 
prayer and fasting, and instead, affirm polygamy. Or, they could have denied the historicity 
of the cross, affirming that Christ escaped it, and was taken up to heaven…etc.334  
Additionally, ‘Ammār maintains that the alleged corruption was in fact impossible 
because the Gospel differs from the Muslim scriptures not only in some details, but on major 
                                               
334 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses,  43-44. 
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issues. Whereas the first affirms the Sonship of Christ and the deity of the Spirit, the second 
denies this totally; likewise, the Gospel denies sexual intercourse in the life to come, while it 
is confirmed in the Qur’ān. ‘Ammār’s final conclusion is that neither the text of the Gospel, 
nor its meaning or interpretation, has been corrupted. It is simply impossible—either 
historically or theologically. ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī decisively rejects the accusation of taḥrīf, and 
objects to his interlocutor even using the word taḥrīf in connection with the Christian 
scriptures. According to him, even the accusation of falsification is not legitimate.335 He 
bases his case on the fact that Christianity was confirmed by divine signs, and not by earthly 
incentives. This strategy was common in Arab Christian apologetics during the ‘Abbasid 
caliphate. For example, this is what ‘Ammār’s contemporary, abū Rā’iṭah, had to say:       
It must be the case that Christianity is either true or false, and those who have 
accepted it are either wise or ignorant. Those who are wise will not accept what 
has not been demonstrated to be true by logical proof, except by compulsion, 
and the ignorant are not restrained from abandoning themselves to worldly 
things, except by compulsion. There are two kinds of compulsion: either it is 
compulsion by the sword or compulsion by signs from God.336  
                                               
335 Ibid., 41. 
336 Georg Graf, trans., Die Schriften des Jacobiten Ḥabīb ibn H̨idma abū Rā'iṭa, CSCO, 130 
(Louvain: L. Durbecq, 1951), 162; cf. Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 342. ‘Ammār 
also makes a clear reference to the sword and the desire for money as incentives for accepting a 
religion. He uses Arabic parallelism to say that Christianity has been accepted and people who 
adhered to it have turned from the obedience of Satan to follow God without the threat of the sword or 
the desire for money. Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 132. Abū Rā’iṭah indicates:  
”ﻻ نﻮﻜﺗ نأ ﻦﻣ ﺔّﻴﻧاﺮﺼﻨﻟا ﻮﻠﺨﺗ :اﻮﻧﻮﻜﻳ نأ ﻦﻣ ﺎﻫﻮﻠﺒﻗ ﻦﻳّﺬﻟاو ً؛ﻼﻃﺎﺑ ﺎّﻣإ ،ﺎًﻘﺣ ﺎّﻣإ :ءﻼﻬﺟ ﺎّﻣإو ،ءﻼُﻘﻋ ﺎّﻣإ.  نﻮﻠﺒﻘﻳﻻ ُءﻼُﻘﻌﻟاو
؛ﺮﻬﻘﻟﺎﺑ ّﻻإ لﻮﻘﻌﻤﻟا سﺎﻴﻘﻟﺎﺑ ّﺢﺼﻳ ﻻ ﺎﻣ ﻻ لﺎّﻬﺠﻟاو ﺮﻬﻘﻟﺎﺑ ّﻻإ ،ّﺔﻳﻮﻴﻧﺪﻟا تاّﺬﻠﻟا ﻲﻓ كﺎﻤﻬﻧﻻا ﻦﻣ نﻮﻌﻨﺘﻤﻳ .ُﺮﻬﻘﻟاوناﺮﻬﻗ  : ﺎـّﻣإ
ّﻣإو ،ﻒﻴﺴﻟﺎﺑ ٌﺮﻬﻗتﺎﻳﻵﺎﺑ ﷲ ﻦﻣ ٌﺮﻬﻗ ﺎ.   “  
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This line of reasoning provided Christian apologists such as ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī with a 
twofold strategy: on the one hand, they could employ it to prove that Christianity is true, and, 
on the other, they could indirectly attack Islam on account of its use of the sword. ‘Ammār 
himself makes brilliant use of all the arguments at his disposal to not only refute Islamic 
objections but also mount a counterattack.337 In this section, therefore, he appeals to 
“psychological,”338 historical and theological impossibilities in the corruption of the Christian 
scriptures.  
 
The Psychological Impossibility 
‘Ammār al-Baṣrī has argued that God removed miracles from the world after having 
established a religion through great wonders and unmistakable signs. The world does not 
need such miracles anymore; the real need is for the Gospel, which, as ‘Ammār puts it, has 
become “the miracles of God.”339 The Gospel itself is now the visible sign or miracle to all 
people.340 It appears that ‘Ammār is referring here to I‘jāz al-Injīl vis-à-vis I‘jāz al-Qur’ān—the 
                                               
337 See Mark Swanson, “Apology or its Evasion? Some Ninth-Century Arabic Christian Texts 
on Discerning the True Religion,” Currents in Theology and Mission, 37, no. 5 (October 2010), 389-
399.  
338 This term is quoted from Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 165. 
339 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 41  
340 Ibid. سّﺎﻨﻠﻟ ُةﺮﻫﺎﻈﻟا ُﺔﻳﻵا ﻮﻬﻓ 
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teaching that was being developed at the time.341 This line of argument made it necessary 
for ‘Ammār to rely on the use of al-Naql in the rest of his defense of the originality of the 
Gospel. This is evident in his teaching that the Gospel had become confirmed in the “whole 
world,” making further miracles unnecessary, but requiring that people now use their minds 
to discern the true religion. This discernment would lead them, he suggests, to both accept 
the truth of the Gospel and to believe it. However, just as the Gospel is proven to be correct 
through the miracles, it is now compelling people to accept it on the basis of its 
correctness.342      
He then affirms that those who had accepted the Gospel as first preached by Christ 
and then by his disciples, received it on account of signs and miracles.343 It then follows that 
in order to spread a false gospel, the falsifiers would have had to produce miracles so that 
people would welcome it. Now, to falsify it, the same type of compulsion would be required, 
just as in the beginning when the Gospel was first spread. He maintains:  
We have proven it to be impossible that the book of the Gospel was enforced 
by the sword or established because of earthly reasons, apart from heavenly 
signs; but rather it was accepted in the world by evident signs and obvious 
marvels; likewise there can be no place for its corruption apart from the 
compulsion of the signs accompanying it. It is equally impossible that it has 
                                               
341 See Issa Boullata, Iʻjāz al-Qur’ān al-Karīm ʻabra al-Tārīkh: Mukhtārāt (Bayrūt: al-
Mu’assasah al-ʻArabiyyah lil-Dirāsāt wal-Nashr), 2006.  
342 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 41.  
343 Cf. Gianmaria Gianazza, ed., Īliyyā II: Kitāb Ūṣūl al-Dīn, vol. 2, 319.  
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been falsified without compulsion of the miracles. For just as it was only 
accepted because of the compelling [evidence] of signs for it to be accepted, its 
change or falsification can only be accepted by the compulsion of signs. And 
signs do not occur at the hands of those who falsify the books of God. 344 
 
 ‘Ammār seems confident that with this strategy he has silenced the Muslim 
opposition—especially in his contention that the falsifiers of the Gospel must bring forth the 
same type of miracles, so that people will trust the new gospel. This is simply impossible, he 
says, for God does not allow those who falsify his books to perform any miracles. Thus, he 
asserts, the Christian scriptures have clearly never been altered.  
In addition, the existence of different interpretations of the widely accepted text of the 
Gospel stands as another witness to its originality. He makes a sharp differentiation between 
the revealed text )ﻞـﻳﺰﻨﺘﻟا(  and the interpreted one )ﻞـﻳوﺄﺘﻟا( , echoing the two types of taḥrīf 
mentioned in the Qur’ān and maintained by Muslim scholars. The very fact that there are 
variant interpretations provides a testimony to the genuineness of the revealed text. 
Christians disagree on the meaning of the same text, and “their difference in interpretation 
demonstrates the impossibility of the way they have been maligned concerning their 
                                               
344 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 41-42. ‘Ammār indicates:  
” ﺎّﻧإإ تﺎﻳﻵﺎﺑ ﻞﺑ ٍﺔﻴﺋﺎﻤﺳ ٍتﺎﻳآ ِﺮﻴﻐﺑ ،ِﺔّﻴﺿرﻷا ِبﺎﺒﺳﻷﺎﺑ ََﺖﺒَﺛ ﻻو ،ِﻒﻴﺴﻟﺎﺑ ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ﺮﻬﻘُﻳ ْﻢﻟ ْذإ ،َﻞِﺒ ُﻗ ﻞﻴﺠﻧﻹا ُبﺎﺘﻛ نﻮﻜﻳ ْنأ ﺎﻨْﻠﺣأ ﺎّﻨﻛ ْذ
 ِﺮﻴﻐﺑ ﻪﻔﻳﺮﺤﺗ نﺎﻜﻣ ﺎًﻀﻳأ ُﻞﻴﺤﺘﺴﻴﻓ ،ﻢﻟﺎﻌﻟا ﻲﻓ َﻞِﺒ ُﻗ تﺎﺤﺿاﻮﻟا مﻼﻋﻷاو ،تﺎﻨّﻴﺒﻟاﻪﻴﻠﻋ ِتﺎﻳﻵﺎﺑ ٍﺮﻬﻗ . ِﺮـﻬﻘﺑ ّﻻإ ﻞﺒﻘُﻳ ْﻢﻟ ﺎﻤﻛ ّﻪﻧﻷ
ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ِتﺎﻳﻵا ِﺮﻬﻘﺑ ّﻻإ ،سﺎﻨﻟا بﻮﻠﻗ ﻲﻓ َﺦَﺳَر ْنأ ﺪﻌﺑ ،ﻪُﻔﻳﺮﺤﺗو ُهﺮﻴﻴﻐﺗ ﺎًﻀﻳأ ﻞﺒﻘُﻳ ّﻻأ ّيﺮﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﻮﻬﻓ ،ﻪﻟﻮﺒﻗ ﻰﻠﻋ ِتﺎﻳﻵا . ﻻ ُتﺎﻳﻵاو
ﷲ ِﺐﺘﻜﻟ ﻦﻴّﻓﺮﺤﻤﻟا يْﺪﻳأ ﻰﻠﻋ ىَْﺮُﺠﺗ. “ 
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agreement in corrupting the revealed text.”345 ‘Ammār confidently repeats and assures the 
reader that “it has become apparent that this [the falsification of the scriptures] has never 
been possible.”346 ‘Ammār is certain that the interlocutor’s arguments are weak. If this were 
not the case, ‘Ammār would have refuted the accusations in more detail.347 
However, ‘Ammār also makes use of this argument to indirectly attack the Qur’ān 
itself. He makes it clear that “other religions” live in one land, under one rule,348 which would 
make it easy to falsify their scriptures. This seems to be a strong, yet indirect reference to 
Islam, and it is best understood in light of his repeated statement that the Gospel has been 
spread throughout the whole world. The phrase “the whole world” is repeated three times in 
‘Ammār’s defense.349 The whole world has accepted the Gospel due to the compulsion of 
miracles, whereas only “one group of people” living under “one king” accepted the other 
                                               
345 Ibid., 42. 
346 Ibid. In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār argues that it is out of God’s justice that the 
Gospel became available to people in their local languages; God did not make it obligatory for them to 
learn a certain language in order to read his book. Here again we see an indirect criticism of the 
Qur’ān, and its claim to universality. Speaking of God’s justice and the Gospel, ‘Ammār states:  
” هﺎﻳإ ﻪّﺜﺑ ﻲﻓ ﻪﻘﻠﺧ ﻊﻴﻤﺟ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻂﻴﺴﺒﻟا ﻪﻟﺪﻋ ﻦﻣ ﻢﻴﻠﺤﻟا اﺬﻫ ﺮﻬﻇأ ﺎﻣ ﺔﻴﻧﺎﺜﻟاو)ﻞﻴﺠﻧﻹا (ِﻢﻬﻴﻓ ًَﺪﺣأ ّﻒَﻠُﻜﻳ ﻢﻟو ،ﻢﻬﺗﺎﻐﻟ فﻼﺘﺧﺎﺑَا 
ﻐﻠﻟا ﻞﻫأ ﻦﻣﻪﻧﺎﺴﻟو ﻪﺘﻐﻟ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻳﺪﻟ ﺔﻓوﺮﻌﻤﻟا ىﻮﺳ ٍﺔﻐﻠﺑ ﻪَﻟﻮﺒﻗ ﺔﻔﻠﺘﺨﻤﻟا تﺎ. “  
“The second [proof] is that God who is compassionate showed His undifferentiated justice to 
all those He created to whom He sent forth the [Gospel] in the diversity of their languages. He did not 
require anyone from these different languages to accept it [the Gospel] in any language other than that 
which is known to him.” Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 131.     
347 Ibid., 45.  
348 Ibid., 42. 
349 Ibid., 41, 43, and 43. 
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book on account of the compulsion of the sword. The polemical point made here is not to be 
missed: the Qur’ān is vulnerable to corruption. 
 
The Historical Impossibility 
There is no possibility that there would be different interpretations of a text that Christians 
had agreed to alter, ‘Ammār goes on to say, for they have no king who might gather them all 
together to agree on how to corrupt a text. Nevertheless for the sake of argument, ‘Ammār 
tackles the assumption that the Roman king, that is the Byzantine emperor, could be the one 
behind the falsification of the scriptures. But he quickly rejects this accusation and 
emphasizes the historical fact that people clung fast to the scriptures, whether under the 
Roman or any other king, to the point that they actually died on account of their belief in its 
authenticity. ‘Ammār assures his opponent that even the power and authority enjoyed by the 
“Christian” emperor could not have been the source of the alleged taḥrīf.  
This is indeed an interesting ecumenical reference in the Kitāb al-Burhān, with ‘Ammār 
defending the moral and even theological integrity of the Chalcedonian king! Although Arab 
Christian theologians were fully aware of the variety of theological stances they adopted, 
they were still united in assuring the Muslims that the differences between the Christians 
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were minor.350 In his discourse confirming the incarnation, ‘Ammār makes this point even 
more strongly when he replies to the Muslim remark: “Christians disagree [regarding the 
incarnation].” He repeatedly argues that the differences that exist are minor in comparison 
with the general Christian consensus. Christians, he indicates, disagree only on 
terminology.351 
 ‘Ammār, with much assurance, puts another objection into the mouth of his 
interlocutor. The previous argument, he thinks, has left the opponent helpless. So, ‘Ammār 
helps the interlocutor by arguing on his behalf. Mockingly he writes:  
“But we will make it easy for you so that when it becomes difficult, despite its 
being easy, and becomes impossible, even though we have made allowances 
for you, you will then know that we have left you with no pretext, and it will 
become obvious to you that falsifying is absurd.”352  
 
Let us agree in theory, ‘Ammār argues on his opponent’s behalf, that the Roman king has 
corrupted the Gospel, which is at his disposal. The question then becomes: If the 
Chalcedonian Gospel has been corrupted, how then is it identical to those copies that are 
under the authority of other kings? The Roman king is thus innocent of the accusation, for 
the other copies are in textual conformity with the one under his authority. Therefore, he 
                                               
350 See Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 65.  
351 Samīr Samīr, “Khaṣā’ṣ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī al-Masīḥī al-Qadīm,” in the Near East School of 
Theology Quarterly, vol. 2, (February 1982), 156-190. See also Maqārūs T. Qaldas, “al-Fikr al-
Maskūnī fīl-Turāth al-Qibṭī,” (al-Qāhirah: Unpublished lecture).  
352 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 41.  
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asserts, history is not on the side of the Muslim interlocutor.  
However, the Muslim opponent argues that taḥrīf took place independently in different 
kingdoms under the auspices of various kings. Here ‘Ammār raises another historical 
difficulty by reminding his interlocutor that this cannot be the case as many Christian 
believers are under the rule of non-Christian kings. Further, ‘Ammār includes geography to 
support his argument of historical impossibility, and speculates concerning the location 
where these kings might have met to tamper with the scriptures. Did they trust each other to 
the point that they left their own kingdoms and went to one kingdom to do the business of 
taḥrīf? Who was that one king who was given such trust? And anyway, how did the Muslims 
know all this?!353    
 
The Theological Impossibility  
‘Ammār rejects the accusation that the variations in the Gospel accounts bear witness to the 
corruption of the text. What purpose would such corruptions serve? He maintains that, if the 
apostles had wanted to magnify more strongly Christ, they would not have spoken of his 
childhood, upbringing, eating and drinking, his death on the cross and burial, or those things 
that could be seen as belittling him or stressing his human limitations. Or, the argument goes 
                                               
353 Ibid., 43. 
 118 
on, was their actual purpose to disparage Christ? If so, why did they bother to record the 
Gospel at all? The Gospel speaks of Christ as the ruler and judge of the world to come, and 
if the purpose of the disciples was to minimize him, then it would have been more logical 
never to have honored him in the first place.354     
We are convinced that the next section of Kitāb al-Burhān stands as a witness to 
‘Ammār’s unique ingenuity as he indirectly turns the whole Muslim accusation of taḥrīf 
against the Qur’ān itself. This type of attack on the Qur’ān is to be found elsewhere only in 
the apology of al-Kindī who, having much pride in his “Arabness” and showing great skill in 
the Arabic language, actually points to the poor style of qur’ānic Arabic, which, he argues, 
borrows words from other languages.355 He evaluates such borrowing as a weakness in the 
text of the Qur’ān and strongly denounces the whole Qur’ān for being broken in rhythm, and 
confused in composition.  
‘Ammār, however, takes a different approach in his attack on the text of the Qur’ān. He 
points to the worldly teachings contained in it—teachings that he declares to be against the 
                                               
354 Ibid., 43-44. 
355 Al-Kindī argues: “If the claim be that (apart from all other tongues) the Coran is an 
unparalleled and miraculous model of Arabic (according to the text, Verily, We have sent down the 
Coran in the Arabic tongue, if perchance ye may comprehend); then, why do we find in it foreign 
words, as namâric from the Persian, and mishkât from the Abyssinian, vocabulary? Here is a defect 
either in the messenger or the message. If there be in the Arabic language no words to express the 
ideas, then the medium of communication, and therefore the message itself, is imperfect; if otherwise, 
the messenger.” William Muir, The Apology of Al Kindy, 30.  
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Gospel. He may have chosen this different strategy because, unlike al-Kindī, his Arab 
heritage was not at stake, nor was he as confident of his proficiency in Arabic. ‘Ammār 
addresses the qur’ānic teachings that contradict the Christian faith (such as the idea that 
Christ was “taken up to heaven” without ever being crucified), as well as tackling the 
concessions to fleshly desires (such as permission for men to marry many wives, and the 
hope of even greater sensual pleasures in the life to come)356 that are promised in the 
“corrupted book.” All these topics, needless to say, are classical themes in Christian-Muslim 
debates. Arab Christian writers—especially as evidenced in the works of abū Qurrah, al-
Kindī, abū Rā’īṭah and Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq—have traditionally utilized these tenets to attack 
the credibility of Islam.  
‘Ammār brilliantly utilizes these same arguments to show that it is the Qur’ān that is 
“the corrupted Gospel,” for it contains that which the Gospel forbids and affirms all that 
people would naturally allow. This falsified book, ‘Ammār maintains, contains everything that 
is easy for people to follow while also omitting everything that would be difficult to grasp and 
follow. He then lists several things that are affirmed in the Christian scriptures, and yet totally 
                                               
356 ‘Ammār also mentions six signs that the book is false: it permits what God forbids, people 
were forced at sword point to believe in it, people were prompted to believe in it by financial 
inducement, people believed in it on account of ethnic loyalty, people were deceived by magic arts 
into believing in it, and people were influenced by the rulers of the world who promote it.   
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denied in the corrupted writings.357 He argues thus: 
Or did they want to erase his [Jesus] laws which they found to be difficult and 
affirm that which was easy [for them]? Then, why have they not cut out the 
whole book? This would have been easier for them! They could have composed 
a book according to their own desires, in which they could have confirmed that 
when the Jews approached Christ, wanting to kill him, he blew on them with 
fiery breath and burned them, and he rose to heaven alive. Death did not affect 
him, nor any evil scourge. And [they could have said] that a man might marry as 
many wives as he wanted. They could have prohibited the affliction of their 
bodies by fasting, persistence in prayers, and the abandonment of pleasure, just 
as the Magi had done. That would have been more pleasant and easier for 
them. Yes, they could have confirmed in it [the book] what they reasoned would 
be delightful to them in the hereafter too, such as sexual intercourse, eating, 
drinking, and the like.358  
 
His argument here is especially brilliant, given that this text is speaking about the alleged 
reasons why Christ’s disciples would have altered the Gospel, but at the same time, he 
powerfully implies that it is Islam that has chosen to corrupt the truth. 
Once more, we can see both similarities and differences in the arguments of ‘Ammār 
and al-Kindī. Al-Kindī challenges the Muslim interlocutor to think and consider history, and to 
trust the testimony of his mind as he reads and considers the truth of the Qur’ān. He clearly 
                                               
357 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 166-167.  
358 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 44. ‘Ammār maintains:  
”و ،ﻪﻨﻨﺳ ﻦﻣ ﻢﻬﻴﻠﻋ ﺐﻌﺼﻳ ﺎﻣ َْﻮَﺤﻣ اودارأ وأَتﺎﺒﺛإ اﻮﻌﻀـﻳو ،ﻢﻬﻴـﻠﻋ ₋ﻒـﺧأ نﺎـﻛو ،ًﻼـﺻأ َبﺎﺘﻜﻟا اﻮﻄﻘﺴﻳ ْﻢﻟ َﻢﻠﻓ ؟ﻞُﻬﺴﻳ ﺎﻣ 
 ﻰـﻟإ ﻊـﻔﺗرا ﻪـّﻧأو ،ﻢﻬﻗﺮـﺣأو ًﺔﺨﻔﻧ ﻢﻬﻴﻠﻋ َﺦََﻔﻧ ْهﻮﺗﺄﻓ ﺢﻴﺴﻤﻟا َﻞْﺘَﻗ دﻮﻬﻴﻟا دارأ ﺎّﻤﻟ ّﻪﻧأ ﻪﻴﻓ اﻮﺘّﺒﺜﻳو ،نﻮﻬﺘﺸﻳ ﺎﻤﻛ ﺎًﺑﺎﺘﻛ ﻢﻬﺴﻔﻧﻷ
ا جوﺰﺘﻳ نأو ،ٌﺔﻓآ ﻪﺒﺼﺗ ْﻢﻟو ،ٌتﻮﻣ ﻪﻠﻨﻳ ْﻢﻟ ،ﺎﻴﺣ ءﺎﻤﺴﻟا نﺎـﻣدإو ،مﻮﺼـﻟﺎﺑ ﻢﻬﻧاﺪـﺑأ َﺐﻳﺬﻌﺗ اﻮﻣﺮﺤﻳو ،₋َﺐﺣأ ﺎﻣ ءﺎﺴﻨﻟا ﻦﻣ ُءﺮﻤﻟَ
سﻮﺠﻤﻟا ﻞﻌﻓ ﺎﻤﻛ تاّﺬﻠّﻟا كﺮﺗو ،تاﻮﻠﺼﻟا .ﻢﻬﻴﻠﻋ ّﻒﺧأو ﻢﻫﺪﻨﻋ ّﺬﻟأ نﺎﻛ ﻚﻟذ ّنﺈﻓ . ﻢﻫﺪﻨﻋ ًاﺬﻳﺬﻟ ﻪﻧﻮﻠﻘﻌﻳ ﺎﻣ ﻪﻴﻓ اّﻮﺘﺒﺛو ،ﻢﻌﻧ
ﻚﻟذ ﺮﻴﻏو ،باﺮﺸﻟاو ،ﻞﻛﻷاو ،حﺎﻜﻨﻟا ﻦﻣ ﺎًﻀﻳأ ةﺮﺧﻵا ﻲﻓ.“  
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contends that Muḥammad made a book for himself and forced it on people.359 But ‘Ammār 
differs from al-Kindī, who uses qur’ānic verses to argue for the genuineness of the Christian 
scriptures. Al-Kindi makes it clear that both the Qur’ān and Muḥammad himself testify to the 
Gospel as the Word of God. He appeals to the text of sūrah 2:121 and 10:49.360 But, 
‘Ammār, while displaying great knowledge of the Muslim scripture, and referring to it in other 
sections of Kitāb al-Burhān, refrains from using any qur’ānic verses to support the 
genuineness of the Gospel. This is a reasonable approach, given that he has just accused 
the Qur’ān of being erroneous. There would be no reason to quote evidence from a falsified 
book; instead, the use of logic would be more useful and fitting than the use of scriptural 
proofs.                   
‘Ammār makes it clear that, due to these fundamental differences between the 
Christian scriptures and the falsified book, it is theologically impossible to contend that the 
Gospel has been altered. Since it still contains what seems difficult and demanding, it must 
be God’s true book. As we saw earlier in the discussion of the reasons for accepting a 
religion, these difficulties in Christianity were used to prove the credibility of Christian 
                                               
359 William Muir, The Apology of Al Kindy, 114-115.  
360 “Those to whom We have sent the Book! study it as it should be studied; they are the ones 
that believe therein; those who reject faith therein the loss is their own….Say: “I have no power over 
any harm or profit to myself except as Allah willeth. To every People is a term appointed: when their 
term is reached, not an hour can they cause delay, nor (an hour) can they advance (it in anticipation).” 
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doctrine, and to show that its spread was due to the compelling nature of God’s miraculous 
works.361 Now, however, ‘Ammār utilizes the same argument, and exactly the same words 
and phrases, referring to fasting, prayer, and the denial of the pleasures of life, to vindicate 
the authenticity of the scriptures. These humbling practices, which are shared by all 
Christians, are a testimony, he says, to the credibility of the scriptures.362  
In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār also makes the argument that the Qur’ān is 
the Gospel corrupted, but this time his tone is more polemical. ‘Ammār argues that the laws 
of the Gospel are consistent with the character of God, unlike misleading laws that are the 
work of the leaders of delusion.363 The interesting word here is ﺔﻤﺋأ, which refers explicitly to 
Muslims. The religious leaders of Islam, he charges, have altered the book. Escalating the 
attack against Islam, ‘Ammār says these misleading laws include the “lewd things” of the 
                                               
361 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 39.  
362 Cf. Gianmaria Gianazza, ed., Īliyyā II: Kitāb Ūṣūl al-Dīn, vol. 2, 336. ‘Ammār connects the 
Christian teachings that denounce the lavish lifestyle of the powerful to the issue of taḥrīf. He argues 
that even the kings, and those who have authority, majesty and pride, and who are also Christian, are 
in full agreement with the ethical hardships enjoined in the Gospel. The powerful Christian elite 
worship a crucified “man,” marry only one woman, and are also committed to prayer and fasting. Thus 
‘Ammār makes his case that a book that had been corrupted would never present such demanding 
moral standards and that not even a single letter of the Gospel has been altered. He concludes: “And 
since they have not changed what was found to be difficult with what was easy, as we have 
described, it is clear they have not changed one letter in the book of God away from its place.”  See 
Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 44. 
363 Ibid., 129.  
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world, such as polygamy.364  
Elsewhere in the same work, he states that they (his imagined Muslim accusers), with 
the help of their religious leaders, are the ones who have falsified their book and included in 
it accusations of taḥrīf with regard to the Gospel. ‘Ammār states, “No, it is you who corrupted 
your own book, )ﻢﻜَﺑﺎـﺘﻛ نﻮـّﻓﺮﺤﻤﻟا ﻢﺘـﻧأ ﻞـﺑ( .365 This accusation is repeated again in question 
forty-three of al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, where he is obviously attacking the leaders of Islam, 
saying, “This is out of the actions of your religious leaders who carried out the falsification of 
their books.”366 At this point in his argument, ‘Ammār expects that his interlocutor will unable 
to refute his arguments and must now acknowledge the correctness of the Gospel! 
Although ‘Ammār clearly makes a case against the Qur’ān in both of his works, he 
never once refers explicitly to the Qur’ān when he is criticizing it. He always uses a phrase 
such as “your book,” “their book,” “the book,” etc. However, when he explicitly mention the 
Qur’ān, it is always within a non-controversial statement. For example, in al-Masā’īl wal-
                                               
364 See sūrah 4: 2 “If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry 
women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with 
them), then only one, or that which your right hands possess. That will be more suitable, to prevent 
you from doing injustice.” 
365 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 146.  
366 Ibid., 249. ‘Ammār says, “ ّﻟو ﻦﻳّﺬﻟا ﻢّﻜﺘﻤﺋأ لﺎﻌﺘﻓا ﻦﻣ ﻚﻟذ ﺎﻤّﻧإﻢﻬﺒﺘﻛ ﻒﻳﺮﺤﺗ اﻮ ” Noteworthy here is 
the verb ـّﻟواﻮ , which is used in exactly the same manner in abū Rā’īṭah’s First Risalah on the Holy 
Trinity. Abū Rā’īṭah, however, borrows this verb from the Muslim interlocutor who indicates that the 
ones who falsified the scriptures are the Jews, دﻮـﻬﻴﻟا ﺎـﻬﻔﻳﺮﺤﺗ اﻮـّﻟو ﻦﻳﺬـّﻟا ّنإ. See Sandra Keating, 
Defending the “People of Truth,” 208.  
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Ajwibah, he speaks of the “founder of the Qur’ān” and the consistency of his actions with 
what is written in the Qur’ān. Had Muḥammad’s actions been in contradiction with the 
Qur’ān, ‘Ammār argues, people “would have rejected his religion, and refused to accept his 
book.”367 Most probably, the socio-political context of ‘Ammār’s time would be the primary 
reason for such indirect criticisms of the Qur’ān.368          
Moreover, ‘Ammār seeks to compare the doctrines of the Gospel with the teaching of 
Islam, in order to demonstrate that the actual text of the Christian scripture, let alone the 
interpretation of it, is fundamentally different from the Qur’ān. The doctrines he highlights 
are: baptism in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the eternal existence of 
the Word by which all was created; the deity of the Holy Spirit; and the absence of sexual 
intercourse, food and drink in the life to come. All of these teachings, according to ‘Ammār, 
contradict the Qur’ān.369  
 ‘Ammār goes on to conclude that, if one denies the Sonship of Christ, it follows that 
one will also deny the Father. He then makes his case against his Muslim interlocutor who, 
according to Kitāb al-Burhān, denies the Spirit, diminishing him as only “from God” in 
                                               
367 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 145-146. 
368 A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs, 12.   
369 See Adel Théodore Khoury, “al-Islām fī Minẓār al-Lāhūt,” 283. 
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contrast to the biblical witness, which claims that “the Spirit is God.”370 This same contrasting 
viewpoint is also applied to the Word, for while the interlocutor believes the Word to be 
created, the Gospel, says ‘Ammār, is clear that “the Word has never ceased to be; it is 
divine.”371 The reference made here to the Word being created is presumably a reference to 
the classical Mu‘tazilī doctrine of the createdness of the Word of God.372      
‘Ammār’s concluding words make it clear that the Gospel—whether in its revealed text 
or as interpreted—is authentic.373 But in doing so, he often uses a sarcastic tone, which 
reveals the polemical character of his works. He declares that the Muslim objectors have not 
been given the privilege of knowing the truth of the Gospel. Further, they are misleading 
others into denying the truth of the scriptures. If they had been given grace, they would 
definitely have kept and followed what the entire Gospel teaches. But since this grace of 
knowledge was not granted to them, they find many things in the scriptures to be distasteful 
and unacceptable, and choose to attack the Christian scriptures instead. Muslims, he 
argues, are attracted to that which seems easy for the human mind to accept; they believe in 
things according to their appearance. When things look difficult, they leave them and keep to 
                                               
370 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 45.  
371 Ibid. 
372 Al-Ashʻarī, Maqālāt, 245-247.  
373 Mark Beaumont makes the argument that the length of the section of ‘Ammār’s defense of 
the revealed scriptures seems to indicate that the taḥrīf of revealed text, not its misinterpretation, was 
the issue at stake. Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Alleged Corruption of the Gospels,” 255.     
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the easy way. In doing so, ‘Ammār claims, Muslims resemble children, who only like what 
seems pleasurable to them and run away from any difficulties. ‘Ammār likens this Muslim 
attitude to those who, because of their “ignorance and pursuit of pleasures,” take the broad 
path—the end of which is their destruction. This is opposite to the response of Christians, 
who follow the difficult way and deny worldly pleasures. Their way will ultimately lead to their 
good. ‘Ammār puts it this way:  
Had they themselves been convinced by the truth, they would not have rejected 
from the book [the Gospel] things whose actual meaning they have found to be 
distasteful by virtue of the callousness of their minds. They are too stubborn to 
know the inner meaning [of these things]. So, they have blamed the book, after 
it compels them to witness that it was the miracles of God, which men cannot 
do, that have been confirmed in the world. But they prefer what is easier for 
their tongues and only accept things, at first glance, on account of their good 
appearance. They have no patience to try to penetrate deeply into it. If the inner 
[side] proves to contradict the beautiful outer appearance, they take on the 
appearance of children who prefer what is easy and good looking, even if it is to 
their detriment, and anyone who follows the wider way such as this, on account 
of ignorance, follows his pleasures, even if it leads to a predatory beast which 
will eat him, instead of following the narrow and difficult way, even if it leads to 
what is good for him.374 
 
These words are judgmental and accusatory. Muslims are far from the truth, they are 
pleasure-seeking people, they do not think thoroughly or deeply, and they omit things from 
the scriptures. All this they do on account of the callousness of their minds, which will 
eventually lead to their destruction. This word ﻢُﻫُدﺎﺴـﻓ( ) not only means destruction and 
                                               
374 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 45-46. 
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decay, but can also mean corruption.375 ‘Ammār seems to suggest that not only is the Qur’ān 
the Christian scriptures in corrupted form, but that the Muslims themselves are also 
corrupted, for they follow the wrong way. The choice of words here is very significant, 
especially when we remember that the image ‘Ammār is using comes directly from Matthew 
7:13-14.376 ‘Ammār integrates these words into his apologetics, but carefully plays on words 
and changes “destruction” to “corruption.”      
Comparison shows that all ‘Ammār’s arguments concerning the theological 
impossibility of taḥrīf are similar to those of abū Qurrah. In Discourse on the True Religion, 
abū Qurrah writes of a certain king’s son who was the object of revenge by the king’s 
enemies. Knowing that the son was sick, and knowing that his father had sent him a book 
containing a medical cure, they came to him and claimed that their book was the right one, 
and would be able to heal his disease. The son, however, was advised to examine the book 
before he consumed the medicine, to see whether it truly provided help. Discerning which 
book is true is of utmost importance.377 Thus, abū Qurrah concludes that it is only possible 
for one true book to contain the remedy for sickness. It is here that we note interesting 
                                               
375 Edward W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, 2396. 
376 “Enter by the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the way is easy that leads to 
destruction, and those who enter by it are many. For the gate is narrow and the way is hard that leads 
to life, and those who find it are few.” 
377 Louis Cheikho, “Traité inédit de Théodore Abou-Qurra (Abucara), évêque Melchite de 
Harrān, (ca. 740-820), sur l’Existence de Dieu et de la Vraie Religion,” al-Mashriq, 15, Bayrūt 1912), 
770-771.  
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parallels between ‘Ammār’s discourse on taḥrīf and abū Qurrah’s parable. The latter argues 
that the book sent by the king contains information about the king (God), a description of the 
disease with which the son (Adam) was afflicted, and, finally, the remedy. Abū Qurrah 
intelligently proves that only the true Gospel presents these three in a way that matches the 
needs and judgment of the mind. Even though ‘Ammār argues differently, we can trace 
similar elements in his description of the false book and abū Qurrah’s description of the false 
apostles who wrote the books. ‘Ammār argues that the falsified book denies the Sonship of 
the Word of God and thus denies God, and allows things that God forbids.378 This is exactly 
what abū Qurrah means by “a fancy book,” which the false apostles presented to the son, in 
the parable of the hidden king.379  
 
‘Ammār’s Christian Context 
Timothy I met the caliph al-Mahdī face-to-face and therefore had to respond to the questions 
set by the caliph. Al-Mahdī alleged that the Bible predicted the coming of Muḥammad, and 
that “Paraclete” was a reference to the prophet of Islam. The defense of the Christian 
                                               
378 “They would have prohibited the affliction of their bodies by fasting, persisting in prayers, 
and abandoning pleasure, just as the Magi had done. Yes, they could have confirmed in it [the book] 
what they reason to be pleasant for them in the everlasting world too, such as sexual intercourse, 
eating, drinking, and the like.” Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 44. 
379 See Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 212-216. 
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understanding of the Paraclete380 therefore occupies a significant portion of Timothy I’s 
apology. However, this discussion is totally absent from ‘Ammār’s corpus. ‘Ammār chose to 
ignore this issue and instead developed a new attack on the Qur’ān itself.381 While Timothy I 
had no choice, we can speculate that ‘Ammār and al-Kindī had relative freedom in choosing 
which topics to include in their works. 
‘Ammār opted for the more important historical questions that pose real difficulties for 
the Muslim interlocutor. “Where is the uncorrupted copy of the Gospel,” Christians 
demanded. “Bring it forth and I will believe it.” This accusation was clearly raised in both al-
Kindī’s apology and Timothy I’s conversation with al-Mahdī. Both theologians use it with 
great skill, reducing the Muslim objection to absurdity, and in return, asking the Muslim for 
the impossible. Timothy I concludes: “If there is such a book let it be placed in the middle in 
order that we may learn from it which is the corrupted Gospel and hold to that which is not 
corrupted. If there is no such Gospel, how do you know that the Gospel of which we make 
use is corrupted?”382 
                                               
380 A. Guthrie, “The Paraclete, Almunhamanna and Aḥmad,” in The Muslim World, 41 (1951), 
251–256; and Montgomery Watt, “His Name is Aḥmad,” in The Muslim World, 43, Issue 2 April (1953), 
110–117.  
381 In addressing this issue, Mark Beaumont argues, “It seems that he [‘Ammār] prefers to 
deal with the allegation of Christian corruption of the Gospels in a more general way.” Mark 
Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Alleged Corruption of the Gospels,” 243.     
382 Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 35-36. Showing greater confidence, 
Timothy I goes on to declare: “To tell the truth, if I had found in the Gospel a prophecy concerning the 
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‘Ammār also reflects on Timothy I’s argument concerning miracles and the corruption 
of scriptures. Timothy I makes it clear to al-Mahdī that the Gospel was confirmed and 
established in the world on account of the divine miracles, and, as he puts it, had abrogated 
the Old Testament, and thus established Christianity. If the Qur’ān was a new revelation 
from God, he argues, it must also be demonstrated by miracles, and thereby show that the 
older revelation, i.e., the Gospel, has been annulled. However, since this is not the case, and 
since the Qur’ān itself has no single miracle attributed to Muḥammad, then the conclusion is 
clear!383 
Like Timothy I, both al-Kindī and abū Rā’īṭah chose to make use of the enmity between 
Christians and Jews to support their argument on the authenticity of the scriptures.384 All the 
aforementioned theologians make the case that, since there is no peace between the two 
groups who hold the two parts of the Christian scriptures, it is impossible to assume that they 
gathered together and agreed among themselves to corrupt the scriptures.385 The scriptures, 
                                                                                                                                                   
coming of Muhammad, I would have left the Gospel for the Kur’an, as I have left the Torah and the 
Prophets for the Gospel,” Ibid., 36.   
383 Ibid., 37.  
384 Sandra Keating, “Refuting the Charge of Taḥīf,” 55.  
385 Timothy I assures al-Mahdī that: “If the Christians and the Jews are enemies, and if there 
is no possibility that enemies should have a common agreement on the line that divides them, it was 
therefore impossible for the Christians and the Jews to agree on the corruption of the books. Indeed 
the Jews disagree with us on the meaning of some verbs and nouns, tenses and persons, but 
concerning the words themselves they have never had any disagreement with us. The very same 
words are found with us and with them without any changes. Since the Torah and the Prophets teach 
 131 
by virtue of the enmity between Jews and Christians, are thus proved trustworthy.  
 
Discourse on the Gospels: An Evaluation 
According to ‘Ammār, the credibility of the Gospel relates essentially to the credibility of 
Christianity: both were attested as true by miracles. Moreover, the Gospel account was 
essential to uphold Christianity, since miracles had ceased to occur. The whole system of 
Christian belief is dependent on what the Gospel has to say about God. The Muslim 
accusation of taḥrīf must therefore be answered with powerful counterattacks. This is what 
‘Ammār attempted to do in his general defense of the Gospel. He makes it clear that “not 
even a single letter of the Gospel has been altered,”386 and introduces innovative arguments 
in its defense. In so doing, he invalidates all of Islam by destroying its scriptural basis, and 
reduces the Qur’ān to a mere book of human invention, containing things that people 
naturally desire to follow and which would ultimately lead them to destruction.387  
‘Ammār’s words reflect his historical context. He repeatedly expresses deep frustration 
at the Muslim misunderstanding of Christian doctrines. We will clearly see this when we 
                                                                                                                                                   
the truth of Christianity, we would have never allowed ourselves to corrupt them, and that is the 
reason why, O our victorious Sovereign, we could have never tampered with the Torah and the 
Prophets.” Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 57, cf. sūrah 2:113.    
386 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 44. 
387 Ibid., 46.  
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examine his defense of the cross and the incarnation. Muslims do not seek to make sense of 
the apparent difficulties with the Gospel. Instead, they jump to hasty conclusions, one of 
which is that the Gospel must have been corrupted. This frustrates ‘Ammār and forces him, 
in a sense, to employ harsh language to answer the accusation, to the point that he ridicules 
his opponent, describing him as someone acting like a child.  
‘Ammār’s defense is powerful and clear, and his conclusion is sweeping and 
unambiguous: taḥrīf is just impossible, the Gospel has been authenticated by miracles, and 
there is no possibility that it was falsified—either in its content, or in its interpretation. Neither 
history nor theology is on the side of the Muslim interlocutor. ‘Ammār’s confidence in the 
Gospel is evident, and he shows no hesitation in raising objection after objection to 
demonstrate the impossibility of the Muslim argument and the logic of his position.  
However, ‘Ammār ignores the alleged biblical references to Muḥammad, and gives no 
attention to the Paraclete argument. Perhaps he considers the arguments he utilizes to be 
sufficient. A denial of Muḥammad, furthermore, would probably have jeopardized his life. So 
instead, he chooses to dismiss the whole text of the Qur’ān indirectly—a common approach 
in much of the Arabic Christian literature within the Islamic empire.388 His attempt is brilliant, 
and full of originality. He stands alone among Arab Christians in marshalling his arguments 
                                               
388 Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Alleged Corruption of the Gospels,” 225.  
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both forcefully and sensitively. His conclusions are compelling. All in all, the 
comprehensiveness of his apology for the authenticity of scriptures, and the quality of his 
arguments are no doubt “finer than any that are to be found in subsequent apologetic 
literature.”389 
Having argued for the credibility of the Gospel, ‘Ammār next addresses a much more 
difficult issue, namely the doctrine of the Trinity. How could he explain the Trinity given his 
Islamic milieu, and his previous arguments concerning the reasons for the acceptance of 
Christianity and the oneness of God? This is our next topic of study. 
                                               
389 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 52, quoted from Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-
Baṣrī on the Alleged Corruption of the Gospels,” 250.   
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The Discourse on the Trinity  
‘Ammār takes on the daunting task of explaining the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. This is 
indeed an “intricate topic,” as Sidney Griffith calls it,390 and it abounds with issues in need of 
clarification, given the foundational Islamic doctrine of the absolute oneness of God. ‘Ammār 
seeks to establish the veracity of the Christian view of God’s triune nature as best fitting 
God’s attributes of ‘existence’ ‘speech’ and ‘life.’ But, before discussing ‘Ammār’s arguments 
and methodology, we must first understand how the Trinity is viewed within Islamic theology. 
 
The Doctrine of the Trinity and Islam  
Attributing any plurality to God’s essence is seen, according to Islamic thinking, as 
associating gods with God,391 which is considered a mortal sin committed against God. 
Indeed, the Qur’ān affirms the oneness of God in several places,392 while it clearly rejects the 
Christian belief in the Trinity.393 Consequently, it was inevitable that Muslim theologians 
would go to great lengths to refute such a doctrine, as it was seen, alongside the doctrine of 
                                               
390 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 168.   
391 See Ghassān Sālim, Maḥāwir al-Iltiqā’ wa-Maḥāwir al-Iftirāq bayna al-Masīḥiyyah wal-
Islām (Bayrūt: Dār al-Ṭalīʻah lil-Ṭibāʻah wal-Nashr, 2004), 215-233. 
392 See for example sūrah 34:20-24; 35:40; 46:4.  
393 See for example sūrah 4:171; 5:17, 72-73; 5:116; 9:30-31; 43:59.    
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incarnation, to deny God’s oneness and transcendence.394 ‘Alī ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī and al-
Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm made considerable headway in their refutation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Al-Ṭabarī in his Radd indicates that the “Silencing Questions” he raises against 
Christianity concerns the doctrine of tawḥīd, asserting the oneness of God.395 Thus, he 
accuses Christians of كﺮﺷ, as they claim to believe in God but also think of Christ as God.396 
He then lists human actions performed by Christ which are completely incompatible with the 
eternal essence of God, and concludes that the doctrine of the Trinity is totally invalid. 
Rather it confirms the Islamic understanding of tawḥīd.397  
Likewise, al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm writes against the Trinity at the beginning of his Radd, 
stating that since “Lordship only belongs to God,”398 it follows that the essence of Christ is no 
different from the essence of Christians.399 In his Radd, al-Qāsim shows great depth in his 
understanding of the Christian position, and his summary of what the various Christian sects 
                                               
394 Muṣṭafā Būhindī, al-Ta’thīr al-Masīḥī fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān: Dirāsah Taḥlīliyyah Muqāranah 
(Bayrūt: Dār al-Ṭalīʻah, 2004), 178-182. 
395 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 121; cf. See Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-
Uqnūm,” 184.  
396 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 123; cf. al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 204. 
397 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 124-131.  
398 Ibid., 18.  
399 Ibid. Cf. David Thomas, Anti-Christian Polemic in Early Islam: abū ʻĪsā al-Warrāq's 
“Against the Trinity,” University of Cambridge Oriental Publications, no. 45 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 33. 
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believe is quite accurate.400 In his summaries, he even mentions certain analogies used by 
Christians at the time to prove the truth of the Trinity, particularly the analogy of the sun.401  
How then does ‘Ammār explain the Trinity to his opponents? 
   
What is “One”?  
In this section, ‘Ammār immediately engages with the difficulty of defining the oneness of 
God, thus engaging the theological issues discussed among the Muslim intellectuals of his 
time.402 His opening words, ﺪـﺣاﻮﻟا ﻦـﻋ ﻢُُﻬﻟﺄﺴﻨﻓ ُئﺪﺘﺒﻧ ﻦﺤﻨﻓ, “We begin with asking them about 
the ‘one’,’’ are indicative of a polemical starting point, as he instantly sets out to challenge 
the Islamic view, providing no preface or introductory statements concerning the Trinity.403  
This becomes clearer through a comparison of the opening words here with other 
statements made at the beginning of other new sections in Kitāb al-Burhān. For example, 
when he moved from speaking about the existence of God to discerning the true religion, he 
opened with these words, “Since we have demonstrated the existence of our Creator...”404 
Likewise, in moving from explaining the reasons why Christianity was accepted, to refuting 
                                               
400 Ibid., 34. 
401 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 33-35; cf. Wilferd Madelung, “al-Qāsim and 
Christian Theology,” ARAM 3 (1991), 43.  
402 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 169.  
403 Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 180.  
404 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 24. 
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the accusation of taḥrīf, he prefaced his argument by saying, “Since it has become correct to 
us that the Christian religion was confirmed on account of miracles…”405 And again, when 
we look at his opening words concerning the divine unity, he writes, “Since we have 
demonstrated our faith in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit...”406 Thus, it seems safe to 
conclude that ‘Ammār intentionally uses these connecting sentences in order to establish 
new arguments based on earlier ones already established. 
However, this feature is absent in his section on the Trinity, and there is no missing 
folio where such a link could have been made. Indeed, the discourse on the Trinity falls in 
the middle of folio 17a in the BL MS. This leaves us with one probability: arguments 
concerning the doctrine of the Trinity occupied a fundamental place in the Islamic polemical 
literature against Christianity, and, in turn ‘Ammār realized the urgency of refuting the Islamic 
view of the oneness of God and vindicating the Christian Trinitarian view. In fact, not only is 
this section of Kitāb al-Burhān the only one without any introductory statements, but it is also 
the only one that starts with a question. 
In addition, the opening paragraph includes the outline of the entire discourse to follow. 
‘Ammār begins by refuting the Islamic view of the oneness of God, proving that Muslims, 
though easily confessing the oneness of God, deny God; and while they say that God is 
                                               
405 Ibid., 41. 
406 Ibid., 56. 
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living and speaking, actually make God a lifeless and non-verbal God, and ultimately even 
deny God’s oneness.407 Next, ‘Ammār firmly states that the Muslim interlocutor has no right 
to question Christians on issues related to their doctrines, which come from the biblical 
witness. He writes:  
We begin by asking them about the ‘One’ who is easy for their tongues to 
confess, and they proclaim Him without verifying the real meaning of His 
knowledge. Because there is contradiction between the apparent meaning of 
their words and their representation of the Creator as inanimate, without ‘life,’ 
and ‘word’ yet calling him ‘alive’ and ‘speaking,’ we will explain what we say for 
those who want to benefit from understanding it. We must question them over 
their saying....it is possible for them to prove that their book, which speaks of 
this [type of oneness], was [not] confirmed by the miracles of God. But it is not 
required again to prove to them that the Gospel has been accepted on account 
of miracles. They are not to question us about anything which it tells us and 
calls us to do. They are to trust our testimony coming out of the 
straightforwardness of our understanding and knowledge.  408  
 
‘Ammār raises two controversial points here. He rebuts the Islamic view of the 
oneness of God, arguing that, according to it, God is in fact denied.409 Then he makes a 
                                               
407 Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 181. Timothy I utilizes the same strategy to 
show that one who denies these attributes in God’s being must be seen as “blasphemous!” Hans 
Putman, L’église et l’islam sous Timothée I: étude sur l’Église Nestorienne au temps des premiers 
ʻAbbāsides. Avec nouvelle édition et traduction du Dialogue entre Timothée et al-Mahdi (Bayrūt: Dār 
al-Mashriq, 1974), 13-14; cf. Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de Théodore Aboucara, 44; cf. Samuel 
Noble and Alexander Treiger, “Christian Arabic Theology in Byzantine Antioch: ‘abd Allāh ibn al-Faḍl 
al-Anṭākī and his Discourse in the Holy Trinity,” Le Muséon, 124 (2011), 405.  
408 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 46. 
409 Cf. abū Rā’iṭah’s similar argument in Salīm Dukkāsh, abū Rāʼiṭah al-Tikrītī wa-Risālatuh “fīl-
Thālūth al-Muqaddas” (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 1996), 66.  
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more provocative point by speaking indirectly against the Qur’ān. His implied accusation is 
that, unlike the Christian Gospel, the Qur’ān was not affirmed by miracles. This statement is 
actually not completely clear in Kitāb al-Burhān, as the ink of the negative particle is 
smeared. The text reads, “We must question them over their saying. It is…possible for them 
to prove that their book, which speaks of this [type of oneness], was confirmed by the 
miracles of God.”410 This statement, however, is clear in the epitome of al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assāl. 
Al-Ṣafī writes, “Since it is not possible for them to prove that their book was accepted and 
was confirmed by miracles.”411 ‘Ammār pointedly refuses the claim that the Qur’ān was 
validated by miracles.        
Further, ‘Ammār starts his refutation of the Islamic view of the oneness of God by 
analyzing the grammar of the Arabic language and the way nouns are related to adjectives. 
He identifies the meaning of the word ‘one.’ According to his analysis, a correct 
understanding of God’s oneness is foundational for understanding the logic of the doctrine of 
the Trinity.412 Muslims, he argues, do not grasp the meaning of the oneness of God, even 
though they ceaselessly confess it. They have failed to carefully examine its meaning and 
implications. This will be addressed at greater length below.  
                                               
410 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 46.  
411 Charfeh MS folio 117a.  
412 David Thomas, “Changing Attitudes of Arab Christians towards Islam,” Transformation, 
22/1 (Jan. 2005), 14.   
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Once again, we are struck by ‘Ammār’s polemical attitude as he mockingly prefaces 
his question with the statement: “Tell me, O you who believe in the ‘one’…”413 This language, 
as seen earlier in ‘Ammār’s refutation of the allegation of taḥrīf, reflects his self-confidence. 
Modern Arabic-speakers use the same structure when frustrated with the other’s arguments. 
‘Ammār makes his interlocutor admit that God is ‘living,’ and examines the true meaning of 
the ‘life’ of God. What is the relationship between God’s being and God’s life? Is God’s life 
found in Godself ‘eternal,’ or is it added to God’s being as an ‘accidental’ life. Such a 
question is exceedingly problematic for his Muslim counterpart. The first option is to say that 
the life of God is essential to God’s being, “as it is in the soul of a human being, a ‘life’ in its 
substantial essence, and part of him.”414 According to ‘Ammār’s reasoning, if the interlocutor 
accepts this position, he is thereby agreeing with the Christian position. This is unthinkable, 
as it would mean that the Islamic view concerning the oneness of God is simply wrong, and 
that it is being corrected by the Christian view! The other choice before ‘Ammār’s interlocutor 
is equally difficult. If life in God’s being is neither essential nor accidental, then God is 
portrayed as a being without life, i.e., God is lifeless.415 This option is also impossible, as 
                                               
413 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 46. 
414 Ibid. 
415 See Wilferd Madelung, “al-Qāsim and Christian Theology,” 37. 
 141 
Islam, on the basis on qur’ānic verses, describes God as ‘living.’416 ‘Ammār shows that he is 
acquainted with such teaching, and asks his counterpart theologian: “How do you claim the 
name ‘the living one?’”417 ‘Ammār’s interlocutor is inevitably faced with the difficult 
conclusion: Islam believes that God has no essential life.418   
The support for ‘Ammār’s problematic question comes from discussions between Arab 
linguists of his day concerning the relationship between nouns and adjectives. It should be 
noted that, under the auspices of al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad and his pupil Sībawayh, who wrote the 
monumental work al-Kitāb,419 this time in history witnessed a formative period in Arabic 
grammar. The grammarians agreed that the adjective could be used as a noun, since it is 
ultimately derived from a noun; and that adjectives and nouns are related by a denotative 
                                               
416 See for example sūrah 2:225, 3:2, and 20:111. 
417 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 47. 
418 This argument is similarly made by Ilīyā the Patriarch of Nisibis (11th century). Ilīyā, 
however, indicates that, since God is the only self-subsisting being, it is necessary that God must have 
life. And it follows that the source of life must have life. See Paul Sbath, Vingt traités philosophiques, 
et apologétiques d’auteurs arabes chrétiens du IXe au XIXe siècles (al-Qāhirah: H. Friedrich, 1929), 
100.  
419 See Louis Gardet and Georges Anawatī, Falsafat al-Fikr al-Dīnī bayna al-Islām wal-
Masīḥiyyah, vol. 1, trans. Ṣubḥī Ṣāliḥ and Farid Jabre (Bayrūt: Dār al-ʻIlm lil-Malāyīn, 1978), 71-72; cf. 
T.J. de Boer, Tārīkh al-Falsafah fīl-Islām, trans. M. ʻabd al-Hādī abū Rīdah (al-Qāhirah: Maktabat al-
Nahḍah al-Maṣrīyah, 1938), 54-57. See also Sībawayh, ʻAmr ibn ʻUthmān, al-Kitāb, vol. I (al-Qāhirah: 
al-Maṭbaʻa al-Kubrā al-Amīrīyah, 1898), 313, 314; and Werner Diem, “Noun, Substantive and 
Adjective according to Arab Grammarians,” in The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition : The 
Formation of the Classical Islamic World, vol. 36, ed. Ramzī Baʻlabakkī (Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 
2007), 279-299, 282ff. See also Khalīl ibn Aḥmad, Kitāb al-ʻAyn: Awl Muʻjam fīl-Lughah al-ʻArabiyyah 
(Baghdād: Maṭbaʻat al-ʻĀnī), 1967.  
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function, i.e., that there is a certain relationship between the adjective and the noun it 
describes. Or, to use Griffith’s words, “The assumption was that verbal adjectives are 
derived from nouns, and nouns by their very nature indicate entities.”420 This is exactly what 
‘Ammār points to in his argument that only the one who has ‘life’ is called ‘living.’ The 
adjective (attribute) ‘living’ is only correct when referring to one who has life. If this 
relationship is broken, then there is no life in that one whatsoever.421 In other words, 
according to ‘Ammār, the negation of life, be it essential or accidental, has one result: God 
cannot be described as living. Only beings with life are called living. However, it is legitimate, 
in ‘Ammār’s view, to also call the being that has accidental life living. The problem, however, 
is that the Muslim interlocutor does not seem to be willing to affirm either kind of life in God’s 
being, and thereby unintentionally attributes death to God. This is well expressed by 
‘Ammār, who repeatedly mentions the word ‘death’ as the logical alternative to ‘life.’ 
This same line of argumentation seems to have been common among Arab Christian 
theologians. We have definite indication, for example, that a reputable philosopher by the 
name of abū ‘Alī ‘Īsā ibn Isḥāq ibn Ẓur‘ah (d. 1007) argues for the correctness of the Trinity, 
                                               
420 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 169; cf. ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyyah, Muḥammad ibn abī 
Bakr, Madārij al-Sālikīn bayna Manāzil Iyyāka Naʻbudu wa Iyyāka Nastaʻīn, vol. I, ed. ʻabd al-ʻAzīz ibn 
Nāṣir Julayyil (al-Riyāḍ: Dār Ṭaybah lil-Nashr wal-Tawzīʻ, 2002), 37; and ibn Qayyīm al-Jawziyyah, 
Muḥammad ibn abī Bakr, Kitāb Shifāʼ al-ʻAlīl fī Masā’il al-Qaḍa’ wal-Qadr wal-Ḥikmah wal-Ta‘līl, ed. 
Muḥammad al-Naʻsānī Ḥalabī (al-Qāhirah: Maktabat Dār al-Turāth, 1975), 271. 
421 See David Thomas, “The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Early Abbasid Era,” in Islamic 
Interpretations of Christianity, ed. Lloyd Ridgeon (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), 87.  
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using this exact argument. He says that Muslim thinkers often use linguistic arguments in 
their conversations, so following this same line of discourse, he challenges them, asking, 
“Tell us, are the derived nouns taken from existing entities, ةدﻮـﺟﻮﻣ ٍنﺎﻌﻣ?...All the attributes 
that we have mentioned as essential attributes, تاﺬـﻟا تﺎﻔـﺻ, are derived nouns. ‘Living’ is 
derived from life; ‘powerful’ is derived from power; ‘generous’ is derived from generosity; 
‘wise’ is derived from wisdom.” His argument is clear: since such names are derived, 
according to the grammar of the Arabic language, these names must therefore have entities, 
ﻲﻧﺎﻌﻣ.422 
‘Ammār’s argument equally applies to the attribute of ‘speech.’ “Animals are not called 
‘speaking’ because there is no speech in their essence,”423 ‘Ammār argues. This state of 
affairs contradicts that of the human soul, which is called living and speaking because it has 
life and word in its very essence. Accordingly, ‘Ammār concludes that the Islamic view of 
God necessitates that God is dead,424 but that this is totally inappropriate to be said of God, 
who is exalted above all.  
This stress on the attributes of word and life is foundational to his defense of the 
                                               
422 See Paul Sbath, Vingt traités philosophiques, 15-16. 
423 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 47. 
424 Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3., Jahrhundert Hidschra: eine 
Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, vol. II (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1991), 275-276. 
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Trinity, for they are to be revealed as the Son and the Holy Spirit.425 To strengthen the attack 
and to support his conclusion, ‘Ammār raises the question again from a different angle. This 
time the question is directly related to the traditional Mu‘tazilī argument that, when the 
attribute of life is affirmed in God, death is negated in God’s being.426 Al-Ash‘arī states that 
abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf maintained that God is:  
He [God] is knowing in an act of knowing that is He and is qādir in a power of 
efficient causality that is He and is living in a life that is He.” And he [al-‘Allāf] 
spoke in similar fashion concerning His hearing, seeing, eternity, might, 
majesty, glory, grandeur, and concerning His other essential attributes. He used 
to say, ‘When I say “God is knowing,” I affirm that He has an act of knowing that 
is God and deny that there is ignorance in God and indicate that there is 
something known [by Him] that has come to be or will come to be; when I say 
qādir, I deny that there is any incapability of efficient causality in God and affirm 
that He has a power of efficient causality that is God and indicate that there is 
something subject to [His] power of efficient causality; when I say “God has life,” 
I affirm that He has a life that is God and deny that there is death in God.’”427 
 
According to al-Ash‘arī, this viewpoint was also shared by other Mu‘tazilī thinkers such 
as Ḍirār ibn ‘Amr and ‘Abbād ibn Sulaymān, along with other Mu‘tazilīs, Khawārij and 
                                               
425 Ibid., 276; cf. Georges Anawatī, al-Masīḥiyyah wal-Ḥaḍārah al-‘Arabiyyah (Bayrūt: al-
Mu’assasah al-ʻArabiyyah lil-Dirāsāt wal-Nashr, 1970), 98; cf. Louis Gardet and Georges Anawatī, 
Falsafat al-Fikr al-Dīnī, vol. 1, 61-63; and Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalām (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 64. 
426 See ʻĀṭif al-ʻIrāqī, al-Falsafah al-ʻArabīyah, 69-73. 
427 Richard Frank, “The Divine Attributes according to the Teaching of abū al-Hudhayl al-
‘Allāf,” Le Muséon, 82, Revue d’Etudes Orientales, Louvain (1969), 451-506, 453.  
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Murji’ites.428 This reference is the grounds on which Josef van Ess builds his case that 
‘Ammār had taken note of the views of Ḍirār ibn ‘Amr, as well as those of Mu‘tazilī 
theologians.429 Certainly, the reference to such important Mu‘tazilī views reveals ‘Ammār’s 
knowledge of his contemporary Islamic intellectual milieu (to the extent that the words of abū 
al-Hudhayl can be found verbatim in this section of Kitāb al-Burhān), and demonstrates his 
ability to employ Islamic terms to serve his argument.430  
However, it should be noted that abū al-Hudhayl’s view supports the Islamic concept of 
the oneness of God431 against the Trinitarian understanding of Christianity, as it does not 
locate the attributes of God outside of God.432 Instead, it identifies the attributes with the 
being of God, thus denying the existence of attributes.433 If the attributes were viewed 
                                               
428 Al-Ashʻarī, Maqālāt, 225, 226. Al-Shahristānī indicates that abū al-Hudhayl differs ( ﻦﻋ دﺮﻔﻧا
ﻪﺑﺎﺤـﺻأ) from the main body of the Mu‘tazilī thinkers by affirming that the attributes of God are God’s 
own essence. Further, it is reported that abū al-Hudhayl derived this theological position from the 
philosophers who taught that God is a simple being without any form of multiplicity. See al-
Shahrastānī, Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects, vol. I, ed. William Cureton (Piscataway, NJ: 
Gorgias Press, 2002), 34; cf. Richard Frank, Beings and their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian 
School of the Muʻtazila in the Classical Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), 22; 
cf. Rashīd al-Khayyūn, Muʻtazilat al-Baṣrah wa-Baghdād (London: Dār al-Ḥikmah, 2000), 313.     
429 Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 36; cf. Ashʻarī, Maqālāt, 226. 
430 David Thomas, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” 90; cf. Sidney Griffith, “The Prophet 
Muḥammad,” 103.   
431 Richard Frank, “The Divine Attributes,” 459.  
432 Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalām, 62; cf. ‘Alī Muṣṭafā Ghurābī, abū al-
Hudhayl al-ʻAllāf (al-Qāhirah: Maktabat al-Ḥusayn al-Tijāriyyah, 1949), 39-40.  
433 Harry A. Wolfson, “Philosophical Implications of the Problem of Divine Attributes in the 
Kalām,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 79, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun., 1959), 76; cf. ‘Abbās M. 
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differently, i.e., if they existed outside of God, it would mean that they too are eternal, 
alongside God, and this understanding would become indistinguishable from the Christian 
view that God’s attributes of speech (the Word), and of life (the Holy Spirit), are equal to God 
in time and eternity.434  
Thus, for Mu‘tazilī thinkers of ‘Ammār’s time, it was of great importance to reject or 
deny the eternity of the attributes,435 and also imperative that they provide an interpretation 
that preserved the oneness of God, while explaining the qur’ānic verses where life, word and 
seeing, etc. are attributed to God.436 Such an interpretation was eloquently set forth by abū 
al-Hudhayl who, for example, differentiated between two statements: “God knows by His 
essence, not by knowledge” and “God knows by knowledge that is He.”437 The main 
difference between the two statements lies in the fact that God’s knowledge is not something 
other than God. The first statement negates the attribute of knowledge, whereas the second 
affirms the attribute which has the same essence as God.438 For abū al-Hudhayl, it is 
                                                                                                                                                   
Ḥasan, al-Ṣilah bayn ‘Ilm al-Kalām wal-Falsafah fīl-Fikr al-Islāmī (Alexandria: Dār al-Ma‘rifah al-
Jāmi‘īyah, 1989), 36-37.    
434 Ṭalʻat Akhras, abū al-Hudhayl al-ʻAllāf al-Muʻtazilī: Ārā’uh al-Kalāmiyyah wal-Falsafiyyah 
(Bayrūt: Dār Khiḍr, 1994), 47. 
435 ʻĀdil al-ʻAwwā, al-Muʻtazilah wal-Fikr al-Ḥurr (Dimashq: al-Ahālī, 1987), 179.   
436 Richard Frank, Beings and their Attributes, 10-11; cf. Zuhdī Jār-Allāh, al-Muʻtazilah 
(Bayrūt: al-Ahliyyah lil-Nashr wal-Tawzīʻ, 1974), 27-28.  
437 See Richard Frank, Beings and Their Attributes.  
438 See Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 180-181; cf. Ṭalʻat Akhras, abū al-
Hudhayl al-ʻAllāf, 48. 
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essential to maintain that God is one essence with no form of multiplicity, which is why he 
identifies the attributes with God.439 In doing so, abū al-Hudhayl insists on the absolute 
oneness of God. This insistence, in fact, was fundamental to the Mu‘tazilī thinkers as they 
maintained that nothing could share God’s eternity, not even God’s attributes. God is the 
only eternal “old” being.440 This belief was so fundamental that they even denied the eternity 
of the Qur’ān—the very Word of God, according to Islam.441 In fact, this caused many 
doctrinal and political conflicts among Muslims of ‘Ammār’s time.442 During the reign of al-
Ma’mūn,443 for example, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal was imprisoned when he refused to agree with 
the Mu‘tazilī view that the Qur’ān was created.444  
However, there were thinkers such as ibn Kullāb who presented a different position 
regarding the “location” of God’s attributes.445 His position and that of abū al-Hudhayl differ 
                                               
439 Rashīd al-Khayyūn, Muʻtazilat al-Baṣrah, 107; cf. ‘Alī Muṣṭafā Ghurābī, abū al-Hudhayl al-
ʻAllāf, 33.  
440 Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalām, 133. 
441 Richard Frank, “The Divine Attributes,” 492-493. 
442 Zuhdī Jār-Allāh, al-Muʻtazilah, 252-254.   
443 See Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Tārīkh al-Khulafāʼ, 333-360.  
444 See al-Maqdisī, Muḥammad ibn ʻabd al-Wāḥid, al-Miḥnah ʻalā Imām Ahl al-Sunnah Aḥmad 
ibn Ḥanbal, ed. Aḥmad Farīd Mazyadī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyyah, 2004); cf. Harry A. Wolfson, 
The Philosophy of the Kalām, 263-278, and Morris S. Seale, trans., Yūḥannā al-Dimashqī fī Ḥiwār 
maʻa Aḥad al-Sharqīyīn (PG, 96: 1335-1347) (Bayrūt: N.P., 1968), 30. 
445 Richard Frank, “The Divine Attributes,” 472. 
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greatly.446 It is reported by al-Ash‘arī that ibn Kullāb frequently said that the attributes of God 
subsist in God; that they are neither identical to God nor non-identical,447 but are in God’s 
essence, since attributes cannot subsist in attributes.448 According to the witness of ibn al-
Nadīm, this position seems very much like the Christian position, which is probably the 
reason ibn Kullāb was accused of being a “Christian.”449 All in all, in the content of ‘Ammār’s 
question, there are clear indications that he used current kalām issues to validate his 
Christian position,450 and, that he probably caused some discomfort among Muslim 
mutakallimūn who could not agree on the location of the attributes of God’s essence.451  
                                               
446 David Thomas, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” 88; cf. Richard Frank, Beings and Their 
Attributes, 13. 
447 See David Thomas, Anti-Christian Polemic in Early Islam, 39.  
448 Al-Ashʻarī, Maqālāt, 229-230; cf. William Brice, An Historical Atlas of Islam (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1981), 391.  
449 Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, 230. Cf. Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 183.  
450 Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. II, 275-276; Sidney Griffith, “The Prophet 
Muḥammad,” 104.  
451 To further illustrate his position, ‘Ammār argues that, when the interlocutor refers to a 
certain man as “seeing,” such a man really must have sight; otherwise, the interlocutor will be found to 
be a liar. The man is only described as seeing because he must have the attribute of seeing 
essentially found in him. He has sight and therefore he is seeing. If the interlocutor claims that he 
denies sight in that man when he refers to him as “seeing,” then blindness is made necessary to that 
man. He is simply blind. Likewise, if life is attributed, then it necessitates that the person has life. Only 
life denies or negates death and one who does not have life, be it essential or accidental, must be 
dead. This is certainly applicable to the attribute of speaking, as “speech” is only attributed to one who 
“speaks.” This attribution, for example, is not valid for animals, ‘Ammār argues, as they do not have 
the attribute of speaking in their essence. In summary, only beings with essential or accidental life and 
word are counted as being living and speaking and it becomes clear that without “life” or “word,” a 
being is basically dead and speechless. If such attributes are not affirmed, then their opposite must be 
affirmed. There is no other possibility. Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 48. 
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Before ‘Ammār ends his criticism of the Islamic view of the oneness of God, he 
reiterates his claim that by denying the eternity of the attributes, the interlocutor has deprived 
God of life and speech. Such a denial, ‘Ammār argues, has occurred because the 
interlocutor wants to avoid any acknowledgment of the Trinity. If the latter view is upheld, 
i.e., if three meanings or entities are affirmed in God’s being, then the Christian view of the 
Trinity is proven to be correct. This conclusion was reported by abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf in his 
articulation of various views on God’s attributes. Al-Shahristānī makes it clear that abū al-
Hudhayl denied the attributes in order to avoid confessing the Christian Trinity.452 So when 
this testimony of al-Shahristānī is put alongside ‘Ammār’s arguments, it becomes probable 
that ‘Ammār was constructing his defense of the Trinity according to the Mu‘tazilī intellectual 
arguments of his day, and particularly that of abū al-Hudhayl. The likelihood of this 
assessment will be strengthened when we reflect on the second part of ‘Ammār’s criticism of 
the Islamic view of the oneness of God.  
‘Ammār likens Muslims who deprive God of word and life to those who worship idols. 
He states that, if God does not have such attributes, then God is no longer speaking, or 
living, which reduces God to a mere idol. However, it is known from the scriptures, he 
                                               
452 Al-Shahrastānī, Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects, vol. I, 34. Al-Shahristānī puts it 
this way: 
” ىرﺎﺼﻨﻟا ﻢﻴﻧﺎﻗأ ﺎﻬﻨﻴﻌﺑ ﻲﻬﻓ تاﺬﻠﻟ ﺎًﻫﻮﺟو تﺎﻔﺼﻟا هﺬﻫ ﻞﻳﺬﻬﻟا ﻮﺑأ ﺖﺒﺛأ ذإو“.  
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continues, that God in fact has word and life, and that God rebukes those who worship idols. 
The witness of the scriptures, ‘Ammār indicates, proves that God indeed has word and life. 
In ‘Ammār’s list of biblical references, the biblical proof-texts come from Psalms, the Book of 
Job, and Isaiah. In the Psalms, David affirms that the Word of God created heaven.453 Job 
states the same.454 Likewise, the prophet Isaiah makes it clear that the Word of God is 
eternal.455 ‘Ammār then uses the Psalms once again to point out that the Word of God is 
worthy of praise456 and stands firm in the heavens.457  
In his discourse on the incarnation, as we shall see, ‘Ammār uses the texts that were 
traditionally used in its defense. But in arguing for the Trinity, ‘Ammār carefully chooses and 
manipulates non-traditional scriptural proof-texts. He only utilizes passages that refer to God 
in connection with word and life. This selectivity shows how Arab Christian theologians, such 
as ‘Ammār, felt pressured by Muslim arguments to re-read their scriptures in search of 
verses that could, even if taken out of context, be used to support a fresh articulation of their 
faith.  
It is instructive to note that in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah ‘Ammār makes rich use of 
                                               
453 “By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, their starry host by the breath of his 
mouth” (Psalm 33:6). 
454 “The Spirit of God has made me” (Job 33:4). 
455 “The Word of our God stands forever” (Isaiah 40:8). 
456 “In God, whose Word I praise, in God I trust without a fear” (Psalm 56:4).   
457 “The Word of our God stands firm in the heavens” (Psalm 119:89). 
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other biblical references, presenting several biblical texts in which God speaks in the royal 
plural, which according to him is clear-cut evidence of the Trinity. The verses mentioned in 
Kitāb al-Burhān are but a portion of the verses used in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah.458 
However, it would seem that the argument in Kitāb al-Burhān was developed out of Timothy 
I’s dialogue with al-Mahdī, where most of the same verses are employed.459 Timothy I’s list 
of verses is more exhaustive, as they come from both the Old and New Testaments—
particularly from the text of the Great Commission.460 Abū Rā’iṭah and abū Qurrah as well 
(though their list is fuller than that of any of their contemporaries)461 use almost the same set 
of biblical witnesses.462 Such widespread use indicates that these verses were common in 
the Christian-Muslim dialogues about the Trinity at that time.  
 
The Christian View of the Trinity 
The previous section of ‘Ammār’s apology sets the stage for an explanation of the Christian 
view of the Trinity, which so far has only been defended. Just as he has formerly used the 
‘speech’ and ‘life’ argument to logically defend the truth of the Trinity before his possibly 
Mu‘tazilī counterpart, he now uses the same set of arguments to state his view of the Trinity. 
                                               
458 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 160.  
459 Hans Putman, L’église et l’islam, 14.   
460 Ibid., 15. 
461 See Salīm Dukkāsh, abū Rāʼiṭah al-Tikrītī, 116-117; cf. Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de 
Théodore Aboucara, 29-32. 
462 Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 116-118. 
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However, before doing so, he clarifies that the Trinity is not to be confused with either 
tritheism,463 or the idea of God consorting with a female partner.464 Against these 
misunderstandings or false accusations, ‘Ammār explains the Christian belief in the Trinity, 
which, according to him, is simply affirming that God is one with two essential attributes: the 
attributes of life and speech.465 In the Trinity, the Father is said to have the attribute of life 
and speech. The ‘speech/word’ is Christ, and the ‘life’ is the Holy Spirit. ‘Ammār states: “In 
saying the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we just want to confirm that God is ‘living’ 
and ‘speaking’.”466 Immediately after this theological statement, ‘Ammār explains what it 
means that the Son of God is the ‘word’ of God and the Holy Spirit is the ‘life’ of God. 
‘Ammār makes it clear that the begetting which is said of the Son is not to be understood 
physically, for God did not take a female partner with whom he begat a Son.467 Rather, the 
Sonship of Christ is likened to the begetting of the word to the soul. Likewise, the life of God 
is eternal and is essential to God’s being. God has never ceased to be and will live forever. 
                                               
463 See sūrah 4:171. Cf. Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 168; David Thomas, “The Doctrine 
of the Trinity,” 95; Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 184; and Sidney Griffith, “The 
Controversial Theology of Theodore Abu Qurrah (c. 750–c. 820 AD): A Methodological, Comparative 
Study in Christian Arabic Literature” (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1978), 154. 
Wolfson clearly states that the teachings of the Qur’ān concerning the Trinity are not those of the 
orthodox Christian church. See Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalām, 304; cf. Michel 
Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 52. 
464 See sūrah 72:3.  
465 Wilferd Madelung, “al-Qāsim and Christian Theology,” 37.  
466 Sidney Griffith, “Answering the Call,” 114-115.   
467 Cf. Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 206. 
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God has always had life. To support this view, ‘Ammār appeals to various analogies, such as 
that of the soul with its word and life, and the analogy of both fire and sun with their heat and 
light. All these analogies are seen as perfect examples of things that are one in essence, yet 
have two essential attributes. These analogies come from the Greek and Syriac fathers, 
being found in Tertullian’s Against Praxeas and St. Gregory of Nazianzus’ Theological 
Oration.468 In fact, Timothy I also uses the same comparisons in his conversation with al-
Mahdī. However, Timothy I builds on these analogies to deduce an inseparable relation 
between the hypostases.469 This inference is dismissed in ‘Ammār’s conclusion.470 
‘Ammār’s implementation of these analogies serves his purposes well, as he maintains 
that, if these beings are deprived of their attributes, they will no longer exist, and the names 
they are given will most assuredly be inappropriate for them. Thus, if the sun is deprived of 
its light and heat, it becomes dark and cold and cannot be called “sun” anymore. On the 
other hand, the triple nature of the attributes of the sun does not negate its nature as one 
sun. Eloquently and profoundly, ‘Ammār summarizes it as follows: “ َﻟو ﻻو َﺎﻫَﺪﻴِﺣَﻮﺗ ﺎَُﻬﺜﻴِﻠﺜ َﺗ ِﻞﻄﺒُﻳ ﻢ
ﺎـَﻬَﺜﻴ ِْﻠﺜَﺗ َﺎﻫُﺪـﻴِﺣَﻮﺗ, Therefore, the triune nature of these things does not negate their oneness; 
                                               
468 See Franz Dünzl, A Brief History of the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Early Church (London: 
T & T Clark, 2007); cf. Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 184.    
469 Hans Putman, L’église et l’islam, 13; cf. Robert Caspar, “Les versions arabes du dialogue 
entre le catholicos Timothée I et le calife al-Mahdi (IIe/VIIIe), “Mohammed a suivi la voie des 
prophètes,” ISCH, 3 (1977), 128. 
470 These analogies are also found in the apology of abū Rā’iṭah. See Salīm Dukkāsh, abū 
Rāʼiṭah al-Tikrītī, 84. 
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neither does their oneness negate their triune nature.”471  
It is interesting to note that here, for the first time, ‘Ammār uses classical Christian 
terms to explain the Trinity, using ﺚـﻴﻠﺜﺗ and ﺪـﻴﺣﻮﺗ to consummate his argument. ﺚـﻴﻠﺜﺗ, 
therefore, is the essential term to be used to refer to God with the attributes of ‘speech’ and 
‘life;’ and similarly, ﺪـﻴﺣﻮﺗ is essential to the nature of God’s essence. There is perfect 
harmony between the two, and, in fact, according to ‘Ammār, the two concepts are 
supportive of each other. The ﺚﻴﻠﺜﺗ supports the ﺪﻴﺣﻮﺗ of God, and the ﺪﻴﺣﻮﺗ is upheld by the 
ﺚـﻴﻠﺜﺗ. This inseparable relation between God and God’s attributes, between God’s essence 
and God’s qualities, is what Christianity means by the doctrine of the Trinity.  
Furthermore, as al-Ṣafī excellently puts it, the triune nature of God is the only way to 
explain God’s oneness, and if it were not for such a nature, the oneness of God would have 
been totally nullified, “ُﻪﺘّﻴﻧاﺪﺣَو َُﻞﻄْﺒُﺗ ُﺚﻴﻠﺜّﺘﻟا اﺬﻫ ﻻﻮﻟ.”472  
 
Islamic Objections        
‘Ammār imagines his opponent asking why the ‘speech’ and ‘life’ of God are called 
                                               
471 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 49.  
472 Charfeh MS folio 119a.  Additionally, al-Ṣafī summarizes ‘Ammār’s argument: “If you 
negated from God the triune nature of entity, and maintained the oneness of His entity, you would 
have negated describing Him with the most noble of the exciting things, and described Him with the 
most despicable and needy (attributes).” See Charfeh MS folio 119a  
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hypostases and the word of the soul and the other attributes of the above-mentioned beings 
are not referred to in the same way.473 This question, in fact, seems natural. But, considered 
carefully, it poses a danger to the uniqueness of God, and herein lies its difficulty.474 From 
‘Ammār’s perspective, if the attributes of other beings can be called hypostases, then God 
will be deprived of his distinctness, as God and nature will become identical. So to maintain 
God’s uniqueness, ‘Ammār modifies his argument, and insists that God is described with the 
perfect terms at hand. Hypostasis refers to the perfect thing that is self-sustained and does 
not need any other thing for its being and subsistence. This is, of course, contrary to the 
attributes of the beings mentioned earlier, since they with their attributes are all created. 
However, the foremost reason why these beings and their attributes are mentioned in 
connection with the Trinity, ‘Ammār clarifies, is that they are mere examples of beings with 
but one nature, which exist in multiplicity. As mere examples, they should not be viewed as 
perfect paradigms of God’s being, for God is far more exalted than such natures. This is 
precisely why the attributes of these beings are not called hypostases. God and nature are 
distinguishable, and the Trinity affirms this distinctness.  
 ﺎًﺌﻴـﺷ ﺎﻧﺪـﺟو ﺎـّﻧأ ﻲـﻓ ،ءاﻮﺘﺳﻻا ﻰﻠﻋ ُﻪﻨﻣ ُﻞﺜﻤﻟا َﻰﻄﻌُﻳ ٌﻪﻴﺒﺷ ِﻪﻠﻟ ﺲﻴﻟ نﺎﻛ ذإ ،َﻞﺜﻤﻟا ﺎﻨﻴﻄﻋأ ﺎّﻤﻧإو
ٍنﺎﻌﻣ ِﺔﺜﻠﺜﺑ ﺎًﻓوﺮﻌﻣ اًﺪﺣاو ِِهﺮِﻫَﻮﺟ َﺪﻴِﺣَﻮﺗ ُهﺎَﻨﻌﻣ ُﺚﻴِﻠﺜ َﺗ ﻞِﻄﺒُﻳ ْﻢﻠﻓ ُﺪـﻴِﺣَﻮﺗ ﻻو  َﺚـﻴِﻠﺜ َﺗ ﻞـِﻄﺒُﻳ ِِهَﺮﻫﻮـَﺟ
ِﻪﻴﻧﺎﻌﻣ .ّﻴﻧاﺪﺣو ﻰﻠﻋ ِهَِﺮﻫَﻮﺟ ﻲﻓ ٌﺖﺑﺎﺛ ﻮﻫ ﻞﺑِِﻪﺘ ﺎَﻬﺜﻴِﻠﺜَﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ ِﻪﻴﻧﺎﻌﻣ ﻲﻓو.     
  
                                               
473 David Thomas, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” 90.  
474 Ibid., 93. 
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Translation: However, we give this example, because there is nothing similar to 
God that can be taken as comparable to Him on a basis of equality. We have 
found one thing known by three meanings, and the threeness of its meanings 
does not nullify the oneness of its substance, nor does the oneness of its 
substance abolish its three meanings. But it is firmly established in the oneness 
of its substance and in the threeness of its meanings.  475     
  
Such a profound statement indicates ‘Ammār’s unique skill in manipulating even the 
Arabic language to vindicate the correctness of the Trinity—a distinctive feature of his literary 
style throughout Kitāb al-Burhān, as we shall see.476 This statement displays ‘Ammār’s 
sensitivity to the intellectual context, while his choice of words and the elegant structure of 
his prose bear testimony to ‘Ammār’s consummate skill in Arabic, even when addressing 
such complex theological matters.  
‘Ammār insists that the distinction between the Creator and the creation must be 
maintained, but then argues that no examples or analogies can correspond perfectly to the 
thing they explain.477 He follows with an example: When someone asks the interlocutor to 
make a statue of a king, it is understood that the statue will not have a sense of taste or 
smell, nor will it hear or be able to walk. Even though the statue perfectly resembles the king 
in appearance, it does not do justice to the king’s nature, and it cannot match his qualities. 
                                               
475 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 50.  
476 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 45.  
477 This is the same way Yūḥannā al-Dimishqī, Theodore Bar Konī and abū Rā’iṭah define the 
“example.” See Yūḥannā al-Dimishqī, al-Ma’at Maqālah, 207; Robert Hespel and René Draguet, 
Theodore Bar Konī, 187; and Salīm Dukkāsh, abū Rā’iṭah al-Tikrītī, 78, 86, 108. 
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Likewise, when the attributes of word and life are used to describe the soul, and the 
attributes of light and heat to describe the sun, they are all only examples of one being with 
multiple attributes. However, states ‘Ammār, it is impossible to make an analogy from 
creation that perfectly matches the Creator. Indeed it is inappropriate, for God is not to be 
compared with his creation, and is the only perfect being. Then, for the third time, ‘Ammār 
indicates his reason for using the analogy, eloquently explaining: “But we have only given 
you, from what you have witnessed, one thing which has one substance yet has three 
meanings, so this possibility is not denied.”478   
This repeated assertion must not go without notice. Why is it important for ‘Ammār to 
modify his argument and repeat himself three times in such a short section of the treatise? 
Before attempting to answer this question, it must be noted that these three repetitions are 
phrased with great eloquence and accuracy. To fully appreciate this, his rendering should be 
considered as a whole.  
1. ”ﺎَﻬَﺜﻴِﻠْﺜَﺗ ﺎَﻫُﺪﻴِﺣَﻮﺗ ﻻو ﺎَﻫَﺪﻴِﺣَﻮﺗ ﺎَﻬُﺜﻴِﻠﺜَﺗ ِﻞﻄﺒُﻳ ﻢَﻟو. “ 
2. ”ُﺪﻴِﺣَﻮﺗ ﻻو ،ِِهﺮِﻫَﻮﺟ َﺪﻴِﺣَﻮﺗ ُهﺎَﻨﻌﻣ ُﺚﻴِﻠﺜ َﺗ ِﻞﻄﺒُﻳ ْﻢﻠﻓ ِﻪﻴﻧﺎﻌﻣ َﺚﻴِﻠﺜ َﺗ ِﻞﻄﺒُﻳ ِِهَﺮﻫَﻮﺟ . ِهِﺮَﻫﻮـَﺟ ﻲﻓ ٌﺖﺑﺎﺛ ﻮﻫ ﻞﺑ
ِﻪِﺘّﻴﻧاﺪﺣو ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎَﻬﺜﻴِﻠﺜَﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ ِﻪﻴﻧﺎﻌﻣ ﻲﻓو. “ 
                                               
478 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 51. This same point is made by abū Rā’iṭah in his 
apology for the Trinity, where he shows that there is clear evidence in creation for things that exist in 
three attributes, صاﻮـﺧ. For abū Rā’itah, this similarity must not be denied. See Sandra Keating, 
Defending the “People of Truth,” 112. On the other hand, Muslim thinkers fiercely dismissed any 
similarity between God and any other thing. See Wilferd Madelung, “al-Qāsim and Christian 
Theology,” 38; cf. Bo Holmberg, “The Trinitarian Terminology of Israel of Kashkar, (d. 872),” ARAM 3 
(1991), 62. 
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3. ”ّﻤﻣ َكﺎﻨﻴﻄﻋأ ﺎّﻤﻧإﻚﻟذ ُنﺎﻜﻣإ َﺮَﻜﻨُﻳ ّﻼﺌﻟ ِ،ﻪﻴِﻧﺎَﻌَﻣ ﻲﻓ ﺎًﺜّﻠَﺜ ُﻣ ِِهﺮَﻫَﻮﺟ ﻲﻓ اًﺪّﺣَُﻮﻣ ﺎًﺌﻴﺷ َتﺪﻫﺎﺷ ﺎ.“ 
 
It is evident that ‘Ammār chooses and repeats his terminology with great care, and his 
phrasing is likewise elegant. In addition, ‘Ammār’s choice of the word ﺪﻴﺣﻮﺗ is significant, as it 
is an important concept in Islamic theology, and is of particular importance in Mu‘tazilī 
thinking.479 Presumably, this choice is an attempt to find common ground with his Mu‘tazilī 
interlocutor. 
However, the repetition of terms (as will be seen again in his discourse on the 
confirmation of the incarnation) probably serves the purpose of assertion and affirmation. 
Like all Christians of his time, ‘Ammār found himself accused of tritheism, and it was his 
mission therefore to affirm the oneness of God to his Muslim counterparts while holding on 
to the Trinitarian position. This tension demands that he assert both truths simultaneously, 
with equal force and eloquence. Failure to do so would suggest that he either does not 
believe in the oneness of God, or that he is compromising his view of the Trinity in order to 
win his argument with his interlocutor. Neither option is viable, for ‘Ammār believes equally in 
the oneness of God, which is only understood when the eternal attributes are upheld, and in 
the Trinity, which is simply understood as the logical and most complete expression of God 
and of God’s attributes of speech and life.  
                                               
479 Ṭalʻat Akhras, abū al-Hudhayl al-ʻAllāf, 45.  
 159 
It is also noteworthy that ‘Ammār displays great appreciation for the transcendence of 
God in this section of Kitāb al-Burhān. This is well expressed in the multiple recurrence of 
the sentence “there is nothing like God.”480 This language also reflects the beliefs of the 
Mu‘tazilī thinkers of ‘Ammār’s time, particularly al-‘Allāf, who repeatedly spoke of God’s 
transcendence above any linguistic description.481 So, even though ‘Ammār is greatly 
concerned with equally upholding the oneness of God in a triune nature, he insists that 
language will always fall short in describing the essence of God, who is far higher than any 
human terminology. It is only because the books of God have portrayed God in this way that 
Christians believe and trust its truth.482  
In Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār addresses a further question: since two 
attributes are seen as essential to God’s essence, why do Christians not accept three, four 
or five, as well? If the Trinity, ﺚـﻴﻠﺜﺗ, is affirmed, why not attribute ﻊـﻴﺑﺮﺗ, quaternity (making 
the Godhead four), or ﺲﻴـﻤﺨﺗ, quinity (making the Godhead five), or ﺲﻳﺪﺴـﺗ, sexity (making 
the Godhead six), to God’s being?483 To answer this objection, ‘Ammār aggressively 
accuses the interlocutor of being blind and ignorant, and declares that the interlocutor has 
                                               
480 Sūrah 42:11.  
481 Ṭalʻat Akhras, abū al-Hudhayl al-ʻAllāf, 52.   
482 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 48, 52, 53, 55, and 56; cf. Thomas Hurst, “The 
Syriac Letters,” 149.   
483 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 156.  
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failed to make a distinction between nouns and adjectives as they relate to the 
characteristics of God’s fundamental essence and the characteristics of God’s intentions and 
actions.484  
                                               
484 Ibid. Cf. Wilferd Madelung, “al-Qāsim and Christian Theology,” 37. It is instructive to note 
the close similarity of ‘Ammār’s answer to that of abū Rā’iṭah. Both show deep consternation at the 
question, and turn back to accuse their Muslim counterpart of either being blind and ignorant, as 
‘Ammār does, or of attributing the lowest possible substance to God, ﺮﻫﻮـﺟ ّﻂـﺣأ, as abū Rā’iṭah does 
(Salīm Dukkāsh, abū Rāʼiṭah al-Tikrītī, 88). Cf. Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de Théodore Aboucara, 
33, 37. At this point in his defense of the Trinity, ‘Ammār attempts to establish another argument 
against the Islamic perception of God. He states that his Muslim counterpart does not describe God in 
the noblest of terms. According to ‘Ammār, beings must either be substance or hypostasis or power or 
accident—an argument found in Aristotle. Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 52.  
However, ‘Ammār does not provide a definition of any of these terms; instead, he gives 
examples of the way each term may refer to a being. “‘Substance,’” he states, “as when you say 
‘man;’ or ‘hypostasis,’ as when you say ‘Moses,’ ‘David,’ or ‘Solomon;’ or ‘power,’ as the heat of fire or 
the ray of the sun; or ‘accident,’ as the darkness of black and the whiteness of white.” His point is that 
only substance and hypostasis are terms of perfection, as they do not need anything else in their 
subsistence, unlike power and accident. The substance and the hypostasis are self-sustained. In 
addition, they assume powers and accidents. The substance, ‘Ammār maintains, has two powers. As 
for accidents and powers, they do not subsist by themselves; rather, they are in need of the 
substances that support them and are in them. Therefore, the most perfect among these four 
classifications are the substance and the hypostasis. Yet immediately after stating this, ‘Ammār 
repeats his previous point regarding beings that are one in essence, but known in three meanings or 
entities. According to his conclusion, earth is one, but it has coldness and dryness; likewise fire, 
though one in essence, has heat and dryness.  
‘Ammār reacts strongly against the manner in which his interlocutor describes God and the 
terminology he uses. He argues that “the most despicable and poorest things are those that need 
others for their sustenance.” This, of course, implies that, by contrast, the manner in which Christianity 
describes God is most noble, full and perfect. ‘Ammār makes no direct claim, but he is clearly 
declaring here (and, as will be seen, in his discourse on the confirmation of the incarnation) that the 
Christian view or description of God is the more perfect, vis-à-vis the Muslim view which deprives God 
of word and life, and thus reduces God to an idol. ‘Ammār reduces the God of Islam to an absurdity, 
showing that the Trinity is the best way to understand God. See Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 
169. 
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“One Substance, Three Hypostases”  
In sharp contrast to the Islamic view of God, ‘Ammār lays out his understanding of the biblical 
and logical reasons why Christians believe that God is of one substance with three 
hypostases. For him, the reason for using such terms is twofold. He is showing first that 
Christianity upholds the oneness of God, and second that God is a perfect being. 
Christianity, as a monotheistic religion, believes in one God, who exists in three meanings or 
entities.  
At this point, ‘Ammār’s interlocutor seems to have conceded that it is appropriate to 
attribute word and life to God’s being, but he wonders why God’s many attributes are 
restricted to only word and life. There are also the attributes of seeing, knowing, hearing, and 
the like.485 This objection was apparently supported by qur’ānic verses in which God is 
described as having such attributes.486 This objection seems reasonable and poses a real 
challenge to ‘Ammār’s argument.487 After all, the being of God cannot be imagined without 
such attributes. So, why can ‘Ammār’s argument regarding word and life not also apply to 
these other attributes? On the one hand, ‘Ammār must show these other attributes to be non 
                                               
485 In answering the same question, abū Rā’iṭah differentiates between two types of names: 
absolute names, such as ‘earth’ and ‘heaven’ and predictive names, such as ‘knower’ and 
‘knowledge.’ See Salīm Dukkāsh, abū Rā’iṭah al-Tikrītī, 71, 74.  
486 See for example sūrah 22:61; 42:11.         
487 Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. II, 276.  
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essential, unlike word and life. If they are affirmed as essential, the Trinity is basically no 
longer upheld; rather, an endless multiplicity of God’s attributes is maintained. Thus, it is 
necessary that ‘Ammār’s argument be interpreted and explained in such a way that only 
these two attributes are affirmed as essential, without totally denying the validity of the other 
attributes.  
The difficulty of this task is demonstrated by the fact that the rest of ‘Ammār’s 
discourse on the Trinity is more or less given to discussing this issue. On the other hand, 
however, the interlocutor seems to use this line of argument to simply nullify the Trinity. For 
him, as a Muslim thinker, the oneness of God is not a subject to be questioned. Thus, he can 
agree with ‘Ammār that the essence of God is one, while attempting to counterattack the 
doctrine of the Trinity by using the same methodology as ‘Ammār employed, i.e., by using 
specific descriptions to refer to God.  
Let us now discuss ‘Ammār’s affirmation of word and life as the only essential attributes 
of God.   
 
‘Life’ and ‘Speech’ and Other Attributes 
‘Ammār lays out the rationale of the Christian position that only these two attributes are seen 
as essential within the Godhead. It is because, “We have found that life and speech belong 
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to the principle of the essence and structure of the substance.”488 This means that these 
attributes are in fact “differentiating attributes”489 they distinguish between essences.490 For 
example, when the attribute of life is affirmed to bodies, they are called animate beings. 
However, this name (animate beings) does not apply to the earth from which bodies were 
made. Moreover, the attribute of word is the basis upon which animate beings are classified; 
those which have the attribute of speech are called human beings, while others, which are 
speechless, are named beasts and animals. In this clear manner, ‘Ammār presents his 
argument, observing that the other attributes do not function as differentiating qualities. He 
puts it thus:  
Hearing, sight, mercy, forgiveness, compassion, kindness, and generosity must 
remain in the substance and there is no separation between them, because we 
see in the one substance the hearing and non-hearing, the seeing and the non-
seeing, the forgiving and the merciful, and the unforgiving and the unmerciful, 
the good and the generous, and the non-good and the ungenerous.491  
 
That is to say, that one substance can indeed have one of these attributes or their opposites. 
For example, the substance of humanity may have the attribute of either hearing or 
                                               
488 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 52. Charfeh MS folio 120a indicates: 
”ﻢﻫﺮﻴﻏ نود ﺎﻤﻫﺎﻨﺘﺒﺛأ ﻚﻟﺬﻛ ﺲﻴﻟ ﺎﻤﻫاﻮﺳ ﺎﻣو ﺎﻤﻬﺑ ّﻻإ ُتاّﺬﻟا مﻮﻘﺗ ﻻ ًّﺔﻴﻠﺻأ ًّﺔﻴﺗاذ َﻖﻄّﻨﻟاو َةﺎﻴﺤﻟا ﺎﻧﺪﺟو ﺎّﻤﻟ  “. 
489 Ibid., 157. 
490 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 170. Griffith states: “All other attributes, such as ‘seeing’ 
and ‘hearing,’ are not basic constitutive attributes of beings, and no one of them delineates another 
grade of being by reason of its occurrence. Rather, the occurrence of any other attribute necessarily 
presumes the occurrence of the essential constitutive attributes of being as the condition of its own 
appearance.” Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 170-171.     
491 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 52.  
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deafness. Yet the substance remains undifferentiated from other substances. The deaf man 
remains a deaf man; he does not turn, because he lacks hearing, into an animal, for 
instance. “The substances are not subject to these differences.”492  
With regard to the attributes of hearing and seeing, ‘Ammār makes it plain that they 
should not be ascribed to God as essential attributes, for they are “two members of the body 
put together in composite bodies.”493 The real meaning of such attributes is to ascribe 
knowledge to God. In fact, as the argument explains, these two attributes are to be 
understood as anthropomorphisms,494 “since according to human experience we become 
aware of things by hearing and seeing.”495 God, according to the revealed book, decided to 
speak to humans according to their experientially-based ability to understand. So, the books 
use words such as hearing and seeing to speak of God. However, such attributes are not 
essential to the substance of God.  
Similarly, ‘Ammār rejects the attributes of justice, compassion, generosity, kindness, 
favor, mercy and forgiveness as essential attributes of God’s nature. He maintains that these 
attributes are, in fact actions which must be attributed to the one who has word as an 
                                               
492 Ibid.  
493 Ibid., 53.  
494 Timothy I makes the same argument indicating that God speaks to humans in such a way 
that they can understand. See Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 152. 
495 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 53.  
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essential attribute. Since they are actions, by their very nature they tend to change. For 
instance, God is described as merciful only when mercy is shown to humans; but when 
humans commit wrongs, God’s attribute of justice is revealed, and so on. This reality 
mandates that such action-based attributes should not be applied as fundamental to God’s 
essence.  
Equally, the attribute of will does not count as an essential attribute, as it is not the 
principal essence.496 He attests to two kinds of will: compulsory and free. The first is simply 
the instinct that animals have, acting according to necessity and inherent incentives; thus, 
during the summer months ants collect food for the winter, without thinking or understanding. 
Only nature and necessity explain such actions. As for the second type of will, free will is—to 
quote al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assāl’s phrase497—ﺔـّﻴﻠﻘﻌﻟا ﺔـﻌﻴﺒّﻄﻟا, the rational nature of the will. This 
rational or free will is only enjoyed by one who has wisdom, i.e., word.  
At this point, however, ‘Ammār lacks precision, as he first indicates that only wisdom 
gives the substance the ability to make free choices, and then he argues that it is only the 
attribute of word that enables the substance to make such choices. Is it wisdom or is it word 
that enables free will? It is not clear. However, numerous considerations strongly suggest 
                                               
496 Ibid., 53, 54.  
497 Charfeh MS folio 121a. 
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that ‘Ammār’s intent is to argue that it is word that gives the substance free will.498 First, he 
does not mention wisdom any further in this section; second, he reflects on the role of word 
in differentiating the substance of humans from the substance of animals; and third, the 
whole framework of the argument is that the existence of will does not differentiate between 
substances. It is clear that both humans and animals have the capacity to will, but the 
difference between the substance of each group does not lie in the fact that will is not 
equally shared. Rather, humans are separated from the beasts only on account of their 
attribute of speech. Reflecting in more detail, ‘Ammār indicates: “The wills that exist in us 
[humans] and them [animals] have become a will of choice in us because we have the 
quality of speech but a will of compulsion in them because of the absence of speech.”499  
In addition, we can know that the attribute of will is not essential, because will is not 
unchanging; that is to say, God wills for us to do different things. The divine will, therefore, is 
changing. At one point in time, God wanted to be worshiped in Jerusalem, but now this 
command has been changed. Yet this changing state is not applicable to the attribute of life, 
for God has always been living and will never cease to live.500 In other words, ‘Ammār 
                                               
498 Speaking of life, ‘Ammār indicates: “This we have and they do not. So, what separates us 
from this inanimate earth is not the existence that we have in common with it, but rather the 
particularity of life which we have and they do not.” Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 54. 
499 Ibid.  
500 The Arabic text of the BL MS has سﺪـﻘﻤﻟا ﺖـﻴﺑ, which is traditionally translated as 
Jerusalem. However, this statement is made clearer in al-Ṣafī’s epitome, where we read  نأ ﺪـﻳﺮﻳ نﺎﻛو
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indicates that will cannot be an essential distinguishing attribute as it is an action-related 
attribute.501 According to ‘Ammār, this proves the uniqueness of the attributes of life and 
speech, and establishes the fact that God is one substance known in three hypostases. He 
further insists that describing God with attributes that are subject to change is not 
appropriate at all. All the Beautiful Names, with which the interlocutor describes God are not 
to be seen, according to ‘Ammār, as essential attributes of God’s essence, since they denote 
some sort of change.502  
Knowledge and wisdom are two other attributes that ‘Ammār considers. He makes it 
clear that these two attributes are essentially dependent on the attribute of speech. Only one 
                                                                                                                                                   
ﻂﻘﻓ ِّسﺪﻘﻤﻟا ﺖﻴﺒﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻪﻟ َب₍َﺮﻘُﻳ, and He [God] wanted [sacrifices] to be presented to Him only in the Holy 
Place (the Temple). Charfeh MS folio 121a. The definite article that al-Ṣafī adds to the word ﺖـﻴﺑ, 
house, makes the sentence more relevant, and it switches the emphasis from the city of worship,  ﺖﻴﺑ
سﺪﻘﻤﻟا, to the place of worship, ِّسﺪﻘﻤﻟا ﺖﻴﺒﻟا. However, this change indirectly maintains the validity of 
worship that was presented in Jerusalem, even after temple worship was nullified, while ‘Ammār’s text 
nullifies such worship altogether.   
501 This was also a common theme in the thought of al-‘Allāf. See Ṭalʻat Akhras, abū al-
Hudhayl al-ʻAllāf, 57.  
502 As for power and might, ‘Ammār likewise dismisses them as essential attributes of God. 
However, he offers a relatively ambiguous response, providing no real refutation of the interlocutor’s 
objection. In fact, he only indicates, as he has done before regarding the attribute of will, that there 
are two kinds of powers: physical power and spiritual power. He then goes on to give examples of 
such powers, stating that the power of the elephant in carrying people and the power of the camel in 
carrying burdens is simply physical, and it can only be attributed to that which has a body. Since God 
has no body, it becomes necessary that God’s power is thought of in terms of spiritual power, which is 
similar to the power of the soul by which things of the world are administered and sustained. However, 
‘Ammār suddenly identifies the spiritual power of God with God’s word, nullifying any real possibility of 
God having power that is not God’s very word. Again, he seems to have in mind the texts from the 
Book of Psalms and the Book of Job that he quoted earlier. He does not elaborate on this point, but 
simply states that the heavens and earth were created by God’s mighty word.              
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who has speech as an essential attribute can be described as wise and knowing.503  
Having denied the aforementioned attributes as essential qualities of God, ‘Ammār 
concludes his discourse on the Trinity by stating for the fifth time504 that only speech and life 
are of God’s essence, as well as the structure of the substance. This repetition is 
fundamental to the argument, because it insists that only two attributes are essential to 
God’s being—and this argument validates the Trinitarian nature of God. ‘Ammār goes to 
great pains to prove that all other attributes proposed by the interlocutor are valid as 
characteristics or descriptions; however, they are all dependent on the essential attributes of 
life and word. According to ‘Ammār, this is supported by the testimony of the Gospel and the 
books that preceded it. This statement, interestingly enough, also occurs five times.505 Such 
                                               
503 Appealing again to an analogy, he states, “We do not say: ‘I saw a knowledgeable donkey 
or a wise bull.’” Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 55. Neither the donkey nor the bull has the 
attribute of speech; hence they cannot be described as wise, since speech does not exist in them. 
Contrary to this, it is perfectly legitimate to call humans knowing and wise. ‘Ammār’s most notable 
examples are Aristotle and Galen. For instance, the reason Aristotle is considered wise is that the 
words recorded in his books on logic are correct; as for Galen, his knowledge of medicine is 
outstanding, and he is therefore worthy of the attribute of knowing. It is only because these men had 
the attribute of speech that they could demonstrate such knowledge and wisdom in different fields of 
knowledge. In addition, ‘Ammār identifies the attribute of speech with knowledge, stating that, when 
the wise one understands the reality of things on account of the attribute of speech it is then called 
wisdom. From human experience, there are those who have wisdom and knowledge, as well as those 
who are ignorant and foolish. The substance of both remains the same. So, neither the presence nor 
the absence of wisdom and knowledge functions as a differentiating quality between substances. 
Only word and life do.  
504 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 52, 53, 54, 54, and 55. 
505 Ibid., 48, 52, 53, 55 and 56. 
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repetition should not be dismissed without careful attention. ‘Ammār suggests that the Trinity 
is ultimately a biblical revelation of God. Another point which ‘Ammār emphasizes is that this 
biblical testimony comes from “correct” books that have been demonstrated to be God’s self-
revelation by miracles and great signs.  
It is no wonder, then, that ‘Ammār places the discourse on the Trinity immediately after 
his refutation of the accusation of taḥrīf! It is simply logical. If the Gospel is correct, it follows 
that whatever it teaches must also be correct and worthy of acceptance.506 Although ‘Ammār 
utilizes logic here, he ultimately appeals to the Gospel as the source from which the proof of 
the Trinity is drawn. This has been stated several times, and ‘Ammār draws attention to the 
fact that understanding the Trinity is challenging. In fact, the doctrine seems 
incomprehensible at times—a major theme that can be traced throughout Arabic Christian 
theology.507 It is only because of the witness of the books of God that Christians, though not 
fully understanding the nature of the Trinity, trust that it is correct belief. Unambiguously, he 
states his case:   
We do not deny that minds cannot comprehend something without the [witness 
of] the book. We in fact acknowledge that minds themselves did not become 
aware by themselves of [the fact that] these meanings are the Father, the Son, 
                                               
506 Abū Qurrah argues similarly in his treatise on the Trinity. See Constantin Bacha, Les 
Œuvres de Théodore Aboucara, 27-28, 33, 46-47. 
507 See Bo Holmberg, “The Trinitarian Terminology,” 58; cf. Thomas Hurst, “The Syriac 
Letters,” 148; cf. Sidney Griffith, “The Controversial Theology of Theodore abū Qurrah,” 154. 
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and the Holy Spirit, without the [witness of] the book; just as they did not 
become aware of any of the Creator’s names and attributes, except through the 
teachings of the book. [Minds] would not have accepted a book that is not 
worthy of acceptance. But since it has been [proven to be] worthy of 
acceptance due to its perfection among the nations…on account of the signs 
that appeared at the hands of those who called for it, signs, not [intellectual] 
search compelled them [the nations] to comprehend His knowledge…just as we 
have made clear in our previous point.508    
 
At this point, ‘Ammār’s opening words concerning the Trinity need to be recalled. He 
states that Muslims are in no position to question Christians on the topic, as the latter find 
the Trinity within their scriptures, which was confirmed by miracles. The words of al-Ṣafī are 
instructive here. He puts it thus:  
The Gospel ordered us to confess the Trinity which is associated with these 
essential attributes, not other attributes. These [the essential attributes] were 
previously mentioned in the books of the Prophets, and they were finally 
mentioned in the books of the Apostles many times.509 
 
This is also clear in the preface to the section on the Trinity in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, 
where ‘Ammār affirms that he has already demonstrated the Gospel to be correct and 
trustworthy, and the accusation that Christians worship three gods is therefore not valid. He 
then uses an analogy of two men going before a king to dispute the ownership of a house. 
                                               
508 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 169.  
509 Charfeh MS folio 120a, the Arabic text is: 
”ِراﺮﻗﻹﺎﺑ ِﻞﻴﺠﻧﻹا ﻲﻓ َِﺮﻣأ ﺎًﻀﻳأ ﻪّﻧﻷوُ ِّﺔﻳﺮﻫﻮﺠﻟا ِتﺎﻔّﺼﻟا هﺬﻫ ﻰﻟإ ﻪﺑ ُﻊََﺟَﺮﻤﻟا ِﺚﻴﻠﺜّﺘﻟﺎﺑ ﺎﻫاﻮﺳ ﺎﻣ نود  ِّﺔﻳﻮّﺒﻨﻟا ِﺐﺘﻜﻟا ﻲﻓ َﺎُﻫﺮِﻛذ
اًﺮﻴﺜﻛ َْتِﺮﻛُذ اًﺮﻴﺧأ ِﻞُّﺳﺮﻟا ُِﺐﺘُﻛ ﻲﻓو ﺎًﻣّﺪﻘﺘﻣ. “ 
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Each one claims that he owns the house. Once the case or argument, ﺔﻨّﻴﺑ, of one of them is 
vindicated, there is no need for the king to go through a process of validating the ownership 
of the doors of the house or its bricks.510 If one of the men proves to the king that he owns 
the house, it follows that the doors, the bricks, and the like are also his. This is exactly how 
‘Ammār considers his argument against taḥrīf and its role in validating belief in the Trinity. He 
attests that, since the Gospel is correct, there is no need to prove the correctness of every 
letter in it. The overall content of the Gospel is true.511 
 
 
                                               
510 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 148. We find this analogy in Kitāb al-Burhān as 
well, but its use and relevance to the Trinity argument are more clearly expressed in Kitāb al-Masā’il 
wal-Ajwibah.    
511 Near the end of this discourse in Kitāb al-Burhān, ‘Ammār takes on the task of refuting 
another objection. This time it relates to the Muslim accusation that Christians impute partition or 
division to God’s being. Obviously the issue at stake here is the relationships between the attributes 
of life and word in God’s being. If these two attributes are affirmed in God, does this really mean that 
God is three separate and divided entities? “No,” ‘Ammār states, “Christianity does not inevitably 
impute to the Creator partition or division, because partition and division only apply to bodies, and 
God has no body.” Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 56; cf. Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de 
Théodore Aboucara, 44.  
This statement is supported by more analogies. The first is that the human soul, having life 
and word in its essence, is not partitioned, but remains one. Likewise, heat and light are confirmed in 
the essence of fire but they do not inevitably cause division in it. In Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, 
‘Ammār speaks directly to his opponent and asks why the attribution of life and word to God’s 
substance seems to indicate partition and division. “I do not know,” he wonders, “why those deniers 
refuse affirming eternal life and essential wisdom to the eternal Creator? Do they think that this will 
necessitate that in God’s essence partition and division must occur? If they think so, let them nullify 
their thought, and know that that which is not a body cannot have partition or division at all.” Ibid., 153. 
For a similar argument, see Hans Putman, L’église et l’islam, 16-17.       
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‘Ammār’s Discourse on the Trinity: An Evaluation 
Now that we have presented ‘Ammār’s discourse on the Trinity, an important question must 
be raised: Was ‘Ammār’s presentation of the Trinity clear and convincing? Would it have 
made any noticeable impact on his interlocutor? Was his utilization of terms drawn from the 
Islamic intellectual context useful in supporting his views, or did it complicate his 
presentation? How effective was this attempt? Does the attribute argument suffice in the 
explanation of the Trinity in his Muslim context?   
Due to the scarcity of the resources available from this era and the fact that even the 
treatise composed by al-‘Allāf in response to ‘Ammār’s theology is lost, we can only 
speculate as we seek to answer these questions. Our speculation, nonetheless, may 
become more convincing when we compare this section of Kitāb al-Burhān with his other 
discourses. There is no doubt that ‘Ammār exhibits great assurance in his refutation of the 
taḥrīf allegation. ‘Ammār does not seem at all hesitant in reducing the whole allegation to 
absurdity, showing great confidence in his position. However, there are signs of hesitation in 
his arguments on the Trinity, which are especially apparent in his numerous claims, and in 
his use of a wide variety of terms.  
Clearly, he does not seem to find a concrete word with which to define ﻢﻴﻧﺎـﻗأ, 
hypostases. So, he uses other terms such as: صاﻮﺧ, Khawāṣṣ, تﺎـﻬﺟ, Jihāt, ﻲﻧﺎـﻌﻣ, Ma‘ānī, 
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and finally decides to render ﻢﻴﻧﺎﻗأ, Aqānīm in its Arabicized form.512 This is informative as it 
is indicative of the difficult nature of the topic that ‘Ammār attempts to explain. As for the 
Trinity, with all the difficult issues involved, it seems understandable that ‘Ammār struggles to 
find a way to faithfully articulate his theological understanding while also remaining relevant 
to his Islamic context. Because of this, he makes several attempts and ‘tries’ a variety of 
terms in order to communicate the Trinity with his counterpart.513 This suggests that ‘Ammār 
does not find any of these terms completely satisfactory or convincing for his opponent, so 
he goes on ‘testing’ different ones, hoping that one of them will adequately convey the 
Trinity. This is, in fact, reflected in his own words in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, where he, 
with both humility and decisiveness, admits that all human descriptions of God, and even his 
own Trinitarian formulation, fall short in describing the quiddity of God. He maintains:   
Goodness me, if our description of Him with oneness and Trinity is false and 
invalid; though some of His creatures are found to be as such, their description 
of Him as one in meaning, since needy powers, and vile accidents are found to 
                                               
512 In Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār provides a definition of al-Uqnūm. He says, “It is a 
Syriac word…It means the individual particularity that is perfect and self-sufficient, which does not 
need any other in the being of its essence.” Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 162. Ilīyā the 
Patriarch of Nisibis (11th century) prefers using the term, نﺎـﻴﻛ, entity or essence; he explains: “نﺎـﻴﻛ, 
according to Syriac-speakers is every self-subsisting being.” This definition perfectly matches 
‘Ammār’s definition of al-Uqnūm. This is indeed interesting, for Ilīyā concludes “God is one essence, 
ﺪﺣاو نﺎﻴﻛ, three hypostases.” See Paul Sbath, Vingt traités philosophiques, 100, 102.  
513 In his refutation of the Christian sects, abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq notes that Christians use 
different words in their description of the Aqānīm, such as ‘properties’ or ‘attributes.’ These different 
uses, he maintains, “are really only an attempt to find what is most apt.” See David Thomas, Anti-
Christian Polemic in Early Islam, 69.    
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be as such, is false and invalid. And if both descriptions fall short of [knowing] 
the truth of His majestic essence, and the splendor of His quiddity; goodness 
me, [at least] we have attributed to Him the best of the qualities and names, 
unlike them. However, truth is in our description, given how we described Him; 
and falsehood is in their description, since they did not know what they said, 
and did not reason the corruption of their depiction.514  
 
This is a clear acknowledgment affirming the fact that speaking of God is indeed 
difficult and remains a theological impossibility, given the limitations of the human mind and 
the majestic essence of God! This is not to suggest that ‘Ammār is unsure of this articulation; 
on the contrary, he is steadfast in his affirmation that the Christian description of God is the 
correct one.515    
That being said, how clear is ‘Ammār’s argument? It is true that ‘Ammār does not show 
the equality of the hypostases.516 He only speaks of the hypostases as independent and 
self-subsisting entities within the essence of God, without explaining the equality of these 
three entities and their relationship to the one substance of God. Nonetheless, it should be 
kept in mind that this ‘insufficiency’ in ‘Ammār’s presentation of the Trinity is understandable, 
for his main focus was not to indicate the equality of the three hypostases, but rather to 
                                               
514 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 164:  
”َﻌﻠﻓ ّﻲﻧاَﺪـَْﺣﻮﻟﺎﺑ ﻢُﻬَﻔـﺻو ّنﺈـﻓ ،ﻚﻟﺬـﻛ ٌدﻮـﺟﻮﻣ ِﻪﻘﺋﻼﺧ ﺾﻌﺑ ّنﻷ ،ًﻼِﻃﺎَﺑو اًرُوُز ِﺚﻴﻠﺜّﺘﻟاو ِﺪﻴﺣّﻮﺘﻟﺎﺑ هﺎّﻳإ ﺎَﻨُﻔﺻو نﺎﻛ ﻦﺌﻟ ،يﺮﻤ
ُوُز ،ﻚﻟﺬﻛ ٌةدﻮﺟﻮﻣ ﺔﺌﻴﻧّﺪﻟا ضاﺮﻋﻷاو ،ةﺮﻄﻀﻤﻟا ىﻮﻘﻟا ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ذإ ،َﻰﻨَْﻌﻤﻟاٌﻞِﻃﺎَﺑو ٌر . ﻦـﻋ ِناَُﺮﺼـْﻘَﻳ ﻦْﻴﻟْﻮـَﻘﻟا ُﻊـﻴﻤﺟ نﺎـﻛ نإو
َﻌﻟ ،ﺪﻘﻠﻓ ،ِﻪﺘﻴﻫﺎﻣ ِلﻼﺟو ِﻪﺗاذ ِﺔﻤﻈﻋ ﻲﻓ ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ﻮﻫ ﺎﻣ ِﻪُﻨُﻛ ِﺔﻘﻴﻘﺣ ِءﺎﻤـﺳﻷا ﻦـﻣ ﻪـﻴﻟإ ُﻞﻴﺒﺴـﻟا ُﺪـَْﺟُﻮﻳ ﺎـﻣ ِﻞﻀـﻓﺄﺑ ُهﺎـَﻧﺮﺛآ ،يﺮﻤ
ُﻢﻬَﻧُود ،ِتﺎﻔﺼﻟاو .ّﺰﻟاو ؛ﺎَﻧْوََﺰﻋ ﻪﺑ يﺬﻟا ﺎَﻧْوََﺰﻋ ذإ ،ﺎﻨﻌﺿو ﺎﻤﻴﻓ ₌ﻖﺤﻟا ،ﻞﺑ ﺎﻣ َدﺎﺴﻓ اﻮﻠﻘﻌﻳ ﻢﻟو ،اﻮﻟﺎﻗ ﺎﻣ اﻮﻠﻬﺟ ذإ ،اﻮﻔﺻو ﺎﻤﻴﻓ ُرو
اﻮﺘﻌﻧ. “  
515 See abū Rā’iṭah’s similar argument in Salīm Dukkāsh, abū Rā’iṭah al-Tikrītī, 88. 
516 David Thomas, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” 90.  
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prove the fact of their existence, and that, though Christians describe God in three 
hypostases, they uphold God’s oneness.517 This concern is what drives him to make use of 
analogies of things with three entities, yet one in substance. Therefore, to balance his 
argument, ‘Ammār states merely that the Trinity does not nullify the oneness of God. The 
issue at hand is not whether or how the three hypostases are equal as much as it is 
concerned with the oneness of God.  
It would then be safe to conclude that ‘Ammār’s struggle is to maintain the triune 
nature of God, rather than to establish the equality of the hypostases, as was the issue 
during the Arian heresy This point of focus is another area where the doctrine of the Trinity 
was reactive, being articulated by Arab Christian thinkers in response to Islamic theology. 
The pressure that came from the qur’ānic affirmation of God’s oneness shaped the way the 
hypostases were conveyed to the Muslim thinker. Arab Christian theologians such as 
‘Ammār found themselves obligated to answer the qur’ānic accusation that they believed in 
three gods. This new challenge shifted the focus of the Trinitarian formulations and made the 
oneness of God the focal point of the defense.  
It is to be noted that ‘Ammār’s purpose in composing Kitāb al-Burhān, as indicated 
earlier, was to provide rational proof of the credibility of Christianity by structuring the entire 
                                               
517 Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 176.  
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argument to correspond with Islamic views of God’s attributes.518 These proofs are directed 
to his opponent as well as to his fellow Christians, who, as he describes, “trust the [witness] 
of the books.”519 As for the Muslim thinkers, ‘Ammār’s main concern is to point out that the 
Trinity is the ultimate solution to the dilemma of the depiction of God found in Mu‘tazilī 
thinking.520 That said, it is still to be wondered whether he was successful in his presentation.  
In answering this question, we must look at the scribal addition at the end of the Trinity 
section in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, which reads: “Whoever wants to look further at this 
[i.e. the issue of the Trinity]…should [read] the epitome of Yaḥyā [ibn] ‘Adī to abū ‘Īsā al-
Warrāq.”521 This insertion is indeed interesting, as it suggests either that the scribe does not 
find ‘Ammār’s arguments convincing, or perhaps that Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s522 gave a more 
comprehensive refutation of the issues raised by abū ‘Īsā than did ‘Ammār’s. Or, it might 
indicate that in the intervening centuries new questions concerning the Trinity had been 
raised, which demanded the additional work by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī. All these remain possibilities, 
as there is no evidence of the Muslim reaction to ‘Ammār’s thinking—except the lost Radd of 
                                               
518 Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. II, 220. 
519 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 67. Abū Rā’iṭah makes the same point in his 
discussion on the correctness of the Trinity, where he shows that the reason for using biblical verses 
is twofold: awaking the Muslim opponents,  ﺎـًﻈﻘﻴﺗ ﺎـﻨﻔﻟﺎﺧ ْﻦـَﻤﻟ, and strengthening, اًﺪﻳﺪﺸـﺗ, his fellow 
Christians. See Salīm Dukkāsh, abū Rā’iṭah al-Tikrītī, 88.  
520 Sidney Griffith, “The Concept of al-Uqnūm,” 180.  
521 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 177.  
522 Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 122-125. 
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al-‘Allāf.523       
Nevertheless, an interesting statement is to be found in the refutation of al-Warrāq. In 
rejecting the arguments of ‘Ammār and other Arab Christians concerning God’s attributes, al-
Warrāq writes, “We have understood your classifications and your descriptions.”524 The 
classifications and the descriptions were the Christians’ description of God as one essence 
in three hypostases. These words of al-Warrāq clearly show that the attributes argument 
made sense, even though the actual teaching of the Trinity was not accepted. In other 
words, the way of communicating the Trinity was understood and its logic was also 
acknowledged, but the doctrine itself was not accepted, most probably due to qur’ānic 
warnings. The means by which the Trinity as a doctrine was introduced seems to have been 
relevant to the intellectual context of the day. In itself, this comment by al-Warrāq is a bold 
witness to the relative success of the Arab Christian theologians in explaining the Trinity to 
their Muslim counterparts.          
However, the Muslim denial of the Christian Trinity must be seen in its broader context 
of Islamic doctrine. If a Muslim were convinced of any Trinitarian formulae, he or she would, 
ipso facto, no longer be Muslim! There is no place for the Christian Trinity in the Qur’ān, 
although it is obvious that the doctrine of the Trinity denied by the Qur’ān is not the Trinity of 
                                               
523 Wilhelm Baum, “The Age of the Arabs: 560-1258,” 62. 
524 David Thomas, Anti-Christian Polemic in Early Islam, 132.  
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Christianity.525 As simplistic as it may sound, the absolute oneness of God’s being remains 
fundamental to Muslim thinking. Although ‘Ammār’s Muslim opponent may have seen some 
rationale or logic in the Trinity in ‘Ammār’s arguments, that would not be able to change the 
Islamic view that the Trinity is simply an incorrect understanding of God.526 This is exactly 
what ‘abd al-Majīd al-Sharafī, speaking of the nature of the Muslim refutations of the Trinity, 
indicates. He states that the authors who composed treatises refuting the Trinity did not see 
any truth in it, even to a small degree. Rather, the starting point in their refutations 
concerned the “absolute wrongness of the Christian position.”527 Given this basic 
presupposition, it is impossible for an argument to be ‘convincing.’ Rather, it is the issue of 
relevancy that matters.    
In addition, it must be borne in mind that ‘Ammār’s text is polemical in nature. Polemics 
rarely lead to convincing persuasion, but rather give birth to more polemical literature. There 
is evidence of al-Warrāq refuting Arab Christian theologians using their own attributes 
argument against them. Al-Warrāq was, in turn, refuted by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī. Such cycles do 
not stop! And even when the Muslim polemicists accepted the analogies used by Arab 
Christian theologians, their acceptance was only for the sake of rebutting these same 
                                               
525 Michel Hayek, al-Masīḥ fīl-Islām, (Bayrūt: al-Maṭbaʻah al-Kāthūlīkiyyah, 1961), 34. 
526 Al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 253.  
527 Ibid., 210.  
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analogies. It was, in fact, an artificial acceptance.528 Again, the qur’ānic prohibition against 
Christians saying ‘three’ concerning God, was both the starting and end point of all 
refutations.529 The force and influence of such verses on Muslim polemicists must not be 
underestimated.  
Further, had the Qur’ān been as tolerant, or even ambiguous concerning the Trinity, as 
it was towards the cross, such discussions could have been dramatically changed. Perhaps 
Muslim polemicists could have appreciated the attributes argument raised by Christians, 
and, in so doing, followed the understanding of ibn Kullāb. Or, perhaps they could have 
shown less resistance to the Christian view that God has two constitutive attributes. But this 
is not the testimony of history. Muslims are bound to deny the Trinity, due to qur’ānic 
warnings.530 Thus, it seems that Christians and Muslim have reached another impasse in 
their intellectual encounter, and that the Islamic creed, “...He is Allah the One and Only; 
Allah, the Eternal, Absolute,”531 will always be irreconcilable with the Christian formula, “In 
the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.”532  
To worsen the situation, there are signs of Muslim polemicists failing to differentiate 
                                               
528 Ibid., 225. 
529 Ibid., 253.  
530 Harry A. Wolfson, “The Muslim Attributes and the Christian Trinity,” Harvard Theological 
Review, vol. 49, no. 1 (Jan. 1956), 16; cf. Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de Théodore Aboucara, 44.  
531 Sūrah 112:1-2 
532 The Gospel according to Mathew 28:19.  
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between three attributes and three essences, and continuing to accuse Christians of 
tritheism.533 This, of course, is to be partially blamed on statements both within the Qur’ān 
and in the history of qur’ānic interpretation. There can be no doubt that works such as al-
Ṭabarī’s Jāmiʻ al-Bayān ʻan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān have had a tremendous impact on the 
Muslim understanding of this issue. Al-Ṭabarī writes that the Qur’ān prohibits Christians from 
saying that the Lords are three, ﺔـﺛﻼﺛ بﺎــﺑرﻷا اﻮﻟﻮﻘﺗ ﻻو .534 ‘Ammār himself reports that such a 
false view of the Christian Trinity was common among his Muslim counterparts. There is 
textual evidence from Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah that ‘Ammār’s opponent seems to hold 
such a misunderstanding.535 This shows that tritheism as an allegation against Christianity 
was common at the time.  
The words of al-Mahdī to Timothy I bear witness to the same confusion and 
misunderstanding. The caliph charges: “You, then, believe in three gods.”536 Similarly, abū 
Rā’iṭah quotes his interlocutor who accuses Christians of believing in three gods.537 It may 
be concluded, in fact, that the Muslim polemicists, by not differentiating between ‘three 
                                               
533 See al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 256; cf. Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar 
Konī, 206. 
534 Muḥammad ibn Jarīr, al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʻ al-Bayān ʻan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān, vol. 8, ed. ‘abd 
Allāh Turkī (al-Qāhirah: Hajar lil-Ṭibāʻah wal-Nashr wal-Tawzīʻ wal-Iʻlān, ND), 579-580; cf. Salīm 
Dukkāsh, abū Rā’iṭah al-Tikrītī, 107. 
535 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 161.  
536 Hans Putman, L’église et l’islam, 13.   
537 Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 102; cf. Salīm Dukkāsh, abū Rā’iṭah al-
Tikrītī, 97.  
 181 
hypostases’ and ‘three gods’ made it almost impossible for fruitful conversation regarding the 
attributes of God to take place. And Arab Christians, such as ‘Ammār, found themselves 
obligated to affirm their belief in the oneness of God repeatedly. Ongoing discussions have 
widened the gap between the understandings of the two faiths, once again proving that the 
history of Christian-Muslim understanding is a history of misunderstanding.  
In addition, the classical word Uqnūm, used by ‘Ammār and other Arab theologians of 
his generation may have contributed to such a misunderstanding. But did ‘Ammār insist on 
this term? The answer is no; he shows no sign of insisting on using it but rather, as shown 
earlier, tried using a variety of terminology. Unfortunately, none of the terms worked! This is 
not to be blamed on ‘Ammār’s articulation or use of Uqnūm. There are several issues related 
to the Trinity, and it is clear that, even though abū Qurrāh does not make use of such a 
classical term, but instead uses the Arabic, ﻪـﺟو, persona, his argument remains equally 
unconvincing.538 We find this term used in the eleventh century by ‘abd Allāh ibn al-Faḍl, a 
prominent translator of patristic theological treatises from Greek into Arabic, who indicated 
that Uqnūm can mean persona, properties, or person.539 Present contemporary publications 
that attempt to explain the Trinity to a Muslim audience, such as Ibrāhīm Lūqā’s al-
                                               
538 Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 28. 
539 Samuel Noble and Alexander Treiger, “Christian Arabic Theology,” 399; cf. Henri Boulad, 
Manṭiq al-Thālūth (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 2001), 43-44.  
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Masiḥiyyah fīl-Islām, seem to have equally little success.540  
It would be unfair, then, to claim that ‘Ammār failed to convince his interlocutor of the 
Trinity because he utilized the term Uqnūm. ‘Ammār was a product of his time, and he made 
use of his heritage in communicating with his new context. Furthermore, he attempted to 
adjust his beliefs according to the intellectual currents of his day, which fully justifies his use 
of the term Uqnūm. There is more, then, to the rejection of the Trinity in Islamic thinking than 
his choice of terminology. 
Furthermore, the attributes argument he employed was in common use by many other 
Arab Christian theologians. According to abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq, many Arab Christians of his 
time favored this type of argument as a means of demonstrating the Trinity,541 and his 
summation of their argument resembles that made by abū Qurrah and ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī. This 
testifies to the widespread use of the attributes argument put forward by Arab Christians 
                                               
540 Ibrāhīm Lūqā, al-Masīḥiyyah fīl-Islām (Rikon, Switzerland: The Good Way, 1984), 70-76; 
cf. Samuel Zwemer, al-Masīḥ kama Yarāhu al-Muslimūn: Ḥayāt wa-Ṣifāt wa-Taʻlīm Yasūʻ al-Masīḥ 
Ḥasaba al-Qur’ān wal-Aḥādīth al-Nabawiyyah (Rikon, Switzerland: The Good Way, ND), 20-21, and 
Sīrat al-Masīḥ bi-Lisānin ʻArabīyīīn Faṣīḥ (Larnaca, Cyprus: ABDO, 1987), 5. This dilemma of 
communication is exactly described by abū Rā’īṭah: “The word of someone who is your [the Muslim’s] 
opponent in religion is unacceptable to you.” See Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 
173. 
541 David Thomas, Anti-Christian Polemic in Early Islam, 133. The Arabic verb used by al-
Warrāq is ﻦﺴـﺤﺘﺴﻳ, which denotes more than the idea of favoring. In fact, it implies that Christians 
have other arguments to demonstrate the Trinity, but this specific one had proven to be applicable to 
the context. Al-Warrāq also describes such an argument as ﺴﻤﻟاﺔﻨﺴـﺤﺘ . See Edward W. Lane, An 
Arabic-English Lexicon, 571.   
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such as ‘Ammār. In fact, it was used so frequently that it irritated many Muslim scholars, 
such as al-Jāḥiz, who wrote about it with great frustration.542 Others, such as ‘Īsā ibn Ṣubaḥ 
al-Murdār and Ḍirār ibn ‘Amr, felt obliged to compose treatises against such Christian 
arguments.543  
All of this leads us to conclude that the refutation of the Trinity in Dār al-Islām goes 
beyond the refutation of any or every doctrine that contradicts the Qur’ān.544 Rather, the level 
of insistence on the absolute oneness of God reflects that the issue was not a matter simply 
of a few verses, but one of a whole system of belief that is founded on God being one.545 
Since Islam came out of the culture of the Arabian Peninsula, where Muslims were 
surrounded by polytheists,546 it seemed imperative for Muslim theologians to insist on the 
existence of one God rather than revert back to the plurality of gods acknowledged in the 
Arabian Peninsula. God’s oneness was a reflection of the newly emerging Islamic empire 
itself. That is to say:  
                                               
542 Joshua Finkal, Three Essays of abū ‘Othmān ‘Amr ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiz (al-Qāhirah:  al-
Salafīyah Press, 1926), 19-20. See the recent study: abū ‘Othmān ‘Amr ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiz, al-Mukhtār 
fīl-Radd ʻalā al-Naṣārā: Maʻa Dirāsah Taḥlīliyyah Taqwīmiyyah, ed. Muḥammad ʻabd Allāh al-
Sharqāwī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Jīl, 1991). 
543 Sidney Griffith, “The Prophet Muḥammad,” 112; cf. Mark Swanson, “The Trinity in 
Christian-Muslim Conversation,” in Dialog, vol. 44, no. 3 (Fall 2005), 258.  
544 This doctrine is found in verses such as sūrah 112:1-2. 
545 Montgomery Watt, Islamic Surveys, vol.1 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962), 
64.   
546 Mark Swanson, “The Trinity in Christian-Muslim Conversation,” 256.  
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In vindicating the doctrine of tawḥid, they [Muslim polemicists] were vindicating 
at the same time a specific civilization with set social, political, economic, and 
spiritual frameworks; and their vindications fit within a culture closed to 
everything that could threaten the foundation of that civilization, its stability, and 
its endurance.547  
 
Thus, the expectation that ‘Ammār’s argument might convince his interlocutor is not 
reasonable. It fails to properly assess the cultural and political implications of the Islamic 
doctrine. When one considers the fact that abū al-Hudhayl composed a treatise against 
‘Ammār, it becomes evident that ‘Ammār’s views were given painstaking examination.548 
Perhaps it was because Ammār had structured his own treatise to oppose the viewpoints of 
a prominent Mu‘tazilī thinker that the Islamic expert felt compelled to respond.549  
We now turn our attention to examine ‘Ammār’s arguments concerning the meaning of 
the Sonship of Christ to the Father, which is an important theme in Christian-Muslim 
discussions concerning the nature of Christ. 
                                               
547 Al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 258. 
548 Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. II, 275-276.  
549 Sidney Griffith, “The Prophet Muḥammad,” 117; cf. David Thomas, “Changing Attitudes of 
Arab Christians,” 14.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: Discourses on Christology 
 
The Discourse on the Divine Unity   
In his discourse on the divine unity, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī begins to address issues of Christology, 
including Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion. We turn our attention, therefore, to the first 
aspect, where he defends the Christian doctrine of divine unity against multiple Muslim 
misconstruals and misunderstandings. ‘Ammār’s defense is straightforward. He briefly states 
two apologetic foundations for this doctrine: the scriptural and the rational proofs. From this 
base, he then refutes the Muslim misunderstanding of the doctrine, while challenging his 
interlocutor to explain why he finds the idea of the Sonship of Christ objectionable. His 
challenge comes in the form of five questions, followed by five refutations of possible 
answers.  
 
The Word of God is the Son of God 
It is safe to state that ‘Ammār was convinced that most Muslim objections were based purely 
on a misunderstanding of Christian doctrine. For example, although the divine unity is not 
threatened by the affirmation that Christ is God’s eternal Word, Muslims see in this doctrine 
a limitation on God or understand it as attributing “bodiliness” to God.550 When Christians 
                                               
550 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 172. 
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venerate the cross of Christ, Muslims protest that this imputes weakness to God’s being.551 
Likewise baptism, which purifies from sin, is judged as despicable; the central liturgical 
sacrament of Eucharist wherein Christians partake of the body and blood of Christ is 
rejected; and the Christian belief in an eternal spiritual, rather than sensual, reward, is 
mocked.  
Having outlined the Muslim objections, ‘Ammār presents the Christian doctrine of the 
divine unity as fundamental to the teachings of Christianity. He clearly states that the way 
Muslims understand the doctrine of the Sonship of Christ to the Father God is based on 
wrong assumptions, and he appeals to the text of sūrah 72:3, “And Exalted is the Majesty of 
our Lord: He has taken neither a wife nor a son.”552 Muslims imagine that, when Christians 
declare that “Christ is the Son of God,” they mean that God had a female partner with whom 
He had a son.553 This is not what the Sonship of Christ means, he assures his interlocutor. 
“To all of this, I say: ‘We are innocent before God of saying that He took for Himself a female 
companion.’”554 God is far too exalted to have had a son through a sexual relationship with a 
                                               
551 See Muṣṭafā Būhindī, al-Ta’thīr al-Masīḥī, 134. 
552 Since ‘Ammār refers twice to this verse during his defense of the divine unity, it would 
seem that it was widely used in anti-Christian Muslim polemics.  
553 Mark Beaumont, Christology in Dialogue, 68.  
554 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 57.  
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female companion.555  
Later in his defense of the Sonship of Christ, ‘Ammār makes another appeal to the 
Bible, stating that, according to the witness of the scriptures, God is revealed as Father and 
Son. ‘Ammār writes: “They are properties of the Creator—may His praise be exalted—as He 
said in his pure and holy book, which was confirmed in the world on account of the 
resurrection of the dead and the indescribable wonders.”556  Indeed, in Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-
Ajwibah, ‘Ammār argues that it was not the later Christians who named the three hypostases 
as Father, Son and Holy Spirit; rather, it was those who were counted as worthy recipients of 
the inspiration of the Gospel, and to whom the nature of God’s secrets was revealed. The 
“Blessed Matthew” mentioned this at the end of “the first part of the Gospel,”557 when he 
records Christ’s command to his followers to go and make disciples and baptize them in the 
name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. These words, ‘Ammār argues, may have 
caused some misunderstanding in people’s minds, so that is why the “Beatified John,” the 
compiler of “the fourth part of the Gospel,”558 makes it clear that the Sonship of Christ to the 
                                               
555 If some Christians, such as monks, have kept themselves pure from such relationships, 
‘Ammār’s argument goes on, how could such sexual activity be attributed to the Creator? Rather, 
‘Ammār proclaims, Christians believe in the Sonship of Christ simply because the Gospels reveal this 
understanding.  
556 Ibid., 61. 
557 Ibid., 164. 
558 Ibid., 165. Being familiar with the traditional accusation that the “Gospel of ‘Īsā” had been 
altered, ‘Ammār makes it clear that there is only one Gospel, existing in four parts. In so doing, he 
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Father is not to be understood in human terms; rather the “fourth section” of the Gospel 
starts with the statement: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
God is the Word; he never ceased to be as such with God; everything came into existence 
through him, and without him no creature [came to being].”559 ‘Ammār further legitimizes the 
naming of the divine hypostases as Father, Son and Holy Spirit by emphasizing that this 
teaching comes from no one less than Christ himself. The Great Commission text in 
Matthew 28:18-20 is a clear statement made by Christ in which he speaks of Father and 
Son. Thus, according to ‘Ammār, Christians base their belief in the Fatherhood of God and 
the Sonship of Christ on Christ’s own words.560  
Such appeals to scriptures would suggest that ‘Ammār is convinced that his earlier 
refutation of the accusation of taḥrīf and his arguments authenticating the credibility of the 
scriptures have been sufficient to persuade his interlocutor. As we have seen before, he 
uses the same appeal at the end of his apology for the Trinity.561 
However, ‘Ammār also seems to be aware that evidence from Christian scriptures is 
not really sufficient for his Muslim interlocutor, who in fact dismisses the testimony of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
shows a deep understanding of his context, and, at the same time, attempts to convince the Muslim 
interlocutor of the authenticity of the Gospel.  
559 Ibid., 208.  
560 Ibid., 167.  
561 Ibid., 56.  
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scriptures as a whole.562 Thus, ‘Ammār does not give further details about scriptural support 
for the Sonship of Christ, but thereafter relies on logic and reason instead.563 And this 
anticipated contempt for biblical support is reflected in the interlocutor’s objections in al-
Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, in the sixth question of the discussion on the oneness of God and the 
three hypostases, where he says:  
Since you were not able to affirm these meanings of God with reasonable logic 
you [falsely] attributed them to the book [the Gospel]. In your claims, you do not 
show any certainty. Rather, in your claims, you are doubting and not certain. 
Truth is not on your side, unlike what you think.564 
 
‘Ammār’s basic argument is that the Christian reference to the Word of God is not to 
“flesh,” for the Word of God is never to be understood in terms of human begetting.565 In 
establishing this viewpoint, he asks, “Why do Muslims think it distasteful to call the Word 
son?”566 He then posits five possible answers. 1) It is distasteful because of all that 
accompanies human conception, pregnancy and the pain of delivery; 2) It is distasteful 
                                               
562 Ibid., 76. 
563 This weakness or inadequacy of scriptural references to support the doctrine of the 
Sonship of Christ seems to have been noticed by al-Ṣafī, who attempts to mention the rasūl, who 
spoke of Christ as “the one from whom all families of earth are named.” This is, of course, the Pauline 
statement in the Epistle to the Ephesians 3:15: “from whom every family in heaven and on earth is 
named.”   
564 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 169. 
565 Al-Ṣafī adds a fourfold assertion to deny this kind of bodily sonship. He indicates that the 
Christian community does not make any reference to this alleged bodily sonship in their book, nor has 
it been heard from them; they do not believe it, nor do they say it. In folio 122a, he renders it this way: 
”ﻟﻪﻟﻮﻘﻧ ﻻو ،هﺪﻘﺘﻌﻧﻻو ،ﺎّﻨﻣ ْﻊَﻤﺴُﻳ ْﻢﻟو ،ٍبﺎﺘﻛ ﻲﻓ ﺎﻨﻟ َْﺪﺟُﻮﻳ ﺲﻴ. “ 
566 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 57.  
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because human sonship is temporal; 3) It is distasteful because human sonship is related to 
the body; 4) It is distasteful because Muslims believe that the praised one is the one who 
“begetteth not, nor is He begotten;” 5) It is distasteful because sonship is related to humanity 
and should not be spoken of in relation to God. 
Before we discuss these possible answers, however, it should be noted that ‘Ammār 
seems to have been influenced by Timothy I’s argument with al-Mahdī, where he first 
assures the caliph that belief in “God’s female partner” is blasphemous.567 The patriarch 
totally dismisses all suggestion that Christians proclaim such ideas.568 Instead, he declares 
that the Christian statement, “Christ is the Son of God,” means that “Christ is the Word of 
God who appeared in flesh, for the sake of the salvation of the world.”569 
We should also note that, to a great extent, ‘Ammār’s explanation of the Christian 
meaning of the Sonship of Christ which uses both biblical proof, ّﻲـﻠﻘﻨﻟا ﻞﻴﻟّﺪـﻟا, and logical 
proof, ّﻲـﻠﻘﻌﻟا ﻞﻴﻟّﺪـﻟا, also resembles that of Timothy I. Timothy I clearly argued that the 
primary reason for understanding Christ to be the Son of God is scriptural: “the Gospel says 
this about Christ.” This Sonship is not physical, he maintains; rather, it transcends all human 
comprehension. Tongues cannot even describe it. It is similar to the sonship (birth) of the 
                                               
567 Hans Putman, L’église et l’islam, 8.  
568 Bar Konī argues similarly. See Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 175.  
569 Hans Putman, L’église et l’islam, 8. 
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word from the soul and the rays of light from the sun.570 Indeed, the structure of the 
argument of both theologians is almost identical. Timothy I’s argument can be summarized 
as follows: denial of physical sonship; the biblical witness as the source of the belief; the 
incomprehensibility of this sonship; and the use of logical arguments and/or examples that 
support the correctness of the doctrine. If we follow the structure of the first part of ‘Ammār’s 
argument, prior to refuting the possible answers, we can see that it is identical to Timothy I’s. 
This testifies to the widespread admiration for the theological prowess of Timothy I during his 
long tenure as the head of the Church of the East (780-823),571 and to the impact of his 
theological thought on later theologians such as ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī. 
We now turn to examine the five objections that ‘Ammār refutes.           
 
First Possible Answer  
Having utilized the same logic as Timothy I, ‘Ammār then asks why Muslims think of Christ’s 
Sonship as distasteful. The interlocutor’s first possible answer is that it is inappropriate to 
                                               
570 Abū Ra’īṭah also indicates that there is no way for the human mind to comprehend “the 
how” in which the Word of God took flesh and became incarnate. See Sandra Keating, Defending the 
“People of Truth,” 262. In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār shows that, in the Christian faith, there 
are some doctrines that are beyond the human mind and its ability to comprehend. This is not to be 
considered a defect in the faith, he argues. For example, the human mind was not aware of the 
Sonship of Christ until the Gospel “awakened” it to understand this divine reality. Michel Hayek, 
Apologie et controverses, 169.  
571 Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 48.  
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attribute sonship to God because sonship, according to our human experience, is always 
associated with “sexual intercourse, ejaculation of sperm and pregnancy.”572 Further, the 
baby remains in the womb for nine months, and when the time comes, she is delivered with 
much blood, and accompanied by pain. This is the only possible way by which humans have 
offspring,573 and such normally private details would be offensive if applied to God. Arguably, 
‘Ammār intentionally chooses to start with this possible answer, as it is directly related to the 
Muslim ‘misunderstanding’ previously indicated. This is not, he maintains, how Christ is 
related to God; nor is it the way the Word of God is said to be the Son of God. Sonship, in 
Christian theology, is not to be understood in human terms, “for we do not believe that the 
Son [of God] is a body.”574 Therefore, Christians are absolutely innocent of the accusation 
that they attribute such human actions to God, for Christ’s sonship to God is not an action.575 
In due time, Christ, who is eternally the Son of God, was born of a woman, but in eternity, his 
Sonship to God is not on account of a woman. He is the Word of God who is unlimited.576 
‘Ammār concludes: “[Christ’s] eternal birth is not from the body of a woman, but he is the 
Word of God who is not to be defined or comprehended. His generation is far more excellent 
                                               
572 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 57. 
573 Ibid.  
574 Ibid.  
575 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 53. 
576 Mark Beaumont, Christology in Dialogue, 69.  
 193 
than the [generation] of light from the sun, and the word from the soul.”577 
 
Second Possible Answer 
Ammār anticipates that the transience of human sonship is another reason why Muslims 
might find the Sonship of Christ to be repugnant. Human sonship is bound in time; sons are 
present in time, but are mortal. This state of being temporal is not, the argument goes, 
applicable to the Sonship of the Word of God, for he is eternal, and he did not begin in 
time.578 ‘Ammār foresees that the Muslim interlocutor will not accept the Sonship of Christ, 
not only because human sons are mortal,579 but also because they are subject to change. 
Sons become fathers and grandfathers, and ultimately they die. This state of affairs, being 
temporal and changing, proves the weakness of the ‘meaning’ or ‘name’ of sonship. ‘Ammār 
agrees with his Muslim interlocutor on this issue, yet he promptly modifies the statement. 
The reason for this status change throughout life, he argues, is that human sonship is not 
related to the essence of human nature; rather, it is given to sons from their fathers. 
                                               
577 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 57. In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār 
makes a brief reference to this assumption, as he contemplates: 
”ﻢﻬّﻧأ ﻞﺟأ ْﻦِﻣأٍ؟عﺎﻤﺟو ٍﺔﻌﺿﺎﺒﻤﺑ ّﻻإ ﺎًﻨﺑاو ﺎﺑأ نﻮﻠﻘﻌﻳ ﻻ “  
Ibid., 165-166; cf. Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 207. 
578 In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, pp. 165-166, ‘Ammār makes a similar, yet brief reference 
to this assumption, as he contemplates 
”؟تﻻﺎﺤﻟاو ِتﺎﻗوﻷا ﻲﻓ ٍﻦﻳﺎﺒﺗ ّﻢﺛ ،ٍعﺎﻤﺟو ٍﺔﻌﺿﺎﺒﻤﺑ ّﻹا ﺎًﻨﺑاو ﺎﺑأ نﻮﻠﻘﻌﻳ ﻻ ﻢﻬّﻧأ ﻞﺟأ ْﻦِﻣأ “ 
579 Mark Beaumont, Christology in Dialogue, 69.  
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However, as for Christ’s sonship, it is too high for human sonship. This is what ‘Ammār calls 
“Sonship which excels all.”  
Reflecting further on this issue, ‘Ammār affirms for the interlocutor that the Sonship of 
God is not a result of the action of God, but rather that he is of the very substance of God. 
This said, it follows that, unlike human fatherhood and sonship, the Fatherhood of God does 
not precede the son’s existence. The substance of God has always had the Word. Without 
this eternal Word of God, God becomes non-knowing and non-speaking.  
This is not the case with human fatherhood and sonship: the father precedes the son 
because he himself has received the ‘meaning’ of fatherhood as a ‘loan’ from his own father. 
The states of fatherhood and sonship are not part of the essence of being human. Rather, 
these states are borrowed from others. Human fathers and sons are two created bodies: one 
created body creates the other. Furthermore, the names Father and Son are noble names, 
which God granted to humans as signs of honor and favor towards them. Among these 
attributes are life, knowledge and speech. However, when speaking of God, Christians 
believe that these names are of God’s own substance, even though they are also used in 
reference to humans, for humans themselves are created with God’s breath. The most 
excellent eternal names that humans have been given are the names Father and Son. 
These two realities are the foundation for the world’s population and cultivation.  
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‘Ammār seems to have al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm’s argument in mind. The latter had raised 
the question concerning the names father and son, asking whether they were derived from 
the nature of God, i.e., from God’s essence, or whether they were accidental names. Al-
Qāsim’s argument asserts that, if the name father is correct only after the son was 
born/begotten, then the name itself must be accidental; it is only true after the birth of sons 
take place. Al-Qāsim even applied this argument to all kinds of Christians—whether Rūm or 
non-Rūm. He further makes the point that the names father and son are not substantial.580 
‘Alī ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī also argued this point, likewise contradicting ‘Ammār’s 
position. He presented two assumptions concerning the Sonship of Christ and its 
relationship to time: either the Father begat the Son before the foundation of the world, and 
thus the Son could not be begotten as he already existed; or the father begat the son as an 
accidental being, and thus the Son must be created, and not eternal.581 The objections of al-
Qāsim ibn Ibrahīm and ‘Alī ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī would seem to be the driving force behind 
‘Ammār’s second answer to his Muslim interlocutor. ‘Ammār evidently attempts to express 
the eternal Sonship of Christ using terminology that corresponds to their presentation of 
                                               
580 Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, Ar-Radd, 318-319; cf. the new edition by Imām Ḥanafī ‘abd Allāh, 
40-41.  
”ﻛ نإ ﻢﻜّﻧإ ءﺎﻤﺳأ ﻻو ،ّﺔﻴﺗاذ ّﺔﻴﻌﻴﺒﻃ ءﺎﻤﺳﺄﺑ ءﺎﻤﺳﻷا ﺬﻫ ﺲﻴﻠﻓ ،ﺎًﻨﺑاو اًﺪﻟو ،ﻢﻜﻤﻋﺰﺑ ،ﺪﻟو ﻪّﻧﻹ ،ﺎﺑأ ﻢﻛﺪﻨﻋ بﻵا ﻢﺘّﻴﻤﺳ ﺎﻤّﻧإ ﻢﺘﻨ
ّﺔﻴﺼﺨﺷ ﺔّﻴﻣﻮﻨﻗ ﺎًﻀﻳأ .مﻮﻨﻗ ﻻو ﺔّﻴﻌﻴﺒﻃ ءﺎﻤﺳﺄﺑ ﺲﻴﻟو ،دﻻوﻷاو ﻦﻳﺪﻟاﻮﻟا ﻦﻴﺑ ٍدﻻوأ ثوﺪﺣ ﺪﻨﻋ ﺔّﻴﺿﺮﻋ ﺔﺛدﺎﺣ ﺎﻬّﻨﻜﻟو— ﻲﻓ ﻻ
ّﺮﻟا ﺮﻴﻏ ﻲﻓ ﻻو موّﺮﻟامو. “  
581 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 137.  
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opposing views. He clearly articulates that time has nothing to do with the Sonship of Christ. 
After all, how can time be applied to the divine reality? Christ’s Sonship is not temporal, but 
rather transcends all human comprehension of time and space.  
 
Third Possible Answer 
‘Ammār’s third possible answer is closely related to the first. He speculates that Muslims 
might find this Christian teaching distasteful because, according to human experience, sons 
exist in human bodies. If this is the case, he argues, let it be known that this is not how 
Christians view the Sonship of Christ, as Christians “do not speak of the bodies of the Father 
and Son.”582 This modification, ‘Ammār believes, should help the interlocutor become more 
comfortable with the reference to Fatherhood and Sonship. As possible support, ‘Ammār 
draws examples from nature, of things and beings that came from or were begotten by other 
things without necessarily having to be termed father and son. For example, Eve ‘came out’ 
of Adam, but Adam, in this case, is not Eve’s father. At this point ‘Ammār turns to his 
interlocutor, as he will at the end of his discourse on the cross, and accuses him of taking 
the honor and grace of receiving names borrowed from the very essence of God and turning 
them into something distasteful and despicable. Praise, not rejection, should be given to God 
                                               
582 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 59.  
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who bestowed on us, as humans, that which is not of our own essence. We should not deny 
this, nor should we dislike it. Rather, we should respond with gratitude, as ‘Ammār himself 
did in his conclusion: “Praise be to Him for His favor, His blessing and endowment.”583  
 
Fourth Possible Answer  
In this fourth possible answer, ‘Ammār utilizes the qur’ānic idea that real honor is given to 
him who “begetteth not, nor is He begotten” (sūrah 112:3). This classic Muslim statement 
speaks of God as the transcendent being who is exalted above having a son. The verse was 
traditionally used against the Christian doctrine of the Sonship of Christ.584 But ‘Ammār 
disagrees with the meaning of this verse, and dismisses its logical accuracy on account of 
nature. He argues that if the one who “begetteth not, nor is He begotten” is the greatest, then 
indeed worms, bugs, mosquitoes, gnats and all that did not grow from fetuses must be 
exalted as the greatest of beings, as well! Further, equal adoration must be given to 
sparrows, swallows, chickens, and all kinds of birds, which “beget not, nor are begotten;” 
rather, they lay eggs.585 Three times he repeats that the Son of God is not flesh—reiterating 
for his Muslim audience that the Christian concept of Sonship is far from the way sonship is 
                                               
583 Ibid., 61. 
584 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 172. 
585 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 60. 
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understood in physical and sexual terms. ‘Ammār makes his argument even stronger when 
he maintains that:  
If what was not begotten is the most exalted thing, then Eve, who was not 
begotten, would have been the most exalted over all things. And [it follows] that 
Satan, who “begetteth not, nor is He begotten,” would have been higher than 
Abraham, the friend of the Most Merciful. Furthermore, if fatherhood and 
sonship were deficiencies, then there would be nothing more deficient than 
people, in which they [fatherhood and sonship] are found.  586   
 
Within this text we note ‘Ammār’s modification of the qur’ānic verse where Satan is 
described as one who “begetteth not, nor is…begotten.” Linking this statement with the idea 
that God is too exalted to be connected with fatherhood, he shows that Satan is thereby 
identified as greater than Abraham, the friend of the Most Merciful.587 Becoming even more 
aggressive, ‘Ammār turns the accusation back to his interlocutor and states that “it is actually 
a deficiency and baseness to be that which ‘begetteth not, nor is…begotten.’”588 This 
outrageous construction testifies to ‘Ammār’s audacious polemical character, daring to apply 
what the Qur’ān says about God to Satan! This argument might have been even more 
distasteful to the Muslims than the doctrine of Christ’s sonship. In fact, ‘Ammār’s words 
might be construed by some as not only offensive, but also blasphemous.    
In a similar fashion, yet without any reference to Satan, Theodore abū Qurrah, in 
                                               
586 Ibid., 61. 
587 See sūrah 4:125 
588 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 61. 
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Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq wal-Dīn al-Qawīm, identifies the similarities between God and 
Adam, and observes that many human characteristics can, indeed, be ascribed to God.589 
He argues thus in reference to the allegorical story he had told of the king’s son (Adam), the 
physician who was helping him in discerning the right medication (reason), and the 
messenger sent by the king (the book). Abū Qurrah argues that three virtues that are true of 
Adam—begetting, emanation and headship—are found in God’s character as well. If Adam 
did not have a son, he would not have enjoyed life or headship; rather his headship would 
have been practiced over pigs, donkeys, and all other beasts. In fact, according to abū 
Qurrah, this is not real headship, but a misery. If we dismiss this similarity, he asks, how can 
we understand God’s headship?590 
However, it is noteworthy that in this section alone, ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī makes ten 
references to sūrah 112:3. On several occasions, he quotes the verse verbatim, while at 
other times he slightly modifies its words to fit the rest of his argument. This suggests that 
                                               
589 See Mahmud Mustafa Ayoub, “Jesus the Son of God: a Study of the Terms ibn and Walad 
in the Qurʼān and Tafsīr Tradition,” in Christian-Muslim Encounters, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad and Wadi 
Z. Haddad (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), 69-71. 
590 Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 224-227. It is interesting to note that, of the many 
animals and insects abū Qurrah lists, ‘Ammār mentions four: ضﻮـﻌﺒﻟاو ﻖﺒﻟاو دوﺪﻟاو ﺲﻓﺎﻨﺨﻟا. Ibid., 227; 
cf. Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 61, and David Thomas, “Explanation of the Incarnation in 
Early ‘Abbasid Islam,” in Redefining Christian identity: Cultural Interaction in the Middle East since the 
Rise of Islam, ed. J.J. van Ginkel, et al., Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 134 (Leuven: Uitgeverij 
Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 2005), 140; cf. Samir Khalil, “al-Ta’thīr al-Lāhūtī al-Masīḥī 
‘alā al-Qur’ān,” in al- Qur’ān fī Muḥīṭuh al-Tārīkhī, ed. Gabriel Said Reynolds, trans. Sa‘d-Allāh al-Sa‘dī 
(Köln: Al-Kamel, 2012), 222-223.          
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this verse was widely known to both Christians and Muslims as a denial of the begetting of 
the Son. ‘Ammār makes all possible efforts to nullify the strength of this qur’ānic accusation 
without making any reference to whether the verse itself is true or false.  
Only at the end of his refutation of his interlocutor’s supposed objection does ‘Ammār 
make the Christian position completely clear. God’s essential names or properties have not 
been withheld, but God has graciously given them to humans as a sign of honoring them 
and showing them great favor.  
 
Fifth Possible Answer  
‘Ammār’s refutation of the last objection is based on the Muslim refusal to attribute to God 
what belongs to humans, such as the names father and son. He notes that Muslims dislike 
such names being given to God, who is far higher than any human experience or essence. 
He reminds his interlocutor that this argument is not entirely correct, for human names or 
qualities such as living, knowing, beneficent, generous, gracious, favorable, and the like are 
essentially God’s. Since this is the case, the argument goes, why not attribute two other 
names, namely, father and son to God?    
‘Ammār answers with two possible responses. The first concerns the claim that such 
names were given on account of God’s preferring and honoring humans, and the second 
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relates to the deficiencies attached to the two names. With regard to the former, ‘Ammār 
affirms that what is more amazing and honoring is not the fact that humans have been given 
such names, but rather the human person itself! Mankind has been given a wondrous 
position within creation. Indeed, he suggests, all of these blessings affirm the reality of the 
hereafter. He says: “It is man who is amazing, and it is through the greatness of his status 
and blessing of his name that the world multiplied; [because of this], we are found in the 
world. We [also] find the world to come in our existence in this world.”591     
As for the second objection, ‘Ammār does not actually refute it, but instead, uses it to 
criticize his opponents. He applies the same word, ﺐـﻴﻋ, deficiency, not to the names father 
and son, but rather to the Muslim interlocutor.592 The deficiency is not in his argument, but in 
his antagonist, who is not following the right path and is thereby condemning himself as 
deficient. ‘Ammār then reflects on Muslim theology and makes reference to two of God’s 
attributes—his mercy and his anger. These attributes, he argues, imply some ‘deficiencies.’ 
The first speaks of certain emotional changes within the heart of the one showing mercy as 
he experiences suffering and anguish, while anger, he argues, implies an “alternation of an 
                                               
591 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 61.  
592 Repeatedly, we notice this distinctive feature of ‘Ammār’s use of the interlocutor’s 
language, where he employs the latter’s exact words against him. We have seen this previously in his 
apology for the correctness of the scriptures, where he applies the noun “دﺎﺴـﻓ” to the interlocutor 
himself.  
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earlier state of knowledge and the contentment which only happens on account of prior 
knowledge.”593 In other words, “If Muslims can distinguish between human and divine 
knowledge and wisdom, they should be able to distinguish between human and divine 
begetting.”594 
Thus, ‘Ammār acknowledges that it is only in human experience, not in the character 
of God, that these qualities are seen as implying deficiency, and he applies the same 
argument to the names father and son. If the name merciful is applied to God, without 
implying that emotional changes exist in God’s essence, why not likewise call God Father, 
as the deficiencies of human fatherhood are not found in God’s essence? In effect, ‘Ammār 
challenges his interlocutor to think of these names metaphorically.595  
In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār makes this same argument, including further 
divine names that are accepted by Muslims, such as mighty, powerful and glorious, which 
are also characteristics that indicate a changing state. ‘Ammār, in fact, challenges his 
interlocutor to drop all these names or descriptions of God since they indicate a changing 
state within God.596 However, since Muslims are not fair in their debating tactics, ‘Ammār 
                                               
593 Ibid., 62. 
594 Mark Beaumont, Christology in Dialogue, 69.  
595 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 173. 
596 Further, he acknowledges that, while humans share certain names with the divine being, 
that does not necessarily mean that humans are equal to God in essence. 
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concludes, they disbelieve God and the divine books, which give these names as essential 
names of God. He says forcefully: “If they did not attribute this to Him, their judgment would 
not have come on them, and they would not have denied Him and His books which say this 
of Him.”597 ‘Ammār’s final words in this regard show that he is convinced of the strength of 
his position, and expects that the Muslims will be silenced and unable to counter his 
arguments.598   
 
Discourse on the Divine Unity: An Evaluation  
In explaining the divine unity, ‘Ammār has taken the theological approach of the via negativa. 
He does not say what the divine unity is, but simply what it is not. God’s unity is not a bodily 
reality, and it is not to be understood in human terms. He argues that human existence and 
the experience of begetting is not applicable to God’s Fatherhood/Sonship. The divine unity 
is essentially beyond human comprehension. He also makes it clear that God cannot be 
defined in terms of time or location. This restricted approach suggests, first, that ‘Ammār’s 
concern is not to define the doctrine of divine unity, but rather to refute what has been 
slanderously and falsely said against it; and second, that the intended audience for this 
                                               
597 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 62. 
598 To ‘Ammār’s words, al-Ṣafī adds the strong claim that Muslims only adhere to “what they 
have heard, what they have received in tradition, and what they have grown accustomed to.” See folio 
123b.  
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argument are not the Christians of his community, but the Muslims. Let us consider these 
two points in further detail.  
 
Defining the Unity versus Defending the Unity 
It is evident that ‘Ammār does not make a concerted effort to articulate or define the doctrine 
of the divine unity; rather, as he states at the beginning of this section, his goal is to refute 
the Islamic misunderstandings and false accusations concerning it. In this section, his main 
objective is to refute the false accusations of the Muslim interlocutor, who understands the 
Sonship of Christ only in human and physical terms. His brief definition of the doctrine of the 
divine unity is found in the following statement from Kitāb al-Burhān:  
We call the Word of God ‘Son’ just as the Gospel told us. We do not say that 
the Word of God is a body. But since you find some of God’s creatures, I mean 
the spiritual and subtle beings, which bring forth their own words in a way that 
cannot be comprehended by reason or understood, why do you not say the 
same about [the bringing forth of] the Word of God, which passes all 
understanding of the spiritual angels and men as a whole?599  
 
In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, however, ‘Ammār devotes a major section to 
answering questions regarding the reasons for incarnation and the divine unity, and thereby 
defining the doctrine. We notice there, for instance, that he locates the doctrine of the 
Sonship of Christ in the divine economy, and seems to suggest a type of “progressive 
                                               
599 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 57. 
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biblical revelation.”600 He argues that though the Fatherhood of God and the Sonship of 
Christ exist eternally in the essence of God, the books of the Old Testament do not mention 
such realities on account of the weakness of the minds of people during those periods. But 
later, when the Son himself appeared in the flesh, in human form like ours, people needed to 
know about the majesty of his incarnation, of “his Sonship to his Father,” of “the Fatherhood 
of God to him,” and of “the eternal nature of the Spirit who proceeds from the Father.”601   
However, this limited teaching on the nature of the divine unity is unlike his coverage 
of other doctrines in Kitāb al-Burhān. For example, as we saw in his discourse on the Trinity, 
he makes use of logic, kalām, and the scriptures to clearly articulate the triune nature of the 
one divine essence. This leads us to conclude that, in this section, his goal was simply to 
refute the interlocutor’s false accusations and to assert that Christ’s Sonship should not be 
understood in terms of time.  
At the end of this refutation, the language becomes sharply polemical and ‘Ammār 
describes the Muslim interlocutor as refusing to believe God and God’s books. His ultimate 
polemical thrust comes in his comparing Satan with God in that he “begetteth not, nor is He 
begotten.” We can only imagine how this polemical use of the text of the Qur’ān must have 
                                               
600 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 37.  
601 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 176. He puts it this way: 
” ﻦـﻣ اًﺮﺸﺑ هّﺪﺴﺠﺗ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻬﻴﻠﻋ ِﻪﺘﻤﻌﻧ ِﻢﻴﻈﻌﺑ ﻢﻫﺮﺒﺨﻳو ﻢﻬﺒﻃﺎﺨﻳ نأ ﻰﻟإ ٍﺬﺌﻨﻴﺣ هﺮﺼﻋ ﻞﻫأ جﺎﺘﺣﺎﻓ اًّﺪﺴﺠﺘﻣ ُﻦﺑﻻا ﺮﻬﻇ ّﻰﺘﺣ
ِﻪﻴﺑﻷ َﻪﺗّﻮﻨﺑ ﻚﻟﺬﻟ ﻦﻠﻌﻳو ،ﻢﻫﺮﻫﻮﺟﻢﻬﻟ ِﻪﻴﺑأ ِتاذ ﻦﻣ ِﺔﻀﺋﺎﻔﻟا ِحوّﺮﻟا َّﺔﻴﻟزأو ،ﻪﻟ ِﻪﻴﺑأ َّةﻮﺑأو ، “. 
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infuriated his Muslim interlocutor! 
We must, however, understand this section within the wider context of Kitāb al-Burhān. 
Immediately after answering the five possible objections, ‘Ammār devotes the greater part of 
this treatise to confirming the doctrine of the incarnation (folio 27b to folio 37a). The section 
on the divine unity, therefore, may have served as a ‘negative’ introduction to the 
subsequent discussion on the incarnation. In fact, on the basis of the terminology and 
language used, we can fairly conclude that ‘Ammār’s short statement explaining the divine 
unity could have been directly followed by the discourse on the confirmation of the 
incarnation, without any excursus to refute Muslim misunderstandings. His defining 
statement ends with an affirmation of God’s unity as surpassing all the understanding of the 
spiritual angels and men as a whole, while his later section on the incarnation begins with 
the same affirmation that God, who surpasses all the understanding of the spiritual angels 
and men as a whole, has indeed been manifested in the flesh. This clear progression of 
thought suggests that we could overlook, if we wished, the five possible answers and 
proceed directly from the statement on the divine unity to the discourse on the incarnation. A 
comparative listing of the Arabic words used in the two sections strengthens this conclusion. 
The identical words are put in bold. Regarding the unity ‘Ammār writes:   
ٌﻢﺴﺟ ِﷲ َﺔﻤﻠﻛ ّنإ لﻮﻘﻧ ﻻو . ﺎﻬﻨﻣ َﺪﻟُﻮﺗ ﺪﻗ َﺔﻔﻴﻄﻠﻟا َّﺔﻴﻧﺎﺣّوﺮﻟا َﺲﻔّﻨﻟا ﻲﻨﻋأ ،ﻪﻘﻠﺧ ﺾﻌﺑ ﺪﺠﺗ ﺪﻘﻓ
ﻻ ﺎـﻤﺑ ﺎُﻬﺘﻤﻠﻛ ُﻞـِﻘْﻌَﺗ ُكِرْﺪـُﺗ ﻻو. قﻮـﻓ ﻚـﻟذ ّنإ ِﷲ ِﺔـﻤﻠﻛ ﻲـﻓ لﻮـﻘﺗ ﻻ ﻒـﻴﻜﻓ ِكْرَد  ﺔـﻜﺋﻼﻤﻟا
 207 
ﻦﻴﻌﻤﺟأ ِﺲْﻧﻹاو ﻦﻴّﻴﻧﺎﺣّوﺮﻟا؟602  
 
He then opens his discussion on the incarnation by saying:  
ﻪـّﻧأ ﺎـﻤﻛ ﻪـّﻧﺈﻓ ،ﺎّﻨﻣ ٍَﺮَﺸﺑ ﻲﻓ ِِﻪﻘﺋﻼﺨﻟ ﻖﻟﺎﺨﻟا ﻲّﻠﺠﺗ ﺎّﻣﺄﻓ—ُُهؤﺎﻤـﺳأ ﺖـّﺳﺪﻘﺗ—ﺑ ٌﻂﻴـﺤﻣ ِءﺎﻤﺴـﻟﺎ
 ضرﻷاوﻪُﻛِرْﺪُﺗ ﻻ ُﺔﻓﺎﻄﻟ و ،ﻦﻴّﻴﻧﺎﺣّوﺮﻟا ِﺔﻜﺋﻼﻤﻟاِﺮﻜﻓ ُﺾﻣاﻮﻏ ﻻﻦﻴﻌﻤﺟأ ِْﺲﻧﻹا  َفْﺮُﻌﻳ ﻻ ﻚﻟﺬﻛ ،
 ﻲﻔﻳ ﻻو ،ﻪﻘﻠﺨﻟ ﻪﻴّﻠﺠﺗ ﻲﻓ ِﻪﻣﺮﻛو ِهدﻮﺟو ِﻪﺘﻤﻌﻧو ِهﺮﻴﺑﺪﺗ ُرﻮﻏِكْرَﺪﺑ ﻂﻴـﺤﻤﻟا ُﻪـﻤﻠﻋ ّﻻإ ﻚﻟذ ِﻢﻠﻋ 
ءﻲﺷ ّﻞﻜﺑ.603   
 
‘Ammār’s main point is clear: God’s Word is not flesh, but, according to the divine 
economy, God’s Word took on flesh in order to show God’s goodness and generosity. In the 
middle of this, ‘Ammār inserts the five possible objections, as we showed earlier, and refutes 
them. Arguably, it could be proposed that ‘Ammār had little choice in developing his defense, 
as his Muslim interlocutor found the idea of Christ’s Sonship to be repugnant and vile. 
Ammār’s agenda was, therefore, set for him. His protagonists had moved from repugnance 
to misrepresenting Christ’s Sonship as equivalent to human, physical sonship, thus 
compelling ‘Ammār to refute the accusations. At this stage, defining the divine unity would 
not be his top priority.   
   
‘Ammār’s Audience 
In some sections of Kitāb al-Burhān, ‘Ammār’s audience is explicitly named. We note, for 
                                               
602 Ibid., 57. 
603 Ibid., 62. 
 208 
example, that, in his answer to question twelve concerning the reasons for the incarnation, 
he directs his criticism to the Jacobite Christians. He makes specific reference to the term 
‘Mother of God’ and addresses the Jacobites as those “people who think that Christ told 
them to name him as one substance and one hypostasis.”604 His polemic against the 
Jacobites is extensive, and yet he keeps in mind that his main disagreement is not with them 
as much as it is with those who deny the incarnation as a whole. These words are very 
indicative of his agenda, for the book as a whole is not directed at opposing the Jacobites’ 
“apparent claims,” but rather at addressing the Muslims’ total denial of the incarnation. The 
phrase “the appearance of their words” suggests that ‘Ammār believes that the Jacobites’ 
mistaken position on the incarnation does not actually lie in the way they understand the 
doctrine, but rather in the way they express it. We shall explore this in more detail later. For 
now, it is important to note that this reflects the way Arab Christian theologians usually put 
aside their own theological disagreements in order to concentrate on addressing issues 
raised by Muslims.  
The section devoted to the five objections seems to have been directed primarily 
toward the Muslims. In other sections of Kitāb al-Burhān, ‘Ammār has acknowledged the 
Muslim accusation of taḥrīf, and explained why he makes little appeal to the scriptures as 
                                               
604 Ibid., 197. 
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supportive proof. However, in his discourse on the confirmation of the incarnation, he 
addresses both the Muslim and Christian communities, and says: “If you did not charge that 
the books [the scriptures] had been corrupted and altered, I would have brought before you 
three prophesies concerning this [incarnation], but I mentioned them anyway before those 
who trust that the books are correct.”605  
In this section then, ‘Ammār is writing to both communities. He includes scriptural 
references and interpretation to assure the Muslim interlocutor that the Gospel supports the 
Christian doctrine, as well as to strengthen the faith of the Christian communities. However, 
this objective does not apply to ‘Ammār’s discourse on the divine unity, where he is focusing 
on making his defense against the Muslim community, rather than delineating a theology for 
Christians. 
The five possible answers are of concern to Muslims, which means that ‘Ammār must 
formulate his defense of the Christian view of the divine unity in terms that are 
comprehensible to the Muslim audience. Furthermore, the fact that many of the objections to 
the doctrine of the divine unity and the incarnation are actually alien to the Christian 
understanding of the doctrine, would support the supposition that Christians were not the 
targeted audience.  
                                               
605 Ibid., 76; cf. Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 44.  
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It seems evident, therefore, that the Muslim theological concerns and 
misunderstanding of Christian doctrines have greatly influenced the nature and style of 
Arabic Christian theological treatises. We have seen ‘Ammār’s many attempts to articulate 
the doctrine of the Trinity following to the Muslim kalām argumentations common during his 
days.606 Likewise, in this discussion of the divine unity, ‘Ammār has totally shaped his 
arguments according to the needs of his Muslim audience.  
We now turn our attention to ‘Ammār’s arguments concerning the possibility of the 
incarnation. This is the largest section of Kitāb al-Burhān and one of the most difficult topics 
in Christian-Muslim theological conversation. 
                                               
606 David Thomas, “Explanation of the Incarnation,” 134.   
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The Discourse on the Confirmation of the Incarnation 
In seeking to analyze ‘Ammār’s arguments concerning the possibility of the incarnation,607 
we shall lay out the Islamic objections to, and ‘Ammār’s four grounds for believing in, the 
incarnation. We shall then examine his argument that the Christian view of God is the only 
correct one, presenting as it does, a God who relates to humans in the flesh, and ‘Ammār’s 
corresponding refutation of Islamic views of God. We shall then discuss ‘Ammār’s use of 
biblical proof-texts, and finally reflect on the overall presentation of the incarnation within the 
broader framework of his Christology, primarily as articulated in Kitāb al-Burhān.      
 
Muslim Theology and the Christian Doctrine of the Incarnation 
  
The Christian teaching concerning the incarnation of God in Christ is understood by Muslims 
on the basis of their understanding of God’s being.608 Obviously, concepts of God differ 
widely between Christianity and Islam. While the former teaches that God’s Word became 
flesh and led a human life in order to redeem humanity from the power of sin, the latter 
strongly denies any physical relatedness of God to the world—especially in human form.609 In 
the Islamic view, God is far too high and exalted for such action. The divine is only 
                                               
607 Noteworthy here is the fact that only in an interfaith context, especially between Christians 
and Muslims, would it be essential to defend the possibility of the incarnation, as opposed to the mode 
in which it took place. The latter discussion was more relevant amongst Christian denominations.  
608 Seyyed H. Nasr, “Comments on a few Theological Issues,” 458; cf. Mark Beaumont, 
Christology in Dialogue, 71. 
609 Ghassān Sālim, Maḥāwir al-Iltiqā’, 241-243. 
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manifested to humans through a mediated disclosure: God sends messengers and prophets 
who speak a divine word. The ultimate revelation, according to Islam, is through Muḥammad. 
As al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm strongly protests, merely suggesting that God relates to the world in 
a human form poses a major threat to the doctrine of God’s transcendence and absolute 
oneness.610  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of Muslim polemicists of ‘Ammār’s time 
composed treatises refuting the doctrine of incarnation and the teaching of the Trinity. Al-
Qāsim’s Radd ‘alā-n-Naṣārā,611 Ar-Radd ‘alā-n-Naṣārā of al-Ṭabarī,612 and the more 
sophisticated refutation of al-Warrāq,613 were all dedicated to this cause. Muslim thinkers 
rejected the incarnation on three counts: according to philosophical and logical reasoning; 
through explication of texts in the Qur’ān;614 and through Muslim interpretation of biblical 
texts.  
Thus, on the first count, they raised difficulties concerning the time and mode of the 
incarnation and the unity of the Godhead. How could God be incarnate, they argued, since 
God is One? Furthermore, as al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm noted, the teaching of the Fatherhood of 
                                               
610 Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, Ar-Radd, 16-17. 
611 Ibid. 
612 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd.”  
613 See David Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity. 
614 See David Thomas, “Explanation of the Incarnation.”  
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God and the Sonship of Christ cannot be substantiated at the same time.615 On the second 
count, Muslim thinkers quoted the Qur’ān to show that the doctrine of the incarnation is 
completely erroneous. Texts such as sūrah 3:59; 4:171-172; 5:17, 72, 75, 116; and 9:30 
unequivocally deny the incarnation. Muslim polemicists ardently sought to disprove the 
incarnation by their interpretation of such qur’ānic texts, but, on the third count, they went 
further and also interpreted some verses in the Gospel in such as way as to strengthen their 
argument.616 This was done either by directly refuting the texts or by giving alternative 
interpretations of them.617 For example, al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm refers to the opening verses of 
the Gospel according to Matthew to identify the physical relationship of Jesus to Joseph and 
his antecedents. His point is that Christ has a human father, and a human grandfather, and 
that it therefore goes against both common sense and the witness of the Gospel to attribute 
divinity to him.618 To this, ‘Alī ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī argues that, upon searching the Christian 
scriptures, he became confident that there were twenty thousand references to Jesus as a 
mere human being, while there were only approximately ten verses that seem to indicate his 
divinity—and even these ten are debatable, he argues. The problem, according to him, is 
                                               
615 Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, Ar-Radd, 16-17. 
616 Al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 317-322.  
617 See for example the Radd of ‘Alī ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī, 327. 
618 Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, Ar-Radd, 44.  
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that Christians have built their doctrine on only the ten difficult verses.619 In light of these 
arguments, we must examine how ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī defended his Christian view of the 
incarnation. 
 
Discourse on the Incarnation: Structure and Content 
 
‘Ammār structured his defense of the incarnation by first arguing at great length that it is 
reasonable to believe in the incarnation, given God’s attributes of graciousness and justice, 
and the human need to know God. He then elucidates the basic “Nestorian” Christological 
explanation of the incarnation. Near the conclusion of this section of Kitāb al-Burhān, he 
assures his Muslim opponent that the agreements between Christians are much greater than 
their disagreements, which are basically over what he classifies as terminology.  
‘Ammār begins by reviewing his arguments in his discourse on the divine unity, i.e., 
that God’s economy cannot to be fully comprehended, and that humans are incapable of 
understanding the God who embraces heaven and earth. He writes that God “embraces 
heaven and earth, and is not comprehended by the subtlety of the spiritual angels or the 
innermost thoughts of all humans.”620 Only God’s own knowledge truly and fully 
                                               
619 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 138. 
620 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 62. 
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comprehends God’s economy.621 Nevertheless, humans are not left without help in knowing 
God, for God is a revealing God. Divine books convey relevant information accessible to the 
limited human mind and the weakness of human knowledge.622 Here, ‘Ammār sets out the 
agenda or purpose for this section:  
However, at any rate, we mention some of what His books have indicated about 
Him regarding this. Nonetheless we know that they only mentioned a few things 
that weak human beings might manage to understand. We will explain this in a 
way that should compel rational people to affirm it.623  
 
His starting point is therefore clear: belief in the incarnation is based on biblical 
witness. The scriptures, having been shown to be the authentic testimony of God’s 
revelation, speaks of the incarnation. Therefore, ‘Ammār concludes, the doctrine must be 
correct. Phrases such as “according to what the Torah has said,”624 and “what God’s books 
have indicated,”625 allude to the biblical approach ‘Ammār used to defend the 
reasonableness of the incarnation.626 Further, we note that ‘Ammār supports his argument 
by reminding his readers that Christians and Muslims both agree that the grace of God was 
first displayed with the free decision to create humankind. ‘Ammār argues: 
                                               
621 Ibid.  
622 Idid., 63.  
623 Ibid.  
624 Ibid., 56, 66, 69. 
625 Ibid., 69, 76.  
626 This argument is also repeated in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah. See Michel Hayek, 
Apologie et controverses, 206. 
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Before we explain in detail the grace of the Creator to His creatures, we must 
mention the nature of His grace, kindness and generosity to them that preceded 
this, so that what we will explain about the beginning of these, which our 
opponents join with us in affirming, becomes a witness in our favor against their 
disagreement.  627  
 
‘Ammār believes that proving the nature of the economy of God will necessarily prove the 
incarnation, so, at this point in his argument he offers four justifications for his understanding 
of the divine economy.  
 
The Incarnation According to the Divine Economy: the Four Reasons 
Before we discuss the four arguments that confirm the divine economy, and which, 
according to ‘Ammār, thereby demonstrate the reasonableness of the incarnation, we must 
mention that all four reasons are ‘God-related.’ They are the means of revealing ‘more’ of 
God. The first reveals God’s wisdom, justice, and love; the second makes public the love of 
God and the joy this brings to humans; the third speaks of God’s favor and justice; and the 
fourth affirms God’s complete grace and goodness. It is obvious, then, that ‘Ammār’s starting 
point in the discourse on the incarnation is to assume divine self-revelation. Using this 
approach would surely guarantee less opposition. If God had chosen to be revealed to the 
creature this way, who could oppose it! The divine economy was simply revealed in the 
                                               
627 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 63. 
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incarnation. ‘Ammār attempts, therefore, not only to prove the correctness and 
reasonableness of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, but to actually silence his 
opponents by demonstrating that the incarnation is simply a divine initiative.   
Such an appeal to God’s initiative and freedom is also found in abū Qurrah’s apology 
concerning the possibility of the incarnation. Abū Qurrah starts his argument by stating that 
God has freely chosen this method of manifestation.628 Likewise, abū Rā’īṭah elaborates on 
the same theme, arguing that the generosity, goodness and grace of God, according to the 
witness of the divine books, are the main reason for the incarnation. He summarizes it as 
follows: 
That which caused God, blessed is His name! to become incarnate and 
become human as much as our weak understanding is capable of grasping and 
based on what we are able to draw from the books of God and what they pass 
on to us, is found in His righteousness, His goodness, and His grace and the 
favor He shows to His creation in accordance with its need of these from him, 
and His great mercy on them, because they had fallen into destruction and 
death, and he wanted to resurrect them and create them anew, for every 
affliction had mastery over them, and every kind of sin had overcome them.  629   
 
However, this strategy for relating the incarnation to God’s initiative of self-revelation 
suggests that ‘Ammār’s appeal, at least in this section, is not based on rational proof as 
much as on the proofs of Christian scriptures. He hopes that, by using a common point of 
                                               
628 Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de Théodore Aboucara, 180. 
629 Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 120.  
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contact, his arguments might find some acceptance by Muslims. “And we have also made it 
a must for the people of sound mind to know the correctness of this, and to stop rejecting 
it.”630  
Now let us consider the four reasons or proofs that confirm the credibility of the 
incarnation. 
 
The First Reason: The Need to Know God 
‘Ammār’s first proof demonstrating the reason for the incarnation concerns God’s own self-
revelation and the nature of the human knowledge of the divine. According to ‘Ammār, 
knowing God is not innate in human beings like the knowledge or instinct of animals. Bees, 
for instance, naturally know how to collect nectar and make honey. The spider, too, does 
what is inherent in its nature in weaving a web.631 But the human understanding of God is 
not instinctive in this way. Nor is it due to a lack of generosity on God’s part that knowledge 
of God is not implanted within humankind. Rather, it is because God is concerned that, if 
humans were to have innate knowledge of the divine nature, they would probably cease to 
                                               
630 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 68.  
631 Noteworthy here is the fact that the Qur’ān has two sūrahs named after these two insects 
that ‘Ammār mentions, see sūrahs 16 and 29.  
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give thanks for that knowledge, taking such grace for granted.632  
 ‘Ammār spares no effort in pressing the question of how we know about God. He 
continues: God chose incarnation as a way of communicating with humans, and did so 
because the knowledge of things that are not perceived by the senses is not readily 
accessible or believable. Rather, sure knowledge is learned through the senses.633  
The human soul is an outstanding example of something that is believed to exist, yet is 
not perceived by the senses. Many people of different backgrounds agree that the human 
soul exists; however, many of them, being unable to subject it to learning obtained by their 
senses, deny it. Yet people have no difficulty in accepting the reality of the human body, 
which they see with the eyes and feel through the senses. Recognizing this limitation in 
human knowing, God has chosen to reveal Godself to people in such a way that their senses 
can comprehend. This has been done in a gradual manner.634 At first, therefore, God spoke 
to Adam, Abel, Cain, Noah, Abraham and Moses, as we know from the witness of the 
Torah.635 
                                               
632 ‘Ammār considers this a legitimate concern, and cites as an example the fact that people 
no longer praise the lamb for its quietness and calmness. Furthermore, if God had granted innate 
knowledge to all people, everyone would know God. This is obviously not the case, since the world is 
full of people who do not know God.  
633 Ibid., 65. 
634 The same argument is made by abū Rā’iṭah. See Sandra Keating, Defending the “People 
of Truth,” 116. 
635 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 64-66.  
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At this point in his argument, ‘Ammār is making a clear appeal to his Muslim audience. 
It is quite obvious that he is referring to Old Testament figures who are also mentioned by 
name in the Qur’ān, and are, therefore, acceptable witnesses to Muslims. In fact, ‘Ammār 
modifies his list of biblical names to match the qur’ānic rendering of their names. This is 
especially clear in the case of Cain and Moses. The first he renders as ﻞﻴﺑﺎﻗ, rather than the 
biblical ﻦﻴﻳﺎـﻗ; the second is named, ناﺮـﻤﻋ ﻦـﺑ ﻰـﺳﻮﻣ, unlike the biblical . ماﺮـﻤﻋ ﻦـﺑ ﻰـﺳﻮﻣ  
According to the qur’ānic text, we read that when Cain, ,ﻞﻴﺑﺎﻗ  killed his brother Abel, ﻞﻴﺑﺎﻫ, he 
did not know what to do with the dead body. At that moment, God sent a raven, which 
started to show Cain how to bury the body of his brother.636 Only in some early Muslim 
commentaries on the Qur’ān, such as that of Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, do we read of more 
divine reaction towards this crime. Muqātil, for example, reports that Cain heard a voice from 
heaven asking him about his brother.637  
We note, then, that ‘Ammār mixes the biblical with the qur’ānic account by slightly 
changing Cain’s name. He also adds a reference to God speaking to Abel, even though 
neither the Bible nor the Qur’ān mentions this. Presumably, ‘Ammār, in his attempt to list 
common biblical and qur’ānic figures, was more concerned with names than with the 
scriptural accounts of what was said concerning these patriarchs.  
                                               
636 See sūrah 5:27-31.  
637 His account seems to be a verbatim quotation of the story reported in Genesis 4:9-10.  
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The second figure to whom ‘Ammār appeals, is Moses. Moses is a leading figure in the 
Qur’ān, and is mentioned in many sūrahs as a prophet and messenger from God.638 ‘Ammār 
makes explicit reference to God speaking to the ‘dumb’639 Moses from the burning bush, as 
recorded in the Qur’ān—especially in sūrah 7:103-137.640 ‘Ammār’s modification of Moses’ 
father’s name is also interesting. According to the Old Testament, Moses’ father was 
‘Amrām, ماﺮﻤﻋ,641 which the Qur’ān renders as ‘Imrān, ناﺮﻤﻋ,642 and it is this latter form that 
‘Ammār uses. Again, this is an attempt to connect with his Muslim audience.643  
‘Ammār moves from mentioning Moses to recounting the Old Testament story of the 
Tabernacle. God, he says, had ordered the Children of Israel to build a house for worship, 
where they could offer sacrifices and know the presence of God in one location. As will be 
                                               
638 Ibn Kathīr, Ismāʻīl ibn ʻUmar, Qiṣaṣ al-Anbīyāʼ, vol. 2 (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Taḥrīr, 1990), 69-
134. See also sūrah 2:47-71; 5:20-26; 7:103-137, 10:75-93; 17:4-7, 101-104; 20:9-97; 26:10-66; 27:7-
14; 28:2-46; 40:23-46; 43:46-55; 44:17-33; 79:15-25;159-166.  
639 ‘Ammār uses the word صﺮـﺧأ, which literally means dumb; this is corrected by al-Ṣafī ibn 
al-‘Assāl who uses the word ﻎـﺜﻟأ, ‘lisper’ to mean “slow of speech and tongue.” This modification 
matches the witness of Exodus 4:10. See Cherfeh MS folio 128b.   
640 Repeatedly, we note the account of God appearing to Moses being used to support the 
possibility of incarnation in the writings of Arabic-speaking Christians. For example, abū Qurrah shows 
astonishment at the Muslim interlocutors who believe that God appeared to Moses in the burning 
bush, while they deny the manifestation of God in the Body of Christ. See Constantin Bacha, Les 
Œuvres de Théodore Aboucara, 185. 
641 Exodus 6:20. See Samir Khalil, “al-Ta’thīr al-Lāhūtī,” 217-218.       
642 See Ghassān Sālim, Maḥāwir al-Iltiqā’, 127. 
643 Similar modifications can be traced throughout much of the Arabic Christian literature of 
the Abbasid caliphate. The well-known example is the rendering of the Holy Spirit as سﺪـﻘﻟا حور, not 
سﺪﻘﻟا حوﺮﻟا. The former is definitely qur’ānic (see sūrah 5:110). 
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shown next, this paved the way for ‘Ammār to make two more connections with Islamic 
teaching, i.e., God’s attributes and the Ka‘bah.  
‘Ammār speaks of those who “go against us in our saying,” who, when it comes to the 
economy of God and the human need to see God, say that God also spoke to them in “their 
book” about the divine economy, and that God spoke to them as a hearing and seeing God. 
Certainly, in several places the Qur’ān speaks of God as such; thus we read the explicit 
formulation, “God is hearing and seeing,” which is quoted verbatim in ‘Ammār’s discourse, 
and is found ten times in the Qur’ān.644 
‘Ammār’s utilization of such anthropomorphic attributes or descriptions of God reflects 
the various ways in which the Muslim mutakallimūn at the time were attempting to 
understand the attributes of God. ‘Ammār himself would reflect on this issue later. However, 
for now, it is important to note his numerous attempts to establish common ground with his 
Muslim audience. For instance, he refers to God forgetting, which seems to indicate an 
acquaintance with sūrah 9:76, where it clearly says, “They have forgotten God; so he hath 
forgotten them.” But, argues ‘Ammār, God does not forget. Forgetting is attributed to God in 
order that humans, who do forget, may be able to understand God.  
However, ‘Ammār is necessarily selective in the qur’ānic ideas that he adopts. 
                                               
644 Sūrah 4:58,134; 17:1; 22:61,75; 31:28; 40:20,56; 42:11; 58:1. Rushdī Zayn, al-Muʻjam al-
Mufahras li-Maʻānī al-Qur’ān al-ʻAẓīm (Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr al-Muʻāṣir, 1996), 107-108.   
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Certainly, there are other references in the Qur’ān that negate the idea of God forgetting, as 
in sūrah 19:64.645 But of course, if ‘Ammār had used such verses, his argument would not 
have stood. Further, he refers to God as a surety for people,646 as someone who is 
angered,647 and someone who is contented.648 All of these attributes, ‘Ammār argues, belong 
only to the creature, but God has described Godself in such a manner in order to identify 
with human actions and feeling. Implementing such anthropopathic elements in speaking of 
God would seem to indicate God’s awareness of the human need to see the divine.  
Yet even while he utilizes Islamic theology, ‘Ammār continues to take a polemical 
stance. He explicitly plays on words to deny the Muslim belief that God spoke to them from 
the Ka‘bah, or that God ever spoke directly to Muḥammad. ‘Ammār’s choice of words makes 
it obvious that he rejects such assertions. He dismisses any revelation in Islam;649 using an 
Arabic conditional phrase containing the particle ﻮـﻟ, followed by a past tense, indicates the 
negation of a past action—if he had…[which he did not].650 Thus ‘Ammār is arguing that had 
God spoken to them or to their prophet, God’s knowledge would have been confirmed to 
                                               
645 “[The angels say:] ‘We descend not but by command of thy Lord: to Him belongeth what is 
before us and what is behind us, and what is between: and thy Lord never doth forget.’” 
646 Sūrah 16:91 says, “Fulfill the Covenant of God when ye have entered into it, and break not 
your oaths after ye have confirmed them; indeed ye have made God your surety; for God knoweth all 
that ye do.”  
647 Sūrah 16:106; 47:28; 48:6; 58:14. 
648 Sūrah 5:119; 48:18; 9:100. 
649 See Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 166-169. 
650 See Edward W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, 3014.   
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them, but the particle ﻮـﻟ indicates that God did not speak either to them or to their prophet 
and that this is why they have pursued erroneous ways in their search for God. As we shall 
see, this accusation is more fully developed in ‘Ammār’s discussion of the second proof 
affirming the reasonableness of the incarnation.  
Near the end of this section, ‘Ammār more clearly reveals his agenda. He expects 
Muslims to accept the possibility of the incarnation on the basis of both logic and the 
testimony of the books of God. The incarnation has been verified, and in fact, it took place, 
according to the Christian doctrine; now the opponents must accept it and believe in it.651 
‘Ammār puts it thus:  
Yet, they ask us to confirm this to them from His books and from what indicates 
to rational people that he had really done it, without them denying that he had 
done it, but instead by confessing that His favor is in it. This is confirmed to 
them, and they ought to accept it and believe in it.  652  
 
The Second Reason: The Need to See God 
‘Ammār’s second argument for the credibility of the incarnation concerns peoples’ insatiable 
need to see God. This proof also relates to God’s love and the joy he brings to humans. 
‘Ammār speaks of the various ways in which humans demonstrate their need to see God. In 
their great desire to know things as they really are, some go to great lengths, counting the 
                                               
651 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 67.  
652 Ibid. 
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stars and trying to figure out what they are; or they explore alchemy, trying to transmute 
metals and seeking to understand the elements of being. Other people use divination, 
foretelling future events or practicing augury653 or incantation. Yet others hurry to listen to a 
new prophet and hear a prophetic word. All this, he argues, shows that, if humans are left 
without revelation, they will ultimately reach incorrect conclusions.  
These attempts are all indicative of the human desire for knowledge. Yet, the highest 
and the most worthy knowledge of all to be sought is knowledge of God, the Creator, the 
most generous one. To substantiate this point, ‘Ammār appeals again to the Old Testament, 
where Moses expressed his desire to see God. ‘Ammār surely has both Exodus 18:23, and 
sūrah 7:143 in mind. The biblical account speaks of God’s majesty being shown to Moses, 
whereas the Qur’ān uses this same story to teach an opposite lesson. It describes Moses’ 
desire to see God, followed by Moses’ repentance when he realizes that God is far too 
glorious to be seen.654  
To this, however, ‘Ammār adds another attempt to dialogue with Muslims. He speaks 
                                               
653 The Arabic word used here is .ﺮﻴﻄﻟا ﺮﺟز  This refers to an ancient practice by which people 
attempted to divine the future or other information through the study of the flight of birds. This word 
traditionally used is .ﺔﻓﺎﻴﻌﻟا  See ibn Manẓūr, Muḥammad ibn Mukarram, Lisān al-ʻArab, ed. ‘abd  Allāh 
ʻAlī Kabīr, et al, vol. 4 (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Ma’ārif, [1984-1986]), 1813.  
654 Al-Ṣafī adds here the text of the Gospel according to Matthew 13:17, in which Jesus says, 
“Truly, I say to you, many prophets and righteous men longed to see what you see, and did not see it, 
and to hear what you hear, and did not hear it.” He uses this verse to further support ‘Ammār’s 
argument that many people have wished to see God in the past. See Cherfeh MS folio 125b.  
 226 
of their belief that they will see God on the Day of Resurrection. Once again, he directly 
refers to a text of the Qur’ān, sūrah 75:22-23, which says the believers will look at the face of 
God, i.e., at the beatific vision. In this, ‘Ammār demonstrates his knowledge of Islamic 
doctrine. However, it is interesting to note that he does not say that “all Muslims” believe that 
they will see the face of God, but refers rather to “many of our opponents”—a clear reference 
to the variety of Islamic interpretations and understandings of the abovementioned text.655 
The Shī‘ah, for example, deny a literal beatific vision, whereas the Mu‘tazilī’s interpretation of 
the first text insisted that it had an allegorical/symbolic meaning, which, according to them, 
was that believers will be waiting to receive God’s reward. These interpreters even doubted 
the literal meaning of the ḥadith attributed to Muḥammad in which he affirms that he saw 
God.656 For example, abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf argued that God can only be seen by the 
heart.657 The adherents of the ḥadīth and sunnah, on the other hand, have always 
maintained that on the Day of Resurrection God will be seen just as “humans can see the 
crescent moon.”658 Muslims have used the Qur’ān to support both interpretations, some 
                                               
655 “Some faces that Day will beam [in brightness and beauty] looking towards their Lord.” Cf. 
sūrah 18:110; 92:18-20.  
656 D. Gimaret, “Ru’yat Allāh,” EI2.  
657 Al-Ashʻarī, Maqālāt, 218.  
658 Ibid., 321.  
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appealing to the text of sūrah 75:22-23, while others appeal to sūrah 6:103.659   
Our concern here, however, is not with how early Muslim theologians differed on the 
issue of the beatific vision; rather, we are noting that ‘Ammār’s reference to ‘many’ rather 
than ‘all’ argues strongly for his acquaintance with this controversial and detailed issue, 
which caused a split among Muslims. This is also a further example of how ‘Ammār used the 
intellectual issues of his day to his own advantage, just as he did in his arguments 
concerning the Trinity, and in his reference to the attributes of God.  
Second, ‘Ammār argues that, since God is not perceived by the senses, people have 
sought out idols to worship as gods and have even given the name of God to them. Worship 
of idols that can be touched and seen seems to have met the human need for the tangible. 
But ‘Ammār is convinced that a generous and loving God would reveal Godself to people in 
order to meet their need. As Griffith states, “[T]he generous God would not be niggardly and 
withhold from His creatures their security. He would appear to them in a body that is evident 
to the senses.”660 And the flesh the creator would indwell could be perceived by the senses. 
This manifestation, ‘Ammār assures his reader, does not diminish or belittle God in any way. 
Rather, it assures humans of God’s favor and generosity, while elevating them to a higher 
                                               
659 “No vision can grasp Him, but His grasp is over all vision: He is above all comprehension, 
yet is acquainted with all things.” 
660 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 176.  
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place, to the benefit of all. The truest honor humans can ever be given is that God has 
manifested Godself in a body like their own.  
 
The Third Reason: The Need to Experience God’s Justice 
The third argument put forward to support the reasonableness of the incarnation likewise 
pertains to God’s nature. The incarnation, ‘Ammār declares, is where God actually displays 
divine justice. Here, ‘Ammār appeals to the human experience of justice, according to which 
it is necessary that the person being judged must see the judge. People of sound mind 
would consider it a great injustice if the judge were not known to the subject of his judgment. 
Likewise, it is also unjust in the eyes of God to judge humans without having first been 
revealed or manifested to them. This criterion of justice can only be achieved when God is 
manifested by being incarnate. However, since manifestation of God’s essence is 
fundamentally impossible, God has chosen to be ‘veiled’ in a body—a tangible, visible body. 
This enables both kinds of people, i.e., those waiting for their reward from God, and those 
who will receive judgment, to see the veiled God. It is only at this moment of God’s 
relatedness to the creature that the obedient will receive their reward from the God they can 
see, and likewise those who are afraid, being under God’s judgment, will also see their 
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judge.661 This plan, ‘Ammār argues, agrees with what the scriptures have said about God. It 
perfectly accords with God’s character as a just God who speaks to the creature in a 
relevant, comprehensible manner. To this line of reasoning, ‘Ammār adds that only the 
human essence could be the essence on earth in which God would chose to be veiled. Of all 
that is seen, the human essence is honorable and most valued; it is the most worthy for God 
to use as a veil of manifestation. The argument is thus: “The worthiest visible thing, and the 
noblest, and the most honorable according to Him [God] and the worthiest thing for His 
veiling, is the essence of man.”662 
 
The Fourth Reason: The Need to Enjoy God’s Dominion 
‘Ammār’s fourth point pertains to humankind’s God-given dominion over creation. God has 
given humanity dominion over this perishable world, and it logically follows that God would 
give them the ultimate form of dominion, i.e., dominion over the hereafter. Repeatedly then, 
we note that ‘Ammār bases his argument on the belief that God will one day bring all 
creation to perfection. This also applies to human domination, for while dominion is only 
limited, God will bring human authority to full completion and grant dominion over the world 
to come. This divine act parallels God’s generosity. 
                                               
661 Ibid., 69. 
662 Ibid. 
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We note here that al-Ṣafī seems to have found this last argument unsatisfactory. 
Instead, he completes ‘Ammār’s point with a reference to Jesus’ words in the Gospel 
according to Matthew 28:18: “All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me.”663 
For al-Ṣafī, this was an important theological addition. As a Copt, he wanted to stress that 
the one in whom God is revealed to humanity was not a mere human, but was indeed the 
one into whose hands all powers were given, that is, he was divine-human. However, this 
does not seem to be what ‘Ammār wishes to emphasize. For him, it was more important to 
depict God’s humanity. This is not to say that ‘Ammār does not believe in the divinity of 
Christ, but rather that he has a different focal point.  
It is claimed that Nestorius taught that there were two separate persons in the 
incarnate Christ, one divine and the other human. This meant that the Virgin Mary did not 
give birth to the divine, but to man; and that the two natures of Christ—divine and human—
were in harmony, but each functioned according to its own attributes. However, according to 
Cyril of Alexandria, who stressed the essential unity of Christ, this explanation seemed to 
indicate a separation in Christ’s person. The Nestorius-Cyril controversy was ended at the 
third ecumenical council at Ephesus in 431. Nevertheless, ‘Ammār clearly adhered to the 
“Nestorian” tradition, which taught that Christ is perfectly human and perfectly divine without 
                                               
663 Cherfeh MS folio 126b.  
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thereby affirming two Christs or two sons. In this he resembles Timothy I, without actually 
quoting his words.664  
It is important to note that the four reasons are not presented at equal length: each 
argument is shorter than the preceding one. Of course, there is no reason why the 
explanations should all be of equal length. However their decreasing lengths are significant. 
First, it seems safe to suggest that ‘Ammār considers the first reason to be the most 
important, given that knowing God is a crucial starting point in theology. Once this is well 
established, the presentation of God’s appearance in the flesh would naturally become more 
convincing. Furthermore, it is also possible that ‘Ammār attempts to use any and every 
possible argument to prove the possibility of the incarnation, regardless of how little there is 
to say on the topic. This is exactly what he does in the following section, where he re-
explains the four reasons.   
 After presenting four proofs of the incarnation, ‘Ammār proceeds to elaborate on his 
arguments. In so doing, he outlines the classical “Nestorian” view of incarnation. He seems 
convinced that his previous arguments are sophisticated enough to compel his opponents to 
accept the reasonableness of belief in the incarnation and, as a result, stop rejecting it. The 
                                               
664 See Thomas Hurst, “The Syriac Letters,” 175. See also Susan Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria 
and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of a Heretic (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
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strength of the argument does not come from logic, however. Rather, he has based it on 
what the books of God have taught about God’s self-revelation to humans.665 It is evident 
that ‘Ammār hopes that his four reasons, along with his subsequent explanation, will be 
completely convincing of the truth of the incarnation. ‘Ammār’s argument starts with a review 
of the four reasons why God has chosen to self-reveal to the creature. This revelation, or 
manifestation, was accomplished in the body that Christ took from the Virgin Mary without 
any human agency through marital relations.666 Through the body of Christ, God spoke to the 
world. In this way, humans who had been led astray by the deceiving tricks of the devil are 
now brought close to God and able to enjoy peaceful relations.667 In fact, ‘Ammār says, the 
devil has lost power in Christ’s body and thus has been subjected to humans; and 
conversely, the human state of misery has been altered such that they can know God, 
without need of the intermediate role played by any messenger or prophet from God.  
 In Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār argues that the benefit of Christ’s incarnation 
would not be equally applicable if God had chosen to self-reveal through an angel without a 
human body. The body of Christ, having been taken from among humans, allows for the 
                                               
665 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 175.   
666 This argument is also found in Timothy I’s defense before al-Mahdī. See Robert Caspar, 
“Les versions arabes,” 127.  
667 Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm refers to this same idea as something claimed by Christians. See al-
Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, Ar-Radd, 38. 
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benefits of the incarnation to be accredited to the rest of humankind, which would not be the 
case if he had taken the form of an angel, not to be identified with them.668  
The unity between the body and the properties of the soul is fundamental to ‘Ammār’s 
argument, as it answers the difficult question of how human actions can be attributed to the 
incarnate God. The properties of the soul, when united to the body, become the actions of 
the body by virtue of ‘borrowing.’ Yet, these properties are of the soul’s own essence. 
Further, such unity does not impute any weakness to the being of the soul; it does not 
indicate that the actions depart from it to dwell in the body. For example, the attributes of life 
and speech, which are essential to the being of the soul, become the attributes of the body, 
without the soul having to be emptied of them. So then, the name of ‘man’ has become 
inclusive of the soul with its attributes and the body. This unity, in turn, necessitates that, 
when an essential act of the soul, such as understanding or knowledge, is attributed to 
‘man,’ it refers to the soul; and when an essential act of the body, such as eating or drinking, 
is attributed to the soul, it refers to the body. ‘Ammār realizes that using the analogy of the 
unity of the soul with its essential properties within the body is not perfectly illustrative of the 
way in which God is veiled in the body of Christ. Nevertheless, this remains a good attempt 
at explicating the manner of the union. 
                                               
668 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 217-218. 
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This “Nestorian” understanding of the distinction between the divine and human 
actions of Christ was already known within the Muslim community. For example, we read in 
al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm’s Radd a faithful summary, if not a verbatim rendering, of the same sort 
of teaching that ‘Ammār indicates here. Al-Qāsim, speaking of what “Nestorian” theologians 
believe, says:  
So, we [“Nestorian” Christians] when we see him [Christ] eating and drinking, 
and coming and going in the world, getting tired, and complaining, laughing, 
and crying, we attribute this and the like to the human nature; and when we see 
him raising the dead, healing the sick and walking on the water, we attribute this 
to the divine nature.  669  
 
This statement also corresponds to what Timothy I states before al-Mahdī: “The very 
same Christ is the Word born of the Father, and a man born of Mary. From the fact that he is 
Word-God, he is born of the Father before the times, as light from the sun and word from the 
soul; and from the fact that he is man he is born of the Virgin Mary, in time; from the Father 
he is, therefore, born eternally, and from the Mother he is born in time, without a Father, 
without any marital contact, and without any break in the seals of the virginity of his 
Mother.”670 However, these human actions were used in Muslim rebuttals of the divinity of 
Christ. Ibn Rabban al-Ṭabari, for example, attempts in his Radd  to refute the divinity of 
Christ and its relation to the incarnation by referring to the physical developments of the 
                                               
669Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, Ar-Radd, 37.   
670 Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 17-18. 
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body of Christ. The body, he indicates, has grown from one state to the other. It has blood 
and flesh, and that which is made of blood and flesh cannot be divine.671  
 
‘Ammār’s Counterattack on the Muslim Denial of the Incarnation 
At this point, ‘Ammār wonders whether there is any greater favor, grace or goodness than 
that which is found in the manifestation of God in flesh. This manifestation, ‘Ammār reminds 
his audience, is the culmination of God’s goodness, which was graciously shown in the 
creation of humankind. God has brought divine goodness to completion by appearing in the 
body of Christ. The first man, Adam, had fallen into sin and was thus wandering far from 
God, having been subjected to death. However, the grace of God, which has been shown in 
its fullness in Christ, brought salvation from such death. God in Christ has not only given 
humans salvation, but has granted them dominion over this perishable life and the life to 
come. ‘Ammār then compares the Christian view of God’s goodness to creation with that of 
Islam, which, according to his analysis, denies any such completion of God’s favor and 
grace. The Christian view of the incarnation, he maintains, brings the ultimate degree of 
honor, dominion and kingship to humans. Conversely, its denial represents an ignorant 
refusal of honor.  
‘Ammār uses the illustration of a person being chosen from a particular nation to be 
                                               
671 I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 124-126, 131.  
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crowned as king. In this case, his honor and dominion is shared by all, since he is their 
representative. Likewise, the honor and dignity of Christ is bestowed on all humans since he 
is from our own race.672 This last point refers to the argument of Adamic representation that 
‘Ammār had established earlier.   
‘Ammār continues to reflect on the anthropological implications of the incarnation. For 
example, he dwells on the benefits of the incarnation, since God, in Christ’s body, lifted the 
bodies of humans to the state of sonship. Those who had been enslaved were given a noble 
status “by the condescension of the Son who is one of them in order to lift them up to share 
in God’s kingdom.”673 As a result, they are filled with an indescribable joy. Even if all people 
joined with heaven and earth in their outpouring of gratitude for God’s goodness, they would 
be unable to offer appropriate thanks.674  
In Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār further reflects on the communal benefits 
bestowed on humanity through the incarnation of Christ. He tells the parable of a king who 
wanted to bestow perfect goodness and favor on his subjects. The king decided to choose 
one person from among them on whom he would bestow grace, dominion and authority. 
This noble status was then given to the rest of the king’s subjects. Likewise, ‘Ammār argues, 
                                               
672 Ibid., 74.  
673 Mark Beaumont, Christology in Dialogue, 82.  
674 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 75. 
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all of creation has been greatly honored by the incarnation of God in Christ.675  
This style of parable seems to have been common within Arabic Christian theology. 
According to Cheikho, it was used in a treatise dated 877 AD concerning the incarnation. In 
this parable, the author describes a certain king who wanted to show his generosity to his 
subjects, so he decided to choose a bride for his son from among his subjects. The king’s 
intention was to pour out his generosity on the rest of the bride’s family, giving them 
authority, nobility and dignity. Here also, the author argues that this is the way the Creator 
has been identified with humanity, through Christ who took the form of man.676       
 
“Three” Proof-Texts  
According to ‘Ammār, God’s books indicate that God always intended to become incarnate. 
The problem is that his opponent has quit studying the books, and even worse, considers 
them to have been corrupted, and therefore unworthy of trust. This line of thinking perfectly 
reflects the words of the Muslim al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, who clearly dismissed any support 
                                               
675 Ibid., 216. 
676 The text reads: “God the Word became incarnate, because God wanted to show us His 
generosity. In this, He resembles a king who found a bride for his son in the house of one of his 
subjects and he intended to join those in the house to himself to make them closer to him in order to 
mingle with them and call them his family, as well as to give them an inheritance. So the Creator 
showed generosity in the incarnation of the Word by mingling with us and befriending us…And the 
Word ascended into heaven and he will come again to join us to himself and give us his goodness as 
an inheritance and make us partake in his riches.” Louis Cheikho, Vingt traités théologiques, 110-111.  
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drawn from the Christian scriptures, as it had been corrupted. He declares that Christians 
have misinterpreted their scriptures in order to find biblical support for their false doctrine.677 
However, after disputing the accusation of taḥrīf, ‘Ammār reflects on ‘three’ prophecies from 
the Old Testament which, according to his interpretation, foretold God’s manifestation in the 
body of Christ.678 Though the prophecies are three in number, they are also, as he indicates, 
from five different quotations. ‘Ammār seems to have numbered them three because they 
are drawn from three Old Testament sources: the Book of Isaiah, the Book of Psalms, and 
the Book of Daniel. At this point, ‘Ammār’s words seem to be directed to a Christian 
audience, as he hopes to provide some kind of biblical support for the average Christian 
who, as ‘Ammār puts it, “trusts that the books are correct.”679  
‘Ammār first quotes from Isaiah 7:14,680 and 9:6.681 These two texts have traditionally 
been used by Christians to support the Virgin birth of Christ.682 However, at this point in Kitāb 
al-Burhān, ‘Ammār does not use these verses in connection with Christ’s birth; rather, he 
                                               
677 Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, Ar-Radd, 59. 
678 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 54. 
679 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 67.  
680 “Therefore the Lord Himself will give you a sign. Behold, a young woman shall conceive 
and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel.” 
681 “For to us a child is born, to us a son is given; and the government will be upon his 
shoulder, and his name will be called ‘Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of 
Peace.’” 
682 See Steven A. McKinion and Thomas C. Oden, Isaiah 1-39. Ancient Christian 
Commentary on Scripture, vol. 10 (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2004). 
 239 
presents them as indications that God was manifested in a body like that of humans, i.e., the 
flesh of Christ. Hence he concludes, “Our God has become flesh like ours.”683 Timothy I also 
uses Isaiah 7:14 to support the doctrine of the incarnation.684 Further, this quotation from 
Isaiah seems to have been known by the Muslim polemicists of ‘Ammār’s time. Abū ‘Īsā al-
Warrāq, for example, questions it and argues that the “Nestorian” view of the means of 
incarnation actually nullifies the words of Isaiah, because it places the timing of divine unity 
at the time of Jesus’ birth, rather than at conception.685  
The second quotation comes from the Book of Psalms 8:4-6.686 This verse states that 
the Son of Man has been placed lower than the angels, which would actually seem to 
counter ‘Ammār’s own argument in this section of the treatise. This point was raised by ‘Alī 
ibn Rabbān al-Ṭabarī, who used these words of David to refute the Christian teaching of the 
incarnation. He argues that, while David is speaking to God in the text of the Psalm, he also 
prophesies about the coming of the Messiah, but does so without attributing divinity to 
Christ.687  
But ‘Ammār swiftly rebuts this charge, inserting an important modification in his 
                                               
683 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 67. 
684 Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 82.   
685 David Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity, 110.  
686 “What is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou dost care for him? 
Yet thou hast made him a little less than God, and dost crown him with glory and honor. Thou hast 
given him dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under His feet.” 
687 See I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 146.   
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interpretation of David’s words. He states that the lowering only concerns Christ’s death, a 
death on the cross. Conversely, ‘Ammār draws further support for his position by showing 
that these verses also point to the exaltation of Christ over all things. He then appeals to 
Psalm 107:20,688 where he finds clear corroboration of the Christian view that God’s Word 
has been sent to heal humans of their sin.  
The last proof-text used by ‘Ammār is from Daniel 7:13-14,689 which is commonly 
interpreted by Christians as referring to God the Father’s exaltation of Christ. Although 
‘Ammār lists this verse in support of the doctrine of Christ’s representative role and the 
dominion he will enjoy and share with all humanity, these verses are interpreted and 
explained here solely in support of the doctrine of incarnation. These particular verses were 
frequently employed by Arabic-speaking theologians of the time to support the doctrine of 
the incarnation. Since they come from the Old Testament, it is possible that they were 
originally used in Christian apologetics against the Jews, and were only later used in Arabic 
Christian apologetics against Islam.690  
                                               
688 “He sent forth His word, and healed them, and delivered them from destruction.” 
689 “I saw in the night visions, and behold, with the clouds of heaven there came one like a 
son of man, and he came to the Ancient of Days and was presented before Him. And to him was 
given dominion and glory and kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his 
dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom one that shall not 
be destroyed.”  
690 It is evident that Timothy I, abū Rā’īṭah, and abū Qurrah all used these sets of verses to 
support the incarnation. See Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 87; Sandra 
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Other Views of God, non-Islamic  
According to ‘Ammār, if one denies the Christian view that God’s self-manifestation offers the 
best understanding of God’s being and attributes, one is left with merely confusing, 
incomplete and contradictory views about God’s being. According to ‘Ammār, the first to err 
in their understanding of God were those who totally denied God’s existence. This may well 
have been a reference to the Zanādiqah, whom he has previously mentioned.691 He also 
refers to Manichaeans and their dualistic view that the world consists of the two fundamental 
entities of good and evil.692 Further, in a clear reference to the Greek philosophy of 
Aristotle,693 he mentions those who speak of God as matter, ὕλη.694 Lastly, he mentions the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 130; Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de Théodore 
Aboucara, 99-100. In Kitāb al-Masā’l wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār gives an exhaustive list of biblical proof 
texts, including texts from the Old and New Testaments. Having referred to the words of David and 
Isaiah in the Old Testament, ‘Ammār then indicates that the testimony of the New Testament is 
remarkably exhaustive. He quotes the “Four Pillars,” i.e., Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. His 
selection of texts contains paradoxical stories of human and divine action in the person of Christ, such 
as Jesus’ weeping at Lazarus’ tomb and his powerful words that gave life to Lazarus. According to 
‘Ammār, these actions show the extent of separation between the divine and the human in the person 
of the Messiah: that is to say, Christ had the attributes of both man and God, as he was subjected to 
human emotions, but at the same time displayed divine acts such as giving life to the dead. Michel 
Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 205-211.   
691 Ibid., 23. 
692 Al-Shahrastānī, Muḥammad ibn ʻabd al-Karīm, Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects, 
181-190.  
693 Ibid., 317-318.    
694 Lit. wood or forest. The term used is ﻟﻮﻴﻫﻲ . It was Arabicized from Greek by Arab Christian 
translators during the Abbasid caliphate. See Tawfīq al-Ṭawīl and Saʻīd Zāyid, al-Muʻjam al-Falsafī (al-
Qāhirah: al-Hay’ah al-ʻĀmmah l-Shu’ūn al-Maṭābiʻ al-Amīriyyah, 1983), 208.    
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idol-worshippers, who, not knowing God, have attached God’s name to idols and worshipped 
them. All these non-Abrahamic views of God, according to ‘Ammār, have erred.  
Unlike his contemporary, Theodore abū Qurrah, in his Treatise on the True Religion, 
‘Ammār does not address the Jewish view of God when considering the Abrahamic religions, 
but focuses on the more challenging view(s) presented by Muslims. Abū Qurrah was seeking 
to compare the religions of his time, and ‘Ammār had likewise previously spoken about the 
multiplicity of religions. However, in this section of Kitāb al-Burhān, ‘Ammār is not trying so 
much to discern the true religion as to prove that the Christian view of God is the most 
viable.  
 
Other Views of God, Islamic  
‘Ammār shows great familiarity with the different views of God within Islamic theology. He 
lists the various Islamic sects of his time, saying:  
Some of them from a religious community in our time, in order to confirm their 
Creator to themselves, represent Him among themselves as limited, seated on 
a throne, ascending from one heaven to another, and descending from one 
heaven to another. Some of them make Him limited to a known space, and 
known forms, and they determine that He is not more than these. Some of 
them, while wanting to honor Him, make Him a visible light that enlightens them 
from the light of the resurrection, having put into consideration the day of 
reckoning the awards of paradise and hell. Some of them, in order to know and 
understand Him, say that He has two hands like their hands, and two feet like 




In the last part of the text quoted above, it is clear that ‘Ammār is referring to the 
Muslim anthropomorphists, who, according to al-Shahrastānī, once said, “We believe in 
whatever is reported in the book and sunnah, and we do not try to interpret it, knowing for 
certain that God does not resemble any created things, and that all the images we form of 
him are created by him and formed by him.”696 ‘Ammār also seems to be making explicit 
reference to the Jawāribiyyah, followers of Dāwūd al-Jawāribī, who once taught that God has 
flesh and blood and even members and limbs such as hands and feet.697 Muqātil ibn 
Sulaymān also believed this.698 ‘Ammār’s words also contain references to the Rāfiḍah who 
were mainly Shī‘ite Muslims. The Hishāmites were a sect of the Rāfiḍah who followed 
Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam. They believed that God has a specific length and width, and 
ultimately a certain limit. They also taught that God is a shining light who shines like a round 
pearl, and that the throne is where God is located.699 Another group of Rāfiḍah maintained 
that God looks like humans,700 while the Rāfiḍah sect of Hishām ibn Sālim al-Jawālīqī denied 
                                               
695 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 77. 
696 Al-Shahrastānī, Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects, 181-76; cf. al-Shahrastānī, 
Muḥammad ibn ʻabd al-Karīm, Muslim Sects and Divisions: The Section on Muslim Sects in Kitāb al-
Milal wal-Niḥal (London: Kegan Paul International, 1984), 88.    
697 Ibid., 258. 
698 Al-Ashʻarī, Maqālāt, 258-259.  
699 Ibid.,102.  
700 Ibid.,105.  
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that God has flesh and blood. According to their understanding, God is a bright light, and has 
a hands, feet, ears, eyes, nose and mouth.701 According to abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq, this last sect 
went as far as to say that God has black hair.702 Finally, ‘Ammār’s reference to those who do 
not attribute a body to God, and thereby limit God’s existence to a given place, seems to fit 
the Mu‘tazilī description of God. Al-Ash‘arī, for example, reports that the general belief of the 
Mu‘tazilah was that God has no body, and that no form or image can represent God.703 
‘Ammār uses these conflicting Islamic views to support his defense of the Christian 
view of God. His reference to God’s throne stands as the best example of this. Although he 
does not refer directly to the text of the Qur’ān,704 he speaks of those who portray God as 
seated on a throne. Muslims at that time were divided in their understanding of this. Some 
interpreted it literally, while others (primarily the Mu‘tazilīs) insisted on a purely metaphorical 
interpretation. They understood it to mean that God is in control.705 
This reference to God enthroned seems to have been a common theme among Arab 
Christian polemicists. For instance, it is clearly found in the apology of abū Qurrah 
concerning those who deny the possibility of the incarnation. He makes it clear that divine 
                                               
701 Ibid., 259. 
702 Ibid.,105.  
703 Ibid., 87-216, 226. 
704 See sūrah 10:3, 13:2, and 20:5. 
705 Al-Ashʻarī, Maqālāt, 261.  
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forgiveness is grounded only in the redeeming work of Christ through his suffering on the 
cross. Thereafter, he refers to the Muslim belief that God is seated on the throne, and uses 
this to rebut their accusation that the teaching of the incarnation imputes limitations to God. 
He argues: “God made for Himself a throne on which to sit in the heavens from the time that 
He first created [them].”706 Abū Qurrah argues that speaking of God as seated on a throne in 
no way limits God to this location. “None of them [the interlocutors] can say that God, having 
sat on the throne is not [present] everywhere in heaven.”707 In the same way, he argues, the 
“body [Christ’s body] has become for us like the throne in the heavens.”708  
The Jacobite, abū Rā’iṭah al-Tikrītī, also utilized the same argument to advance the 
Christian doctrine of the incarnation. He maintains that, since Muslims believe that God is 
seated on the throne and yet is not limited to it, they should also understand that the 
Christian doctrine of the incarnation does not impute any limitation to God. According to abū 
Rā’iṭah, God is everywhere and is not limited to one place.709   
 
                                               
706 David Thomas, “Explanation of the Incarnation,” 134; cf. Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres 
de Théodore Aboucara, 181.   
707 Ibid., 182.  
708 Ibid. Ultimately, abū Qurrah eloquently says: “Why do the opponents then deny the 
dwelling of God in the body taken from the pure Virgin Mary, while they say that God is seated on the 
throne in heaven?” Ibid., 199.      
709 Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 258. 
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The ‘Correct’ View of God: the Christian View 
In presenting the ‘correct’ view of God, ‘Ammār answers the accusation that Christians 
themselves disagree concerning the incarnation. Christians agree, he says, that God the 
Creator is one, is known by three hypostases, and that God is everywhere, not limited or 
comprehended.710 The Christians’ “disagreement concerns the body which they see, to the 
point that some of them say one hypostasis, and others say two hypostases, whereas their 
agreement is that the one in whom the Creator manifested had a body and a soul.”711  
It is interesting to note al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assāl’s scribal addition to ‘Ammār’s text. As a 
Copt, al-Ṣafī had a different interpretation of the hypostatic union from that of the “Nestorian” 
‘Ammār. However, he seems to totally agree that all differences between Christians lie in 
mere expression. Christians, he states, affirm God’s oneness and triune nature. God is “One 
God; He is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.”712 Furthermore, al-Ṣafī identifies the 
Christian groups mentioned in ‘Ammār’s text by their Christological view. Those that teach 
that Christ is “two natures and two hypostases” would be the “Nestorians,” while those who 
believe Christ is “two natures and one substance” would be the Melkites. Yet, because 
                                               
710 See Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 194.  
711 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 79. We note that this is not the case in Kitāb al-
Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, where ‘Ammār clearly refutes the Jacobite and Melkite understanding of the 
incarnation. See Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 197-200.  
712 Cherfeh MS folio 130a.  
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‘Ammār’s original text made no reference to the Monophysite understanding of the 
incarnation, al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assāl adds a short marginal note concerning the Jacobite 
understanding of the incarnation. He writes, “And the Jacobites say that ‘He is one 
substance and one hypostasis and they unite on account of His goodness in substance, 
hypostases, and will.’”713 
The fact that ‘Ammār minimizes the differences between the “Nestorian” communities 
and other Christian views is significant, because it seems to contradict his polemical 
language against other Christians in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwibah. There, he directly calls the 
Jacobites and the Melkites “people of ignorance.”714 Such language must be understood 
within its historical context, for the doctrine of the incarnation was extremely divisive between 
the Christian communities long before the rise of Islam.715 Many Christian apologists wrote 
treatises against other Christians, particularly concerning their understanding of the mode of 
the union. We are reminded of abū Qurrah’s “Confession of Faith,” where he lays out the 
‘correct’ view of the incarnation in opposition to the ‘erroneous’ views of the Jacobites, the 
                                               
713 The Cherfeh MS folio 130a reads:  
”ُﺔّﻳرﻮﻄﺴّﻨﻟا ِﺖﻟﺎﻘﻓ :ِنﺎﻣُﻮﻨﻗأ ِناﺮﻫﻮﺟ ﻪّﻧإُ ِﺔّﻴﺤﻴﺴﻤﻟاو ِّةﻮﻨﺒﻟا ﻲﻓو ِّﺔﻴﺸﻤﻟﺎﺑ َاﺪَّﺤﺗا ﺎﻤﻬّﻧإو ِمﻮﻨﻘﻟﺎـِﺑ ﻻو ِﺮﻫﻮﺠﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻻ.  ِﺖـﻟﺎﻗو
ُﺔّﻴﻜﻠﻤﻟا :ِﺔّﻴﺸﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻻو ِﺮﻫﻮﺠﻟﺎﺑ ﻻ ِمﻮﻨﻘﻟﺎِﺑ اﺪﺤّﺗا ﺎﻤﻬّﻧإو ٌﺪﺣاو ٌمﻮﻨﻗ ناﺮﻫﻮﺟ ﻪّﻧإ) .ﺎﻗوُﺔّﻴ ِﺑُﻮْﻘﻌَﻴﻟا ﺖﻟ : ٌمﻮﻨﻗأ ،ٌﺪﺣاو ٌﺮﻫﻮﺟ ﻪّﻧإُ
ِّﺔﻴﺸﻤﻟاو ِمُﻮﻨُﻘﻟاو ِﺮﻫﻮﺠﻟﺎﺑ ِهدﻮﺠﺑ اﺪّﺤﺗا ﻢﻬّﻧإو ٌﺪﺣاو .(ِِﻖﻟﺎَْﺨﻟا ِدُﻮُﺟو ﻲِﻓ َﻻ ِدﺎَﺤ₍ِﺗﻻا َِﺐﺒَِﺴﺑ اُﻮﻔَﻠَْﺘﺧﺎَﻓ. “  
714 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 200.  
715 Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Incarnation,” 56; cf. Sidney Griffith, “‘Melkites,’ 
‘Jacobites’ and the Christological Controversies in Arabic in Third/Ninth-Century Syria,” Syrian 
Christians under Islam: the First Thousand Years, ed. David Thomas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001), 9-55; 
cf. Sidney Griffith, The Controversial Theology of Theodore abū Qurrah, 172ff.   
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“Nestorians,” the Eutychians, Dioscorus of Alexandria, the Maronites, and finally Severus, 
whom he calls “the ass.”716 It seems, however, that the moderate attitude ‘Ammār takes in 
this section is similar to that of Timothy I, who in discussing the variant Christological 
formulae says, “Some confess one person of natural filiation in two natures and hypostases. 
Others confess one hypostasis either in two natures or out of two natures. Still others 
confess one person, one hypostasis and one nature.”717  
In addition, this ecumenical attitude must be seen within the context of the Muslim 
objections concerning the incarnation. Arabic-speaking Christian polemicists considered 
Islam a much bigger challenge to the fundamentals of their faith than the positions of other 
Christians. ‘Alī ibn Dāwūd al-Arfādī (11th or 12th century), for instance, eloquently argues that 
there is no fundamental difference between Christians, since they all base their doctrines on 
the Gospel, Saint Paul and the Book of Acts. He says:  
I have not seen amongst them any doctrine which contradicts the other… Since 
the Gospel is the foundation of the religion, and Paul is its proof, and the Book 
of Acts is its witness… their agreement, their consensus and their faith are 
correct as far as the foundation of the religion, its proof, and its witness are 
concerned.718  
                                               
716 Ignace Dick “Deux écrits inédits de Théodore Abuqurra,” Le Muséon, 72 (1959), 59; cf. 
Constantin Bacha, Les Œuvres de Théodore Aboucara, 104-139; cf. Louis Cheikho, et al. Vingt traités 
théologiques, 98, 102; and Sidney Griffith, The Controversial Theology of Theodore abū Qurrah, 172ff.  
717 Thomas Hurst, “The Syriac Letters,” 182.  
718 See Samir Khalil, “Khaṣā’iṣ al-Turāth al-ʻArabī al-Masīḥī al-Qadīm,” Theological Review of 
the Near East School of Theology, vol. 2 (February 1982), 157; cf. Sidney Griffith, The Church in the 
Shadow, 140-142. 
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The Discourse on the Incarnation: An Evaluation           
In arguing for the possibility of the incarnation, ‘Ammār’s style is characterized by several 
features. First, we note the repetition of certain arguments and the use of particular 
expressions. For example, ‘Ammār mentions three times that God created the world out of 
divine generosity, not out of any need.719 Three times he speaks of the fact that it is worthy 
of God to fulfill divine generosity.720 Twice he addresses his Muslim opponent and requires 
him to trust the Christian views on the incarnation.721 Three times he describes the miracles 
performed at the hands of Christ’s disciples as “great miracles.”722 Ten times he speaks of 
God being manifested to Moses in the bush.723 ‘Ammār makes four references to the 
concept that God is not comprehended by sight and that eyes cannot see God’s essence.724 
Furthermore, he repeats not only formulae, but the arguments themselves.  
This repetition is significant, for it suggests that ‘Ammār is not so much concerned with 
a specific style of writing as with a desire to use whatever is at his disposal—argument, 
                                                                                                                                                   
”ُﺖﻳأر ﻻوﺮﺧﻵا َدﺎﻘﺘﻋا ُﺦَْﺴﻔَﻳ اًدﺎﻘﺘﻋا ﻻو ،ِﻪِﺒﺣﺎﺻ َنﺎﻤﻳإ ُُﺾﻘْﻨَﻳ ﺎًﻧﺎﻤﻳإ ﻢﻬﻴﻓ ....ًﻧﺎﻫﺮﺑ ُﺲﻟﻮﺑو ،ﻦﻳﺪﻟا َسﺎﺳأ ُﻞﻴﺠﻧﻹا نﺎﻛ ﺎّﻤﻠﻓ ﺎ
 سﺎﺳأ ﻲﻓ ّﺢَﺻ ﺪﻗ ﻢُﻬُﻧﺎﻤﻳإو ُﻢﻬُﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟاو ُﻢﻬُﻗﺎﻔّﺗا نﺎﻛ ؛ﺎًﻔﻠﺧ ﻻو ﺎًﻗﺮﻓ ﻚﻟذ ﻲﻓ ﻢﻬﻨﻴﺑ ﺪﺟأ ْﻢﻟو ؛ﻪﻟ اًﺪﻫﺎﺷ ُﺲﻴِﺴِْﻛْﺮﺑﻹاو ،ﻪﻴﻠﻋ
ﻪﻟ ِﺪﻫﺎﺸﻟاو ،ِﻪِﻧﺎﻫﺮﺑو ،ﻦﻳﺪﻟا. “ 
719 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 64, 69, 70.   
720 Ibid., 67, 67, 67.  
721 Ibid., 67, 68.  
722 Ibid., 72, 73, 73.  
723 Ibid., 66, 66, 66, 67, 68, 70, 70, 74, 75, 75.  
724 Ibid., 65, 68, 70, 70. The first part of this particular reference is qur’ānic in nature. It reflects 
the text of sūrah 6:103, which indicates that “Vision comprehendeth Him not, but He comprehendeth 
(all) vision.”  
 250 
formulae, logic and phrases—in order to show the reasonableness of the doctrine of the 
incarnation. This is not to say that his writing style is poor or awkward. In fact, his treatise is 
very eloquent, and his defense of the incarnation testifies to the variety of ways by which 
Arab Christians argued for the credibility of Christianity. The repetition may also indicate that 
‘Ammār has been drawn into a discussion that was not of his choice. 
Confirming the incarnation is not a matter for debate in Christianity. Notwithstanding 
the differing interpretations, up to this point in history no Christian had denied the incarnation 
of God in Christ. But ‘Ammār finds himself on the defensive, seeking to provide a rationale 
for a doctrine that is basically assumed among all Christians, and he may well have hoped 
that repeating his arguments would provide a forceful and convincing case. The repetitions 
present ‘Ammār as a theologian who seeks to convey his point in a variety of ways. He has 
indeed made all possible efforts to vindicate the doctrine of the incarnation, insisting that it 
was God’s own choice and initiative to disclose Godself to humanity.  
Another feature of this discourse is his heavy dependence on scriptural proofs. This 
greatly reduces ‘Ammār’s reliance on logic and rational argument. Indeed, there are only two 
places where we note explicit logical analogies being used. First, ‘Ammār speaks of mankind 
being fed with milk as a child, which is likely a reference to the text in Hebrews 5:12-14. The 
second logical argument is found in his example of a slave who has been entrusted with 
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many responsibilities and advantages. A master who entrusts a slave with the management 
of the affairs of his house can be compared to God, who gives dominion to humankind 
through the body in which God was veiled.725  
However, as we have seen earlier, the Qur’ān asserts that the Christian scriptures 
have been tampered with, thereby denying its credibility and authority and it would therefore 
seem most improbable that ‘Ammār’s interlocutor would be convinced of the possibility of the 
incarnation on the basis of biblical testimony. One in fact wonders why ‘Ammār makes such 
a strong appeal to scriptures when he certainly knows that the interlocutor dismisses it. Has 
‘Ammār’s clear confidence in his argument against taḥrīf caused him to think that the 
interlocutor will accept the teachings based on the witness of the scriptures? Or is he listing 
the biblical support not to convince the Muslim interlocutor, but rather to provide scriptural 
proofs for his fellow Christians to counter any doubts they might face when their belief in the 
incarnation is challenged? Or, as Mark Beaumont argues, was it indeed difficult for 
Christians of ‘Ammār’s time to “ignore the source of their theology in defending the 
                                               
725 Repeatedly, we notice al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assāl adding more biblical support to reinforce 
‘Ammār’s point. Here for instance, he makes reference to the text of the Gospel according to Luke 
when Jesus says, “If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much 
more will the heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him!” Al-Ṣafī maintains that, if a 
master can give the good gift of dominion to his slave over a house or certain properties, how much 
more will God give humans ultimate dominion over the lasting world.  
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incarnation?”726 Presumably, ‘Ammār finds his best proof in the book of God, which has been 
confirmed by miracles. And thus the scriptures stand as the ultimate proof and the solid 
basis for the incarnation.     
However, we are inclined to conclude that such an appeal to scriptural texts and 
analogies may screen ‘Ammār’s inability to defend the doctrine of the incarnation in a logical 
manner. By contrast, we saw that he utilized logical reasoning vigorously in his rebuttal of 
the accusation of taḥrīf. Is the latter a demonstration of confidence in his argument, while the 
former betrays a lack of such confidence? In all likelihood, this is not the case, for 
concerning such mysteries as the Trinity or the incarnation, how can God, the Infinite, be 
explained in human language? Defending the person of the Godhead in human terms is 
indeed a difficult task, let alone seeking to make such a defence to Muslims, who consider 
the absolute transcendence and the oneness of God to be non-negotiable truths. To escape 
this dilemma, ‘Ammār would have found an appeal to the witness of the scriptures to be his 
best line of argument. When forced to provide a logical defence, he readily admits that divine 
things cannot be completely comprehended. As he argues, everyone knows that God 
created the world, without knowing how it was created; thus the incarnation should be 
                                               
726 Mark Beaumont, Christology in Dialogue, 80.  
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accepted on account of scriptural evidence, without too much investigation into the ‘how.’727       
In the whole of his discussion of the incarnation, ‘Ammār never provides a complete 
definition of the doctrine.728 The reader is only given a defense of it. This would seem to 
indicate that ‘Ammār is not attempting to compose a theological treatise on the incarnation, 
but rather to defend its truth. According to Islam, God’s transcendence and distinctiveness 
are jeopardized if the incarnation is upheld.729 Because of this, ‘Ammār’s major concern is 
not to ‘correct’ the Muslim understanding of the incarnation, but rather to convince his 
Muslim audience that a belief in God’s generosity is the foundation of this Christian teaching. 
Definition is offered concerning things unknown, while a defense is offered regarding 
doctrines that are known but rejected. We have traced this approach in his previous 
discourse on the divine unity. He does not provide a definition of the unity, but rather 
defends it as legitimate, and, in so doing, refutes five Muslim objections.    
It must also be noted that ‘Ammār does not answer Islam’s main objection, i.e., the 
allegation that the incarnation would limit God’s being. While he shows awareness of this 
objection,730 he does not attempt to refute it in any comprehensive manner. Instead, he 
                                               
727 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 214.  
728 See Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 174.  
729 Mark Beaumont, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on the Incarnation,” 57; cf. David Thomas, “Explanation 
of the Incarnation,” 134.  
730 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 56.  
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simply repeats such statements as “God is not limited,”731 or “God is not comprehended,”732 
and fails to show how the incarnation does not contradict the incomprehensibility of God, or 
how the incarnation of the Word of God does not threaten the transcendence of God. 
‘Ammār does not seem to be able to produce adequate refutations of the Islamic objections, 
though he clearly speaks of his arguments as though they were convincing enough to 
silence his opponent.733 Unlike his creative and forceful arguments against the allegation of 
taḥrīf, it seems that ‘Ammār’s confidence in his defense of the incarnation may in fact hide a 
kind of helplessness!   
Furthermore, according to Muslim reasoning, Ammār’s argument is actually self-
contradictory. Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, for example, argues that the Christian belief in the 
incarnation not only threatens the transcendence of Almighty God, but also limits God’s own 
identity by making the Creator identical to the creature, and the Lord who made all things 
equal to the things He made.734 In a word, God’s uniqueness is not upheld if the doctrine of 
the incarnation is believed. This is not viewed as a theological difficulty within Christianity, 
where it is held that the divine power manifested in creation and history is indeed disclosed 
                                               
731 Ibid., 72.  
732 Ibid., 75.  
733 Ibid., 67. 
734 Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, Ar-Radd, 27-28. 
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to humans in the person of Christ.735 God’s Word took on human flesh: “In the beginning was 
the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God….and the Word became 
flesh and dwelt among us.”736 Or as Yaḥyā ibn ʻAdī indicated, Christianity teaches that God, 
the Most Generous, has given humanity Godself in the incarnation.  737  
 We also note that challenges raised by Muslim thinkers placed a new pressure on 
‘Ammār, which shaped his answers and the structure of his presentation and forced him to 
be selective in his arguments. ‘Ammār himself says that there are other reasons that confirm 
the possibility of the incarnation, but he does not specify what they are.738 Rather, the four 
reasons he chose to include in this section of Kitāb al-Burhān seek to answer the concerns 
of his interlocutor. We are left to wonder about the other reasons and arguments he alludes 
to. Were they less relevant to Muslim theology? Or perhaps ‘Ammār may have thought that 
what he wrote concerning the incarnation was long enough.  
The specific pressures of his Muslim audience shifted the focus of ‘Ammār’s 
explanation. In Christian theology, the incarnation is related to the Trinity and to the Sonship 
                                               
735 Kenneth Cragg, “Islam and Incarnation,” in Truth and Dialogue in World Religions: 
Conflicting Truth Claims, ed. John Hick (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), 137.  
736 John 1:1, 14. Al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assāl actually uses this verse to further strengthen ‘Ammār’s 
argument. He writes, “God is the Word, and the Word became flesh, and He indwelt in us, and we 
have seen His glory.” Cherfeh MS folio 127b.  
737 Samir Khalil, “al-Turāth al-ʻArabī al-Masīḥī al-Qadīm wal-Islām,” in al-Masīḥiyyah wal-Islām: 
Marāyā Mutaqābalah, ed. Raḍwān Sayyīd (Bayrūt: Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Masīḥiyyah al-Islāmiyyah, 
Jāmiʻat al-Balamand, 2002), 84-85.  
738 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 70, 79. 
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of Christ. However, for his Muslim interlocutor, and in the context of explaining his contrary 
view of God, ‘Ammār relates the incarnation to the Gospel, rather than to the Trinity. He 
emphasizes that the message of the Gospel, which had been entrusted to the apostles, is all 
about the incarnation. Thus, the Gospel as outlined by ‘Ammār is that God, who is one 
essence but known in three hypostases, has appeared in the flesh. While traditionally, the 
heart of the Christian Gospel had been presented as the salvation of humanity through the 
cross of Christ, this core focus shifts to an emphasis on the incarnation.739 In the same way, 
‘Ammār shifts the focus from the Trinitarian Great Commission to the ‘incarnation Gospel.’ 
The pressures of his Islamic context did indeed foster new answers and insights.   
All in all, however, we cannot calculate the effectiveness of ‘Ammār’s arguments 
regarding the incarnation, as we have no specific Islamic polemical texts that explicitly 
respond to them. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that al-‘Allāf, who spared no effort in 
composing a refutation of ‘Ammār the Christian740 must have devoted a significant portion of 
his work to refuting ‘Ammār’s articulation of the incarnation.741  
A doctrine that is closely related to the issue of incarnation is that of Christ’s 
crucifixion. How can the Word of God die? Why do Christians venerate a symbol of death? 
                                               
739 Ibid., 72, 73. 
740 Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, 204. 
741 David Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity, 38. 
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Does not the cross of Christ belittle him, and impute weakness to God? These questions are 
samples of what ‘Ammār, the Christian apologist must answer. We now turn to examine his 
answers. 
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The Discourses on the Cross of Christ 
All Arabic-speaking Christian theologians face the predicament of defending the crucifixion 
of Christ in the face of Muslim denials of its historicity, as well as Muslim mockery of the 
Christian practice of venerating the cross. In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah where ‘Ammār 
deals with the reasons for the incarnation of the Word of God, he dedicates fifty-one 
questions and answers to the topic, eighteen of which deal directly with the divine economy 
of the cross. But in Kitāb al-Burhān, ‘Ammār spends little time addressing the actual 
crucifixion of Christ. 
 
Discourses: Structure and Content 
Despite the small amount of attention given to this aspect of his defense, he in fact devotes 
what can be classified as two sections to the subject. The first section, folios 37a-38a, is 
actually part of his discourse on the confirmation of the incarnation; the second section, 
folios 41b-42a, has the explicit title “Discourse on the Cross.”742 In differentiating the two 
parts, Hayek has called the first, “Saying on the Crucifixion [of Christ],”743 while keeping ibn 
Kabar’s title for the second, “Discourse on the Cross.”744 We, however, will treat the two 
sections concerning the cross as one comprehensive text, given the close relationship 
                                               
742 The Cherfeh MS has a title for the first part but omits the whole of the second part.  
743 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 20.  
744 Wilhelm Riedel, Der Katalog, 650.  
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between the two topics in Christian theology. The first section addresses Muslim objections 
to the historicity and theology of the cross, while the second seeks to validate the Christian 
practice of venerating the cross.  
Here, nonetheless, a question must be raised: “Why did ‘Ammār approach the issue of 
the crucifixion and the cross in two separate parts? One would think that it would have been 
logically appropriate to deal with these issues in one major section. After all, when dealing 
with other Muslim objections ‘Ammār does gather the whole subject under one heading. 
However, as we shall see, ‘Ammār himself explains the structure. As we saw previously in 
his discourse on the union of the divine and the human in Christ, ‘Ammār lists some Muslim 
objections to the Christian faith. Most of these were objections to Christian doctrines that, 
according to him, are misunderstood in Islam. Among them was the issue of the union of the 
divine and human natures in the person of Christ, which Muslims see as a limitation of God. 
Likewise, baptism and the Eucharistic belief in eating the body and blood of Christ are 
rejected. Further, the Christian belief that eternal reward is spiritual, rather than physical, is 
mocked. The crucifixion of Christ is also on this list, because Muslims object that it imputes 
great weakness to God’s character. He then promises to address all the topics that Muslims 
find to be the most distasteful and despicable.745 It is these Muslim objections, then, that 
                                               
745 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 56.  
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form the fundamental structure of Kitāb al-Burhān.  
This list of objections reveals several things. First, it shows how essential it was that 
Arab Christian writers present a logical justification for their belief in the union of the divine 
and human natures in Christ, as this was seen to pose a major challenge to the Muslim 
doctrine of the oneness of God. Likewise, it explains the length of the sections devoted to 
defending the union of the two natures in Christ, and the incarnation, in Kitāb al-Burhān. 
Second, this list shows ‘Ammār’s priorities in answering the Muslim accusations. The order 
of the topics is deliberate, reflecting the seriousness of the Islamic objections and the 
importance of a Christian response. In this list, ‘Ammār's evaluation and explication of the 
cross of Christ follows his vindication of the union of the two natures in Christ. When this 
union is confirmed, the Muslim objection to the Christian’s belief about the identity of the 
crucified one arises naturally. In response, ‘Ammār is ready to lay out the logic of the cross, 
the identity of the crucified one, and the human need that it meets.  
One other possible reason for splitting the discussion into two sections could be that 
‘Ammār wanted to address doctrine and practice separately. In this way, he could set out the 
philosophical and logical reasons why Christians believe in Christ’s crucifixion and the role it 
plays in the divine economy of salvation; and only then would he lay out the consequences 
of the cross of Christ in the life of the church, its worship, and liturgy. By placing the Christian 
 261 
practice of venerating the cross at the end of Kitāb al-Burhān, this practice is set alongside 
his discourses on other practices such as baptism and the Eucharist. This might have served 
his strategic purposes in Kitāb al-Burhān, which were framed on the basis that Muslim 
opposition primarily concentrated on the issues of the Trinity and the deity of Christ. ‘Ammār 
might have considered it less important, at least at this point in Kitāb al-Burhān, to defend 
the Christian practices of kissing the cross, baptizing children, and distributing communion.  
Further, ‘Ammār’s theological background may have played a role in his decision to 
offer no more than a minimal apology for Christian veneration of the cross, since the 
“Nestorian” Church does not venerate icons, but only the cross. In contrast, the Melkite 
theologian Theodore abū Qurrah, unlike ‘Ammār, composed a lengthy treatise entitled On 
Venerating the Holy Icons.746 The limited number of Islamic writings rejecting the cross may 
also have influenced ‘Ammār’s decision to provide a relatively minimal defense of the cross. 
Indeed, as we have seen earlier, Mu‘tazilī theologians considered it most important to refute 
the doctrine of the incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity because they contradict the 
most fundamental Islamic doctrines. Their critical analysis of both the Trinity and the 
incarnation established a pattern in Islamic refutation of Christianity: Islamic polemicists tend 
                                               
746 See Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Ikrām al-Ayqūnāt li-Thāwdhūrus abī Qurrah, PAC, vol. 10 
(Jūniyah: al-Maktabah al-Būlusiyyah, 1986); and the English edition of the text by Sidney Griffith, A 
Treatise on the Veneration of the Holy Icons (Leuven: Peeters, 1997). 
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not to refute all that Christians believe, but only the tenets over which there is the most 
serious disagreement.747 This may well explain the basic structure of Kitāb al-Burhān—a 
book that shows great interest in justifying the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and 
incarnation.  
Before we examine the main ideas in the text, it is beneficial to present the overall 
structure of ‘Ammār’s statement concerning the cross. At the end of the previous discourse, 
he had provided four proofs to substantiate the Christian doctrine of the incarnation. The 
incarnation stems from divine generosity; it answers the human desire for knowledge of God; 
it meets the need for human beings to see the God who will be their Judge; and it is God’s 
gift to honor humans by giving them authority over the hereafter. ‘Ammār concludes by 
rejecting the Muslim charge that belief in Christ’s death on a cross imputes weakness to 
God’s being. Throughout this discourse he maintains that the cross does not imply any 
weakness in God’s character, but rather, that it is God’s power that is revealed in the cross 
of Christ, as God relieves humanity of the anxiety of sin and death—an argument which is 
found in Bar Konī’s Livre des Scolies. 748  
In protecting God from the imputation of weakness, Muslims express horror at the 
Christian belief that God’s prophet ‘Īsā was killed. ‘Ammār therefore uses the Qur’ān to draw 
                                               
747 David Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity, 18.  
748 See Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 202. 
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a parallel with another prophet who had been killed. He argues that God permitted Yaḥyā ibn 
Zakariya, a prophet who was close to God and occupied an honored position in Muslim 
eyes, to be killed.749 In his case, it was never suggested that the manner of his death 
contradicted the divine protection of God’s messengers. ‘Ammār finds similarities between 
Yaḥyā ibn Zakariya’s death and the death of Christ on the cross. He argues that both died in 
total accordance with God’s will. As a result, ‘Ammār questions why Muslims are so 
appalled, contending that the death of Christ on the cross would make “the skies…ready to 
burst, the earth to split asunder, and the mountains to fall down in utter ruin.”750 If Christ is a 
mere prophet, as Islam asserts, why would his death be the cause of all of this? After all, the 
Qur’ān admits that many prophets were killed. 
‘Ammār next explains the significance of the cross of Christ within the divine economy 
of salvation. He maintains that Christ’s death on the cross alleviates human anxiety, which is 
inherited because of sin. Death was the penalty humanity had to pay on account of Adam’s 
sin. The death of Christ brought remission for such sins and Christ’s death took place in 
public so that everyone would see and know that he had died, and so trust that, when they 
died, they would rise in human form, just as Christ had risen. Thus, on the cross of Christ, 
death was overcome: this is why it is a sign of God’s power. It is because of this, ‘Ammār 
                                               
749 See Michel Hayek, al-Masīḥ fīl-Islām, 47-48.  
750 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 79; cf. sūrah 19:90. 
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states, that the cross, which symbolizes Christ’s death, is honored and venerated in the 
liturgical life of the Christian church. According to ‘Ammār, it is surprising that Muslims, who 
kiss the very stone that polytheists in the Arab Peninsula used to kiss, should object to 
Christians kissing the cross. Muslims, according to ‘Ammār, kiss the stone on account of 
Abraham. ‘Ammār sees the crucifixion of “the veil of the Creator” (i.e., the body of Christ) on 
the cross as a sign worthy of more honor than a stone associated with Abraham.  
Bar Konī argues in a similar way, reminding his readers that other material objects had 
been given honor, such as the Ark of the Covenant during the Old Testament period. He 
argues that the honor that Christians give to the cross is in no way given to the wood. 
Rather, it is offered to Christ, who gave his life on it, and that it thus manifests the power of 
the resurrection over death and sin.751  
 
Islamic Theology and the Cross of Christ 
Simply stated, Islam rejects the cross.752 While Christianity praises “the power of God” 
displayed in the cross of Christ, Islam sees in it the “weakness of God.” The two viewpoints 
                                               
751 Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 200-201.  
752 See Ghassān Sālim, Maḥāwir al-Iltiqā’, 278-299, cf. Heribert Busse, Usus al-Ḥiwār, 167-
172. 
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are irreconcilable.753 The Qur’ān, in sūrah 4:157f declares:  
That they said: ‘We killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary, the Apostle of God.’ But 
they killed him not, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them, and 
those who differ therein are full of doubts, with no knowledge, but only 
conjecture to follow, for of a surety they killed him not. 
 
This verse has been universally understood by Muslims as denying the historicity of the 
crucifixion.754 Muslim exegetes have gone to great pains to provide various theories 
explaining that Christ was not crucified, but rather “he/it was made to appear so,” ﻢﻬﻟ ﻪّﺒُﺷ, to 
the Jews.755 It seems, as al-Sharafī argues, that the lack of qur’ānic reference to Jesus’ last 
days on earth has opened the door wide for Muslim commentators to speculate as they 
reflect on the text of sūrah 4:157f. Indeed, they have found it difficult to provide a reasonable 
explanation of the qur’ānic text regarding Jesus’ death.756 Oftentimes their theories are 
inconsistent and contradictory.757 One major theory holds that Judas Iscariot or some other 
disciple was put to death in place of Jesus. Others maintain that, when Jesus was “taken up” 
to the heavens, the Jews, out of fear of the crowd, seized a man and put him on the cross; 
                                               
753 Al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 378.  
754 David Thomas, “Denying the Cross in Early Muslim Dialogue with Christians,” in Jesus and 
the Cross: Reflections of Christians from Islamic Contexts, Global Theological Voices, ed. David E. 
Singh (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2008), 51.  
755 Michel Hayek, al-Masīḥ fīl-Islām, 216; cf. Muṣṭafā Būhindī, al-Ta’thīr al-Masīḥī, 178-182; 
and Samir Khalil, “al-Ta’thīr al-Lāhūtī,” 230-233.  
756 See al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 378-379; cf. Gabriel S. Reynolds, “The Muslim Jesus: 
Dead or Alive?” BSOAS. 72(2) (2009), 250.   
757 Gabriel S. Reynolds, “The Muslim Jesus,” 258. 
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others claim that prior to the crucifixion, God made one of Christ’s guards look like Jesus, 
and when the latter was taken up to heaven, the Jews took the guard and killed him.758 All of 
these theories are offered in order to erase any suggestion of God’s powerlessness. Muslims 
highly esteem God’s power in protecting messengers and prophets, and believe that God 
would not allow them to be subjected to their enemies. Al-Qādī ‘abd al-Jabbār, for example, 
argues that God “protected Christ from the cross, and exalted him so that the hands of his 
enemies could not reach him to crucify him.”759  
It would be an oversimplification, however, to conclude that Muslims only objected to 
the doctrine of the cross on account of the text of sūrah 4:157f. There is no doubt that 
Christian veneration of the cross, shown especially during liturgical processions, might have 
posed a challenge to the newly emerging Islamic empire, where Islam needed to “establish 
its distinctive character.”760 Muslims, being a people who strongly believe in the 
transcendence of God, must have felt uneasy with displays of an emblem representing 
                                               
758 Michel Hayek, al-Masīḥ fīl-Islām, 222-231. 
759 ʻAbd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, Tathbīt Dalā’il al-Nubūwah, ed. ʻabd al-Karīm 
ʻUthmān (Bayrūt: Dār al-ʻArabiyah, 1966), 123. For a fuller exposé of the classical interpretation of 
Muslim scholars, see Gabriel S. Reynolds, “The Muslim Jesus,” 240-245; cf. Mark Swanson, “Folly to 
the Ḥunafā’: The Cross of Christ in Arabic Christian/Muslim Controversy in the Eighth and Ninth 
Centuries A.D.” (Ph.D. diss., [Rome: Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e d’Islamistica, 1992]), 197-223; 
Folly to the Ḥunafā’ (al-Qāhirah: Pontificum Institutum Studiorum Arabicorum et Islamologiae, 1995); 
and recently, “Folly to the Ḥunafā’: The Crucifixion in Early Christian-Muslim Controversy,” in The 
Encounter of Eastern Christianity with Early Islam, HCMR, vol. 4, ed. Emmanouela Grypeou, et al., 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2006), 237-56.  
760 Al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 114.  
 267 
“God’s death.” It would seem as though the Christian dhimmīs were challenging not only the 




As the Kitāb al-Burhān contains several qur’ānic quotations, it is natural to assume that 
‘Ammār was quite familiar with the Qur’ān, including the text of sūrah 4:157f regarding the 
historicity of the cross. In fact, his indirect reference in Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah:  
ﻦﻳﺮﻇﺎﻨﻟا يﺮُﻴﻟ اًﺮﻜﻣو ًءﺎﻳر ﻪﺳأر ﻰﺧرأ ﻪّﻠﻌﻟو ؟ﺎًﺤﻴﺤﺻ ًﺎﺗﻮﻣ تﺎﻣ ﻪّﻧأ ﻢﻠﻌﻧ نأ ﺎﻨﻟ ﻒﻴﻛو ﺪـﻗ ّﻪﻧأ 
ﺎًﻨﻴﻘﻳ ﺎًﻨﻴﻘﻳ تﺎﻣ...  
 
Translation: How are we to know that he [Christ] died a real death? Perhaps he 
bowed down his head in deceit and deception in order to show those who were 
looking [at him] that he died for certain, 
 
echoes the text of sūrah 4:157f.762 The significance of the exact occurrence of the structure, 
ﺎًﻨﻴﻘﻳ تﺎﻣ, and its equivalent in sūrah 4:157, ًﻨﻴـِﻘَﻳ ُهُﻮﻠَﺘَﻗ ﺎﻣَوﺎ , “they did not of a certainty kill him,” 
should not be underestimated. It clearly indicates the ‘Ammār’s familiarity with the text of 
sūrah 4:157f, and his acquaintance with the various Muslim interpretations of this ambiguous 
verse regarding the crucifixion of Christ.  
                                               
761 See Mark Swanson, “The Cross of Christ in the Earliest Arabic Melkite Apologies,” in 
Christian Arabic Apologetics During the Abbasid Period, (750-1258), ed. Samir Khalil and Jørgen 
Nielsen (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 117.  
762 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 236.  
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As far as Kitāb al-Burhān is concerned, however, it is evident that ‘Ammār chooses to 
address this issue on a different level. He realized that this Christian doctrine had a negative 
impact on Muslims, because they saw it as imputing weakness to God’s being—which was 
unimaginable to them.763  
In response to the Muslim total denial of the historicity of the cross, ‘Ammār defends 
the Church’s belief in the doctrine of the cross and its right to adore it as the symbol of God’s 
mercy. This was indeed a difficult endeavor, since, in arguing for the correctness of the 
doctrine, he had to rebut the clear-cut qur’ānic denial of the crucifixion event. Yet none of his 
words called into question the actual text of the Qur’ān, as this would have jeopardized his 
status as a dhimmī, and would have made him liable to be judged as a blasphemer against 
the holy scripture of Islam. ‘Ammār rather quotes sūrah 19:90, which declares that heaven 
and earth cannot tolerate the association of God with any other. The qur’ānic reference 
directly opposes those who associate a son with God. Even though this speaks against a 
false understanding of the Christian doctrine of the Sonship of Christ (especially when linked 
with sūrah 72:3), it has been traditionally taken to oppose the Christian belief in the Sonship 
of Christ. ‘Ammār may have found himself in a position of danger when dealing with the 
                                               
763 Kenneth Cragg, “The Qur’ān and the Cross,” in Jesus and the Cross: Reflections of 
Christians from Islamic Contexts, Global Theological Voices, ed., David E. Singh (Eugene, OR: Wipf 
and Stock, 2008), 177. 
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issue of the cross, having to deny or declare suspect the text of sūrah 4:157f. It is interesting 
here to notice that ‘Alī ibn Rabban al-Ṭabarī uses this verse in the same way as ‘Ammār. The 
verse clearly speaks against those who associate others with God, yet both al-Ṭabarī and 
‘Ammār refer to it in connection with the cross. This may well suggest that both borrowed 
their argument from a “Nestorian” tradition, or that ‘Ammār is actually answering ‘Alī ibn 
Rabban al-Ṭabarī’s objection.764 
Whereas Sidney Griffith questions why ‘Ammār should have chosen not to deal with 
sūrah 4:157f,765 the high reverence given to the Qur’ān by Muslims and the political support 
given by the state must not be underestimated. These would have been strong deterrents 
against any direct questioning of a qur’ānic text. The only exception is probably that found in 
the apology of ‘abd al-Masīḥ ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī—a text judged by many scholars to have 
been written under a pseudonym.766 Timothy I, in his dialogue with al-Mahdī, raises some 
difficult theological issues in answering al-Mahdī’s use of sūrah 4:157, but he does not 
actually offer any criticism of it. Timothy I argues: 
And who made a similitude for them in this way, O our King? How did God 
deceive them and show them something which was not true? It is incongruous 
to God that He should deceive and show something for another thing. If God 
deceived them and made a similitude for them, the Apostles who simply wrote 
                                               
764 See I.A. Khalifé and W. Kutsch, “Ar-Radd,” 133.  
765 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 178. 
766 See William Muir, The Apology of al-Kindī, 123-128. 
 270 
what God had shown to them, would be innocent of the deception, and the 
real cause of it would be God. If on the other hand, we say that it is Satan who 
made such a similitude for the Apostles, what has Satan to do in the Economy 
of God? And who dares to say about the ḥawārīyūn that Satan was able to 
deceive them? …[The] crucifixion is consequently a reality also, and not an 
illusion or a similitude.767 
 
A Common Ground 
‘Ammār carefully searched the text of the Qur’ān to find common ground on which to build 
his argument. His selection falls upon the person of John the Baptist. Then he asks: 
How do they accuse us, when they consider Christ to be a prophet, that we 
diminished him when he was crucified? It is much more honoring to God, they 
say, that He would not let Christ be crucified. I wish I could know what they 
say of John, son of Zechariah. They confessed that he was beheaded, and 
that his head was given to a slave-girl, a dancer, who had sought his death. Is 
it because God considered him little that He let all of this happen to him?768  
 
 
Here ‘Ammār shows his creative originality. Having recognized that Muslims dismiss 
the Christian doctrine of the Sonship of Christ, he instead utilizes their traditional portrayal of 
Christ as a mere prophet. He thus argues from Muslim theology itself. If Christ is a mere 
prophet, even lower in rank than the prophet of Islam, why were the skies ready to burst and 
the earth to split on account of what took place on his cross? After all, many prophets of God 
were not well received. In fact, some were killed—a point previously made by Timothy I in his 
                                               
767 Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 41-42.  
768 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 80.  
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encounter with al-Mahdī.769 Thus the cross of Christ should not be seen as a stumbling 
block.770 ‘Ammār may have had sūrah 2:87 or 3:181 in mind. ‘Ammār continues to speak 
from common ground, using the specific example of Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā. According to the 
Qur’ān, Yaḥyā, who is mentioned five times, was a prophet whose life was pure and whose 
message was a witness to that of Jesus’. Al-Ṭabarī records a saying attributed to Muḥammad 
in which Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā is reckoned as someone who will be without blemish on the day 
on judgment. According to al-Ṭabarī, the reason for this high rank is that Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā 
never committed a sin, nor had intercourse with women.771 It is worth noting here the 
similarities between this Islamic tradition about Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā and the biblical witness 
about him. Jesus said, “Truly, I say to you, among those born of women there has risen no 
one greater than John the Baptist.”772  
The Qur’ān records that Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā died, but gives no details about this death. 
Again, Qur’ān commentators have proposed several possibilities. Therefore, ‘Ammār mixes 
the biblical account of Yaḥyā’s death with that of the Qu’rān. Details such as the “girl dancer” 
who asked for John’s head are not found in the Qur’ān, but are a clear reference to 
                                               
769 Robert Caspar, “Les versions arabes,” 142. 
770 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 54. 
771 Abū-Jaʻfar Muḥammad ibn-Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʻ al-Bayān ʻan Ta’wīl Āy al-Qur’ān, vol. 5-6 
(al-Qāhirah: Maktabat wa-Maṭbaʻat Muṣṭafa al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1954), 12-17.  
772 See Matthew 11:11a. 
 272 
Herodias’ daughter who asked for Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā’s head. According to the biblical 
narrative, Herod Antipas (21 BC-39 AD), a son of Herod the Great (73 BC-4 BC), ordered 
that Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā be killed.773 This conflation seems to support ‘Ammār’s purpose, as 
he puts what the Bible says about Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā into the mouths of Muslims. This, in 
fact, was a strategy used by many apologists on both sides.  
Although, according to Islam, Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyā enjoyed a high position among the 
prophets of God, he was put to death. This tragic end did not, ‘Ammār reminds them, impute 
any weakness to God;774 nor does it seem to contradict God’s ability to protect his prophets. 
Likewise, Christ’s death should not, ‘Ammār argues, be seen as an imputation of weakness 
to God, for it fits well within God’s economy for saving humanity. If the death of a prophet 
has some salvific value to others, if it furthers the divine purpose of saving people, then God 
will allow it to happen. The results of a prophet’s death can be beneficial to people for whose 
sake the prophet was originally sent by God. According to ‘Ammār, the prophet often faces 
the risk of having his mission rejected and could even be killed. When this happens, God 
should not be blamed for letting a prophet go through the pain of death.  
Elsewhere, ‘Ammār found further common ground in the traditional Christian and 
Muslim practice of “touching the coat of a godly man.” This sign of honor, according to 
                                               
773 See Matt 2:19-22; 14:1-12; Mk 5:14-29. 
774 Mark Beaumont, Christology in Dialogue, 72.  
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‘Ammār, was a normal way for eastern people to show respect to their godly teachers. This 
practice can still be seen in various parts of the Arab world, as Christians kiss the hand of 
the priest holding the cross, and as Muslims visit and touch the tombs of devout imāms. 
According to ‘Ammār, in honoring those seen as good and devout in their worship of God, 
people show their sincere desire for closeness to God. ‘Ammār maintains that, by kissing the 
sign of the cross, Christians, too, seek to be closer to God through worship.  
 
The Cross in the Divine Economy  
Having proven that Christians do not impute weakness to God when proclaiming Christ’s 
crucifixion, ‘Ammār reverts to fulfilling the original purpose of Kitāb al-Burhān, i.e., providing 
the proof of the course of the divine economy.775 ‘Ammār argues that Christ’s death, with its 
salvific value, is God’s way of relieving humanity of sin and death. Before stating this in more 
detail, however, ‘Ammār inserts the phrase “in his human nature,” ﻪﺘﻴﺴـﻧﺄﺑ.776 This is another 
modification he uses to guard himself against the objection raised by Muslims concerning 
God the Father’s union with Christ on the cross, and the notion that Christ’s death in fact 
meant that God was crucified. ‘Ammār is affirming for his Muslim audience that “Nestorian” 
Christians, at least, refer only to Christ’s human nature when speaking of his death. This 
                                               
775 Wilhelm Riedel, Der Katalog, 650. 
776 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 80.  
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same statement had been made by Timothy I in his discussion with al-Mahdī.777 In fact, there 
are significant similarities between Timothy I’s explanation and that of ‘Ammār. Both state 
that it was the human nature of Christ that was crucified. Another similarity is seen in 
‘Ammār’s argument concerning the wood of the cross. Timothy I says, “As we honor the 
roots because of the fruits that come out of them, so also we honor the Cross as the root of 
which the fruit of life was born to us, and from which the ray of immortality shone upon us.”778 
By comparison, Ammār states, “After all, the wood of the cross, speaking of the fruit, is 
closer than the stone.”779 Timothy’s encounter with al-Mahdī seems to have been widely 
known within the “Nestorian” church, and ‘Ammār was evidently influenced by the 
apologetics of the Patriarch, finding themes and examples that he could implement in his 
Kitāb al-Burhān.  
Our premise that ‘Ammār used Timothy I’s apology is more clearly supported when we 
examine the latter’s presentation of the divine economy of the cross. Timothy I had shown 
al-Mahdī that Christ was not weak when he was put on the cross. Rather, as Christ had 
foretold, he had gone to the cross by his own will, demonstrating his authority over his body. 
                                               
777 Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 87; cf. N.A. Newman, ed., The 
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Christ “showed that he would suffer out of his own free will, and not out of his own weakness 
or from the omnipotence of the Jews.”780 ‘Ammār develops this idea into his more 
comprehensive view of the divine economy. He argues that God, out of love for humans, and 
desiring to grant them enjoyment of eternal life, was manifested in the flesh, thus 
demolishing their fear of death. Further, God spoke to them in the flesh of Christ. God then 
made this same flesh go to the cross and die there.781 ‘Ammār’s understanding of the divine 
economy of salvation perfectly parallels that of Timothy I, as both Christian authors 
emphasize the free will of Christ in going to the cross. Timothy I believes that, in going to the 
cross, Christ showed his power; while ‘Ammār maintains that it was Christ’s power, not his 
weakness, that was in fact displayed on his cross. In Kitāb al-Masā’īl wal-Ajwibah, ‘Ammār 
makes the argument even clearer that Christ’s power and majesty were the main reasons 
why he endured the pain of the cross. Christ overpowered suffering, pain and death by his 
resurrection. ‘Ammār affirms that, on the cross God was not weak, contrary to the Muslim 
accusation. Rather, God thereby abolished death and gave life to humankind. To use 
Timothy I’s words, “God delivered to death in the flesh His beloved Son for the life, salvation, 
and resurrection of all.”782  
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The Veneration of the Cross 
In speaking of the Christian practice of venerating the cross, ‘Ammār presents the cross as a 
symbol of Christ’s body which was crucified on the cross to relieve humans of death. Thus, 
this symbol is worthy of all honor and veneration. Notwithstanding this, some people 
believed that Christians worshipped the actual wooden cross. Caliph al-Mahdī charges 
Christians with this in his conversation with Timothy I.783 Likewise, another Muslim polemicist 
addressed Christians, saying: 
You extol the cross and the image. You kiss them, and you prostrate yourselves 
to them, even though they are what people have made with their own hands. 
They neither hear, nor see, nor do harm, nor bring any advantage. The most 
estimable of them among you are made of gold and silver. Such is what 
Abraham’s people did with their images and idols.784 
 
‘Ammār does not address such issues, but he does draw a comparison between the 
veneration of the cross and the honor given to the procession of the ‘Abbasid caliph. The 
                                                                                                                                                   
concerning redemption from sin, although he argues that, on the cross, God redeemed humanity from 
anxiety, death, and ignorance concerning the life to come. People had not seen anyone die and rise 
again before the death and resurrection of Christ, nor did they know of the eternal life awaiting them. 
“Philosophers, intellectuals, and advocates of error and ignorance, as a whole, did not know that after 
death, which separates their bodies from their souls, they will be raised from their graves and return to 
life,” ‘Ammār announces. The fact that death ruled over all humanity and seemed to be their end 
brought sadness and anxiety to people. The hope of eternal life was not yet achieved. Death and sin 
were obstacles facing humanity, and release from death was needed. It was this exact human need 
that was met on the cross, bringing happiness to those who longed for eternal life and were burdened 
with anxiety at being ruled by sin. Just as Christ rose from the dead, their bodies would also be raised 
to enjoy the life to come.  
783 Ibid., 39. 
784 Quoted from Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 143-145.  
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honor Christians give to the cross is likened to when people “honor the king by venerating 
even the hoof of his horse, and the dust of his feet, in addition to his footwear and coat,” 
‘Ammār argues.785 It is also similar, he declares, to the honor people offer to a godly man, 
who is close to God through worship. It is noteworthy that these arguments are also found 
verbatim in the later apology of Īshū‘yāb ibn Malkūn, the Patriarch in Nisibis in the thirteenth 
century.786  
‘Ammār does not provide any further rationale for kissing the cross, but counterattacks 
by speaking of the Islamic practice of kissing the black stone in Mecca—an argument that 
was also borrowed by Īshū‘yāb ibn Malkūn.787 In their ṭawāf around the Ka‘ba, as part of the 
Ḥajj, Muslims must kiss the stone, if possible. This practice has been preserved because 
Islamic tradition records that the prophet of Islam once kissed the black stone in Mecca.788 
‘Ammār maintains that the wood of the cross has “fruit” unlike the dead nature of the black 
stone. That the stone was previously honored and kissed by idol worshippers before Islam in 
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Mutarjimūn, 73-84; and Mājidah Muḥammad Anwar, al-Madāris al-Fikrīyah al-Suryānīyah fīl-Sharq al-
Adnā al-Qadīm (al-Qāhirah: Ītrāk lil-Ṭibāʻah wal-Nashr wal-Tawzīʻ, 2009), 80-86. See also the recent 
study: Suhayl Qāshā, Tārīkh al-Turāth al-ʻArabī, 59-60.  
787 Paul Sbath, Vingt traités philosophiques, 160. 
788 See in particular book 25 in Muḥammad ibn Ismāʻīl Bukhārī’s Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, and book 
16 of Muslim ibn Ḥajjāj al-Qushayrī’s Ṣaḥiḥ Muslim. See al-Jāmiʻ bayna al-Ṣaḥīḥayn: lil-Imāmayn al-
Bukhārī (194-256 H.), wa-Muslim (206-261 H.), compiled by Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad Shāmī (Dimashq: Dār al-
Qalam, 1995).  
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pre-Islamic Mecca makes this action more unacceptable than the Christian practice of 
kissing the cross.  
At this point in his argument, ‘Ammār returns to his conversation with the imaginary 
Muslim opponent and asks why Muslims would honor such a stone. Is it “because it came 
down from heaven?”789 If Muslims believe so, ‘Ammār says, then they should not worship 
created stones, since God had commanded them to fight the polytheists on the same 
account. Why then would Muslims kiss a stone, similar in nature to that which was kissed by 
polytheists? This seems like nonsense to ‘Ammār. If the honor given to the stone is because 
it came down from heaven, as Islamic tradition holds, then there should be no difference, he 
goes on to say, between the stone which came out of heaven, and the wood of the cross 
which is from earth.  
But, if Muslims answer that such honor is offered to the stone mainly on account of 
Abraham, who according to sūrah 2:125-127 was the builder of the Ka‘ba in Mecca, then 
why would they stumble at the idea of honoring the cross of Christ? If the honor is given 
because of Abraham, ‘Ammār argues, how much more should Christians honor the cross, on 
which the body of the Creator was crucified?  
‘Ammār thus points to a contradiction in Islamic traditions, for if Muslims say that God 
                                               
789 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 88.  
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ordered them to kiss the black stone, it sharply conflicts with God’s displeasure at the 
polytheists for doing the same thing. As in his discourse on the true religion, ‘Ammār once 
again alludes to the military power of Islam and its wars—one of which was against the 
polytheists who kissed the black stone. All in all, he convincingly uses the Muslim practice of 
kissing the stone as a parallel to the Christian practice of venerating the cross.  
In actuality, this same argument was often used to attack the Muslim practice of 
venerating the black stone while also defending the Christian practice of kissing the cross. 
Yūḥannā al-Dimashqī seems to have been the first Christian apologist within Dār al-Islām to 
have used this defense.790 This same argument can also be found in the Apology of al-Kindī, 
who dismisses the veneration of the Ka‘ba as pagan in origin. Al-Kindī even uses a 
discussion on comparative religions to support his arguments. He tells his imaginary Muslim 
interlocutor that the Brahmans and the Indians who worship the sun kiss the stone.791  
However, it should be noted that Muslim scholars during the ‘Abbasid period also 
linked the veneration of the cross to worshipping idols, and polytheism. They claimed that 
the Christian practice of worshipping or venerating the cross was similar in nature to the 
                                               
790 Barbara Roggema, “Muslims as Crypto-Idolaters: A Theme in the Christian Portrayal of 
Islam in the Near East,” in Christians at the Heart of the Islamic Rule: Church Life and Scholarship in 
‘Abbasid Iraq, HCMR, 1, ed. David Thomas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003), 3. 
791 Anton Tien, ed., Risālat ʻabd Allāh ibn Ismāʻīl al-Hāshimī ilā ʻabd al-Masīḥ ibn Isḥāq al-
Kindī Yadʻūhu bi-hā ilā al-Islām, wa-Risālat ʻabd al-Masīḥ ilā al-Hāshimī Yaruddu bi-hā ʻalayhi wa-
Yadʻūhu ilā al-Nasrāniyyah (London: N.P., 1880), 104.  
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polytheistic practice of venerating idols in the ancient temples. The anonymous Radd speaks 
of the veneration of the cross as the equivalent of what the contemporaries of Abraham had 
done with idols.792 The other interesting allusion to veneration as a form of honoring idols 
comes from ‘abd al-Jabbār in Tathbīt Dalā’il al-Nubūwah, where he sees this Christian 
element of worship as a continuation of the ancient Roman practice of worshipping idols in 
the temples.793 In a word, the veneration of the cross was seen by Muslims as “idolatry and 
hence another sign of shirk.”794 
 
Discourses on the Cross: An Evaluation 
‘Ammār maintains that the work of the cross and the veneration it is due are fundamental to 
Christianity. Humans can only experience true relief from death and sin through the death of 
Christ. The cross brings happiness and joy to those who have been longing for the life to 
come, and its symbol is therefore worthy of veneration. As Christians kiss this emblem, they 
worship the Creator, and glorify him. Praise therefore should be offered in this way to the 
work of God on the cross, and should never be seen as a distasteful rite. It is a gift from God 
which should be received with thanksgiving. 
                                               
792 D. Sourdel, ed. & trans., “Un pamphlet musulman anonyme d’époque ‘abbāside contre les 
chrétiens,” Revue des Etudes Islamiques 34 (1966), 1-33; cf. al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 436.  
793 ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Tathbīt Dalā’il al-Nubūwah, 167. 
794 Barbara Roggema, “Muslims as Crypto-Idolaters,” 1.  
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However, ‘Ammār clearly displays his polemical expertise in this section of Kitāb al-
Burhān, as is seen if consideration is given to his use of Arabic verbs. For instance, he 
accuses Muslims of being “loquacious and garrulous” نُﻮَﻓﺮَْﻬﻳ( ) in their objection to the cross. 
The verb indicates excessive praise of something or someone and is frequently used to 
describe sayings that are not based on fair judgment. It also carries the idea of being hasty. 
For example, when it is linked to prayers, ﻮـﻓﺮﻬﻳةﻼّﺼـﻟا ﻲـﻓ ن , it means people rush their 
prayers, or perform the prayers too quickly. Thus, he accuses Muslims of being both long-
winded and hasty in judging that Christian belief in Jesus’ death on the cross imputes 
weakness to God. This polemical language can also be found in his description of the 
Muslims’ objections: “They [the Muslims] have prejudice, bias and injustice.”795 These three 
negative adjectives indirectly express the Christian’s plea for Muslims to be fair rather than 
quickly labeling Christians as those who follow a corrupt faith. In short, ‘Ammār seems to be 
requesting a fair trial.  
It is of considerable interest to note that such an appeal for fairness was openly 
expressed in abū Rā̕̕iṭah’s third letter on the Holy Trinity, where he says, “Verily we are 
called upon to a debate with you. Let us get down to our dispute about what stands between 
                                               
795 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 80.  
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us. It is hoped that you will treat us justly in the discussion…”796 This shows that Arab 
Christians felt that their Muslim counterparts judged their beliefs unjustly. Arabic Christian 
treatises are thus an attempt to explain their beliefs and justify their doctrines  
On another occasion, ‘Ammār offers sharp criticism of his Muslim opposition. In his 
concluding words concerning the cross, he launches a counterattack on the Muslims, 
describing them as “dead.” They find the gift of God’s grace in the cross of Christ to be 
distasteful and, instead of recognizing such a gift, they are “returning the recognition…into 
disbelief and defamation!”797 Then, in stating that a person of sound mind cannot accept the 
Muslim idea of venerating the stone that had previously been kissed by the polytheists, he 
clearly turns the Muslims’ own arguments against them. ‘Ammār says, “And if this is not so, 
what does worship by venerating the stone really mean? We do not think they can give a 
reasonable answer. We leave the discourse on this subject, since we know the result!”798 
This statement indicates the polemical nature of ‘Ammār's arguments. He is both displeased 
with the hasty Islamic accusations and pointing out the inconsistent elements in Muslim 
practice. However, he sees no use in further reflection on the issue, maintaining that 
                                               
796 Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 169.  
797 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 81. It is noteworthy that al-Ṣafī ibn al-‘Assāl, in 
the Cherfeh MS, uses softer and more inclusive language when referring to the reaction people 
should have in response to the cross. He includes both Muslims and Christians, and says, “Let us, 
then, praise the grace of the economy of the cross, and not deny it—particularly not oppose it.” Folio, 
131a.  
798 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 87. 
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Muslims are unfair. Thus, he argues that the final result would not be just, and suggests that 
Christians should leave the discussion of this subject, for silence is better! 
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CHAPTER SIX: Discourse on the Sacraments 
As we have seen throughout Kitāb al-Burhān, ‘Ammār’s main goal is to show the 
reasonableness of Christianity by refuting the intellectual and doctrinal charges that were 
raised almost exclusively by his contemporary Muslim polemicists. Rarely, however, do we 
find Christian ‘practices’ defended, with the exception of these sections on the veneration of 
the cross, and the discourses on baptism and the Eucharist. ‘Ammār chose to address some 
Christian practices in order to show that they must be ‘correct’ practices since they are 
based on ‘correct’ doctrines. As we learn from Islamic anti-Christian literature, Muslim 
polemicists, such as ‘abd al-Jabbār,799 argued against the Christian inattention to washing 
before prayers and their consumption of pork.800 Baptism and the Eucharist, however, were 
rarely criticized by Muslim polemicists.  
Such rare mention of Christian practices raises a difficult question: Why does ‘Ammār 
ignore the specific Islamic charges against Christian practices and behavior, and focus only 
on the correctness of baptism and the Eucharist? We shall try to answer this question at the 
end of our analysis of the discourse on the Eucharist, but first we turn to analyze ‘Ammār’s 
apology for baptism. 
 
                                               
799 ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Tathbīt, 149.  
800 Al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 529-538. 
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The Discourse on Baptism 
‘Ammār opens this section by stating that the practice of baptism is mocked and ridiculed by 
Muslims. Such ridicule, he indicates, is an affront to the Christian view, which upholds 
baptism as a glorious sign by which sin is nullified and removed.801 According to ‘Ammār, 
Muslims never analyze their own practices, or view them dismissively, although they are 
quick to do so with Christian practices. For example, their washing after sexual relations is 
done to excess, as a way of obtaining purity. He then notes that Muslims not only wash their 
sexual organs but do a thorough cleansing so that even their hair is washed.802 ‘Ammār 
seems to have some of the purification ḥadiths in mind, such as those mentioned by al-
Bukhārī.803 ‘Ammār makes the point that Muslims should critically analyze such washings, for 
their effectiveness in purification is in doubt. ‘Ammār thus turns the Muslims’ ridicule and 
objection back on his opponents, while presenting his belief that their washings are 
erroneous.  
 
What is Baptism? 
Up to this point, ‘Ammār has not presented a definition of baptism. However, he explains that 
                                               
801 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 81.  
802 Ibid., 82.  
803 Muḥammad ibn Ismāʻīl al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (al-Qāhirah: Dār Maṭābiʻ al-Shaʻb, 
1960), 70-72.  
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Christ had wanted to leave something tangible for his followers, thereby enabling them to 
remember that resurrection follows death. Baptism, therefore, is seen as a reminder of 
Christ’s death and resurrection. ‘Ammār presents the viewpoint that Christ ordained the ritual 
of baptism, using the natural element of water. This element has special significance, since 
humans themselves were created of water and dust.804 And since Jesus had been baptized 
in water, and later rose from the dead, Christians who followed his example would likewise 
be raised.805 ‘Ammār sees baptism not only as pointing to the resurrection, but also as a 
symbol of the creation story. Almighty God created humans out of water and dust, and after 
they had fallen victim to sin, desired to re-create humans through Christ, who would share 
their substance. Baptism then, symbolizes and generates re-creation. 
This concept of baptism is found in Yūḥannā al-Dimashqī, who argues that it is both a 
sign and a proof that God took the initiative once again in restoring creation and thus 
overcoming sin.806 However, according to ‘Ammār, the process of re-creation can be likened 
to the work of a potter, who, out of the same elements of water and dust, makes earthen 
vessels. When a vessel is spoiled, the potter re-models the work by applying water to the 
same clay. Similarly, therefore, the water of baptism renews humans into the new life given 
                                               
804 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 55. 
805 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 83.  
806 Yūḥannā al-Dimishqī, al-Ma’at Maqālah, 224-225. 
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by God through Christ.807 ‘Ammār presents this analogy of the potter as proof that water is 
indispensable in the process of re-creation. Although ‘Ammār makes no reference to the 
Bible, this image seems to be a reference to Jeremiah 18. Theodore of Mopsuestia also 
made this same allusion to the potter in his discussion of baptism.808 ‘Ammār, however, adds 
the idea that water is involved in the remaking of the vessel, since this is crucial to his 
argument concerning baptism.  
 
Discourse on Baptism: An Evaluation 
Thus far, ‘Ammār has presented the benefits of baptism and argued that it is a correct 
Christian practice. However, we need to see how this argument fits in the flow of Kitāb al-
Burhān, and seek to determine whether his argument would have been convincing to a 
Muslim reader.  
Needless to say, ‘Ammār’s explanation of baptism is selective because of his 
apologetic intent. We note with interest that he chooses not to detail the various rituals 
related to the practice of baptism, such as the oil with which the baptized person was 
anointed, or the prayers that were said, the role of the priest, or the Trinitarian formula that 
                                               
807 Bryan D. Spinks, Early and Medieval Rituals and Theologies of Baptism: From the New 
Testament to the Council of Trent (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 77. 
808 Khalil Chalfoun, “Baptême et Eucharistie chez ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” Parole de l’Orient 27 
(2002), 325.  
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was pronounced during baptism. Al-Ṣafī also avoids mention of most aspects of the 
sacrament, adding only the liturgical detail that baptism is administered by three immersions 
in water.809  
However, all of these ‘overlooked’ aspects of baptism would seem to confirm that 
‘Ammār was mainly concerned with defending only one point with regard to baptism. Unlike 
the East Syrian theologians,810 who clearly described the liturgical aspects of baptism, 
‘Ammār chose to focus only on the significance of the sacrament in removing sin, its 
depiction of re-creation, and the remembrance and hope of Christ’s death and 
resurrection.811 Thus, it would appear that his Islamic context was uppermost in his mind, 
and that in this section, he was primarily addressing Muslims.812 This also explains why 
‘Ammār does not offer any definition of baptism; he simply addresses the Islamic arguments 
against its effectiveness. Although he does not go into detail in refuting the Muslim viewpoint 
and defending Christian baptism, Ammār derides the Islamic practice of washing as 
ineffectual and absurd. 
Furthermore, in speaking about God’s creation of the world from dust and water—a 
                                               
809 Charfeh MS folio 132b.  
810 Bryan D. Spinks, Early and Medieval Rituals, 75.  
811 See Khalil Chalfoun, “Baptême et Eucharistie,” 323.  
812 Ibid. 
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reference to Job 33:6,813 ‘Ammār attempts to show that God is the author of baptism, and 
that it has a divine origin. Thus, its legitimacy is directly derived from the authority of God. 
Furthermore, in stressing that Christ’s death and resurrection are remembered in baptism, 
‘Ammār is indirectly linking Jesus with God. The point is clear: God created the world from 
water and dust, and correspondingly Christ creates new life by the water of baptism, which is 
the symbol of his death and resurrection.814 Obviously, this further supports ‘Ammār’s 
theological understanding that Christ is God incarnate. In addition, this identification of Christ 
with God shows that ‘Ammār considers Christ to be central to the whole of creation. Only 
through Christ do humans enjoy new life and victory over death. Without him, as the potter 
example shows, creation is forever spoiled. Christ’s centrality is indispensable in the process 
of human re-creation.  
That said, however, it remains unclear to ‘Ammār’s interlocutor that there is a need for 
re-creation. This idea of restoring the human nature to its original state is based solely on a 
Christian understanding. Yet here, it seems that ‘Ammār presents the Christian doctrine of 
salvation and redemption as a solution to answer Islamic objections. This does not seem 
satisfactory! 
                                               
813 Ibid., 326. This reference was also used by Theodore of Mopsuestia. The Qur’ān refers to 
the creation story in similar terms; see sūrah 3:59; 15:26; 22:5; 23:12; 32:7; 37:11; 40:67; 55:14.  
814 Khalil Chalfoun, “Baptême et Eucharistie,” 324.  
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We now turn to look at ‘Ammār’s view of the Eucharist, and his defense of this 
practice.  
 291 
The Discourse on the Eucharist 
We have seen in the previous section, on baptism, that ‘Ammār considers baptism to 
represent new life given by water to the followers of Christ. However, he spent little time 
explaining or defending it, since Muslims gave relatively little attention to this practice. As 
with baptism, we note with al-Sharafī that, when dealing with the Eucharist, Muslim 
polemicists seldom paid attention to the practice, let alone attacked it. Al-Sharafī indicates 
that only in Tathbīt Dalā’il al-Nubūwah does ‘abd al-Jabbār mention the Eucharist, as a 
practice carried out by Christians in remembrance of Christ.815 This is a brief yet fair account 
of the Eucharist. Presumably, what ‘Ammār is refuting is a popular criticism raised by the 
average Muslim, vis-à-vis the more intellectual rebuttals presented by his contemporary 
Mu‘tazilī thinkers.  
 
The Name of Christ is given to the Eucharist 
‘Ammār’s argument indicates that beneath the Muslim objection to the Eucharist is the issue 
that it has been named “the body of Christ.”816 ‘Ammār dismisses this objection, arguing from 
scriptures that in many cases Christ gave his name to others. ‘Ammār’s proof-texts are 
                                               
815 Al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 529, footnote 24.  
816 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 84.  
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Matthew 25:35-40, where Jesus identifies himself with the prisoners and the sick;817 and, 
interestingly, sūrah 2: 245, where it says: “Who is it that will lend unto Allah a beautiful loan.” 
‘Ammār sees in these two texts a clear identification between Christ and the sick, and 
similarly, between God and the recipient of a loan.  
‘Ammār does not mention the Qur’ān as the source of the text, but this lack of 
reference is corrected by al-Ṣafī, who clearly states that the source of the text is “the book of 
those who deny this [calling the Eucharist the body and blood of Christ].”818 We know that 
‘Ammār was well-acquainted with the text of the Qur’ān, so not mentioning the Qur’ān should 
not be seen as an indication otherwise. Rather, it is his style in Kitāb al-Burhān819 to 
effortlessly use texts from both the Christian scriptures and the Qur’ān to shape and form his 
phrasing and arguments. Meanwhile, it is a characteristic of al-Ṣafī to mention the source of 
quoted texts. For example, in the same discussion in the Charfeh MS, when the reference is 
made to the Eucharist as being a remembrance of Christ, al-Ṣafī acknowledges this as a 
                                               
817 “‘I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a 
stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick and you visited me, I 
was in prison and you came to me.’ Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see thee 
hungry and feed thee, or thirsty and give thee drink? And when did we see thee a stranger and 
welcome thee, or naked and clothe thee? And when did we see thee sick or in prison and visit thee?’ 
And the King will answer them, ‘Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my 
brethren, you did it to me’” (Mathew 25:35-40).  
818 Charfeh MS folio 133a.  
819 See the appendix of qur’ānic citations. See also Sidney Griffith, The Church in the 
Shadow, 56. 
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Pauline term.820  
Nevertheless, ‘Ammār considered identifying the bread and wine with the body and 
blood of Christ to be clearly legitimate, since both the Gospel and the Qur’ān make similar 
identifications. Ultimately, if Christ so identified himself with the poor, then he would freely 
identify himself with the elements of the Eucharist.821 Thus ‘Ammār concludes:  
As it is legitimate that he named himself with names of others, it is [also] 
legitimate that others be named with his name, for there is no difference in that. 
Accordingly, he names the bread and the drink [wine], which he made as 
Eucharist, his body and his blood; the [ultimate] aim of Christ, our Lord, was to 
make manifest the world that lasts, the resurrection from the death, for there is 
no harder thing in this world for the people in it than death, and nothing more 
valuable for them than salvation from it [death], and attaining a life that has no 
death, and after which death does not come.822  
 
It should not escape attention that ‘Ammār uses the word “drink,” instead of the 
classical word “wine.” In doing so, he shows some sensitivity to his Muslim audience, by 
distinguishing the type of drink used in celebrating the Eucharist from that which is offered as 
drink to visitors to monasteries. We learn from historical records that one reason that 
Muslims visited Christian monasteries was to drink wine.823 Certainly this gave a bad 
reputation to several monasteries, especially after alcohol shops that sold wine to Muslims 
                                               
820 Charfeh MS folio 133a. 
821 Khalil Chalfoun, “Baptême et Eucharistie,” 329.  
822 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 85.  
823 Ḥabīb Zayyāt, al-Diyārāt al-Naṣrānīyah fīl-Islām (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 1999), 41-50, cf. 
Mūsā Makhkhūl, al-Ḥaḍārah al-Suryāniyyah, 483-486.  
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were established near some monasteries!824 So it seems appropriate that ‘Ammār should 
differentiate between the type of drink used in the Eucharist, i.e., the drink and that which is 
consumed by visitors of monasteries.825 However, the question remains: “Why celebrate the 
Eucharist?” 
 
The Reasons for Celebrating the Eucharist 
The Eucharist, according to ‘Ammār, is not merely a theological issue. It is rather a practical 
teaching which, alongside Baptism, demonstrates an important aspect of Christian doctrine, 
that is, the resurrection. The reason why Jesus ordained the Eucharist is to remind his 
followers that “similar to his being raised victorious from death, their bodies will be raised 
from the dead. Consequently, this brings joy and comfort.”826 The practice of the Eucharist 
therefore becomes a means of remembering a future hope. The eschatological 
accomplishment of Christ’s death is remembered in the Eucharist, and so ‘Ammār does not 
use the word “sacrament” to speak of the Eucharist. To him the Eucharist is a powerful 
reminder of the life to come—a life of eternal bliss.827 He may have intentionally avoided 
                                               
824 Ibid., 69-76; cf. Suhayl Qāshā, Tārīkh Naṣārā al-ʻIrāq, 217-232.  
825 Muḥammad M. Sa‘ad al-Dīn, al-‘Aysh al-Mushtarak, 34; cf. Adam Mez, al-Ḥaḍārah al-
Islāmiyyah, 83. 
826 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 85. 
827 Ibid., 87.  
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speaking of the Eucharist as a sacrament with any mystical nature so that his interlocutor 
would not find another ground on which to question Christian doctrines.  
To make this clear, ‘Ammār affirms that the practice of the Eucharist is not to be 
understood literally, i.e., the bread is not literally the body of Christ, neither is the drink, or 
wine, his blood. This means that the elements in themselves do not give life,828 while at the 
same time, ‘Ammār is reaffirming to his fellow Christians that their practices indeed are 
significant—both theologically and practically. Surely, his words carry a pastoral concern 
through which the needs of his Christian community are met. Even if Christians face the 
danger of death, the Eucharist reminds them that eternal life is assured. ‘Ammār teaches 
that “[t]he remembrance of his [Christ’s] death relieves them [Christians] from sadness, and 
they rejoice as they remember life, as if they took the assurance of life by their hands.”829 
This seems to be what ‘Ammār has in mind in this section, for he uses the word نﺎـﺑﺮﻗ, 
Qurbān, a Syriac word that made its way into Arabic, and indicates the idea of offering, or 
sacrifice.830 The Arabic verb َّبﺮَﻗ, means to offer something. This is actually the meaning of 
the word found in the Qur’ān, in sūrah 5:27 and 46:28.831 Therefore, it seems accurate to 
                                               
828 Khalil Chalfoun, “Baptême et Eucharistie,” 331.  
829 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 85.  
830 Khalil Chalfoun, “Baptême et Eucharistie,” 327; cf. Sidney Griffith, “‘Spirit in the Bread; Fire 
in the Wine’: the Eucharist as ‘Living Medicine’ in the Thought of Ephraem the Syrian,” in Modern 
Theology 15(2) (April 1999), 229-233.  
831 Khalil Chalfoun, “Baptême et Eucharistie,” 327, footnote 24. 
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conclude that ‘Ammār intentionally uses this term to make a theological point. The point is 
this: in celebrating the Eucharist, Christians affirm their belief that Christ, ﻪﺴﻔﻧ َّبﺮـَﻗ, offered 
himself on their behalf so that they may have new life.832 
From scriptures, ‘Ammār appeals to the sacrificial system in the Old Testament as a 
prototype of the sacrifice of Christ that is remembered at the Eucharist—a theme that was 
used by Theodore Bar Konī in his Livre des Scolies.833 ‘Ammār then utilizes the ‘second 
Adam’ theme developed in the New Testament by Paul to argue that just as the ‘first Adam’ 
brought sin to his descendants, هﺮﻫﻮـﺟ ﻞﻫأ, and people therefore needed to offer sacrifices 
for the remission of sin, so has the ‘second Adam’ brought obedience and forgiveness to 
all.834 It is as if Christ:  
…representing all those of his substance, has nullified sin on account of which 
death entered into the sacrifices that were slaughtered and offered to God on 
behalf of the sins of the Children of Israel. [This happened] because it was 
necessary for him to nullify death and show life by his righteousness, just as 
death had been necessitated, and life was nullified on account of the 
disobedience of the first Adam.835  
 
In fact, ‘Ammār goes to great pains to demonstrate the similarities and differences 
                                               
832 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 87. 
833 See Robert Hespel and René Draguet, Theodore Bar Konī, 186, 198.  
834 This view seems to have been taken from Theodore of Mopsuestia. See Būlus al-Faghālī, 
Thiyūdūrus Usquf al-Maṣṣīṣah wa-Mufassir al-Kutub al-Ilāhiyyah (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 1993), 81-
84; cf. Samir Khalil, “al-Ta’thīr al-Lāhūtī,” 222-223.  
835 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 86.  
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between the first Adam and Christ. And thus he shows great familiarity not only with 
arguments from systematic theology, but also with biblical theology and its explanation of the 
unfolding of divine revelation. It is true that, although ‘Ammār can be identified as a Christian 
Arab apologist in Dār al-Islām, he also demonstrates a solid biblical knowledge, which 
entitles him to be called a biblical theologian as well. He takes into account the way the 
Christian scriptures reveal the divine plan.   
The humanity of Christ is also crucial in ‘Ammār’s apology concerning the Eucharist. It 
is only because Christ shared the human substance that his victory over death and his 
triumphal resurrection can be ascribed to them. If his substance were different, it would have 
been impossible for their substances to be raised from the dead. ‘Ammār uses the word 
“substance,” ﺮﻫﻮﺟ, eleven times in this short segment of Kitāb al-Burhān. Such repetition is 
significant as it shows the importance of Christ’s identification with humans.  
  
Why Defend the Eucharist? 
In concluding this chapter, we now turn to the question we raised in the opening paragraph 
of the discussion on baptism. Why did ‘Ammār not defend other Christian practices, but 
focus only on baptism and the Eucharist?  
It seems safe to conclude that, in Christian thinking, these two sacraments were of 
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great importance to the whole of Christian life and doctrine. Their fate is linked with the 
defensibility of many essential doctrines. According to ‘Ammār, sin is nullified and new life is 
given to the faithful in baptism;836 likewise, the Eucharist is the demonstration of Christ’s 
victory over death,837 and is therefore a remembrance of the resurrection and eternity which 
is to come.838 Given the importance of these doctrines, and the fact that these two 
sacraments constitute the backbone of Christian practices, it is understandable that ‘Ammār 
devotes a section of his Kitāb al-Burhān to deal with possible objections raised against these 
primary sacraments in the Church of the East.839  
This is in fact how al-Ṣafī understands Kitāb al-Burhān, for we see in his epitome that 
baptism and the Eucharist are the two means by which the story of redemption is unfolded to 
human society. Al-Ṣafī indicates that Christ, wanting to confirm the correctness of salvation 
in word and deed, left two practices to the Church: “first, the symbol (ﺰـﻣر) of baptism; and 
second, the sacrament (ّﺮﺳ) of the Eucharist.”840 In summarizing the ultimate significance of 
the Qurbān, al-Ṣafī, brilliantly puts ‘Ammār’s words as follows:  
 ﻲـﺘﻟا ﺔـّﻴﻣدﻵا ﺔـّﻴﻄﺨﻟا ﻦـﻋ ﺔﺤﻴّﺑﺬﻟا مﺎﻘﻣ مﺎﻗ ذإ ُتﻮﻤﻟا ﻊﻔﺗرﺎﻓ ،ﻢﻫﺎﻳﺎﻄﺧ ﺔﻨﻌﻟ ﻢﻬﻨﻋ ﻞﻤﺘﺣﺎﻓ
                                               
836 Ibid., 82.  
837 Ibid., 81.  
838 Ibid. 
839 ‘Ammār's tradition accepts seven sacraments as ordained by the word of God. They are: 
1. The Ordination, 2. Holy Baptism, 3. The Oil of Unction, 4. The Oblation of the Body and Blood of 
Christ (the Eucharist), 5. Absolution, 6. The Holy Leaven, 7. The sign of the life-giving Cross.  
840 Charfeh MS folio 133a. 
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 هﺬﻫ ﻢﻫﺎﻳﺎﻄﺧ ﻦﻋ ّبَﺮﻘُﺗ ﻞﻴﺋاﺮﺳإ ﻲﻨﺑ ُﺢﺋﺎﺑذ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﺎﻤﻛ تﻮﻤﻟا َﺐََﺒﺳ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﻰﻠﻋ اًﺰﻣر ﺖﻧﺎﻛ يﺬﻟا
ِهﺮﻫﻮﺟ ﻞﻫأ ﻦﻋ ِﻪِﺗاذ ِﻪﺒﻳﺮﻘﺗ . ََنﻼُﻄﺑ َّﻦَﻴﺑو َُﻪَﺒَﺒﺳ ِﻪﻟﺎﻄﺑﺈﺑ تﻮﻤﻟا ََﻞﻄﺑأ ّﻪﻧﻷ ؛ّﻲﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟا نﺎﺑﺮُﻘﻟا ﻮﻬﻓَ
 ﺪﻠﺑ ﻦﻣ ﻊﻔﺗراو ،ٌتﻮﻣ ﺎﻬﺒﻘﻌﻳ ﻻ ﻲﺘّﻟا َةﺎﻴﺤﻟا َﺮَﻬﻇأو ،ﺔّﺘﺒﻟا ٍﺖﺋﺎﻣ َﺮﻴﻏ ﻪﻨﻣ َجَﺮَﺧو ،َُهﺮَﺷﺎَﺑ نﺄﺑ تﻮﻤﻟا
ﻋأ ،ةﺎﻴﺤﻟا ﺪﻠﺑ ﻰﻟإ تﻮﻤﻟاءﺎﻤّﺴﻟا ﻰﻟإ ضرﻷا ﻦﻣ َﺪِﻌَﺻ ﻲﻨ. 841  
 
Translation: He [Christ] bore on their behalf the curse of their sins, and 
therefore death has been nullified since he took the place of the sacrifice that 
was offered for Adam’s sin, which was the cause of death—for thus were the 
sacrifices of the Children of Israel offered for their sins. These were a type of his 
offering of himself in place of those who are of his essence. He is the true 
offering, because he nullified death by nullifying its cause. He showed the 
nullification of death by going through it, and coming out of it alive. Thus, he 
manifested the life which is not followed by death, and was lifted from the place 
of death to the place of life, that is, he ascended from earth to Heaven. 
 
However, this conclusion should not lead us to think that ‘Ammār has presented us 
with a full Christian understanding of the Qurbān, for the framework of his presentation is 
considerably influenced by Islamic objections to these sacraments. As we have seen, 
‘Ammār intentionally avoids speaking of some aspects related to the Eucharist, such as the 
manner in which the Qurbān is to be practiced. Instead, his whole presentation of the 
Qurbān is structured to prove that Christ offered his body on behalf of sinners and that new 
life is given to those who trust his sacrificial work. Therefore, the Eucharist is not to be 
denied, ‘Ammār believes, for it serves as a reminder of the work of Christ by which sin is 
forgiven and new life is celebrated and received.842 Baptism and the Eucharist, then, are two 
                                               
841 Ibid., folio 134a. 
842 Khalil Chalfoun, “Baptême et Eucharistie,” 330, cf. Michel Hayek, Apologie et 
controverses, 87. 
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means of receiving such grace. Baptism not only purifies, but gives new life; and the 
Eucharist is not merely a consumption of some elements, but is a celebration of the 
forthcoming eschatological fulfillment. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Eschatological Arguments 
The Discourse on Eating and Drinking in the Hereafter 
The last issue ‘Ammār tackles in Kitāb al-Burhān concerns eschatology—specifically the 
issue of eating and drinking in the hereafter. ‘Ammār’s basic argument is twofold. First, the 
reward of believers cannot be physical, but rather, must be spiritual; and second, that 
humanity’s real need is for God.843 
‘Ammār starts by presenting the Islamic objection to the Christian view of eternity, 
i.e., that an eternal life without marriage, eating and drinking is not a proper reward. ‘Ammār 
sharply refutes this objection, presenting his opinion that the the nature of the reward 
according to the Islamic understanding is “low, passing, imperfect, and vile…in which 
afflictions bind us, such as sickness, diseases, many blights.”844 Further, ‘Ammār indicates: 
“What they [the Muslims] mention of reward is the imperfection, the deficiency, and 
abrogation of reward.”845  
This position is essentially a defense of the biblical understanding of eternal life, as 
‘Ammār indicates, for he mentions at the beginning of the section that this type of reward is 
                                               
843 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 56.  
844 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 88.  
845 Ibid. 
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what is recorded in the Gospel.846 In fact, the word “Gospel” is mentioned twice in this short 
section, 847 as is the phrase “His [God’s] Books.”848 It would appear that ‘Ammār and his 
contemporary theologians, being well-acquainted with Islam, choose to make a pointed 
reference to Islamic teaching on this issue in order to turn the accusations back on their 
Muslim interlocutors. This method of defense was justifiable in polemical treatises such as 
Kitāb al-Burhān.  
‘Ammār argues that the eternal reward as described in the Gospel is far higher than 
fleshly needs. Such needs are certainly not evil in themselves: they are necessary for the 
continuation of life.849 But they thereby also serve as reminders that our lives in this world 
are vulnerable and imperfect, and that we have many needs. This reminder also promotes 
humility as the proper attitude for all humans. According to al-Ṣafī, the cause of the original 
fall was the lack of such humility.850 But, in eternal life, believers will have no physical needs, 
since their bodies will be transformed into a more powerful form.851  
Rather than the enjoyment of physical pleasures in Paradise, the true eternal reward 
                                               
846 Ibid.  
847 Ibid., 88 and 88. 
848 Ibid., 89 and 90.  
849 This view was put forward by Yūḥannā al-Dimishqī and abū Qurrah. See Yūḥannā al-
Dimishqī, al-Ma’at Maqālah, 119; and Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 231-236.  
850 Charfeh MS folio, 134b. 
851 Cf. Gianmaria Gianazza, ed. Īliyyā II: Kitāb Ūṣūl al-Dīn, vol. 2, 390-391.  
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will include a transformation that erases human neediness, and makes nature perfect.852 
This new nature can be likened to the nature of “the righteous angels.”853 ‘Ammār did not 
believe that the nature of humans would be the same as that of the angels, but he implies 
that the honor that believers will enjoy is the same honor that is given to angels. Such honor 
includes rejoining the angels “in rank, power, dignity, endurance, and eternal joy.”854 ‘Ammār 
states: 
He [God] will transfer us from this vile world and from this weak and needy 
body to a strong and honorable body; and after this vile life, which is not 
dependent on anything other than itself, to an everlasting life which does not 
experience need and is not weak.855  
 
Here ‘Ammār refers to his interlocutor and states: 
I do not think that the opponents claim that the reward of Gabriel, Michael and 
all the angels who are close [to God] is imperfect or vile, or that their [the 
opponents’] pleasure in having sexual intercourse with women, and eating 
and drinking, is more than the pleasure of the angels or other things than 
these.856  
 
‘Ammār ends Kitāb al-Burhān with a final reference to the Book of God, which tells of 
                                               
852 See Wafīk Naṣry, The Caliph and the Bishop: A Nineth Century Muslim-Christian Debate: 
al-Ma’mūn and abū Qurrah (Bayrūt: CEDRAC, 2008), 266-268. 
853 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 89.  
854 Ibid. 
855 Ibid.  
856 Ibid., 89-90. This same argument is put forward by abū Qurrah, who argues that the 
ultimate reward is attained when humans become God-like. See Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-
Khāliq, 237.  
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the things of God.857 This point is well expressed by al-Ṣafī, who compares the reward of this 
world with that which comes from God. Al-Ṣafī indicates that fleshly rewards make humans 
dependent on things coming from the earth, whose essences are lower than that of humans. 
By contrast, the ultimate reward comes when full dependence on God is accomplished. Al-
Ṣafī puts it thus: “We will be sustained by that which is far nobler than our essence, i.e., our 
Creator.”858  
‘Ammār’s discourse concerning eating and drinking in the hereafter is similar in focus 
to that of his contemporary Arab Christian theologians, abū Qurrah and abū Rā’iṭah, who 
also alluded to Islam’s belief in the sensual pleasures of Paradise, while insisting that the 
Christian view is higher and nobler since it does not include any physical aspect. These 
Christian polemicists thus utilized the Muslims’ own beliefs against them.859 What is striking 
is that, in this case, Muslim polemicists felt the force of these arguments enough to rebut the 
Christians’ accusations. They felt the need not only to refute Christian beliefs, but also to 
defend their own stand on polygamy, and on eating and drinking in Paradise.860 This, in fact, 
is a rare moment where Arab Christians seem to have been successful in making their 
                                               
857 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 90.  
858 Charfeh MS folio 134b; cf. Gianmaria Gianazza, ed., Īliyyā II: Kitāb Ūṣūl al-Dīn, vol. 1, 
PAC, vol. 17 (Bayrūt: CEDRAC, 2005), 389.  
859 See Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 210, 236-239, 252-253. 
860 Al-Sharafī, al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 552.  
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Muslim counterparts feel pressured and defensive.  
It is to be noted that, although ‘Ammār refers to the Gospel four times, he never 
quotes any biblical verse to support his arguments. He seems to assume that the reader is 
already familiar with verses that negate the idea of any physical need in eternity. This 
section, therefore, might primarily be addressed to ‘Ammār’s fellow Christian community. 
Although ‘Ammār presents identical arguments in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwiba, there is 
a significant change in ‘Ammār’s tone in this section of Kitāb al-Burhān, and he takes a 
strongly polemic approach, whereas friendlier language is observable in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-
Ajwiba. For example, words such as ‘vile’ and ‘abrogation’ are not found in reference to 
Islamic doctrines; rather, in Kitāb al-Masā’il wal-Ajwiba, ‘Ammār actually addresses his 
opponent as “O, wise man”861—an unprecedented title! Even the endings of the two books 
differ. In the conclusion of Kitāb al-Burhān, ‘Ammār betrays frustration with his interlocutor, 
considering it fitting to end the book shortly after denying the ‘vile’ Islamic view of fleshly 
reward in eternity. In al-Masā’il wal-Ajwiba, however, the conclusion is short and 
straightforward, without any of the emotional expressions found in Kitāb al-Burhān. It is 
indeed difficult to explain this difference in tone.  
In his discourse on eating and drinking in eternity, ‘Ammār assures his fellow 
                                               
861 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 264.  
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Christians that their ultimate need in eternity is not based on things similar to their earthly 
substances. Rather, God will reward the faithful with divine rewards for they will no longer 
have any needs. This Christian view, ‘Ammār is persuaded, is the correct one, and it 
therefore follows that the Islamic objections are irrelevant. God will reward the faithful by 
giving them a status that is similar to the rank of the angels in honor and dignity. 
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SECTION THREE: A CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
CHAPTER EIGHT: The Place of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī 
This section analyzes the significance of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī as an Arab Christian theologian 
writing during the formative days of Islam. We shall discuss his literary style and his use of 
both scriptures and logic. In addition, we shall examine how Kitāb al-Burhān fits within the 
Mu‘tazilī milieu of the ninth century. We shall then explore the ways in which he 
contextualized his faith to meet the challenges of Dār al-Islām, and defend our conclusion 
that he not only proved the credibility of his theological position but totally invalidated the 
Arabic proverb, “ أَََﺘﺗ ْنأ ُّﺔﻴﺑ ََﺮﻌﻟا َِﺖﺑَﺮَّﺼﻨ , Arabic [culture] has refused to be Christianized.” Finally, 
we shall highlight the lessons that can be drawn from Kitāb al-Burhān for the Arabic-
speaking church of today.  
 
‘Ammār al-Baṣrī: An Arab Christian Apologist  
‘Ammār’s Literary Style  
It is clear from the opening words on the divine unity in Kitāb al-Burhān that ‘Ammār’s 
agenda is apologetic in nature, as he sets out to correct the Islamic misunderstanding of 
Christian doctrines. In so doing, however, his literary style tends to move back and forth 
between apologetics and polemics. This point is difficult to miss. Not only does he seek to 
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clear up Islamic misunderstandings of Christianity and provide logical and scriptural support 
for his claims, but at times, very sharp criticisms are made of the Islamic perception of God, 
as we have seen in his discourses on the Trinity, the incarnation, the cross of Christ, and the 
hereafter.  
‘Ammār’s critical style is distinguished by two features: it is both direct and 
generally polite. He is mostly respectful of those who disagree with him, and he 
takes their objections seriously.862 Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that ‘Ammār 
is not pointed in his criticism of his Muslim interlocutor. He openly criticizes his 
counterpart’s views on the nature of God, and then offers the Christian view as the 
truest depiction of God. However, we must keep in mind that dhimmī regulations 
may well have been a major factor in his chosen style. In this, his style differs 
greatly from the apologetic style of al-Kindī. The latter, whoever he may have been, 
did not seem to fear the same consequences if the Qur’ān or Muḥammad were 
insulted. After all, he most likely was writing anonymously! But this was not the 
case with ‘Ammār. The very fact that the BL MS lacks the section where ‘Ammār 
offers unflattering reasons why people would accept Islam suggests that some 
dhimmī regulations were in force at the time the manuscript was copied. However, 
                                               
862 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 39.  
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the fact that ‘Ammār directly criticized Islam, may indicate that some of the 
regulations were not in effect when ‘Ammār actually wrote the section. It may also 
indicate that ‘Ammār’s criticism was considered respectful enough to be permitted 
in Baṣrah in the ninth century without jeopardizing his life.  
‘Ammār obviously desired to be clear and relevant, and all of his arguments show 
astute sensitivity to his times and audience. He sought to make his theological convictions as 
intelligible as possible, and thus avoid any charge of “intellectual absurdity.”863  
 
The Arabic eloquence of ‘Ammār  
‘Ammār was a master of writing, with an outstandingly rich command of the Arabic 
language.864 There are very few inaccuracies, awkward structures or deficiencies in the Kitāb 
al-Burhān, and those that exist can be blamed on scribal errors. Most mistakes are either 
grammatical in nature, or spelling errors. For example, we read ﻢﻬﺗآآﺮﺑ, their innocence which 
is a corruption of ﻢﻬﺗآﺮﺑ.865 Similarly, we notice that the scribe uses نﻮﻌﻀـﻳ, put or compose, 
instead of اﻮﻌﻀـﻳ.866 This particular type of mistake appears quite frequently, with the scribe 
                                               
863 Sidney Griffith, “Ḥabib ibn Khidmah abū Rā’iṭah: a Christian Mutakallim of the First Abbasid 
Century,” Oriens Christianus 64 (1980), 165. 
864 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 45.  
865 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 34. 
866 Ibid., 44. 
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seeming to have difficulty putting verbs in the plural form.867 Apparently, the scribe also 
considers the word أﻢﻴﻧﺎـﻗ , hypostases, to be an Arabic word, which in the accusative case 
should be written with nunation, ﺎـًﻤﻴﻧﺎﻗأ.868 He also wrongly renders ﻦﻴﻘﻃﺎـﻨﻟا, the speaking 
ones, in the genitive case, when it should be in the nominative, نﻮﻘﻃﺎـﻨﻟا. Another scribal 
mistake can be seen in the repetition of a sentence in folio 25b. However, none of these 
mistakes or deficiencies can be blamed on ‘Ammār, and the book as a whole shows not only 
a good grasp of grammar, but great eloquence.869  
‘Ammār’s fluency was probably affected by the level of Arabic that was common 
among his Muslim countrymen in Baṣrah, for it is obvious that he was well acquainted with 
their kalām arguments, and had established intellectual equality with some Mu‘tazilī thinkers. 
In fact, the quality of his Arabic is another aspect that distinguishes him from his Christian 
contemporaries—especially abū Qurrah and abū Rā’iṭah. For, although they also composed 
theological treatises in Arabic, ‘Ammār’s Arabic, and his creative use of it, far surpasses 
theirs. ‘Ammār was comfortable “inventing” Arabic terms to support his arguments.870 We 
note with interest how he breaks all the rules, as Hayek indicates, and uses “nouns as if they 
                                               
867 Ibid., 56, 57, 62, and 65.  
868 Ibid., 51. 
869 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 31. 
870 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 17.  
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were infinitives.”871 ‘Ammār also feels at liberty to coin new forms of words—especially 
attributive nouns. He speaks, for instance, about ّﻲﻧاﺪـﺣو, one, i.e., related to the oneness; 
ّﻲﻧﺎـﻤﻜﺣ, wise, related to wisdom; and ّﻲﻧﺎﻤﺴـﺟ, fleshly, related to the flesh; ﺔـّﻴﻧأ, identity, 
related to “I am,” ﺎـﻧأ; ﺔـّﻴﺋﺎﻣ, whatness, related to ﺎـﻣ. The prime example of this is the many 
words he invented from the Arabic word ٌنﺎﺴـﻧإ, man or humanity. From this word he 
creatively derived: ٌﺔَﻨَْﺴﻧأَ , humanizing; ََﻦّﺴﻧﺄَﺗ, became human; َّﺲﻧﺄَﺗ, He became human; ٌّﺔﻴْﺴﻧأُ , 
humanity; and ٌﺔـَﺳُﻮﻧأُ , humanity.872 This explains Hayek’s fascination with ‘Ammār’s Arabic 
and his description of his writing as “نﺎﺟﺮﻬﻣ,” festival of words.873  
When we consider this richness, the eloquence of his linguistic style and his ability to 
both summarize and present compelling arguments, it becomes obvious why ‘Ammār has 
been identified as the most profound and exciting figure among Arab Christian theologians in 
the ninth century, for he was someone who used Arabic to the advantage of his theological 
position.874 In this regard, Hayek argues that, since Timothy I did not write in Arabic, ‘Ammār 
can be classified as the first Arab Christian theologian who composed treatises in Arabic, 
especially given his mastery in using the language and his rigorous style.875  
                                               
871 Ibid. 
872 Ibid., 18. 
873 Ibid.  
874 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 45-46. 
875 Ibid., 26-27. 
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Another interesting feature of ‘Ammār’s style is his use of repetition. As noted earlier, 
he carefully repeats words and phrases in order to further his arguments. But he also shows 
great skill in using synonyms and unexpected antonyms to great effect. With regard to 
Christianity he says:ِّﺔﻴﻧاﺮّﺼﻨﻟا ﻦﻳد ﻦﻣ اًﺮﻣأ ََﻖﻴْﺿأ ﻻو ٍّةﺬﻟ ﻦﻋ َﺮَْﺴﻛأ ﻻو ٍةﻮﻬﺸﻟ َﻊَﻨ ْﻣأ ِءﺎﻤّﺴﻟا ﺖﺤﺗ ٌﻦﻳد ﺲﻴﻟَ َ َ , 
“There is no religion under the sun which prohibits desire more, and destroys pleasure more 
and has more restrictive commands than the Christian religion.”876 Likewise, in refuting the 
taḥrīf allegation, he powerfully writes: ﻲﻓ ﺎَﻬﻗﺎّﻔﺗا ﻦﻣ ﺎَﻬﻴﻠﻋ َﻲِّﻋدا ﺎﻣ َلﺎَﺤُﻣ ُﺢﺿﻮﻳ ِﻞﻳوﺄّﺘﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺎَُﻬﻓﻼﺘﺧﺎﻓ
ِﻞﻳﺰﻨّﺘﻟا ِﻒﻳﺮﺤﺗ, “Their [the Christians] differing interpretations demonstrate the impossibility of 
what has been alleged concerning their conspiracy to corrupt the revealed text.”877 And 
eloquently he states “ هدﻮﺟ ﻦﻣ ﻪﺑ ﺎﻧاﺪﺘﺑا ﺎﻣ ﻪﺑ ﷲ ﻢﺘﺧ ﺎّﻤﻣ ﺮﻬﻇأ ٍدﻮﺟ ّيأو ﺮﺜﻛأ ٍﻞﻀﻓ ّيأو ﻢﻈﻋأ ٍﺔﻤﻌﻧ ﺔّﻳﺄﻓ
ﻪـﻣﺮﻛو! , “What greater grace, what more abundant favor, what more obvious generosity is 
there than that by which God has sealed His generosity and kindness which He initiated in 
us!”878 It is indeed correct that ‘Ammār 
…had the advantage of being the first to write a suitably rigorous account of 
the fundamental proofs of Christianity in Arabic in adequate language. 
However, he had other merits; his gift for synthesis, his powerful theological 
vision, his certainty regarding existential faith…make him one of the most 
attractive figures in Eastern Christianity.879  
                                               
876 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 38. 
877 Ibid., 42. 
878 Ibid., 73.  
879 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 33-34. 
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‘Ammār’s Use of the Christian Scriptures 
‘Ammār was clearly a biblical theologian who held the scriptures in high regard, depending 
on its truths as he made his defense of Christianity. As we have previously shown, there are 
obvious allusions to biblical texts throughout the text of Kitāb al-Burhān. ‘Ammār 
demonstrably knew the scriptures and the specific verses that could be used as proof-texts, 
and he also makes references, both direct and indirect, to biblical narratives. For example, 
he mentions the story of Amnon and his rape of Tamar, the beautiful sister of his half-
brother, Absalom;880 the story of Samson’s vengeance on the Philistines;881 David’s affair 
with Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah;882 and Solomon’s love for women.883  
But more than this, the Bible is foundational to ‘Ammār’s apology, and he structures 
his arguments by adding phrases such as “They [the apostles] reported in the Gospel,”884 
“As the Gospel reported,”885 “As they [Christians] found it written in the Gospel,”886 “The 
Gospel attributes them [the hypostases],”887 and “The Gospel tells…”888 All these modifying 
phrases show that he considers the scriptures to be the real source of theological reflection, 
                                               
880 II Samuel 13.  
881 Judges 15.  
882 II Samuel 11.  
883 I Kings 11. 
884 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 34.  
885 Ibid., 36. 
886 Ibid., 52. 
887 Ibid., 55. 
888 Ibid., 57. 
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and the ultimate proof of the truthfulness of an idea. In a word, he sees his theology as 
biblical theology.  
Further, we note that ‘Ammār does not limit himself to the text of either the Old or New 
Testament; but quotes from both. For example, he repeatedly appeals to the Psalms and to 
the Gospel according to Matthew, and he also quotes the Book of Daniel, the Book of Isaiah, 
the Book of Acts, and the Gospel according to John.  
It is revealing that the majority of ‘Ammār’s biblical citations are found in his defenses 
of the Trinity and the incarnation. Concerning the first topic, he makes five biblical 
references,889 and six references are made regarding the latter.890 This large number of 
quotations is significant, given that these two teachings have always been difficult topics in 
Christian-Muslim theological conversation. The fact that he appeals to the scriptures to 
explain them shows that he believes that the testimony of the scriptures stands as the 
ultimate witness to the truth of these beliefs. However, he does not quote any verses to 
support Christian teaching on the cross, the crucifixion, or baptism. 
It is also notable that when ‘Ammār quotes the scriptures he does not paraphrase 
them. The only exception in Kitāb al-Burhān is when he indirectly refers to Isaiah 53. Here, 
unlike his other quotations from Isaiah, he summarizes the whole chapter in one sentence! 
                                               
889 Ibid., 48, 48, 48, 48, and 48. 
890 Ibid., 72, 76, 76, 76, 77, and 77.  
 315 
He puts it thus: ﻢﻫﺎـﻳﺎﻄﺧ ₋ﻚـﺻ قﺮـﺣو ﻢﻬﺘﻨﻌﻟ ﻞﻤﺘﺣﺎﻓ ﻪﻘﻠﺧ ﻦﻋ ﷲ ﻲﺿر ﺎﻣ, “God was not pleased 
with His creature. He has borne their iniquities, and has burned the written code [record] of 
their sins,”—a summation that seems relatively unrelated to the actual text.891 
Nevertheless, ‘Ammār uses significantly fewer biblical quotations than do abū Qurrah 
and abū Rā’īṭah. There is no convincing explanation for this, since these theologians were all 
writing within the same time-frame, and presumably with the same purpose in mind. Perhaps 
the Mu‘tazilī context of Baṣrah where ‘Ammār was active demanded more reliance on kalām 
and rational proofs than on scriptural proofs.  
Nonetheless, it remains true that the verses used by ‘Ammār could not only support his 
arguments but also provide spiritual and intellectual support to his fellow Christians in their 
daily encounter with Muslims.892 It may well have been the case that some Christians 
doubted the incarnation or the Trinity due to the fierce and consistent Muslim objections they 
faced all around them. There is textual evidence supporting this idea, for ‘Ammār makes it 
clear that he is listing certain verses in order to support those who trust that the books of 
God are correct, i.e., his Christian community.893 This comes as no surprise when we 
consider that Kitāb al-Burhān was meant to function as an attestation of credibility both to 
                                               
891 Ibid., 86. 
892 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 44. 
893 Ibid., 76.  
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those who ask for proof,894 and to those who might start to doubt their faith.  
All biblical citations in Kitāb al-Burhān are, of necessity, addressed directly to the 
Christian community, since the Muslim interlocutor attributes taḥrīf and corruption to the 
Christian scriptures. This accusation was well known to ‘Ammār who, as we have seen, 
includes arguments refuting it and demonstrating that the books of God are trustworthy. This 
is exactly why ‘Ammār, whenever he makes reference to scriptures, adds a declaration that 
the books of God have not been corrupted in any way whatsoever, but remain correct and 
reliable. Invariably, ‘Ammār either prefaces or closes his quotations in Kitāb al-Burhān with a 
statement concerning the trustworthiness of the scriptures.895 
 
‘Ammār’s Use of the Qur’ān  
‘Ammār’s wide knowledge of the Qur’ān is no less impressive than his knowledge of the 
Christian scriptures. It is clear that he had specific qur’ānic passages in mind as he arranged 
his arguments supporting Christianity.896 ‘Ammār shows great confidence in using the book 
of Islam, knowing where and how to quote it, and which texts to “ignore” in order to avoid 
                                               
894 See sūrah 2: 111; cf. Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 155. 
895 See, for example, Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 40. 
896 See Paul Khoury, al-Tafsīr al-Masīḥī lil-Qur’ān, al-Masīḥiyyah wal-Islām fīl-Ḥiwār wal-
Taʻāwun, 18 (Jūniyah: al-Maktabah al-Būlusiyyah, 2002), 5-7; cf. Paul Khoury, al-Kitāb al-Muqaddas fī 
Nuṣūṣih al-ʻArabīyah al-Qadīmah, vol. 1, al-Masīḥiyyah wal-Islām fīl-Ḥiwār wal-Taʻāwun, 49 (Jūniyah: 
al-Maktabah al-Būlusiyyah, 2010), 5.  
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complicating the flow of his arguments. That is to say, that ‘Ammār is highly selective in 
using the holy text of Islam. The most obvious example is when he “ignores” a qur’ānic verse 
in his defense of the crucifixion. Sūrah 4:157ff has always been associated with the Islamic 
rebuttal of the historicity of the cross, as we see in al-Mahdī’s conversation with Timothy I.897 
However, ‘Ammār makes no reference to this verse. The reason, as we have suggested 
before, may have had to do with the dhimmī regulations concerning criticizing the Qur’ān.  
Not only does ‘Ammār use both direct and indirect quotes from the Qur’ān, but he also 
takes the title of this treatise from a qur’ānic verse. The Qur’ān, in sūrah 2:111, challenges 
the “People of the Book” to bring forth their proof if they are right in their claims. The proof 
that ‘Ammār puts forward is therefore two-fold: it is proof that Christianity is not absurd, and it 
is a refutation of Islamic objections.898 It becomes obvious that ‘Ammār deliberately makes 
this qur’ānic allusion in naming his treatises. First, sūrah 2:111 is quoted literally in Kitāb al-
Masā’il wal-Ajwibah, in question 17 under the fourth section, where the reasons for the 
incarnation are discussed.899 And second, he quotes directly from sūrah 2 on two 
occasions.900 He is, in fact, answering the qur’ānic challenge, and thus putting forth his 
detailed proof that Christianity is correct, that the Gospel has not been altered, that 
                                               
897 Robert Caspar, “Les versions arabes,” 141-143. 
898 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 48. 
899 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 206.  
900 Ibid., 28 and 84. ‘Ammār quotes verses 286 and 245.  
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incarnation is possible, and that God is one with three ṣifāt.  
However, it must also be kept in mind that ‘Ammār does not accept the Qur’ān as a 
revelation from God.901 As we have seen in ‘Ammār’s refutation of the taḥrīf allegation, he 
not only denies that there is any truth in the Qur’ān, but also sharply attributes taḥrīf to it, 
arguing that it is the Gospel corrupted. Nevertheless, the Qur’ān is the book of ‘Ammār’s 
opponent and it seems appropriate, and even necessary, that ‘Ammār give it some serious 
attention, and attempt to draw proofs from it to substantiate his arguments. Indeed, his use 
of the Qur’ān may well have been a strategy for establishing an element of common ground 
with his interlocutor.  
‘Ammār makes ten direct references to the Qur’ān in Kitāb al-Burhān, (2:245, 286; 
5:18; 6:109; 17:59, 85; 19:90-91; 72:3 twice; and 112:3). Not all ten quotations oppose the 
Christian faith, though some, of course, do. Verses such as 5:18; 72:3 and 112:3 have been 
used in anti-Christian polemics throughout most of the history of Christian-Muslim relations. 
These verses ‘Ammār refuted. For example, in response to sūrah 72:3, he argues that 
sonship should not be understood physically, offering the birth of the word from the soul and 
the light from the sun as examples of non-physical births.902  
On the other hand, there are verses that he seems to have used simply in order to 
                                               
901 See Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 166-169. 
902 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 57. 
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establish common ground with Muslims. These are verses in which he faces no doctrinal 
challenges but is in agreement with them. In quoting such verses, he hopes that the 
interlocutor will accept the argument being discussed, since it is based on the common 
ground of biblical and qur’ānic verses. We note, for example, that sūrah 2:245903 perfectly 
corresponds to his argument that God can be identified with humans, to the point that God 
speaks as someone who seeks a loan! ‘Ammār then uses this idea to explain and defend the 
Eucharist, for Christ, as ‘Ammār maintains, called the elements his own body, thus 
identifying them with himself—a theme undoubtedly expressed in sūrah 2:245. Though such 
use seems reasonable, it may not have been accepted by his Muslim counterpart, since 
anthropomorphisms were not always appreciated in Islamic thinking.904  
However, other instances of qur’ānic usage perfectly match the Islamic interpretation—
at least in ‘Ammār’s immediate time and context. For example, we note that his interpretation 
of sūrah 17:59 echoes the words of Muqātil ibn Sulaymān concerning people who asked 
Muḥammad to perform miracles similar to those performed by Mūsā and ‘Īsā. This verse, 
along with its interpretation, supports ‘Ammār’s point that only Christianity was accepted on 
account of great miracles and mighty wonders, and that even the Qur’ān itself denies that 
                                               
903 “Who is it that will lend unto Allah a goodly loan.” 
904 See for example, Binyamin Abrahamov, al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm ar-Rassī, Anthropomorphism 
and Interpretation of the Qur’ān in the Theology of al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm: Kitāb al-Mustarshid (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1990).  
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any miracles were performed by Muḥammad. 
‘Ammār not only quotes directly from the Qur’ān, but also borrows several phrases that 
are qur’ānic. This is significant because it shows that ‘Ammār, like his contemporary (and 
now also, modern-day) Arab Christian theologians, was confident in using the text of the 
Qur’ān, even manipulating it at times to his own advantage. We are reminded, for instance, 
of Patriarch Timothy I in his conversation before al-Mahdī, where the Patriarch showed 
excellent knowledge of the Qur’ān. Similarly, abū Qurrah uses many of the “Beautiful 
Names” of God from the Qur’ān, such as Ḥakīm, and Ṣabūr, to describe the attributes of 
God.905 ‘Ammār and the others living in Dār al-Islām not only knew the Qur’ān but also knew 
how to use it to prove their differing views. This is true enculturation, and shows that Arab 
Christian theology was effectively translated into the context of Islam.906 It also shows that 
the Qur’ān itself became a part of their mindset, as a source of their theological 
articulations.907 Samir Khalil puts it thus:  
The author [an Arab Christian theologian] is impregnated with the qur’ānic 
culture. He does not live in a “Christian ghetto,” nor does he use what some 
                                               
905 Ignace Dick, Maymar fī Wujūd al-Khāliq, 187-189. 
906 See Mark Swanson, Folly to the Ḥunafā’, 5; cf. Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 
50.  
907 Samir Khalil, “The Earliest Arab Apology for Christianity, (c.750),” in Christian Arabic 
Apologetics during the Abbasid Period, (750-1258), ed. Samir Khalil and Jørgen Nielsen (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1994), 109; cf. Sidney Griffith, “The View of Islam from the Monasteries of Palestine in the Early 
‘Abbasid Period: Theodore abū Qurrah and the Summa Theologiae Arabica,” Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations 7 (March 1996), 12.  
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might call a “Christian Arabic” vocabulary or style, and much less a “Christian 
Arabic grammar.” He shares with Muslims….the common Arabic culture, 
which carries many qur’ānic words and expressions, and a certain style and 
even some Muslim thoughts.908 
 
To find a verse or theme within the Qur’ān, a modern researcher only needs a print or digital 
concordance. But in ‘Ammār’s time, such a task would be truly daunting. The fact that he 
used some verses that were not commonly employed in anti-Christian discourse suggests 
that ‘Ammār probably owned and studied his own copy of the Qur’ān. This proposition 
becomes even more likely when we consider that, after quoting sūrah 6:109, ‘Ammār cites 
what he identifies as ibn ‘Abbās’s interpretation of sūrah 6:109. This could indicate that he 
had a set of Islamic books in his private book collection!  
All of these considerations suggest that the Qur’ān itself was foundational to ‘Ammār’s 
intellectual life to the point that we can no longer differentiate between his words and some 
qur’ānic phrases and allusions.909 In a word, he knows the Qur’ān, quotes it, interprets it, and 
is ultimately aware of its contemporary interpretation. 
Finally, It is interesting to note that several qur’ānic quotations used by ‘Ammār are 
identical with the text of the current Qur’ān. This interesting fact leaves us wondering whether 
‘Ammār was indeed quoting from an actual copy of the Qur’ān. It is difficult to imagine him 
                                               
908 Samir Khalil, “The Earliest Arab Apology,” 109. 
909 Samir Khalil, The Significance of Early Arab-Christian Thought for Muslim-Christian 
Understanding (Washington, D.C: Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, 1997), 8. 
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memorizing such lengthy verses and reproducing them exactly in his works. Was he perhaps 
a monk studying at a “Nestorian” monastery and writing to refute Islamic objections to 
Christianity? Does the reference he makes in Kitāb al-Burhān while discussing the union of 
the divine and human natures in Christ—,“If some of us exalt ourselves above that 
(marriage), how then this can be attributed to the Creator?”—shed any light on his 
profession? Or does his statement, “The Gospel orders us to baptize people…” suggest that 
he was in fact a priest? We can, unfortunately, only speculate. 
  
‘Ammār and Islam  
We know that ‘Ammār had immersed himself in study of the Qur’ān, but what was his 
attitude toward Islam? As a Christian apologist who writes to refute Islamic objections, it is 
understandable that he dismisses any claims to the truth of Islam. However, in his rejection, 
he shows admirable fairness and objectivity. As we have seen in many sections of Kitāb al-
Burhān, such as the discussion on the Trinity and the incarnation, ‘Ammār structures his 
argument to fairly address the beliefs and questions of his imagined interlocutor. ‘Ammār 
opens each discourse by stating an actual Muslim objection to a Christian doctrine, outlines 
what Muslims believe about the topic, and then refutes their objections.910 For example, he 
                                               
910 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 39.  
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speaks of the Islamic objection concerning the divine unity, indicating that their objection 
primarily arises from their wrong perception. They believe that the Christian doctrine of the 
Sonship of Christ denotes a physical relationship. Next, he details the Islamic doctrine that 
God “begetteth not, nor is He begotten,”911 and then states that the Christian position is very 
different from their understanding. This is indeed a fair way of handling an objection, and it 
clearly demonstrates his attempted objectivity in addressing the “other.” This attitude seems 
to be characteristic of ‘Ammār. When speaking of the human ability to understand the divine 
nature, he states that neither the Islamic nor the Christian religion can grasp the full 
‘whatness’ of God, who transcends all human intelligence912—a statement that today would 
be labeled pluralistic! 
This perspective suggests that beneath ‘Ammār’s apparent confidence in his doctrinal 
accuracy is a humble apologist who fully acknowledges the limitations of the human intellect. 
This can also be seen in his discussion of other religions, and other Christian positions. 
‘Ammār disagrees with the Christologies of the Jacobites and the Melkites, but he 
nevertheless emphasizes that the various sects agree that God appeared in the flesh. For 
his time, ‘Ammār demonstrates an unusual level of “ecumenism.”  
‘Ammār also uses the term ﺎـﻧﻮﻔﻟﺎﺨﻣ, our opponents, when referring to Muslims. 
                                               
911 Surāh 112:3.  
912 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 164. 
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Otherwise he either directly calls them “Muslims,”913 or sometimes uses the term 
“Islāmiyyah.”914 Both terms are different from abū Rā’iṭah’s designation of Muslims as “ ﻞـﻫأ
ّﻦﻤﻴـﺘﻟا, people of Yemen, or the Southerners.”915 According to ‘Ammār, the south is not a 
place with which Muslims are identified; rather, the south is where Christianity spread and 
flourished.916 ‘Ammār, then, avoids the negative tone of abū Qurrah and the localized 
descriptions used by abū Rā’iṭah. He also avoids any engagement with Islam that would 
result in direct confrontation. As we have seen, this is particularly evident in his discussion of 
Christ’s cross. ‘Ammār ignores the blatant qur’ānic denial of the historicity of the crucifixion, 
and instead develops a theological reflection on the implications of the cross for human life, 
and the assurance it gives of victory over death.  
However, whenever it is possible to refute qur’ānic accusations without thereby 
impugning the credibility of the Qur’ān itself, ‘Ammār rigorously challenges such texts. We 
see this in his discourse on the divine unity, where he boldly provides an alternative 
understanding of sūrah 112:3. Furthermore, he deliberately avoids addressing some of the 
complicated issues in Christian-Muslim conversation, such as the role and function of 
Muḥammad, the revealed nature of the Qur’ān, and the issue of the Paraclete. Indeed, such 
                                               
913 Ibid., 22.  
914 Ibid., 23. 
915 Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of Truth,” 164. 
916 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 32.  
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questions are not usually addressed; rather, only when compelled to answer do Arab 
Christian theologians provide an apology. The most diplomatic example has always been 
that given by Timothy I.917 All in all, it is clear that ‘Ammār felt at home within the context of 
Islam. That is to say, that he did not divorce himself from his Islamic context, but rather went 
to great lengths to understand Islam, thereby showing respect for its teachings. He then 
sought to explain Christian doctrine to his Muslim counterparts.918 Because of his attitude 
and concerted effort, ‘Ammār’s conversation with Islam is exceptionally important.919 
Having examined ‘Ammār’s use of the Christian and Muslim scriptures, we now turn to 
consider his use of the kalām arguments.  
 
‘Ammār al-Baṣrī and the Question of “Christian” Kalām 
Sidney Griffith has demonstrated that ‘Ammār’s style of answering questions is similar to that 
of the Muslim mutakallimūn—especially that of al-‘Allāf.920 Further, Griffith demonstrates that 
‘Ammār develops strategies and even casts his terminology in the manner of his 
contemporary mutakallimūn. However, is it a fair appraisal to describe ‘Ammār as a 
                                               
917 Alphonse Mingana, Timothy’s Apology for Christianity, 33-35; cf. Samir Khalil, “The Prophet 
Mohammed as Seen by Timothy I and Other Arab Christian Authors,” in Syrian Christians under Islam: 
The First Thousand Years, ed. David Thomas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001), 75-106. 
918 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 39. 
919 Ibid., 44.  
920 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” 148.  
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“Christian mutakallim,”921 as Griffith has done?  
First, there is no justifiable reason why ‘Ilm al-kalām itself, as an intellectual exercise, 
should be described as either Muslim or Christian. The evidence suggests that it was indeed 
started by some Muslim scholars who, following the theological legacy of Yūḥannā al-
Dimashqī,922 wished to reconcile Greek philosophy (which they encountered at the hands of 
their Christian counterparts) with the teachings of the Qur’ān, especially concerning the 
issue of predestination and divine attributes. It is in this way that ‘Ilm al-kalām came into 
existence. That it was developed at the hands of Muslim scholars does not necessarily make 
it an exclusively Islamic science, especially since it was developed in dialogue with other 
thinkers.923  
Further, there seems to be no evidence in the writings of Muslim mutakallimūn that 
they were engaged in this endeavor in order to establish something that was specifically 
Islamic. Rather, their main aim was to synthesize the teaching of Islam with tenets of Greek 
philosophy, hoping to provide rational refutations of other beliefs.924 Muslim mutakallimūn, 
especially the early ones, were in close contact with Christian theologians, and so it seems 
natural that both groups influenced each other intellectually. Such mutual influence must 
                                               
921 Ibid.  
922 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 22-24. 
923 Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 158. 
924 ʻAbd al-Majīd al-Sharafī, al-Islām wal-Ḥadāthah (Tūnis: Dār al-Janūb lil-Nashr, 1998), 46.  
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have left both groups struggling to articulate their faith in light of the opposition of the other, 
and these articulations were then further refined as they conversed together.925 The “crisis of 
faith” therefore was not only ‘Ammār’s! It was indeed a crisis that helped shape Arab 
Christians and Arab Muslims as both groups were involved in theological conversations 
regarding their religious convictions.926 As the proverb says, “Iron sharpens iron, and one 
person sharpens the wits of another.”927  
Thus, their theological conversation took in a specific style and had a certain religious 
flavor: one gave rise to Arabic Christian theology, while the other resulted in what has 
become commonly known as Islamic kalām.928 The Islamic nature of ‘Ilm al-kalām is indeed 
questionable, given the fact that “al-kalām and al-lāhūt [theology] are two sides of one 
coin.”929  
In addition, Griffith often refers to ‘Ammār’s arguments about the Trinity as the most 
logical and appropriate solution to the intellectual dilemma that arose among Muslim 
mutakallimūn concerning the attributes of God. Thus, Griffith presents Kitāb al-Burhān as if it 
were a “Christian answer” to a “Muslim problem.” This view seems an inadequate description 
                                               
925 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 24. 
926 See Joseph Nasrallah, Manṣūr ibn Sarjūn, 222-223. 
927 Proverbs 27:17 (NRSV). 
928 Yūsuf Zaydān, al-Lāhūt al-ʻArabī wa-Uṣūl al-ʻUnf al-Dīnī (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Shurūq, 2009), 
172. 
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of Kitāb al-Burhān, since it reduces the treatise to a mere conversation with the Mu‘tazilīs. 
Such a reduction fails to address the fundamental structure of Kitāb al-Burhān, for we know 
from abū al-Barakāt that ‘Ammār’s Kitāb al-Burhān is structured as a testimony to the 
unfolding of the divine economy.930  
‘Ammār’s treatise is thus also a pastoral solution offered to support Christians who 
were at risk of converting to Islam while under intense socio-political pressures and faced 
with difficult questions regarding the truthfulness of their faith.931 ‘Ammār is engaging in a 
vitally important contemporary discussion in order to explain the mystery of the Trinity in 
terms that may also have found some appreciation among the Muslim thinkers of his day. 
His main focus, however, remains, not the Mu‘tazilīs, but his fellow Christians, who needed 
to present a burhān of the integrity of their faith. Kitāb al-Burhān is ‘Ammār’s contribution to 
support the Christian community in Dār al-Islām; ‘Ammār’s arguments surely sustained 
Christians, enabling them to stand firm, ready to give reason for their hope.  
Kitāb al-Burhān must also be seen against the background of a long series of “faith 
crises” experienced by ‘Ammār, both as an individual and as representative of a church that 
unexpectedly found itself in the midst of a theological discussion that was not of their own 
choice.  
                                               
930 Wilhelm Riedel, Der Katalog, 650. 
931 See Sandra Keating, Defending the “People of the Truth,” 12.  
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Accordingly, in keeping with abū al-Barakāt’s subtitle to Kitāb al-Burhān, ‘Ammār’s 
method of answering Islam is to be understood within the wider context of the divine 
economy, where God, according to Christian thinking, unveils the divine salvific plan in 
successive historical events.932 The truth of Christianity, according to ‘Ammār, lies within the 
whole divine plan in which humans know that God exists; that God is One known in three 
attributes; that their divine books are authentic; that God appeared in the flesh; that the body 
in which God was veiled died on the cross; and that eternity is a place where God and 
humans can have a relationship. These are the preoccupations of Kitāb al-Burhān, and it is 
therefore evident that ‘Ammār not only uses the attributes argument as both proof and 
explanation of the Trinity, but also provides a more holistic discussion and proof. It is the 
whole economy of God that is the burhān per se. The whole of God’s plan perfectly parallels 
the foundations of the Christian faith, and as a result Christianity must be the only “vera 
religio,” since truth itself is single.933 This is ‘Ammār’s ultimate interest, rather than any 
preoccupation with certain Mu‘tazilī discussions on the nature of God’s attributes.  
For ‘Ammār, the credibility of Christianity has to do with God’s self-revelation more 
than with God’s character. The revelation of God in history and scriptures (revelation history) 
                                               
932 G.W.H. Lampe, et al., A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
940. 
933 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, 27. 
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assures Christians that their understanding of God is correct, and that God is indeed a triune 
God who is manifested in Christ for the sake of their salvation. The whole of Kitāb al-Burhān 
is a proof not only of the Christian doctrine but also of a perfect harmony between God’s 
revelation and the way Christians received it through the books of God, and the manner in 
which they responded to this revelation.934 Their reception is clearly equated with their 
system of doctrines, and their response to doctrine is their worship and their observance of 
religious practices such as baptism, the Eucharist, and the veneration of the cross. ‘Ammār’s 
point is clear: all of Christianity harmonizes with God’s plan. Therefore, it necessitates that 
Christianity is the “vera religio.”  
‘Ammār was a man of his age who was under pressure to provide a proof of credibility. 
This seems to have provoked a crisis of faith, which led him to compose his Kitāb al-Burhān, 
as a “literature of resistance.”935 His compelling burhān is the fruit of a crisis or process of 
struggle, which demanded that he re-articulate his theological identity.  
The manner in which this apology was expressed is indeed significant. ‘Ammār’s aim 
was to re-articulate the truth of Christianity in a vocabulary suitable for his Muslim audience, 
or, as Griffith declares, ‘Ammār’s task as well as the task of all Arab Christian theologians 
                                               
934 Ibid., 25. 
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was to put the orthodoxy of their faith into accommodation with the New World Order,936 
whose paradigms of thought were generated essentially by Islam.937  
With this view of ‘Ilm al-kalām in mind, we can conclude with certainty that ‘Ammār 
was neither a mutakallim nor a classical theologian, but rather a Christian apologist par 
excellence! There is no doubt that ‘Ammār particularly utilized kalām arguments in his 
discourses on the existence of God, the Trinity, and the incarnation. That kalām arguments 
are clearly used when he addresses Muslim objections raised mainly by Mu‘tazilī thinkers, 
does not necessarily mean that he was a mutakallim. Rather, as an apologist, he utilizes 
everything at his disposal in order to refute his interlocutors’ objections and to offer pastoral 
support to his fellow Christians in their conversations with Muslims. It is not surprising, then, 
that he employs the givens of “Islamic” kalām in relation to those beliefs that were 
particularly opposed by the Mu‘tazilī thinkers. ‘Ammār uses the kalām arguments to establish 
common ground with his contemporaries whose main articulations of theological discussion 
were clearly colored by kalām. Had ‘Ammār’s apology been structured differently, it may not 
have reached the attention of al-‘Allāf and may have failed to communicate to his context. In 
                                               
936 Sidney Griffith, “The Kitāb Miṣbāḥ al-‘Aql of Severus ibn al-Muqaffa‘: A Profile of the 
Christian Creed in Arabic in Tenth Century Egypt,” in idem, The Beginnings of Christian Theology in 
Arabic: Muslim-Christian Encounters in the Early Islamic Period (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2002), 28. 
937 Sidney Griffith, “The Apologetic Treatise of Nonnus of Nisibis,” ARAM 3 (1991),136; cf. 
Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 22.  
 332 
a word, kalām was only one tool for conversing with Islam, as our analysis of Kitāb al-Burhān 
has demonstrated.  
This viewpoint is supported when we consider other sections in Kitāb al-Burhān, such 
as the discourses on the cross and on baptism, where ‘Ammār refutes classical Islamic 
objections that were not raised by his Mu‘tazilī counterparts. Yet at other times, such as in 
his discourse on the incarnation, ‘Ammār makes use of non-Mu‘tazilī Islamic views of God. In 
this discussion, he concludes that the Christian view is the correct understanding of the 
divine. In his defense of the existence of God and in refuting the allegation of taḥrīf, he 
appeals to Greek philosophy and logic. In his defense of the incarnation, the crucifixion and 
baptism, he appeals to the scriptures and in the apology for the Trinity, he uses kalām 
arguments. 
His use of such differing styles of argument clearly shows that ‘Ammār’s main concern 
is not to establish a coherent “Christian” kalām, but rather to use all available tools to 
vindicate his theological position and to demonstrate the truth of the Christian faith. That we 
cannot find a unified apologetic method within Kitāb al-Burhān demonstrates that ‘Ammār’s 
focal point is not kalām, but a desire to demonstrate the reasonableness of Christianity, 
against the Muslim accusation of absurdity.  
However, if we cannot call ‘Ammār a “Christian mutakallim,” neither should we see him 
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as a classical Christian theologian. There can be no doubt that in his attempts to justify 
Christian doctrine, he is definitely theologizing. But when we consider the structure and 
content of Kitāb al-Burhān, it becomes obvious that his methodology differs from that of 
theologians. ‘Ammār did not choose the topics of Kitāb al-Burhān; rather, his theological 
agenda was set decades before he was born, when the Qur’ān first challenged Christians to 
bring forth their burhān of credibility.938 This challenge questioned the Trinitarian view of 
God, the deity of Christ, the cross of Christ, the incarnation, and the trustworthiness of the 
scriptures, as well as particular Christian practices. As a result, these topics of discussion 
were part of the conversation between Islam and the wider Christian community, and thus 
Arab Christians in particular found themselves compelled to discuss these issues with their 
Muslim challengers.  
Given these parameters, it is not accurate to describe ‘Ammār as a theologian. Rather, 
he is a theological apologist who articulated the traditional doctrines of his “Nestorian” faith 
and, aware of his Islamic context, engaged in addressing its objections. Accordingly, he is 
not so much concerned with structuring a consistent theological treatise as with answering 
Islamic objections. This becomes evident when we consider that the topics covered in Kitāb 
al-Burhān do not compose a coherent theological treatment of all Christian doctrines; rather, 
                                               
938 See sūrah 2:111.  
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they are answers to questions raised almost exclusively by Muslims. This is very clear, for 
example, in the lengthy discussion on the incarnation and the divine unity. In Kitāb al-
Burhān, a full theological explanation of these two complex topics is not provided. Instead, 
‘Ammār simply repudiates the idea of the physical sonship of Christ, and then lists four 
arguments showing that the incarnation is credible. There are many other issues related to 
these two topics, but ‘Ammār ignores them and focuses only on those aspects that were 
opposed by Islam. Clearly, Islam shaped the theological agenda of Arab Christian 
apologists! 
‘Ammār’s Kitāb al-Burhān is therefore to be seen in this context, and the selection of 
these particular topics demonstrates the faith crisis that he encountered and eloquently 
answered. The credibility of aspects of his faith had been questioned, and it was 
understandable that he should answer accordingly. In this, he fits within the larger context of 
ninth-century Christian-Muslim relations, wherein, prompted by clear qur’ānic objections to 
Christianity,939 the two faiths conversed on theological matters.  
No wonder then that we find close similarities between the arguments of ‘Ammār al-
Baṣrī and other Arab Christian theologians; similarities also found with the works of his 
predecessors, his contemporaries, his successors, and even contemporary Arab Christians. 
                                               
939 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses (FI), 24. 
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As noted previously, ‘Ammār’s views on the Trinity have recently been used by Ibrāhīm Lūqā 
in his al-Masīḥiyyah fīl-Islām. 
Of course, one factor that has helped maintain this continuity of thought is Islam itself. 
Islam’s objections to Christianity have not fundamentally changed, and they remain as fierce 
and direct as they were during the early encounters between the two religions. The fact that 
such objections have remained unchanged has enabled Arab Christians, especially those 
living within Dār al-Islām, to draw insights from their long heritage and to utilize ancient 
answers once again.  
Negatively, however, this state of affairs means that, like ‘Ammār, Arab Christians 
have focused their energies on apologetic discussions rather than on reflection about other 
issues and the development of new theological thought.940 Presumably, this is why very few 
theological theories have been produced by Arab Christians: they have been engaged in 
responding to unchanging issues since the seventh century! Possibly, the only exception is 
the recent articulation of Arab/Palestinian liberation theology, which was developed in 
response to the ever-increasing political conflict between the Arabs and Israel.941 But 
another interesting result has been that, after the advent of Islam, new Christian heresies 
                                               
940 Adnane Mokrani, An Intellectual Biography: an Interview with F. Samir Khalil Samir S.J., 
PAC, vol. 23 (Bayrūt: CEDRAC, 2010), 22-23.  
941 The outstanding example remains the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center. 
Naim Ateek, A Palestinian Christian Cry for Reconciliation (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2008).  
 336 
ceased to appear in the Eastern world, presumably because major theological conversations 
were thereafter limited to the discussion of issues raised by Islam.942  
 
The Legacy of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī 
In our analysis of ‘Ammār’s discourse on the Trinity, we saw that his arguments circulated in 
later centuries, and that Arab Christian theologians who followed him sometimes reproduced 
his arguments almost verbatim.943 Indeed, some of the arguments that he presented in the 
ninth century are still in circulation today. It seems fitting, then, to consider the influence of 
‘Ammār al-Baṣrī on modern Arabic-speaking theologians. 
 
A Theological “Father” of the Arabic Church 
Before we discuss this, however, we must consider Hayek’s argument concerning ‘Ammār’s 
influence on the theologians who followed him—particularly abū al-Faraj ibn al-Ṭayyīb, who 
used some of ‘Ammār’s terms to describe the Trinity. Likewise, Hayek argues that Īlīyā of 
Nisibin, and ‘Amr ibn Mattā may also have made use of ‘Ammār’s arguments concerning the 
Trinity. Although these theologians used numerous terms that were first found in ‘Ammār’s 
treatises, such similarities do not provide conclusive evidence that they actually knew 
                                               
942 Yūsuf Zaydān, al-Lāhūt al-ʻArabī, 75. 
943 See Paul Sbath, Vingt traités philosophiques, 15-16. 
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‘Ammār’s works, for such explanations and defenses of the Trinity were, and are, frequently 
used by Arab Christians. It is equally likely that a common pool of ideas developed, from 
which all Arabic-speaking theologians have drawn their teaching, modifying them as needed 
to fit their discussion with Muslims.944  
 Some modern Christian authors, writing in Arabic in the Arab world, clearly use 
‘Ammār’s arguments, often without giving him due credit.945 Unfortunately, they basically 
repeat his arguments—especially concerning the Trinity—without even acknowledging that it 
was he who formulated them. A quick glance at recent publications shows that numerous 
theologians have put forward the same line of thinking that was first introduced by ‘Ammār.946 
This phenomenon surely indicates that ‘Ammār’s arguments are viewed positively by Arab 
                                               
944 Michel Hayek, Apologie et controverses, (FI), 30-32.  
945 These arguments could well have been used by other Christians who preceded ‘Ammār, 
but it is in ‘Ammār’s writings that such arguments are first recorded.  
946 See, for example, the anonymous, al-Burhān al-Ṣarīḥ fī Ḥaqīqat Sirray Dīn al-Masīḥ 
(Malṭah: N.P, 1834); Ibrāhīm Lūqā, al-Masiḥiyyah fīl-Islām; Iskandar Jadīd, Fī Sabīl al-Ḥaqq (Bayrūt: 
Irsāliyat al-Karmal al-Injīliyyah, 1960), and his two other works: ʻIṣmat al-Tawrāh wal-Injīl (Rikon, 
Switzerland: The Good Way, 1990), and Nuṣrat al-Ḥaqq (Rikon, Switzerland: The Good Way, 1980); 
C.G. Pfander and William Tisdall, Kitāb Mizān al-Ḥaqq (al-Qāhirah: N.P, 1915); Samuel Zwemer, al-
Masīḥ Kama Yarāhu al-Muslimūn: Ḥayāt wa-Ṣifāt wa-Taʻlīm Yasūʻ al-Masīḥ Ḥasaba al-Qurʼān wal-
Aḥādīth al-Nabawiyyah (Rikon, Switzerland: The Good Way, ND), and his other work: al-Sirr al-ʻAjīb fī 
Fakhr al-Ṣalīb (al-Qāhirah: Maṭbaʻat al-Nīl al-Masīḥiyyah, 1900) ; Yassā Manṣūr, al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣarīḥ fī 
Lahūt al-Masīḥ (al-Qāhirah: Maṭba‘at al-Nīl al-Masīḥīyah, 1922) ; Zakarīyā Buṭrus, Allāh Wāḥid fīl-
Thālūth al-Quddūs (Rikon, Switzerland: The Good Way, 1980). 
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Christians. In our discussion of the Trinity, we noted that abū ‘Īsā al-Warrāq saw that 
Christians of his time favored certain arguments for defending the Trinity.947  
 Given the testimony of al-Warrāq, and the fact that the topics under discussion 
among Christians and Muslims remain unchanged today, it should be no surprise that 
Christians of modern times still favor ‘Ammār’s arguments. After all, it was ‘Ammār’s 
faithfulness to his religious position in the midst of an alien thought-world that sustained the 
Arabic-speaking church itself. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to call him a foundational “father” 
of the Arabic-speaking church.948 It follows that the members of the Christian community in 
the Arab world owe their religious existence to this great apologist theologian, whose writings 
“helped lay the foundations of Christian theology in Arabic.”949  
 
“Arab Christians”? 
Most people are puzzled by the terms, “Arabic Christian theology,” and “Arab Christians.”950 
“Arabic” and “Islamic” are often considered synonymous, thereby aggravating the problems 
that arise from Christianity being incorrectly identified only with the West. An example of this 
                                               
947 David Thomas, Anti-Christian Polemic in Early Islam, 133. 
948 Adnane Mokrani, An Intellectual Biography, 62, footnote 40; cf. Wafīk Naṣry, ed., abū 
Qurrah and al-Ma’mūn, 10. 
949 Sidney Griffith, “‘Ammār al-Baṣrī,” in The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity, ed. 
Kenneth Parry and John R. Hinnells (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 26.  
950 Wafīk Naṣry, ed., abū Qurrah and al-Ma’mūn, 10; cf. Wafīk Naṣry, The Caliph and the 
Bishop, 29-30.  
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assumption can be seen in a statement made by the former Libyan leader Muʻammar al-
Qadhdhāfī, who once said, “Christians who live in the Arab World are closer to the Vatican 
than Mecca; they have a European spirit in an Arab garment.”951 This pronouncement is 
dangerous as it places Arab Christians outside of Dār al-Islām, in which they once were 
active members. Moreover, such a biased view does not do justice to the history of 
Christianity in the Middle East, and it particularly dismisses the valuable and indispensable 
role played by Arab Christians in building what has become known as “Arab/Islamic 
civilization.”952  
Moreover, on an intellectual level, this view overlooks the fact that Arab Christians 
were intellectually equal to their Muslim counterparts. This has been demonstrated to be 
particularly true in the case of ‘Ammār al-Baṣrī, who no doubt considered himself ‘equal’ to 
his interlocutor, despite being socially subjected to dhimmī regulations. Further, ‘Ammār is a 
fine example of an Arab Christian who chose not to ignore the reality of Islam, but rather 
decided to engage with it in meaningful and significant dialogue.953 His Kitāb al-Burhān is 
                                               
951 Andriyah Zakī, al-Islām al-Siyāsī wal-Muwāṭanah wal-Aqallīyāt: Mustaqbal al-Masīḥīyīn al-
ʻArab fīl-Sharq al-Awsaṭ (al-Qāhirah: Maktabat al-Shurūq al-Dawliyyah, 2006), 26. 
952 See Muḥammad M. Sa‘ad-al-Din, al-‘Aysh al-Mushtarak, 87-104; cf. Sidney Griffith, The 
Church in the Shadow, 176.  
953 Adnane Mokrani, An Intellectual Biography, 23.  
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certainly an example of a ‘living text’ that still speaks today to the Arabic-speaking church.954 
Besides providing arguments showing the truthfulness of Christianity, it functions as a 
profound plea, seeking to inspire Arab Christians of today to seriously grapple with the 
claims of Islam in their own context. 
 
A Common Ground with Islam 
Kitāb al-Burhān falls within the broader literary contributions of Arab Christians to Dār al-
Islām. Scholars and historians now recognize that Arab Christians played a major role in 
providing the emerging Islamic empire with vital literature in numerous fields of 
knowledge.955 One can hope that Christians can again fulfill this role as cultural mediators, 
seeking to both maintain their Arabness and relate to Western Christians who are interested 
in learning about, and conversing with, Islam.956 Arab Christians can indeed be bridges, or 
translators, between Islam and global Christianity, just as they were cultural bridges between 
Islam, the Syriac world and Hellenism.  
This ‘translation’ remains imperative. However, it is not a translation of texts into other 
                                               
954 See Sidney Griffith, “Kenneth Cragg on Christians and the Call to Islam,” Religious Studies 
Review, 20, no. 1 (Jan. 1994), 34.  
955 See Wilhelm Baum, “The Age of the Arabs,” 64-69; cf. As‘ad ‘abd al-Raḥman, “Ahammīyat 
al-Wujūd al-Masīḥī fīl-Sharq al-Awsaṭ,” in al-Rabī‘al-‘Arabī wa-Masīḥīyū al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, ed. Metrī 
al-Rāhib (Bayt Laḥim: Dīyār, 2012), 50.  
956 Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow, 21. 
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languages, but rather a transmission of Arab Christians’ knowledge of Islam to the West. 
The Arabic church needs to renew its mission, making its extensive history of dialogue with 
Islam available to Western Christianity. In this way, the Arab church can extend its work of 
translation by explaining Christianity to Muslims, but also by explaining Islam to the Western 
church.957  
Likewise ‘Ammār, an apologist active in the intellectual life of Dār al-Islām during the 
ninth century, becomes an intermediary between his community of Eastern Christians and 
Christians in the West. His work thus has the potential to initiate an ecumenical movement 
between the two Christian communities. In one sense, ‘Ammār also becomes a connecting 
point between the Arabs of the Day of the Pentecost and contemporary Arab Christians. He 
stands as a witness to the rich heritage of the Arabic-speaking church, which extends from 
those who were present in Jerusalem listening to the Apostles of Christ, to the Syrian 
“Nestorians” of the East and now to modern-day Arabic-speaking Christians.  
                                               
957 Ibid., 179.  
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Concluding Thoughts: A Plea for Engagement 
The appeal of ‘Ammār’s Kitāb al-Burhān is primarily one for engagement between the Arab 
church and its Islamic context.958 ‘Ammār’s work is a fine example of an attempt to 
contextualize Christianity within Dār al-Islām, and especially amongst the Mu‘tazilī 
intellectual life in Baṣrah. This example is one that is needed to inspire the Arabic-speaking 
church today, for there is a tremendous need once again for the church’s faith to be spoken 
into its context; and for its present to connect with its past.  
There can be no doubt that the Arabic-speaking church of today does not find itself in 
the same context as ‘Ammār. However, it is equally true that Islam continues to form the 
church’s context and that theological conversation between the two religions is an inherent 
part of their relationship, and of the life of the church. The reality of Islam still demands a 
burhān from Christians concerning their doctrinal claims. Further, the ties between Islam and 
the Arab context have become indissoluble, since Arab culture has been strongly colored by 
Islamic thought and theology. And of course, the Arabic language itself, which, as many 
would say, is the ‘language of the Qur’ān,’ has become the strongest tie between Islam and 
Arab culture. It is natural, then, that this discourse must be carried out in Arabic. This is 
                                               
958 Wajīh Mīkhāʼīl (Wageeh Mikhail), “Taṭawwūr al-Lughah al-Kanasīyah bayn al-‘Aṣr al-Islāmī 
al-Mubakkir wal-Wāqi‘ al-Mu‘āṣir,” in Translated Manuscripts: Proceedings of the Fourth International 
Conference of the Manuscript Center, Bibliotheca Alexandrina, May 2007, ed. Yūsuf Zaydān 
(Alexandria: Bibliotheca Alexandrina, 2010), 158.  
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exactly what ‘Ammār accomplished through his rich and eloquent use of the Arabic 
language, thereby showing how Arab Christians can indeed be genuine members of their 
Arabic world, making use of the common ground on which Christianity and Islam can meet. 
Likewise, Arab Christians should not be expected to live as strangers in their 
homelands!959 For it is completely inappropriate for one group to lay claim to a language by 
virtue of it being called ‘holy.’ Nor is it fitting that Arab Christians should adhere to theological 
formulae coined within the Greek context and use them in the context of Dār al-Islām. The 
two tendencies are equally dangerous: the latter a temporal alienation that locks the church 
into its ancient history, while the former is a geographical alienation, uprooting the church 
from its Arabness and situating it in a non-Arabic context.960 This engagement must also be 
comprehensive. It is imperative that it include topics of faith, worship and life. Furthermore, it 
needs to be carried out in a way that is relevant to Muslims; otherwise, communication 
between Muslims and Christians will break down once again.961 Likewise, there is a need to 
question the relevance of Greek theological formulations in the Arab context. How can Greek 
theological formulae, created to address Greek concerns and theological issues raised in a 
                                               
959 See Riad Jarjour, “The Future of Christians in the Arab World,” in Who Are the Christians 
in the Middle East? eds. Betty Jane Bailey and J. Martin Bailey (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 
2003), 16.  
960 Samir Khalil, Dawr al-Masīḥīyīn al-Thaqāfī fīl-ʻĀlam al-ʻArabī, vol. 2, Mawsūʻat al-Maʻrifah 
al-Masīḥiyyah 5: al-Fikr al-ʻArabī al-Masīḥī (Bayrūt: Dār al-Mashriq, 2004), 53.  
961 Wajīh Mīkhāʼīl, “Taṭawwūr al-Lughah al-Kanasīyah,” 158.  
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Greek milieu, be useful today in a Muslim context? Were not these same articulations a 
major factor in dividing Christians before the advent of Islam? Arguably, the absence of any 
Arab Christian creedal formula, with Islam in mind, is a grievous lack. This absence is 
especially unhealthy given that Islam is a creedal religion in which the Shahādah is repeated 
five times a day.962  
One of the primary needs of the church in the Arab world today is to formulate 
statements of faith that speak to the challenges of Islam. In such an attempt, a work such as 
Kitāb al-Burhān would doubtless be of great importance.963 Its value comes from the fact that 
‘Ammār maintained a balance between his Christian heritage and his contemporary Islamic 
context, and was able to reconcile his heritage with the inheritance of his Islamic culture.964  
When the modern Arab church succeeds in such a mission, it will thereby succeed in 
preserving its apostolic faith, having Arabicized it!965 Arab Christians, following the example 
of ‘Ammār, must genuinely bring together their theologies with their Arab culture and thus 
                                               
962 Wajīh Mīkhāʼīl, “The Missiological Significance of Early Christian Arab Theology with 
Special Reference to the Abbasid Period, (750-1258)” (ThM. thesis, Calvin Theological Seminary, 
2004), 104. 
963 See Ignace Dick, “Deux Écrits,” 56-59.  
964 An outstanding contemporary example of this is Maẓhar Mallūḥī. See Paul Gordon 
Chandler, Pilgrims of Christ on the Muslim Road: Exploring a New Path between Two Faiths 
(Lanham, MD: Cowley Publications, 2007). See also the unique ‘eastern’ readings of the Christian 
scriptures by M. Mallūḥī: al-Injīl Kamā Awḥiya ilā al-Qiddīs Lūqā: Qirāʼah Sharqiyyah (Bayrūt: Dār al-
Jīl, 1998), Nashʼat al-ʻĀlam wal-Bashariyyah: Dirāsah Muʻāṣirah fī Sifr al-Takwīn (Bayrūt: Dār al-Jīl, 
2001), and Qirāʼah Ṣūfiyya li-Injīl Yūḥannā (Bayrūt: Dār al- Jīl, 2004). 
965 Riad Jarjour, “The Future of Christians,” 11. 
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once again invalidate the loathsome saying: “Arabic [culture] has refused to be 
Christianized.”  
Kitāb al-Burhān speaks of the divine economy, and Arab Christians also have a role to 
play in this economy. As ‘Ammār exemplified, their role is to affirm themselves as Christian 
and as Arab simultaneously and indissolubly,966 and to fulfill their task with deep humility,967 
and openness.968 
                                               
966 George Khoury, “Theodore abū Qurrah, (c. 750-820): Translation and Critical Analysis of 
his Treatise on the Existence of the Creator and on the True Religion” (Ph.D. diss., Graduate 
Theological Union, 1990), 303. 
967 David Thomas, “Early Muslim Response to Christianity in Muslim-Christian Dialogue, 
(Second/Eighth-Eighth/Fourteenth Centuries),” in Christians at the Heart of Islamic Rule: Church Life 
and Scholarship in Abbasid Iraq, ed. David Thomas, HCMR I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003), 254.  
968 Adnane Mokrani, An Intellectual Biography, 129.  
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APPENDIX I 
List of biblical quotations in Kitāb al-Burhān 
 
Bible Arabic  English   Hayek MS 
Mtt. 10: 
9-10 
لﺎــ ﻗ ﺢﻴﺴــ ﻤﻟا ﺎــ ﻨﺑر ﻪﻠــ ﺳﺮﻟ 
ﺚﻴﺣ ﺚـﻌﺑ ﺑﻢـﻬ :ﻻ اﻮـﻠﻤﺤﺗ 
ﴼﻃﻮﺳ ﻻو ﺎًﺼﻋ ﻻو ﺎًﺒﻫذ ﻻو 
ﺔﻀـﻓ ﻻو اﻮﺴـﺒﻠﺗ ءاﺬــﺣ ﻻو 
ﺺﻴﻤﻗ ﻻو ﻦﻳءﺎﺴﻛ 
…Take no gold, nor silver, nor 
copper in your belts, no bag for 
your journey, nor two tunics, nor 
sandals, nor a staff… 




ﻦـﻣ ّﻞــﺳ ﻒﻴﺴـﻟا ﻒﻴﺴـ ﻟﺎﺑ 
تﻮﻤﻳ 
…for all who take the sword will 
perish by the sword. 
35 10a 
Acts 3:6 ﺲﻴــ ﻟ ﺎــ ﻨﻟ ﺐــ ﻫذ ﻻو ﺔﻀــ ﻓ 
،ﻚﻴﻄﻌﻧ ﻦﻜﻟ ﺎﻣ ﺎﻧﺎﻄﻋا ﺎﻨﺑر 
ﺎـﻨﻟ ﻢـﺳﺎﺑ ﺢﻴﺴـﻤﻟا :ﺾـﻬﻧا 
ﻞــــ ﻤﺣاو ﻚــــ ﺗزﺎﻨﺟ ﻢــــ ﻗو 
ﻖﻠﻄﻧاو ﻰﻟا ﻚﺘﻴﺑ 
I have no silver and gold, but I 
give you what I have; in the 
name of Jesus Christ of 
Nazareth, walk [and carry your 
bed, and go to your home].  
35 10a 
Ps. 33:6 ﺔﻤﻠﻜﺑ ﷲ ﺖﻘﻠﺧ تاوﺎﻤﺴـﻟا 
ﻪﺣوﺮﺑو ﻊﻴﻤﺟ ﺎﻫدﻮﻨﺟ  
 
By the word of the Lord were 
the heavens made, their starry 
host by the breath of his mouth 
48 18a 
Job 33:4 حور ﷲ ﻲﻨﺘﻘﻠﺧ  
 
The Spirit of God has made me 48 18a 
Is. 40:8 ﺔــ ﻤﻠﻛ ﷲ ﺔــ ﻤﻳﺎﻗ ﻰــ ﻟا ﺪــ ﺑا 
ﻦﻳﺪﺑﻻا  





ﺔـــﻤﻠﻛ ﺎـــ ﻨﻬﻟا ﺔــﻤﻳﺪﻗ ﻲـــ ﻓ 
ءﺎﻤﺴﻟا. 
[The] word of our Lord is eternal 
in the heavens 
48 18a 
Ps. 56: 4 ﺔﻤﻠﻜﻟ ﷲ ّﺢﺒﺳا [To the Word of God] I praise 48 18a 
Jn. 10: 38 نا ﻢـﻟ ﻲﻧﻮﻗﺪﺼـﺗ اﻮﻗﺪﺼـﻓ 
ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻋا 
…even though you do not 
believe me, believe [my] works 
72 23b 
Is. 7: 14; 
Mtt. 1: 23 
هﺬﻫ ىرﺬﻌﻟا ﻞﺒﺤﺗ ﺪﻠﺗو ﴼﻨﺑا 
ﻰﻋﺪـــ ﻳ ﻪﻤـــ ﺳا ﻞـــ ﻳﻮﻧﻮﻤﻋ 
هﺮﻴﺴﻔﺗو :ﺎﻨﻌﻣ ﺎﻨﻬﻟا 
Behold, a young woman shall 
conceive and bear a son, and 
shall call his name Immanuel, 




Is. 9: 6 ﺪﻟو ﺎـﻨﻟ ﺪـﻟو ﻦـﺑاو ّﻂﻠﺴـﻣو 
،ﻚﻠﻣو ﻪﻧﺎﻄﻠﺳو ﻰﻠﻋ ﻪﻘﺗﺎﻋ 
For to us a child is born, to us a 
son is given; and the 
government will be upon his 
shoulder 
76 35b 
Ps. 8: 5-6 َﻦﻣ ﻞﺟﺮﻟا يﺬﻟا ﻪﺗﺮﻛذ ﻦﺑاو 
ﺮﺸـــﺒﻟا يﺬـــﻟا ﻪﺘﻴﻔﻄـــﺻا 
ﻪﺘﺼﻘﻧو ًﻼﻴﻠﻗ ﻦﻣ ﺔـﻜﺋﻼﻤﻟا .
ﻢـﺛ ﺪـﻤﺤﻟﺎﺑ ﺪـﺠﻤﻟاو ﻪـ ﺘﻳدر 
ﻪﺘﻄﻠــﺳو ﻰــ ﻠﻋ ﻞــﻛ ﺊــﺷ 
ﺖــ ﻠﻤﻋ كاﺪــ ﻳ .ﻞــ ﻛو ﺊــ ﺷ 
ﺖﻌﻀﺧا ﺖﺤﺗ ﻪﻴﻣﺪﻗ 
Yet thou hast made him little 
less than God, and dost crown 
him with glory and honor.  Thou 
hast given him dominion over 
the works of thy hands; 





ﻞـــ ﺳرا ﻪـــ ﺘﻤﻠﻛ ﻢﻫﺎﻔﺸـــ ﻓ 
ﻢﻬّﺼﻠﺧو ﻦﻣ لﺎﺒﺤﻟا 
He sent forth His Word, and 
healed them, and delivered 




ﺖﻳأر ﻰـﻠﻋ بﺎﺤـﺳ ءﺎﻤﺴـﻟا 
ﻻﺎﻛنﺎﺴــ ﻧ ﻰــ ﺗأ ﻎــ ﻠﺒﻓ ﻰــ ﻟا 
ﻖــ ﻴﺘﻋ مﺎــ ﻳﻻا هﻮــ ﺑﺮﻘﻓ ﻦﻴــ ﺑ 
،ﻪــــ ﻳﺪﻳ هﺎــــ ﻄﻋاو ﻚــــ ﻠﻤﻟا 
نﺎﻄﻠﺴﻟاو ةرﺪـﻘﻟاو هﺪـﺒﻌﺘﻟ 
بﻮﻌﺸﻟا ،ﻦﺴﻟﻻاو ﻪﻧﺎﻄﻠﺳو 
نﺎﻄﻠﺳ ﺮﻴﻏ ﺪﺋﺎﺑ ﻻو ﺾﻘﻨﺘﻣ 
ﻻو نﺎﻓ 
I saw…and behold, with the 
clouds of heaven there came 
one like a son of man, and he 
came to the Ancient of 
Days…and was presented 
before him. And to him was 
given dominion and glory and 
kingdom, that all peoples, 
nations, and languages should 
serve him; his dominion is an 
everlasting dominion, which 
shall not pass away, and his 






ﺖــ ﻨﻛ ً ﻼﺋﺎــ ﺳ ﻲﻧﻮﻤﺘﻴﻄﻋﺎــﻓ 
ﺖـﻨﻛو ﴼـﻌﺋﺎﺟ ﻲﻧﻮﻤﺘﻌﺒـﺷﺎﻓ 
ﺖــ ﻨﻛو ﴼﻀــ ﻳﺮﻣ ،ﻲﺗﻮﻤﺗﺪــ ﻌﻓ 
ﺎﻣو ﻪﺒـﺷا اﺬـﻫ ﻦـﻣ لﻮـﻘﻟا 
ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻞﻴﺠﻧﻻا .لﻮﻘﻳو 
ﻦﻴﺤﻟﺎﻄﻠﻟ َﻞﺜﻣ ﻪﻟﻮﻗ ﻲﻜﺤﻳو 
ﻢﻬﻨـــ ﻋ فﻼـــﺧ ﺎـــ ﻣ ﻞـــ ﻌﻓ 
نﻮﺤﻟﺎﺼـــــﻟا .نﻮـــــﻟﻮﻘﻴﻓ 
ﻪﻟ:”ﻰﺘﻣ ﺖﻨﻛ ﺎﻳ ﺎﻧﺪﻴﺳ ،ﻚﻟﺬﻛ 
لﻮﻘﻴﻓ ﻞﻛ ﺎﻣ ﻢﺘـﻠﻌﻓ ﺪـﺣاﻮﺑ 
ﻦــ ﻣ ﻻﺆــ ﻫء رﺎﻐﺼــ ﻟا ﻲــ ﺒﻓ 
ﻢﺘﻠﻌﻓ ₋ﻲﻟاو ﻢﺘﻌﻨﺻ. “ 
…For I was hungry and you 
gave me food, I was thirsty and 
you gave me drink, I was a 
stranger and you welcomed 
me…[He will say to the evil 
doers the opposite of this] Then 
the righteous will answer him, 
‘Lord, when did we see thee [as 
such] And [He] will answer 
them, ‘Truly, I say to you, as you 
did it to one of the least of these 




اﻮﻠﻛ اﺬﻫ يﺪﺴﺟ يﺬﻟا ب₋ﺮُﻘﻳ 
ةﺮﻔﻐﻤﻟ ،ﺎﻳﺎﻄﺨﻟا اﺬﻫو ﻲﻣد 
يﺬﻟا ﻚﻔُﺴﻳ ناﺮﻔﻐﻟ بﻮﻧﺬﻟا 
…Eat; this is my body [which is 
offered for the forgiveness of 
sins]…this is my blood…which 
is poured out for many for the 





نا اﺬﻫ يﺬﻟا ﻢﻜﻴـﻄﻋا ﻮـﻫ 
يﺪﺴﺟ 
This [which I am giving you] is 
my body 
85 40b 
Is. 53: 3, 
11, 12 
ﺎــ ﻣ ﻰــ ﺿر ﷲ ﻦــ ﻋ ﻪــ ﻘﻠﺧ 
ﻞﻤﺘﺣﺎﻓ ﻢﻬﺘﻨﻌﻟ قﺮﺣو ₋ﻚﺻ 
ﻢﻫﺎﻳﺎﻄﺧ 
[God was not pleased with 
him]…he shall bear their 
iniquities…and [burn the written 






List of qur`ānic quotations in Kitāb al-Burhān 
 
Qur’ān Arabic English  Hayek MS 
2: 286 ﻰﻟﺎﻌﺗ ﷲ ﻦﻋ ﻒـﻴﻠﻜﺗ سﺎـﻨﻟا 
ﺎﻣ ﻻ نﻮﻘﻴﻄﻳ 
[May God be exalted of] 
place[ing] a burden greater than 
it can bear 
28 5b 
17: 59 ﺎﻣو ﺎﻨﻌﻨﻣ نا ﻞﺳﺮﻧ تﺎﻳﻵﺎﺑ ﻻا 
نا ّبﺬـ ُﻛ ﺎـﻬﺑ نﻮـﻟوﻻا .ﺎــ ﻨﻴﺗآو 
دﻮﻤﺛ ﺔﻗﺎﻨﻟا ةﺮﺼﺒﻣ اﻮﻤﻠﻈﻓ ﺎﻬﺑ 
ﺎﻣو ﻞﺳﺮﻧ تﺎﻳﻵﺎﺑ ﻻا ﺎًﻔﻳﻮﺨﺗ 
And We refrain from sending the 
signs, only because the men of 
former generations treated them 
as false: We sent the she-camel 
to the Thamud to open their 
eyes, but they treated her 
wrongfully: We only send the 
Signs by way of terror. 
31 8a 
6: 109 اﻮﻤﺴﻗاو ﺪﻬﺟ ﻢﻬﻧﺎﻤﻳا نا اوﺮﻳ 
ﺔﻳآ اﻮﻨﻣﺆﻳ .ﻞـﻗ ﺎـﻣو ﻢﻫﺎﺴـﻋ 
ﺎﻬﻧا اذا تءﺎﺟ ﻻا اﻮﻨﻣﺆﻳ ﻦﻜﻤﺘﻟ 
ﻢﻬﺗدﺎــ ﻓا ،ﻢﻬﺑﻮــ ﻠﻗو ﺎــ ﻤﻛ ﻢــ ﻟ 
اﻮﻨﻣﺆﻳ ﻪﺑ لوا هﺮﻣا  
They swear their strongest 
oaths by God, that if a sign 
came to them, by it they would 
believe. Say: they will not 
believe.” [instead we confound 
their hearts and their minds that 





ﻪﻧا دﺎﻜﺗ تاﻮﻤﺴﻟا نﺮّﻄﻔﺘﻳ ﻪﻨﻣ 
ﻖﺸﻨﺗو ضرﻻا ّﺮـﺨﺗو لﺎـﺒﺠﻟا 
،اﺪﻫ نا اﻮﻋد ﻦﻤﺣﺮﻠﻟ اًﺪﻟو 
At it the skies are ready to burst, 
the earth to split asunder, and 
the mountains to fall down in 
utter ruin, That they should 
invoke a son for Most Gracious. 
45, 79 16a, 
37a 
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5: 18 ﺖﻟﺎﻗو دﻮﻬﻴﻟا ىرﺎﺼـﻨﻟاو ﻦـﺤﻧ 
ءﺎــ ﻨﺑا ﷲ هؤﺎـ ﺒﺣاو .ﻞـﻗ َﻢــ ﻠﻓ 
ﻢﻜﺑﺬﻌﻳ ﻢﻜﺑﻮﻧﺬﺑ. ﻞﺑ ﻢﺘﻧا ﺮﺸﺑ 
ﻦـﻣ ﻖـﻠﺧ ﺮـﻔﻐﻳ ﻦـﻤﻟ ءﺎﺸـﻳ 
ّبﺬﻌﻳو ﻦﻣ ءﺎﺸﻳ 
The Jews and the Christians 
say: “We are sons of Allah, and 
his beloved.” Say: “Why then 
doth He punish you for your 
sins? Nay, ye are but men,- of 
the men he hath created: He 
forgiveth whom He pleaseth, 
and He punisheth whom He 
pleaseth… 
45 16a 
17: 85 ﺎﻬﻧا ﻦﻣ ﺮﻣا بﺮﻟا The Spirit (cometh) by 
command of my Lord 
45 16a 
72:3 نا ﷲ ﺬــﺨﺗا ﺔﺒﺣﺎــﺻ اًﺪــﻟوو 
،ﺎﻬﻨﻣ ﻰﻟﺎﻌﺗ ﷲ ﻦﻋ ﻚﻟذ اًﻮﻠﻋ 
اًﺮﻴﺜﻛ 
And Exalted is the Majesty of 
our Lord: He has taken neither a 
wife nor a son. 
56 23b 
72: 3 نا ﷲ ﺬﺨﺗا ﺔﺒﺣﺎﺻ اًﺪﻟوو He has taken neither a wife nor 
a son. 
57 23b 
112: 3 ﻢﻟ ﺪﻠﻳ ﻢﻟو ﺪﻟﻮﻳ He begetteth not, nor is He 
begotten; 
60 25b 
2: 245 اﻮﺿﺮﻗا ﷲ ﺎًﺿﺮﻗ ﺎًﻨﺴﺣ Who is it that will lend unto Allah 








Kitāb al-Burhān, translated into English 
 
Proof of the Existence of God 
 
In the name of God, the most compassionate and generous:  
 
We start with the help of Godーmay He be exaltedーand with the excellence of His guidance, 
to copy The Book of Verification of the Faith. It includes The Unity [of the divinity and 
humanity of Christ]; The Confirmation of the Incarnation; The Eucharist; and Food and Drink 
in the Everlasting Life. It also includes Questions and Answers. To our Lord be the glory 
forever and ever. Amen. 
First of all, Greek sages such as Plato and Aristotle speak of the nature of the world 
as intimidating, by which I mean the air, water, fire and other things similar and analogous. 
[2a]// Their antipathy, and the antipathy of all the animals with their force to destroy humanity 
proves to you the economy of the Creator and all that it has of goodness and benefit [to 
humans]…to go far away from him and to flee him so that they, by natural force, do not make 
him perish…...a recruit in the army isolated from his home situation becomes intimidated and 
fearful…and grows up. And his status became unsafe from them dominating him or taking 
his life. Their power…shortens his life. It, [humanity], became familiar with these weak beings 
which do not have the strength to destroy [the human race], but [rather] that [humans] have 
the force to destroy them. [All this is] obvious proof that the Creator moved these destructive 
forces away from humans so that they would not destroy them, and [thus] humans became 
used to these weak things that had no power to destroy their souls, and this had the effect of 
moving them to understand about transference from this world, and that [this world] is not a 
place of rest or stability because of its many plagues and tribulations. Therefore, these 
painful and hurtful things have become of greater benefit to humans than the pleasant and 
enjoyable things, because the latter nourish their bodies while the former rectify their hearts, 
moving humans to seek a world where there is no adversity or tribulation, and causing them 
to give up this world on account of the tribulations that it has brought them.  
As for death, who is ignorant of its proof concerning the Giver of life? For the One 
who gave life is the One who takes it again, and only He has the authority to take what 
belongs to Him. And we know that on the Day of Resurrection, we, being delivered from 
death, without doubt or disagreement will all undoubtedly know the One who delivered us. 
We will know the overabundance of the enjoyment of life when we are saved from adversity. 
And death will add to the quality of our happiness, just as the trial of hunger and thirst 
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increases the joy of eating and of drinking. All the diseases and illness[es] edify us in this 
[2b]// world. They show us that which befalls us and which we cannot drive back; they move 
us away from disobedience and trespasses, inciting us to do good, making us give up this 
world which passes away, and making/causing us to desire that which remains/endures. 
There are many reasons, too long to expose/expound, but people of sound mind know some 
of them. 
Since the existence of the Creator has been made obvious by testimonies from His 
creation… so I… the whole world, in spite of their differences, agree to confess that there is 
only one God, and [such] agreement never lies. We see that the three greater religionsーI 
mean Christianity, Judaism and Islamーtestify unanimously, giving testimony that God is one. 
And we see the Magians, the Manicheans, the Bardesanes, and other who are like them, in 
spite of their associating [others with God] that they [all] attest to two eternal beings, saying 
that one of them is a god and the other a devil; and so, in spite of their mistake, they believe 
in only one god, since they do not call the other one a god, but filthy and accursed.  
We see the Greek sages such as Plato and Aristotle testifying that God is one. 
Aristotle in his book, On the Nature of the World and the Heavens on the World and the Sky, 
after having spoken about the heavens and the earth, and the air and water and fire, and of 
other substances of the world, says: “We must speak now about He who is the cause of all of 
this.” It is not good if he tells us about all these things if he omits discussion about their 
cause! Shortly after this, he said: “It is true God…Who directs all things...Who is wise…and 
from His might all heavenly beings proceed, and thereafter one thing after another results in 
these earthly beings.” In another book known [3a]// by the name of Existence and Decay, 
having spoken of the sun and the planets and the way in which they move and guide 
everything, he said: “Above these is He who regulates them and Who is not regulated by 
anything, He is everlasting, immutable and unchanging, and one in number.”  
And Plato said: “The shape of everything was in the knowledge of the Beneficent, 
like the engraving of a seal; and after He created all things, it is like an engraving in clay, 
since it is not separated from the seal, [but] is visible and seen in the clay.” 
As for the idol worshippers, while they name their idols “gods,” they say that above 
them is a god above whom there is nothing else. Therefore since all people of the world, 
(whether Christians, Muslims, Jews, Magians, Manicheans, philosophers, [or] idol 
worshippers), have [all] without meeting together agreed concerning the oneness of the 
substance of God, he is exceedingly ignorant who goes against the agreement of the whole 
world together with the testimonies of the created things as well, concerning their Creator!  
And if the polytheists showed ignorance by associating something of the eternal 
whom they named “demon” with God, yet they agree on the oneness of the substance of 
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God, and are ignorant of the oneness of the Eternal whose oneness is naturally embedded in 
minds; as some of the people of truth have said, “One cannot think of ‘two’ without there 
being ‘one,’ but one can think of ‘one’ without there being ‘two.’” Just as if you have “one”  
servant, you can take “two” of them; and if you have “two,” it is not possible that one of them 
did not precede the other. So, if you have “two,” therefore it cannot be that the second is 
before the first. “One” before both is possible. And the temporal one cannot precede the 
eternal, but the [3b] eternal can precede the temporal one. It is thus obvious that the Eternal 
must be one, and that all things are after Him.  
In what we have described is that which provides evidence to whoever is different 
from the animals, [i.e., humans], concerning his Creator, the wise, whose attributes are pre-
eminent. To Whom be all praise. 
 
Proofs of the True Religion 
And since we have demonstrated the existence of our Creatorーmay His name be 
blessedーit is necessary for us to consider rational proofs apart from uncritical tradition 
concerning the beginning of the knowledge of religion on earth as a religion pleasing to Him 
for the whole of His creation. We will produce three proofs. First: Since we know that 
Heーmay He be glorified and exaltedーis wise and generous, through that which we have 
seen of His wisdom in making this world a great and perfect abode out of conflicting things 
whose strengths He balanced by His foreknowledge and His profound wisdom until He made 
them equal, so that one did not come against another in such a way that the created world 
would disintegrate and be destroyed. With what we have seen of His wisdom in making our 
bodies and other things, along with what we have witnessed of His generosity in creating us, 
(without Him having any need of us), [and] setting us in this world and subjecting all that is in 
it under us, we conclude that He would not spoil what He has made. For we do not see a 
wise person making something and [then] spoiling it; on the contrary, that is one of the 
attributes of an ignorant person who regrets what he has done. [Yet] if God spoiled our 
bodies by death, then that would not contradict our conclusion that the wise person does not 
spoil what he has made. This is because we have seen that wise people have spoiled in 
order to improve, like the seed that they sow in the soil to obtain fresher and more useful 
grain. [They] soak [it] with water so that it rots and from this, much grain is newly produced in 
a form achieved by the new production. And we have seen them breaking up the ground and 
working it so that it will be beneficial to them and bring forth what will adorn it. And they cut 
down plants and burn them, and in this way they become useful to people. And they chop 
wood so that it serves a useful purpose for them, and they wet the soil with water and 
change its nature so that it is useful to them for building. Likewise, [4a]// we must give up the 
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idea that our Creator has spoiled our bodies with death; and we know and trust that He did 
not want to destroy us as if He is not wise in what He does, but rather He renews us to a 
higher and more magnificent and more perfect form than this one we now have. He does this 
for reasons that prevent spoken arguments from being refuted when they are clarified.   
And if we are right in thinking that He spoils our bodies to renew them, then we 
must believe in their resurrection and life. And if He created us out of His generosity and not 
out of need for us, and set us in this passing world in which we are surrounded by hardships 
and evils, then we must know that He has not yet perfected His generosity from which He 
created us in His mercy towards us; however, He will do this when He renews us and fulfills 
His grace and generosity towards us. At that point, it will become true for us that, since there 
is no doubt that He is transforming us from this realm to the other, [and] that He would not 
refrain from telling us what He has prepared for us; that rather, He has sent us the good 
news about this and put it in a book lest we forget and so that future generations [also] may 
inherit it and have great joy in it.  
Second: If He created human beings in a form in which it is possible for some of 
them to harm others, we have no doubt that He commanded them to love one another and 
forbade them from harming one another. Indeed, He has not failed to do this, but informed 
them and taught them what they are to do. And thus He gave them evidence about Himself, 
through His commanding and His forbidding, since they are not by nature acquainted with 
knowledge of Him without being instructed. And He put His commands and prohibitions in a 
book which all their descendents would inherit and put to good use. 
Third: Since in His kindness and generosity He has prepared for us a noble and 
sustainable world, we have no doubt that He will regard our prayers to Him in ways that are 
most beneficial to us. And this would not happen unless He commanded us to reach it by our 
striving and effort, because we see [4b]// that someone, when he achieves something by his 
[own] merit and accomplishes it by his [own] work and effort, has greater joy from it than from 
what is given and freely granted to him, (like one who receives as a gift what he did not ask 
for, or acquires something by guile), and he has greater joy and pride in it, and people praise 
him for it; unlike someone who is given without cleverness and acquires without merit.  
So we must know that He has commanded people to do good and to strive in 
worship with this aim, and that He put this in a book lest it be forgotten, and so that future 
generations would inherit it and act according to it.  
Therefore it is clear that God has a religion on earth for all His creation that is 
pleasing to Him. And we have seen that there are many religions and that the followers of 
each religion claim that it, [theirs], is the religion of God. So we must put them, [these 
religions], on the same level, and be careful about relying on anything of theirs unless the 
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argument seems correct to us and that it is the religion of God, and then we will believe in it 
and accept it and drop whatever is not it. The argument is only [shown to be] correct by one 
of two means: Either we see in it the signs which human beings cannot imitate, and we 
testify about it that it is from God and we accept it as our religion it and we drop whatever is 
not it; or [we see] by rational evidence that nothing resembling it refutes the existence of the 
signs concerning it at the time of its appearance, even if they, [those who performed the 
signs], have died after it, [the religion], became well established and powerfully accepted. 
Each unanimously claims this about their religion, and to accept one claim apart from the 
others is ignorance and an unquestioning [acceptance of] tradition. Equally, the acceptance 
of [all] their claims with all the contradictions and falsehood between them all, is 
inconceivable and impossible. 
There is nothing more probable in the investigation of the claim of each of them and 
the search for knowing its truth so that we become aware of its aim, than the agreement of all 
of them that God made His signs appear at the hands of the one who proclaimed it during 
the first appearance of each religion, to guide people by the signs to His religion; and setting 
forth for them, (by the appearance of signs which they are incapable of imitating), His 
argument to them by their observation of [5a]// signs which are not in the power of human 
beings to imitate, so His religion, rather than that which contradicts it, is [shown] to them [to 
be] true. And they must accept it and they will inevitably be punished if they go against it. If 
this is so, and if [God] guides people to His religion and sets forth His argument to them, He 
manifested signs. 
And we have seen people in our day disagreeing about their religions, divided in 
their sects, and each claiming that his religion is the religion of God, and that what 
contradicts it is not from God. And we know that there is one religion of God among them 
allーsince truth is one and it does not contradict itself, and whatever contradicts it is invalid 
and corrupt. Even though people need guidance, and need to distinguish the religion of God 
from that which contradicts it, and to move away from the many religions which are not from 
God towards the religion of God, God’s ceasing to promote the signs in our time is based on 
one of two things: It may be, when He had to inform people about His religion and lead them 
to it and set forth for them the argument for it by the appearance of the evident signs of His 
religion, that He then withdrew what was necessary for guidance by removing evident signs 
of His religion and the certainty of the proof of it. Or it may be, when He made His religion 
appear by its true signs and visible tokens, and knowing that minds would be hard pressed if 
He removed the signs of His religion to testify that they are the signs confirmed and accepted 
in the world, that He withdrew their appearance from the human eye so that by mental effort 
a deduction would be drawn about His religion, and that He did not set them forth before their 
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eyes in a compelling position for people to accept the religion and so negate praising them 
for this and so revert to what God dislikes by compelling them to obey Him. 
The first suggestion, which involves God changing what is necessary for guidance 
and withholding what is necessary for direction to His religion by the manifestation of His 
signs cannot be, [5b]// and no religious person would say it. We are obligated, therefore, to 
consider the second possibility, that God, having revealed His religion through His signs and 
having set forth His argument by them, and having known that His religion would compel 
minds to testify that it was established in the world on account of the signs and tokens, [that 
He] has removed their appearance from human eyes. Only a stubborn person claims that, 
without signs, he knows the religion of God and His Book from among other religions and 
books by examining what the religions call people to do in the whole world, and by studying 
through logic their books and the books of the one who repudiates them, and scrutinizes and 
narrows his investigation of this until he discerns the religion whose meaning is correct and 
whose teaching is powerful and whose language is truthful. Then he would judge it as [the 
religion] originally from God, in terms of the correctness of the meaning and the power of the 
teaching and the truthfulness of the language, unlike other religions.    
I say to this [person]: You [are one] who has demanded far too much from people 
and you throw them into a sea!ーwhich God knows that He did not give them the means to 
cross, and so He did not demand that they cross it. This is because there are two kinds of 
human beings: There are fine and subtle people as well as rough and unsophisticated ones; 
and there are many unsophisticated people but few subtle ones. So if He had demanded of 
them what you mentioned, it would only lead the unsophisticated people to alienation in their 
minds and action concerning what they need for their lives through studying the books of 
different and conflicting people in the world, and weighing them until they distinguished the 
one whose meaning is correct, and whose words are truthful, judging it to be from God. 
Since among the different groups of people there is the person who expresses an opinion 
about his religion and negates what contradicts it, [and] who is more perceptive among them, 
[and] who may be incapable of this until he sees for himself, apart from others, that he 
possesses the truth. Perhaps he is wrong and his mind, though subtle, falls short from 
knowing the truth. So how do common people attain such knowledge when the sophisticated 
ones among the different groups failed to? God is far above demanding from people what 
they cannot bear, [6a]// and He also brings down the subtle people to something about which 
knowledge they do not agree. Since we have seen that the sages and the philosophers 
disagree about the nature of the visible world and contradict one another in their numerous 
books about it, how can they not differ about the nature of religion, which is much more 
profound and deep than the nature of the world? Rather, there can be no doubt that they 
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disagree about the knowledge of it twice as much as they disagree concerning the 
knowledge of the nature of the world. And this is as harmful for the cultured people as it is for 
the unsophisticated people: a contradiction for them in reaching the truth of religion. Had God 
known that His religion would be recognized from among all these religions He would have 
confined it to this argument when He revealed His religion, and would not have put some of 
His signs into the hands of His messengers. At the time when the messengers were seen 
with their abundance of knowledge on account of what had been revealed to them, and with 
their power in demonstrating the truth by their words, the people were more aware of the 
revelation of signs to them at the hands of the messengers than we are in our time, and 
therefore we do not have them, and we therefore need to know God.  
So if God by His authority did not instruct the apostles to clarify this by words 
without signs to those prior to us, then He instructs us in our weakness with what the 
apostles announced much more adequately. Thus it is obvious that Godーmay He be 
glorified and exaltedーbecause He knew that demanding humans according to what you, 
stubborn person, have wanted, would have damaged the common people as well as the 
educated, and would have deprived them of what is needed for them to know the truth, 
[therefore, God] sent His apostles and revealed His signs at their hands just as the religious 
people have reported it, to gather together by this meansーthe sophisticated and the 
common peopleーin the knowledge of the truth of His religion. And He does not show 
favoritism between the subtle and the vulgar people in the knowledge of the truth, but He 
removed the miracles from each group all together, restricting them to those who [first] 
showed the signs which cannot be imitated, and made them accept His word. So there would 
be no preference for the subtle [6b]// in withdrawing themselves by their cleverness from 
what others are incapable of, and likewise there would be no delay for the vulgar in that 
which the subtle attained. If the truth is  attained by sight, by the appearance of the signs to 
the eyes, and [if] it is necessary for the reception of teaching from a person who reveals it, 
not by the inquiry of the mind nor by the acuteness of sight, nor by understandingーGod, may 
His name be blessedーwants to entrust to the two groups His signs which neither of them 
can imitate; [and this] is more useful than what you have wanted, [which is] that everyone 
accepts tradition by his [own] reason. If each person claims that his [tradition] is his own and 
is not [derived] from anyone else, and that it is not necessary for each person to judge 
others, then the tradition of each one is his own thought [and] he must follow his desire and 
his pleasure and the testimony of his reason to attain that of which no one else is capable. 
And as for all their traditions, the signs which cannot be imitated distinguish their search for 
truth from that which could be confused with the false. 
So by employing reason there is the tradition of the signs, whereas by employing 
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ignorance there is the tradition of each person [and] an investigation by his reason apart from 
signs, as we have described, from a comparison of minds and the claims of each person that 
he has attained what no one else has attained with the religion of Godーmay He be blessed 
and exaltedー[but] His revelation of the signs at the hands of His apostles is more useful to 
people and more plausible to them for [attaining the] knowledge of His religion; and the 
investigation of the signs is more essential for them than what he demanded of them. And 
the claim of each person to whom God revealed the signs at the hands of His messengers, 
testifies to this. 
Therefore, corruption is evident in what the stubborn have stated about this, and we 
go back to the consideration that compels us to affirm that God removed the signs in our time 
because His religion compels minds to the attestation that it, [the true religion], is established 
in the world by them, [the signs], so He did not need to continue to reveal them to the eyes.  
Know that minds are not compelled to affirm concerning one religion among the 
religions; that [7a]// it is established in the world by the signs of God unless they find in it a 
cause among the causes of the world which might establish it permanently. If it became 
possible for us that it, [a religion], were established by a cause among the causes of the 
earth which would allow people to be led to agreement on one [religion], there would be no 
need to testify that it is established by signs. [When] you find something that leads people to 
one conclusion about a [religion] and about those like it, indeed you know that it is not the 
religion of God that has the signs removed from it. Since minds are compelled to testify about 
it by them, because God, if He knew that there would be something in His religion that minds 
might accept as establishing it in the world, then He would not have removed the signs from 
it; just as He did not remove them in the time of the children of Israel when they were one 
people. Presumably, other causes can be mentioned concerning its establishment other than 
the signs: many earthly causes. It was not until the time when the revelation of the Christian 
religion drew near that God manifested greater signs, [and] then He removed them from it 
after it was established from the east to the west of the earth, and closed off the opportunity 
for earthly causes so that it was no longer possible for minds to accept any of them for 
establishing [His religion]. So in this way it is known that minds were compelled to testify that 
[His religion] is [established] by signs apart from anything else, and the argument of them 
was found even when the signs were rejected, and there was no other cause that they might 
have accepted for it. 
For this reason, Christ, our Lord, said to his apostles when he sent them out: “Do 
not carry a stick or a rod or gold or silver, and do not wear sandals or two shirts or two 
garments or the like,” to remove from his apostles all earthly causes by which people are 
empowered and honored, so that he dissuaded the inhabitants of the world from accepting 
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earthly causes by removing them in favor of the signs of God, apart from anything else.  
Therefore, since [we] have made it clear that the religion of God compels minds to 
hold [7b]// that it is established in the world by the signs of God, and therefore, no other 
reason may be found that establishes it, I will begin to examine, religion by religion, among 
those religions that claim the signs. So in each religion in which we can recognize a cause 
that establishes it, or that it was accepted on account of collusion, we know that it is not the 
religion of God which He intended for all of His creation or that He wanted to be extended to 
them all.  
I begin with the first of the religions, the religion of the Torah, which God did not 
intend for the whole of His creation, nor did He make it such that He compelled minds [so] 
that it was accepted on account of signs. He made it a distinct religion, and He did not extend 
it to include the whole of His creation. This is why He did not remove the signs from it until it 
had been completed. The viewing of the signs testified about it. When they came to an end, 
and His prophets and His kings and His priests and His sacrifices ceased to exist, it became 
obvious that it, [the religion of the Torah], had ended. God did not make it a religion that was 
established from Himself so that it may not be accepted. And He did not intend it for the 
whole of His creation until they witnessed the religion which does include the whole of His 
creation, [i.e., Christianity]; and He left it behind in such a way that He abandoned it, so it 
was not established among people of sound mind, except by the latter. 
So I say that we may accept as the basis for its establishment five causes apart 
from signs: firstly, the sword; secondly, bribery and payment; thirdly, fanaticism; fourthly, 
approval; and fifthly, collusion. 
Concerning the sword: Since the Children of Israel were in one country and under 
one king, then the king could have convinced whoever was under his power to accept and 
submit to his word,  since subjects are obedient to the one who rules over them, keeping his 
commands. 
Concerning bribery and payment: Since the Children of Israel were slaves in Egypt 
and escaped from there, their obedience may have.…… 
[8b]// and Ḥamzah ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib and others among them about this. And if 
others among them differ then it does not negate fanaticism.  
Concerning collusion: Perhaps someone may have responded to him, [i.e., 
Muḥammad], in the first instance by the greed of the world, and accepted his collusion 
concerning the testimony about him by mentioning the signs which they described. They 
could have set that up, [the testimony], as they wished and forced it on those whom they 
compelled by the sword, even though the Book, [i.e., The Qur’ān], on which they agree 
rejects the signs and mentions that the one, [Muḥammad], who is said to have performed 
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them was asked that he perform the signs as they were performed by the prophets before 
him, but according to his own word, he did not perform them:  “And We refrain from sending 
the signs, only because the men of former generations treated them as false: We sent the 
she-camel to the Thamūd to open their eyes, but they treated her wrongfully: We only send 
the Signs by way of terror.” And that [happened] after they asked him to perform signs, and 
their description of what Moses and Jesus performed.  
Likewise, his saying: “They swear their strongest oaths [by God], that if a sign came 
to them, by it they would believe. (Say, it may be, that even when the signs come they will 
not believe, instead we confound their hearts and their minds that they do not believe in the 
first instance.)” And Ibn ‘Abbās interprets this and he was a witness to the situation when the 
Christians and the Jews and the idolaters joined together and they swore by God that if they 
saw a sign of the Prophet they would believe it. So he replied to them that this had been sent 
down to him concerning their request. 
So these religions that might be established by these things, or by some of them, 
are not the religion of God from which He removed the signs after He had established it to 
support minds in testifying that the signs were there at its appearance, clearly seen by the 
eyes that looked upon them. God did not remove the signs from His religion until He annulled 
the significance of earthly causes for it. So it cannot be assumed that [His religion] was 
established by such [earthly] reasons, rather it is compelling to minds that [His religion] was 
established by signs in the world, and thus the law of God [that] is established, rests on His 
creation. 
 
Concerning the Acceptance of the Christian Religion 
[8b]// As far as the Christian religion is concerned, I did not see it in a people of one house or 
one country, [among] a people speaking one language so that they might be in collusion over 
one thing which they desire, like the religion of the Children of Israel; nor in one kingdom in 
which they might [have a common] opinion, where the king could gather them together in one 
religion, like the religion of Zoroaster; [nor] with what was accepted on account of [ a 
common] opinion like the religion of Mani and similar religions; nor in one kingdom with one 
language where they might be compelled by the sword to accept it, like the religion which 
came after it. Rather, in every kingdom, every language and tongue in the east and west, 
among the Khūzī and the Yemenis, among the whites and blacks, in nations that dislike each 
other’s language, they became enemies and could not be united to be in collusion or be 
established by the compulsion of the sword, or set up in the world by feverish fanaticism, or 
by bribery or payment. Separated by their languages, living apart in their countries, opposed 
in their kingdoms and the situation of their world, situated apart from each other by the seas 
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which God made as a barrier lest they join themselves together and destroy each other 
because of the diversity of their kinship and the differences of their races and skin colors. 
If someone says, “The nations did not collude in this religion, nevertheless there are 
those who proclaimed it that there was collusion in it such that the nations accepted it by 
trickery”; we say: “If we go along with what you say, we must judge according to what we 
have seen, and by reason and analogy. And you know that people [worship] according to 
what they are born to [follow] and according to their customs, and on what their body grows, 
and on what they inherit from their fathers and elders, but it is not possible after what we 
have seen, that a group of people should convert to another religion in our time, or the time 
which preceded us, [9a]// from what it they were [believing in] to another, unless for 
compelling reasons.” 
So let us put forward, between ourselves and you, all of the reasons why people 
might transfer from what they [believed] to another [religion] to which they were called. 
[However], as we informed you that we can assume that the establishment of all religions 
that are in the world [is based on earthly reasons], therefore we will examine them, [such 
reasons], concerning the spread of the Christian religion in order to show you that it, [such 
reasons are], excluded from them, and that it is not assumed that [it was established] by 
them, unlike their [role] in the establishment of other religions. Rather, it compels minds in an 
alternative way: by signs and wonders. And there are six reasons after collusion which we 
may ascribe to the proclamation of those who proclaim it, [the religion]. So let us examine 
whether it is possible for them to be received without signs. 
The first [reason] is the sword; and the second is desire for wealth and leadership 
and power; and the third is fanaticism; and the fourth is approval, and the fifth is permission 
in law; and the sixth is trickery by magic and suchlike. 
Concerning the sword: The Christian religion forbids it, how then can [its 
establishment] be assumed by it? There is no preacher of it, [the Christian religion], who 
[would] use the sword while the writings in his Book which he gives to those who were 
compelled by it, [the sword], [state] that he did not use it and that he forbids it. This would be 
understood as robbery and a great deceit, since it contradicts his action: it is unacceptable. 
We have already looked at the Torah which used the sword, not rejecting it but 
rather describing and depicting its use. Likewise, the religion of Islam uses the sword, not 
rejecting it but rather describing and depicting its strength and how it invaded territory by 
using it. Having presented the Holy Gospel in which is [found] prohibition of the sword and 
the reception of it by the nations, and their testimony in the east and the west agreeing that 
there was no collusion among them, [that] they have not been compelled by the sword, 
neither was the [sword] used [9b]// against them, [all] testify that the Christian religion was 
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not established by the sword and that that those who proclaim it did not use it. [Given the fact 
that] the innumerable nations in the east and the west could not agree without 
communicating or meeting or getting together from [their] different kingdoms [that are] in 
opposition to each other, (in all parts of the world and faraway countries and different 
languages and races), [all] testify that those who proclaimed to them this religion were weak 
fishermen with no rule and no sword; they could not have compelled them all by the sword. 
And how is it possible [to allege], if their testimony agrees with that of the twelve 
helpless men, that they compelled kings of power and strength and of fortified and large 
kingdoms, since their proclamation was incompatible with the power of authority and rule. 
The assistance of the kings cannot be assumed to [have helped] them, nor the submission to 
them, [kings], unless by the compulsion of [the apostles] over them, [the kings]. In this, the 
whole world which opposes the Christian religion, such as the Jews, the Magi, and the 
Muslims and others, agree that the disciples of Christ did not compel people with the sword 
nor use it. [Indeed,] the most the Jews could accuse them of, is magic and trickery, not the 
sword. And in a similar way the Magi and the Muslims attributed the [acceptance of the 
disciples] to signs.  
So how does the whole world agree on their being free from the sword, and that it is 
clear to minds that they did not use the sword in establishing their religion, and that the issue 
as they wrote in the gospel concerning the prohibition of it, prohibiting the whip and the rod, 
and gold and silver, and every reason among worldly causes in the establishment of their 
religion, so that nothing but [divine] signs are assumed [concerning] the establishment of 
their religion? In this way, our argument concerning the prohibition of the sword for the 
Christian religion is well founded, clear, and corroborated by the existence of the prohibition 
of the sword in the Book, [the Gospel]. And anyone who makes a contrary claim [10a]// 
against us needs firm evidence for his claim from the testimony of rational people, but he will 
never find it; instead he will only find [copious] words. It is not rational whatsoever that a 
religion be established in the whole world with all its languages, commanding submission 
and humility and subservience, and forbidding what contradicts them, while [clearly] stating 
the prohibition of the sword in the saying: “Whoever uses the sword dies by the sword.” This 
is not what minds accept; rather common opinion and the varying pieces of evidence that 
support it. People testify that those who proclaimed it, [the Christian religion], were poor 
fishermen, not that it was established by the sword, but testify to their being free from it. 
Therefore it has been shown to be correct that the Christian religion was not established by 
the sword. 
Concerning bribery and financial payment: How is it possible, if the whole world 
agrees, despite there being no communication and no collusion, that the apostles were poor 
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fishermen, [just as] their Book which was in their hands describes? For example, it is said 
that even their leader, Simon, said to a crippled man at the gate of Jerusalem who had 
begged from him: “We do not have gold or silver to give you, we only have what our Lord has 
given to us. In the name of Christ, get up and carry your mattress, and stand up and go to 
your home.” [How then] to accuse them of offering a bribe with gold or silver? Or is it possible 
that, since their Book forbade them from [possessing] gold or silver, (for example, the Holy 
Gospel reports that Christーto him be praiseー said to them: “Do not carry a whip or a rod or 
gold or silver”), that they offered a bribe with gold or silver? And had they demonstrated [to 
people] contradictory actions to what they had commanded them, or to their words that “We 
do not have gold or silver,” people would not have accepted their words and would not have 
considered their saying, and no one would have accepted the Christian religion from them 
[10b]// if they were commanded to do it, and people would have denied [their claims.] People 
also would not have accepted their Book, and the signs would have been nullified in their 
hands. But, if we see leaders of the kings and sages of the people and races of the nations 
accepting their Book in which they commanded, as their Lord commanded them, not to carry 
gold or silver, and that they were poor, not having gold or silver, [therefore] we conclude that 
their Book with its teaching concerning this matter was accepted only upon their truthfulness, 
their words, and their beliefs: their Book did not contradict their teaching. And how do you 
accuse fishermen, (about whom all the kings and nations of the world without collusion 
[agree] concerning their insignificance and poverty, and they have made clear in their Book 
that they were poor), that they bribed the kings of the world to accept their proclamation and 
they gave freely to them what they coveted? Rather, their Book declares the opposite of this 
in their prohibition of covetousness and money, and power, and pride, and whatever 
resembles these. So it is clear that it is not possible to mention bribery and financial payment 
in the establishment of their proclamation at all. 
Concerning fanaticism: Goodness me! If it were the case that the Jews followed 
Christ, disregarding other people, you might say: “They became fanatical about him.” 
However, since uncountable and differing races followed him, how is it possible to mention 
fanaticism among different groups of people who would surely oppose someone not from 
their group? Rather, this is totally absent from them.  
Concerning approval and what is of common opinion which is accepted by minds 
and comprehended by reason which can be assumed as a cause of the acceptance of [the 
Christian religion] apart from signs, I have seen that the Christian religion has nothing to do 
with that at all! For those who proclaimed it stated things and reported news which cannot be 
accepted by common opinion, nor can it be comprehended by reason, or imagined by 
intelligence, or comprehended by reason. So we may summarize ten points [11a]// in which 
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we demonstrate the [credibility] of our saying, by the will of Godーmay He be exalted.   
First: At the beginning of their message they said that a young virgin became 
pregnant without intercourse or impregnation, and this had never been witnessed in the 
world. 
Second: They said that she gave birth without losing her virginity, so she was a 
nursing mother while still being a virgin, and this is contrary to reason. 
Third: They said that this child was God’s son, and this is denied by all of the 
nations, which speak of God’s oneness in terms of distinctiveness, and uniqueness.  
Fourth: They said that the son of God was crucified and died and was buried; at one 
time they attributed power to him, and at another they attributed submissiveness to him, and 
that, at first sight, contradicts itself.  
Fifth: They said that after his death and burial he was raised and came out of the 
tomb alive, and that is not known by the very nature of reason. 
Six: They said that after his resurrection from the tomb he ascended into heaven, 
and that is far from comprehensible. 
Seven: They said that after his ascension into heaven he will descend to the earth 
to raise the dead and to send the good to the place of bliss and the wicked to hell, and that 
did not cross the minds of the people of the world. 
Eight: They called for the worship of the crucified one, even if people answered the 
call with what was involved in it of submissiveness and repulsiveness and which is contrary 
to lust and pleasure, and with its constraints upon them to carry a heavy burden by receiving 
it from them through the dispersal of their wealth to the poor and the giving up of their souls 
to death for his sake, as well as what is similar to that.  
Nine: They proclaimed another world. They did not promise [the people] something 
of the pleasure which is known, like the things they witnessed in this world. Rather, they were 
commanded to renounce this world and treat lightly [11b]// with the pleasure of food and 
drink and sexual intercourse and other things. And they called them to another world also, 
informing them that they would not eat or drink or marry there. So they prohibited them from 
what is known as [physical] pleasure in this world and in the hereafter. 
Ten:ーwhich is the summary, the completion, and perfection of this allーthey called 
them to believe in God, who is Father, and Son and Holy Spirit. This is not comprehended by 
reason or common opinion. Common opinion only accepts the idea of good and evil, 
according to what people conceive of good and evil in the world; or accept one [Being], 
according to what they conceive of the order of things and their testimony that one [Being 
exists]. However, as for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, they are not imagined by 
common opinion. Further, it cannot be assumed that common opinion would accept this, like 
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the other [reasons] that we described [earlier]. Did reason accept any of this information or 
did common opinion invent it, or did the mind comprehend so that it was assumed as a 
cause of its acceptance? In fact, all of it was considered belittling, despicable, and nonsense, 
and is there anything so repulsive as the call to worship a crucified [man] and submission to 
the cross, and faith in the unity in trinity?! 
So it is clear that the Christian religion was not established by acceptance on 
account of the approval of minds, and that neither common opinion, nor lust, nor power was 
the reason for its acceptance, for it opposed the power of authority and rule and such like, 
and souls were submitted to the cross and the carrying of injury and dishonor. And it 
opposed reason and the wisdom of the wise as it contradicts what is not in their wisdom, and 
it opposed their wisdom. And it opposed pleasure by prohibiting lust and pleasures while 
commanding devotion to fasting and prayer. 
Concerning permissiveness in the law: Even when we say that permissiveness is 
one [reason] by which [12a]// people are attracted, [we say] that this benefits only when 
those who proclaim something, [i.e., a religion], proclaim it in a way which reason will accept, 
so that minds accept it, [the religion], after this [permissiveness in the law]. As for what 
reason does not accept: it does not accept permissiveness in the law, and minds do not 
follow, for it opposes it. Among the first things which are strict in law is burdening the mind 
with what it does not comprehend, and the afflicting of the intellect with what it cannot 
understand. Therefore I say: There is no religion under the sun which prohibits desire more, 
and destroys pleasure more and has more restrictive commands than the Christian religion. 
For people of sound mind know that there is no desire more overwhelming than that of men 
for women, because God made it natural in them when He established their essential 
[nature.] Through it, the [human] world is increased, and by it, the world is populated. So we 
may report about David the prophet who, despite his purity, desired women so intensely that 
he murdered a man for his wife; and about Solomon, son of Davidーa spring of wisdom and 
a sea of proverbsーwho so desired women that they defeated his wisdom; and about a man 
that God raised up for the children of Israel from among the giants to protect them, (so he 
protected them and killed a thousand men from among their enemies with the jawbone of an 
ass, and God caused water to flow out from that jawbone when he was thirsty so he drank 
from it), who afterwards desired women so that because of them he put himself into the 
hands of his enemies, who tore out his eyes; and about a man from among the kings in our 
time who set out from his kingdom with his whole army for the Rum, [Byzantium], in search of 
a woman at a certain citadel, (we have not seen kings do such things for any other worldly 
pleasures!); and about one of the sons of David, the prophet, who acted immorally towards 
his sister. His action was notorious and became well-known.  
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Those who proclaimed the Christian religion commanded kings and others who had 
been overcome by desire for women and excessive demand for them, that a man should 
marry [12b]// only one woman. And even if she is afflicted by all kinds of illness, which in turn 
would not allow for them to be together, he is forbidden to look at a woman besides her, until 
death. And they made equality in this between the kings and their servants, and they did not 
seek to win over the kings by preferring them to their servants. And they also commanded 
them to disperse their wealth among the poor, and they increased fasting and were devoted 
to prayer and they consider submissiveness and subjection to be a noble [thing] and let go of 
earthly pleasures and desires. Therefore, some people began to fast all the time; and some 
fled to the mountains and hid themselves in caves with wild beasts; and some lived in 
monastic cells; and some chose to withdraw to their monasteries, devoting themselves to 
fasting and prayer. And in their struggle they did not promise them anything that they were 
accustomed to of pleasure, except what they consider restrictive, such as the absence of 
food and drink and marriage and other things like them.  
[Therefore,] what place is there at all to mention permissiveness in the law 
alongside their command to give up the world and its pleasures and lust? Thus it is clear that 
permissiveness in the law was excluded for them, and it cannot be the case that it is 
assumed of them.   
And concerning the fantasies of sorcery: I have seen them warning people to be on 
their guard against it and caution them not to be deceived by it, and they guarantee to them, 
contrary to it, the resurrection of the dead and the healing of the sick and chronically ill, and 
the opening of eyes and other things like that. So I know that they set themselves to be free 
from them, and to make a clear distinction between their actions and the actions of magic, 
and that people, having looked into their [actions] were confident that they are free of such 
thing in their proclamation, based upon three qualities:  
First: [People] noticed the signs which they, [the apostles], performed; they 
hastened to watch [them] just as one hastens to watch acts of incantation and the like, [13a]// 
or when something is proclaimed to be astonishing, people hurry to see it and may give gifts 
for it. So if they, [the apostles], did not do what they promised to do [in miracles] when people 
hastened to watch, they would have been exposed and their lying would have been made 
clear, and people would not have accepted their Book or paid any attention to their speech. 
Second: Since there is no one who proclaims a religion who can guarantee the 
acceptance of his proclamation through performing anything without being asked [by people] 
about the conditions he had imposed [on people to also be] on himself. So if he performed 
what he proclaimed, his call would be accepted, and if he did not perform it then it would not 
be accepted since he had not fulfilled his conditions. So you understand, that since their 
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religion, [Christianity], was accepted according to the conditions they had imposed on 
themselves, then it was not accepted until they had been asked concerning what they had 
promised [of miracles] and had performed them. 
Third: Therefore, because there is no one with any illness among the types of 
illnesses, (a chronic illness among categories of chronic illnesses, blindness, having only one 
eye, and other similar complaints), who upon hearing of someone who proclaims the power 
to heal him, would not hurry to him with his need, for the health of his body. People hurry to 
doctors who do not claim the power to heal by words which have no harm in them, but [claim 
to heal] by rigorous medical treatment that is undesirable for people. So how would people 
not hurry to those who proclaim the power to heal by words that have no pain or trouble for 
them! Therefore you understand that with their promise of this, [performing miracles], 
everyone who had something, [some illness], like we have described would have hurried to 
them. Thus, if they did not heal through their hands and if they did not perform what they had 
promised to them, then they would have been exposed to all people, and as a result their 
proclamation would have been nullified and people would not have accepted their religion. 
Therefore, it is true for everyone that they established the religion with signs that magicians 
cannot imitate, and not by fantasies of magic that have no truth in them. So the argument 
has compelled us, seeing the absence from the Christian religion of earthly reasons which 
might have established it, to the conclusion that it [13b]// was accepted and established by 
clear miracles from God, and His true signs have spread throughout all the different nations. 
And the testimony about this from its Book is on our side, since it announces that the ones 
who proclaimed it had performed great miracles, and all the nations accepted their scriptures 
concerning this. Had they had not performed the signs that they claimed in their Book to 
have performed, then their Book would not have been accepted and we would not have 
believed a single letter of their saying, as they demonstrated lies and falsehoods by 
recording in their Book what they had not done. And also, if they wrote in their Book about 
what they had not done or if they committed such foolishness, people would not have 
accepted this falsified written Word or clear fabrication. For example, if a man in our time 
proclaimed a religion which he preferred, [and] wrote a book to those to whom he said that 
he had performed great miracles on account of which they had accepted his religion, but he 
in fact had not done anything of this because he was a liar, people would have rejected his 
book and they would not have accepted one letter from such a book.  
 Thus, since we have seen these great kingdoms, numerous nations, and 
different languages agreeing together despite their different countries, kingdoms, and 
languages about the acceptance of the Book, [the Christian Scriptures], and since those who 
proclaimed it to them had performed great miracles, we [must] conclude that they had done 
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such [great miracles]. And had they had not performed such [miracles], these nations would 
not have agreed to accept their Book, and they would not have agreed to testify that they 
performed them. 
 
Refuting the Charge of Corrupting the Scripture 
Since it has become true to us that the Christian religion was confirmed on account of 
miracles, and that the Gospel is the Book of God made generally available to all creatures, 
and that God has removed miracles and no longer displays them before people’s eyes once 
the Gospel became confirmed in the world by them, and since it, [the Gospel], demands that 
minds acknowledge it as the Book of God which was confirmed by His miracles and 
wonders, ーit therefore necessitates that the whole world should accept and believe it. As for 
those who oppose us, it is not necessary for us to refute what has been slandered against it 
as being corrupted since the cessation of [14a]// miracles in our age. Nevertheless, the 
[existence] of the love of God which guides His creatures is the reason His Book is in the 
world, just as was proven to be correct at its inception, it demands minds to witness to its 
correctness. It, [the Gospel], is the evident sign to the people. There is no need for the 
appearance of other signs and wonders other than it, because of the truthfulness and 
confirmation of that which has been revealed [in it].  
However, we will show to those who love the truth the impossibility of even 
mentioning corruption in the universally-available Book of God, which is for all His creatures, 
and I say:  
Since we have shown it to be impossible that the Book of the Gospel was accepted 
without heavenly miracles, (since it was not enforced by the sword, nor was it confirmed on 
account of earthly reasons but it was accepted in the world on account of obvious miracles 
and clear signs), it is also impossible that it has been corrupted without the compulsion of 
miracles, because, just as it was acceptedーbut on account of the compulsion of 
miraclesーits alteration and corruption is [needing to be made] much more acceptable, 
having been grounded in the hearts of the people, but on account of the compulsion of 
miracles.  And [since] miracles are not performed at the hands of those who corrupt the 
Books of God, it becomes obvious that no corruption ever happened after the nations 
accepted it, and that it remains as it was. We must also judge that which has gone before us 
with that which we have witnessed. If we suppose a certain city from among cities, [each] 
having [different] types of religions, our minds cannot imagine the collusion of one of them to 
corrupt their Book, because of the multiplicity of peoples’ opinions and the lack of their 
compliance with each other, without someone uniting them all on one thing.  
The proof of this is that we see groups of interpretation in all religions, as they differ 
 369 
from each other and they do not follow one another. If it were possible that people agreed to 
gather together to corrupt the revealed [text], it would not have been possible that their 
interpretations would differ.  Their different interpretations demonstrate the impossibility of 
what has been slandered concerning their, [the religious sects’], agreement in corrupting the 
revealed text.  If they are being compelled [14b]// to agree on one thing in corrupting the 
revealed [text] or others thereof, they would have also agreed on one thing in the 
interpretation. Therefore, it is apparent that they never agreed; they never corrupted [the 
Scriptures] without someone uniting them on one thing and forcing them to do so. There is 
no one king over the Christian kings in the world who could unite them and force them to 
corrupt the Book. It is obvious that this [corruption] is impossible.  
If anyone says that the widespread different opinions prove that there was 
corruption, as they say about the sect of the Greeks, [namely, concerning] the religion of the 
king and similar statements, we say that Christianity is neither [found] in a single country nor 
is it in one kingdom, unlike other religions. Therefore, which kingdom is the one accused of 
the corruption [of the Gospel] which you claim that its king has united it, [i.e., everyone], to 
agree on it? If you say “the Greeks,” we will not hold this against you and will allow it, 
because if you suppose that the King of the West wants to corrupt his Book, you would not 
have found it possible for him to do this, because people have been instructed by this Book 
even until death where it remains as is. How then could the King of the Greeks do what 
others than himself could not have done? And why would he corrupt a book in which all the 
things which he opposes in it [are confirmed], without dropping that which he opposes and 
dislikes, and confirming in it that with which he agrees and likes?  
But we will make it easy for you, so that if you find your opinion unsubstantiated and 
impossible to prove, even though we allowed it, you know that we have given you all possible 
ways to present your objections, and it becomes obvious to you that corruption [of the 
Gospel] is absurd. We say:   
“O you, behold, the King of the Greeks has corrupted the Gospel in his hands, just 
as you claim. [So] how is it that there is no difference between his Gospel in his own tongue, 
and the Gospels which are in the tongues which differ from his which are not under his 
power, but do not accept his word on the corruption [of the Gospel]? Therefore, the King of 
the Greeks is blameless of the charge of having changed his Gospel, on account of the 
testimony of all the Gospels in many tongues which are not [15a]// under his power and do 
not accept his word. These Gospels agree with the King’s text, and, likewise, his text agrees 
with them.” 
If he comes back saying: “Every King has forced the people in his kingdom to 
corrupt the Gospel,” we say: “But, there are Christians whose king is not a Christian.” We 
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answer you regarding the Christian kings, and then we turn to those whose king is not 
Christian. We say:  
“We said, ‘Is it with some consent of the Christian kings throughout the world 
concerning what is to be changed, what is to be deleted, and what should be left in its 
[original] state? Or did each and every one of them on his own, change, add or delete?’” If 
you say, “They had consent,” we say: “You have reached the impossible as we have shown 
you, [in your claim] that people comply with one another and agree on their opinions. Also, 
where did you gain knowledge that one of them, or all of them, agreed on this corruption? It 
is either based on your own assumption, or that they informed you, or perhaps you saw them 
gather together to corrupt [the Gospel]? I do not think that you claim that have seen them, or 
that they informed you. It is only your own assumption. With the ‘correctness’ of your own 
assumptions, you have not attained that which nullifies the certainty of the whole world 
[regarding the Book of God]. It is only your saying! Indeed, with the “correctness” of your own 
saying and claim you have not attained that which would nullify the Book of God in the whole 
world.”     
I ask you further: “Where did they gather together? In whose kingdom did they 
meet? It must be the case that all of them traveled to a particular kingdom of one king. Who 
is this one? How did they trust each other, and how did everyone submit to the other? And 
how did you know you about this?”  
Or you may say: “The apostles differ amongst themselves.” I wish I could know 
what they really want with all of this attention being paid to the corruption [of the Gospel]! 
Was it the exaltation of Christ that they wanted? Why then did they not remove from the 
Gospel that which diminishes him, that is, the mention of his childhood, his upbringing, his 
food, drink, crucifixion, death, burial, and other things? And why did the Jews and the other 
nations of the time [15b]// neglect to write about this, and let them know about it? We see 
them claiming that the [apostles] did what they really did not do. 
 Or was it his, [Christ’s], denigration that they wanted? Why then did they not 
remove the whole book to start with, since they wanted to denigrate its object by erasing 
from it that which exalts him, such as his saying that he is the Judge of the Day of Judgment, 
the Lord of the world, God the Creator of the universe, and the like.   
Or did they want the eradication of the laws which were hard for them to maintain, 
and to affirm what was easy? Why then did they not remove the whole book to start with? It 
would have been easier! They could have composed a book according to their own desires 
and could have affirmed in it that when the Jews wanted to kill Christ they approached him, 
[that] he blew a breath on them and burned them; and that he was lifted up to heaven alive, 
[that] death did not win him, nor was he affected by any scourge. [They could have written] 
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that a man may marry as many women as he wants; they could have prohibited the 
disciplining of their bodies by fasting, the commitment to prayers, and the abandonment of 
human pleasure, just as the Magi [have done]. This would have been even more pleasant for 
them and easier. Yes, and they could also have affirmed in it what they reason to be 
pleasurable in the everlasting world, such as sexual intercourse, food and drink and the like, 
since they think [so] lightly of the Book of God to the point that they corrupt it however they 
wish. Why do they not delete the hard [things], such as its call to them to worship a crucified 
[person]ーI know nothing harder for kings and those who have authority, majesty, and honor 
than confessing the worship of a crucified [person]ーalong with its prohibition against a man 
marrying more than one woman, and such as its commands to them regarding humility, 
submission, perseverance through hardships, and the abandonment of pleasures and lusts, 
and [instead,] being committed to fasting and prayers, and the like.  
And since they did not exchange that which was difficult for them with that which is 
easy, as we have described, it is obvious that they have not changed even one letter of the 
Book of God away from its original state. 
If any of the people of “sight” says, [16a]// “We believe that it was not possible to 
corrupt the revealed text, but they have corrupted the interpreted text away from its purpose 
and its meaning; they have not corrupted the actual text itself.”  
We say, “The Gospel has instructed us that we baptize people in the name of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. It also informed us that the Word has never ceased to 
be; He is eternal. The Word is God, by whom all things were created, and the Spirit is Lord; 
and that there is neither sexual intercourse nor food nor drink in the everlasting life, and 
many other things which are too countless to mention. This and many other similar things are 
in the text of the Book without any interpretation. Now, look, do any of these agree with your 
Book?” 
As for the Son, you say, “The skies are ready to burst, the earth to split asunder, 
and the mountains to fall down in utter ruin! That they should invoke a son for [Allah] the 
Most Gracious.” And you say that “[both] the Jews and the Christians say: ‘We are sons of 
Allah, and His beloved.’ Say: ‘Why then doth He punish you for your sins? Nay ye are but 
men,ーof the men He hath created: He forgiveth whom He pleaseth, and He punisheth whom 
He pleaseth.’” You also deny the Father as you deny the Son. As for the Spirit, [you say] the 
contrary: “It is from the command of the Lord.” You say, then, that it comes from the Lord, 
and God’s Book says it is the Lord. As for the Word, you say it is created; but the Gospel 
says that the Word has never ceased to be, and the Word is God.  
Regarding sexual intercourse, food and drinking in the everlasting life, you affirm 
these things, while the Gospel invalidates them. How then can the Gospel be turned around 
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to the direction of the teachings of your Book? This is absolutely impossible. If it were not for 
the weakness of your argument, I would have multiplied the testimonies which invalidate your 
statements. But I find it sufficient to refute your [argument] with your own words.  
Therefore, it has become obvious that the Gospel has never been corrupted nor 
altered, either in its revealed text or in its interpretation, from that which Christians agreed 
upon; and that it is the Book of God which demands that the world believe in it and submit to 
it, and accept whatever is in it of things [16b]// which are clear and ambiguousーthings which 
are hidden from our opponents, who have then admonished the hearts of those who have 
not looked at the Books of God and have not known their ways, to turn [them] away from 
believing in them, [the Books of God]. Had they been convinced with truth, they would not 
have negated things from the Book which they, on account of their coarse minds, have found 
the apparent meaning to be distasteful, and they have become too crude to know the inner 
meaning therein. So, they have blamed the Book, after it compels them to witness that it was 
the miracles of God which men cannot do, which have been affirmed in the world. But they 
prefer what is easier for their tongues and hearts, and only accept things on first glance, 
according to their good appearance. They have no patience to try to penetrate deeply in it. If 
the inner [aspect] proves to contradict the beautiful outer appearance, they throw it 
awayーand in this, they bear a resemblance to children who prefer what is easy for them and 
what is attractive in appearance to them, even if it is for their ruin. And [they are like] those 
who follow wide ways such as this on account of ignorance and follow after pleasures, even 
if it leads to a lion which will eat him, instead of following the narrow and difficult way, even 
though it would lead to what is good for him.  
 
The Discourse on the Trinity 
We begin with asking them about the “One” who is easy for their tongues to confess, and 
about Whom they proclaim without verifying the real meaning of His knowledge; to show that 
there is a contradiction between the apparent meaning of their words and their 
representation of the Creator as inanimate, without “life” and “word” yet calling Him “alive” 
and “speaking.” We will explain what we say for those who want to benefit from 
understanding it, for it is legitimate to question them over their saying....it is possible for them 
to prove that their Book which speaks of this [type of oneness] was confirmed by the miracles 
of God. But it is not required to again prove to them that the Gospel has been accepted on 
account of miracles. They are not to question us about anything which it tells us and calls us 
to do. [17a]//. They are to trust our testimony coming out of the straightforwardness of our 
understanding and knowledgeーjust as when witnesses testify before the judge about the 
boundaries of a house. The judge asks them to give witness about it one after the other.  I 
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say:  
“Tell me, oh you who believe in the ‘One,’ do you say He is ‘living?’” If he says, 
“Yes,” then we say: “Is it a life of His own in His eternal essence, as it is in the soul of a 
human beingーa life in its substantial essence and part of him? Or, is this life accidental, like 
the life of the body which has a life that is other than it, and has no life in the essence of its 
substance?” If he says, “Life is in Him, in His eternal essence,” then, he says what we say. 
But, if he says, “His life is neither essential nor eternal, nor accidental,” we say, “Then you do 
not want to confirm in the word ‘living’ a life which is essential, eternal, and not accidental.” If 
he says: “Yes,” we say: “How do you claim the name ‘the living One’ while the name ‘living’ is 
derived from life? We call a man ‘living’ as long as life is in him; but when his living spirit 
leaves him, we call him ‘dead.’ Since you call him ‘living,’ where his life is neither essential 
nor permanent nor accidental on account of nature or food, therefore, you should call earth 
‘living although it has no life; and water “living” even though it is without life; and also the air, 
fire, and sky, and other inanimate things. We only know that a thing is called by what it has, 
not by what it does not have. Therefore, these four elements and their like are not called 
‘living,’ for they have no ‘life’ in their essences. Further, animals are not called ‘speaking,’ 
because there is no speech in their essences. But we call the soul of a human being ‘living’ 
and ‘speaking’ because it has ‘life’ and ‘word’ in its essence.” 
It has become clear that he does not call Him “living” since he does not affirm that 
He has “life” and “word”ーjust as we have previously explained. [17b]// He deprives his God 
of “life” and makes Him inanimate. May God be greatly exalted above that! We will tell him 
again: “Why have you called Him ‘living’ while you do not want to attribute ‘life’ to Him?” If he 
says, “In order to deny that He is dead,” we say: “What you have fled from, what you have 
denied in your teaching, you must affirm, because as you call Him ‘living’ to deny that He is 
dead it necessitates, without doubt, that you attribute death to Him when you deny Him ‘life’ 
and do not make it necessary for Him. This is because there is no difference between calling 
Him ‘living’ simply to deny that He is dead, and not making ‘life’ necessary to Himーin which 
case you have made death necessary to Him. In other words, if the name ‘living’ is used here 
to negate the name ‘death,’ then ‘life’ remains under the name ‘death.’ And we have seen 
that that which does not have life, whether it is essential or accidental, must be subjected to 
death, since death is, without doubt, the opposite of ‘life.’” 
It is as if you say: “This person is ‘seeing,’” and we ask you: “Does he have ‘sight’?” 
If you answer: “No,” then you lied in describing him as “seeing”; for the name “sight” is 
correct for someone who has “sight.” Your saying, “I did not want to verify ‘sight’ in him by my 
saying that he is ‘seeing,’ but I wanted to deny blindness in him,” shows that you wanted to 
deny any confirmation of blindness; in doing so you have denied “sight” while confirming 
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blindness. Similarly, the name “living” is only necessary when the concept of “life” is involved, 
and the name “death” is only negated when “life” is affirmed. And you, no matter what you 
want to assert by mentioning its name, you [only] deny death. You can only call someone 
“speaking” when he has “word” in his essence. Just as you would never call an animal 
“speaking” because it does not have “word” in its essence, so you would call the soul of a 
human being “speaking” because it has “word” in its essence. The opposite of “speech” is 
only negated by affirming “word,” and if it is not affirmed it follows, without doubt, that its 
opposite must be affirmed. 
It is clear…the source of life and wisdom [can only be described] by the names “life” 
and “wisdom.” [18a]// But he has negated their meaning and necessitated that He is “non-
living” and “non-speaking.” Since he escaped from asserting “the Word” and “the Spirit” in 
order to avoid three meanings in the essence of the Creator which would nullify his 
confession of the oneness of God, he ended up totally invalidating the Creator, making Him 
an inanimate being, without “life” or “word,” similar to the idols which are called gods. But 
God, in His Books, reproaches those who worship them because they worship gods that 
have no “life” and no “speech.” Meanwhile, He speaks of Himself in all of His Books as 
having “Spirit” and “Word.” Thus He said by the mouth of David: “By the word of God the 
heavens were made, their starry host by His breath,” (Psalm 33:6); and He said by the mouth 
of Job: “The Spirit of God created me,” (Job 33:4); and He said by the mouth of Isaiah: “The 
word of our God stands forever,” (Isaiah 40:8); and from the mouth of David again when he 
said: “The word of our God stands firm in the heavens,” (Psalm 119:89); and again, 
“Because of the word of God I praise God,” (Psalm 56:4). Their testimonies to “the Word” 
and “the Spirit” are too numerous for us to count or list in this book. 
And we say: “We are blameless before God concerning the accusation of speaking 
of three gods. On the contrary, in saying the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we only 
want to affirm that God is ‘living’ and ‘speaking.’” The Father is the One we refer to as having 
“life” and “word.” “Life” is the Holy Spirit, and “Word” is the Son. This is not, as our opponents 
attribute to us, that we make a female partner for God, and a son from her. May God be 
greatly exalted above that! Just as the word is produced from the soul… but achieving 
understanding of this subtlety and ambiguity exceeds the intellectual faculties of the spiritual 
angels and the sent prophets.  Concerning the “word” of the soul, we do not hold to a literal 
interpretation of the written letters, which you suspect is happening. Speech has four 
aspects: there is the heard word, made apparent by the voice; there is the shown word, 
made visible through writing; there is the word produced in the soul, which is not [18b]// 
expressed by the lips or made visible by ink and is unseen by the eyes; there is the power of 
the soul by which we can express words and are able to do things, conduct business, lead 
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the world, and subdue animals. Therefore, according to the teaching of the Christian religion, 
the power of the soul is in “the Word” of God, but our intellectual faculties fall short in 
achieving understanding of this perfection.  
What they say about “the life,” (i.e., the Holy Spirit), is that it is essential and eternal, 
not the life of accidental bodies which have neither permanence nor eternal existence. But it 
has not ceased to be and it will not cease to be. He has always existed and will exist forever 
and ever. It is, therefore, correct when they, [Christians], say that God is “living” and 
“speaking.” They do not by necessity mean that there are three gods, for we see that the 
soul, when “word” and “life” are confirmed in it, does not become three souls; nor does the 
fire, when “warmth” and “light” are confirmed in it, become three fires; nor does the sun, 
when “light” and “heat” are confirmed in it, become three suns. But just as the soul, fire, and 
sun are truly like this, so by the confirmation of substantial “life” and “word” in the soul, it 
becomes “living” and “speaking”; otherwise, it would be inanimate. By the fact of the 
“warmth” and “light” in a fire, it becomes complete through them and becomes a fire, not 
water or anything else. If it loses “heat” and “light,” it would no longer be named “fire.” 
Likewise, the sun with its “light” and “heat” is called “sun.” If it loses “light” and “heat,” it dims 
and cools down and would not be named “sun” anymore. You find that the soul, with its 
“word” and “life” is one soul; the fire, with its “warmth” and “light” is a single fire; the sun, with 
its “light” and “warmth” is one sun. Therefore, the triune nature of these things does not 
negate their oneness; neither does their oneness negate their triune nature. 
 [19a]// If someone says: “How can you call ‘the Word’ and ‘the Spirit’ hypostases in 
God, but you do not call the ‘word’ of the soul and its ‘life’ hypostases, nor the ‘warmth’ and 
‘light’ of the fire, nor the ‘light’ and ‘warmth’ of the sun?” We answer: “We do this because of 
the perfection of the Creator and His transcendence above having His ‘Word’ and His ‘Spirit’ 
imperfect or flawed. For us, the hypostasis is a perfect thing, not deficient, and it does not 
need anything else for its establishment. As for these powers we have mentionedーthat of 
the soul, the sun, and the fireーthey are imperfect in power if compared to the Creator, for 
they are created. Because of this imperfection, we do not call them hypostases. We did not 
give you these examples from the created to the Creator [to indicate] that both are equally 
perfect, so that when you call the three concepts by which the Creator is found to be known, 
hypostases, in virtue of their perfections, you would also call the three concepts by which the 
created substances are known, hypostases. If this were the case, then what would be the 
superiority of the Creator over the creature, if you could apply whatever you find in the 
Creator to the creature?  
“However, we give this example, but because there is nothing like God, the 
example is given in relation to Him [only] in terms of similarity. We have found one thing 
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known by three meanings. The triune nature of this thing did not nullify the oneness of its 
substance, nor did its oneness of substance abolish its three meanings. But it is established 
in its substance on its oneness, and in its meanings on its triune nature. This example cannot 
be similar in all things to the thing it represents, just as if someone had asked you to make a 
statue of a king whom he had never seen, and when you sculpted it, he did not find it 
moving, or seeing, or hearing, or smelling, or tasting, or walking. Then, he tells you, ‘That 
man moves, sees, hears, tastes, smells, [19b]// and so on, but this one has none of these 
qualities. How do you say, then, that you have made the statue like the king?’ It would seem 
as though it were impossible for you to make the statue identical in every way to the one 
whose likeness you have made, (if this were not a representation but the object itself), 
particularly when it is not in your power to make the thing that is represented into an image of 
it in all respects. Therefore, it is impossible for us to give you an example taken from the 
creature to the Creator in every respect, because they are not alike, and you will not find any 
creature as perfect as the Creator to the extent that he has what the Creator has, which 
would make him identical to the Creator in all respects. But from what you have witnessed, 
we have only given you one thing which has one substance yet has three meanings, so that 
this possibility is not denied. We do not mean that the Creator has any equivalent. You also, 
when you say that the Creator has one meaning, do not wish to compare Him to the accident 
which is apart from the substance, for He is one in meaning.  
“Still, you should not specify your Creator in your doctrine by what you witness to be 
despicable. You know that things are not but four types: either ‘substance,’ as when you say 
‘man;’ or ‘hypostasis,’ as when you say ‘Moses,’ ‘David,’ or ‘Solomon;’ or ‘power,’ as in the 
heat of the fire or the ray of the sun; or ‘accident,’ as in the darkness of black and the 
whiteness of white. The more perfect of these four things are ‘substances’ and ‘hypostases,’ 
because all substances have powers,ーsuch as the heat of fire and the rays of the sunーand 
they also sustain accidents. Furthermore, any substance has two powers, such as the earth 
which has coolness and drought; such as water which has coolness and humidity; such as 
fire which has heat and dryness; such as air which has heat and humidity. All these things 
are one in substance and triple in their meanings. Hypostases, also, [20a]//ーas when you 
say ‘Moses,’ ‘David,’ ‘Solomon’ーeach is sustained by himself, without the need for the other. 
But accidents and powers, one in their meanings, do not subsist by themselves as the 
substances and hypostases do, for they need the substances which support them and are in 
them. 
“You have appealed to the most despicable and the poorest things, and to those 
things which need others for their sustenance, and you have described your Creator by 
means of them, and you have confessed His oneness in meaning like them. Heat is only in 
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the meaning of heat, coolness is only in the meaning of coolness, whiteness is only in the 
meaning of whiteness, and blackness is only in the meaning of blackness. In your narrow 
description of Him, you are not even allowing Him to have ‘life’ and ‘word’ so that He is 
complete in His essence by His ‘life’ and His “’word’! If you had done this, you would have 
attributed to Him the most honorable meanings you have ever found, not the most 
despicable, the lowest, and poorest meanings you have witnessed. As for Christians, 
however, having found that the Creator is One yet known in three meanings, and since 
‘substance’ to them is the most perfect meaning that they have found which includes several 
hypostases, (just as the substance of a human being includes all of the hypostases of 
humanity), and since they wanted to confirm what they had validated before men, they called 
it ‘substance.’ Furthermore, since He is perfect and lacking in nothing, and it was not 
appropriate that His meanings be attributed to what they found to be incomplete, and since 
they witnessed hypostases lacking nothing in themselves, needing nothing and having no 
defect, such as the accidents which are in need of the substances, (which generally are one 
in meaning), they called them ‘hypostases’ after they had found this mentioned in the 
Gospel. So what they have attributed to the Creator, that is, Him being One in substance and 
three in hypostases, is consistent with that which they have found to be the most perfect 
thing. [20b]// Since you found accidents and powers [which are] one in their meanings to be 
despicable, unlike that which was one in substance yet known in three meanings, you have 
described the oneness of your Creator’s meaning in the most despicable way.” 
Someone could say: “Since you have confirmed that God has ‘word’ and ‘spirit,’ and 
you say, ‘three hypostases,’ why do you not also confirm in Him, hearing, seeing, wisdom, 
knowledge, power, authority, mercy, understanding, compassion, generosity, kindness, 
grace, will and other similar substantial qualities? Just as you have called Him “living” and 
“speaking,” confirming in Him “life” and “word” you can also call Him hearing, seeing, wise, 
knowing, powerful, authoritative, merciful, forgiving, compassionate, generous, gracious, 
willing, and other similar names.”  
We respond: “We have come to this because we have found that ‘life’ and ‘speech’ 
belong to the principle of the essence and structure of the substance, unlike other properties. 
We see that earth is inanimate and that bodies have been made out of it. The concept of 
living separates it from what was formed out of it. This is why we call bodies ‘animate 
beings,’ not the earth. We have also seen that the meaning of speaking makes a separation 
between the animate beings. That is why some are called ‘speaking,’ (i.e. human beings), as 
for the rest they remain speechless, rightly called beasts and animals. Hearing, sight, mercy, 
forgiveness, compassion, kindness, and generosity must remain in the substance and there 
is no separation between them, because we see in the one substance the hearing and non-
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hearing, the seeing and the non-seeing, the forgiving and the merciful, and the unforgiving 
and the unmerciful, the good and the generous, and the non-good and the ungenerous. The 
substances are not subject to [21a]// these differences, and they do not change their status in 
order to be divided into other substances, as we have seen the meaning of ‘living’ separating 
the earth from what is formed out of it, making something called animate beings while the 
earth remains inanimate and lifeless. As we have seen the concept of speech differentiating 
between the substances of animate beings so that some are called ‘beasts’ and ‘animals’ 
while others are called ‘speaking,’ so, out of the other attributes, we have confirmed only ‘life’ 
and ‘speech’ as substantial in the essence of the Creator, since we find them to be of the 
principle of the substance. Further, God has attributed them to Himself, and testimonies in 
His Books affirm that as well. That is what we will show in more detail later, explaining it 
more clearly than in this sentence, God willing. 
“As far as ‘hearing’ and ‘seeing’ are concerned, you should not attach them to God 
as substances, because they are two members of the body put together in composite bodies, 
and God has no body in which two members can be put together. But by saying ‘hearing’ and 
‘seeing,’ we mean ‘knowing,’ because we become aware of things by hearing and seeing, 
and God has spoken to us by what we can comprehend. He affirmed in Himself what is in us 
to make us understand His understanding of things, because otherwise we would not have 
understood them.”  
With regard to justice, compassion, generosity, kindness, favor, mercy, and 
forgiveness, these are actions, since He uses them with His creatures. When He punishes 
them on the basis of their merits, they call Him “just”; if He shows them mercy, they call Him 
“merciful”; if He shows them an act of kindness, they call Him “generous”; and if He is good 
and gracious to them, they call Him “good and gracious”; when He shows them His mercy 
and forgives them, they call Him “merciful and forgiving.” These actions are attributed to the 
one who is “speaking.” If “speech” is essentially confirmed in him, it becomes possible for 
him to implement them and use them. We do not say: “We have seen a just lamb, or a 
favorable or generous elephant, or a merciful and gracious horse, or a merciful and forgiving 
bull,” because animals lack speech, [21b]// from which the qualities of these and similar 
actions come.   
As for the “will,” it is of two kinds. One is the will of compulsion, [i.e., instinct], such 
as the will of that which is not “speaking,” for what it performs is by virtue of its nature, like 
ants which accumulate in summer what sustains their life in winter, without discernment or 
wisdom on their part, but because of what is inherent in them. The other is the will of choice, 
such as the will of someone who chooses one thing, thinking about it before doing it, to be 
used for his benefit and the benefit of others. This will of choice is only to be attributed to 
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someone who has “word.” If “word” is confirmed in his substance, he becomes able to 
choose, since making choices is a quality which is not possessed by that which does not 
have “word.” “Will” is not of the principle of substance because it has nothing to do with 
differentiating us from the animals. We share wills with the animals, and we are not 
differentiated by that which we have in common, but rather by the meaning of speech which 
is affirmed in us by our superiority over the animals. This we have and they do not. So, what 
separates us from this inanimate earth is not the existence that we have in common with it, 
but rather, the particularity of life which we have and they do not.  
Thus also, our separation from the animals is not because of the life which we have 
in common, but is rather the particularity of speaking which we have. It is also not on account 
of the wills which we share with the animals that we became separate from them. The wills 
that exist in us and them have become a will of choice in us because we have the quality of 
“speech,” but a will of compulsion in them because of the absence of “speech.” Therefore, 
the will is not part of the structure of the substance, like “life” and “speech.” We have shown it 
to be true that “will” does not differentiate between substances, as the substance of the 
animate beings is separated from the earth on account of “life,” and the substance of those 
who “speak” is separated from other animate beings by virtue of “speech.” 
The proof of this is that we say: “God wills us to do this or that, and He does not will 
such and such, and we want to worship Him; we do not want to deny Him.” [22a]// We say: 
“He used to want us to worship in Jerusalem, but He does not want us to do this today.” But 
we cannot say the same about “life” and “speech” which are parts of the structure of the 
substance; as if we said “God was alive at one time, or was “speaking” and now is “not 
speaking.” No, not according to what ought to be said about Him, what those with speech 
claim for Him by their speaking about “the Noble Names.”  
As for “power” and “strength,” they are of two kinds. One is physical and the other is 
spiritual. The physical is like the force of an elephant carrying men by the massive size of his 
body, and like the force of a camel carrying a burden by the strength of its body and its 
members. The spiritual, however, is like the subtle strength of the soul; I mean its “word,” by 
which it shows its “commands” and “prohibitions.” The soul hears things and obeys them. 
Animals, which are stronger than the human body, have been subdued by it, [spiritual 
power], and it directs the affairs of the world and controls the world’s economy. Thus, the 
power and strength of God are not in members, as we have described the strength of 
physical beings, since He has no body. But this is like the power of the soul that we have 
mentioned, that is, His Word, by which heaven and earth have been established. 
As for “wisdom” and “knowledge,” they are only attributed to a speaker who has 
wisdom. We do not call “wise” or “learned” that which is “not speaking,” just as we do not 
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say: “I saw a knowledgeable donkey or a wise bull.” But, we call speakers wise and 
knowledgeable, just as we call Aristotle “wise” on account of the rightness of his words in 
composing books of logic. We call Galen “knowledgeable” on account of what he composed 
in books of medicine and what he accomplished in that field. Wisdom and knowledge are 
associated with the “word,” since they are only attributed to the one who has “word.” So if 
you see someone who has “word” demonstrating an understanding of existing things as they 
are and showing the ability to distinguish between them, then you call his word “knowledge.” 
And if you see him understanding the way things exist by his word and the reasons for their 
existence, you call it “wisdom.” If wisdom and knowledge were other [22b]// than what we 
have described, it necessitates that, (since you see some people who are wise and others 
who are not wise, some knowledgeable and others who are not knowledgeable), that their 
substances should be different and be separate from each other to the degree that the 
substance of the wise is not the substance of the one who is not wise, and the substance of 
the knowledgeable is not the substance of the one who is not knowledgeable. Just as when 
you see some animate beings speaking, (such as human beings), and others not speaking, 
(such as beasts), you realize that the substance of the one speaking is not the substance of 
the one that cannot speak,ーhere I mean spiritual speech. If the expression of the latter is 
prevented by illness, then his speech and thought are not negated in his soul and are not 
excluded from the substance of those who speak. 
This is what we say of the Word of God when we see Him knowing things as they 
are through it and surrounding them by His comprehension, we call it “knowledge.” When we 
see Him governing and directing all of their economy, we call it “wisdom.” It is clear, then, 
that wisdom and knowledge are associated with the “word,” and that they are only attributed 
to the wisdom and knowledge of one who speaks, who has “word.” It is obvious then that 
nothing ought to belong to the structure of the substance and its essential nature except “life” 
and “word.” Therefore, the Holy Gospel and the Books which preceded it, attribute the Spirit 
and the Word to the essence of the Creator. In doing this, Christianity did not by necessity 
impute to the Creator partition or division, because partition and division only apply to bodies, 
and God has no body. We do not see the subtle spiritual soul becoming embodied, or 
partitioned, or divided by confirming life and word in the essence of its substance, but we 
know this by means of our conjecture, not by its becoming embodied, or being partitioned or 
divided. We do not see fire becoming embodied, or partitioned, or divided by our confirming 
heat [23a]// and light in it; we know that it is the most subtle element because it is invisible in 
its essence, intangible, and untouchable but sheltered in bodies by its subtlety, and that it is 
a substance which is not felt, and does not burn by its heat. And yet, because of its subtlety, 
its heat and light are assumed to be in it and of it. Thus it shows the heat and light which are 
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in its essence, when it appears by its relationship with that which is other than it, and it is not 
divided or partitioned with its subtlety and the existence of these concepts in it. 
Therefore Godーmay His praise be magnifiedーsince we also know by conjecture 
that He is One, exists in three meanings. It is best that in this we do not assume that He has 
any partitions or divisions, which are applicable only to bodies, and He has no body. But we 
find this in some of His creatures, without them having to be divided or partitioned, and this is 
accepted on the basis of what He announced to us in His Book which He authenticated to us 
by its appearing with overwhelming miracles. We believe that He is one substance known in 
three hypostases; that He surrounds the heavens and the earth, without being limited; that 
He is invisible, eternal, and unceasing; and that He lasts forever and ever. 
 
Discourse on the Union 
Having demonstrated our faith in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, that we believe 
Him to be one Creator of everything, who embraces all things, we leave aside the questions 
and answers that might develop concerning this, not wanting the book to be too lengthy, and 
turn to address their condemnation of us for saying that Christ is the Son of God. They stirred 
up people against us by reporting that we say that God took a female companion and had a 
son from her. May God be greatly exalted above that! When we mention that God manifested 
His plan in a body of ours, they allege that we say that He descended into the womb of Mary 
and limited Himself in her. When we mention that Christ was crucified, [23b]// they allege that 
we impute weakness to God. When we mention baptism, and taking the Eucharist as the 
body and blood of Christ, and our belief that our reward in the eternal world is not found 
through sexual intercourse, food or drink, they oppose us in all of this. We will demonstrate in 
all of this the grace of God towards spiritual and physical beings, and His revelation of life 
from death to human beings, and of their ascent from earth to heaven, the place of eternity 
and immortality. 
Therefore, I will begin with what they found to be most despicable and most 
distasteful to them, when it became lodged in their hearts that we say that God took a female 
companion and a son. To all this I say: We are free before God from being suspected of 
saying that He took a female companion. If one of us could exalt himself above that, how 
then can this be attributed to his Creator? May God be greatly exalted far above that! But we 
call the Word of God “Son” just as the Gospel reports. We do not say that the Word of God is 
a body. But since you find one of His creatures, (I mean the spiritual and subtle soul), 
bringing forth its own words in a way which you do not understand or comprehend, why do 
you not say this about the Word of God which is beyond the comprehension of both spiritual 
angels and human beings? 
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I would like to ask them why they find distasteful our naming of the Word as “Son,” 
according to what is in the Books of God concerning him. Is it perhaps because we find that 
our sons only exist through sexual intercourse, which we are ashamed to show? We 
consider the sperm by which they exist to be dirty to the extent that we wash ourselves of it. 
This is how their creation comes from it. They remain in the darkness of the womb for nine 
months, and they come out by strong labor pains through a narrow uterus, together with 
much blood. We therefore inform them, [our accusers], that we are blameless before God 
from all of this, because the Son, according to us, does not have a body [24a]// and he has 
no members, flesh or blood. His eternal birth is not from the body of a woman, but he is the 
Word of God, not confined or perceived. His origination is far beyond the description of the 
generation of light from the sun and speech from the soul.  
If it is because our sons exist in a moment of time, then we inform them that the 
Son remains timeless and that he has no beginning in time. If it is because the sonship of our 
sons changes as they become fathers and then they become grandfathers, and then after 
that they die, bringing to an end what they are called, then this is a proof of the weakness of 
the meaning of what they are called. We inform them that their sonship is changed and 
transferred to something else until it comes to an end, which happens because these 
meanings are not from their own essences, but they are borrowed from fatherhood. The 
exalted sonship, (which is from the essence, does not change, is not transferred, and does 
not come to an end), becomes an example for their sonship. Thus other sonships can be 
inferred from it, even though the example does not contain the completeness of the thing it 
represents. It is known that a son of ours is not an act of the father, but is from his substance, 
and that fatherhood has not preceded sonship, since a man is not called “father” until he has 
a son: thus fatherhood and sonship must be together. So the Word of God, when called 
“Son,” is not His act, but is from the essence of His substance; it was not His act but it was 
from His substance. His substance never ceases to be; it never ceases to be and He was 
never without it. If He were without Word at any point in time, it would have to be said that He 
was not speaking or knowing. If a father from among us, at the occurrence and time of 
coming into being, (before the name of “fatherhood” was applied to him), precedes the son in 
his occurrence and time of coming into being, it is because they are two created [24b]// 
bodies; a created one creates; one is after the other. Fatherhood and sonship do not belong 
to their essence, but they were loaned names of what belongs to the Creator in His essence, 
because He has given us all of the noble names He has in His essence, such as “living,” 
“wise,” “knowledgeable,” and “speaking,” among others. 
It can only be inferred from the naming of the Word as “Son,” (since we know that 
the created son is from the essence of the substance of the father and is not his act), that the 
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Word is from the substance of God and is not His act. It cannot be inferred that God is a 
body in which another body was created. Fatherhood and sonship are two properties created 
together in us; one cannot lack the other, since a father and son from among us are created 
in time. It is imperative that we know that fatherhood and sonship in the essence of the 
Creator are eternal; neither preceded the other, since there is nothing in the essence of the 
Creator that is created or which precedes or follows. When an example is given to us about 
one thing, we do not to apply it to everything, but we limit it to the meaning that is intended by 
it. For example, since our Creator calls us by His noble names which belong to Him in His 
essence, such as “living,” “wise,” “knowledgeable,” and “speaking,” so that it can be inferred 
from their nobility that they are His and that they are not from our essence, then He shows 
His favor to us by granting us these names. It is not permissible for us, having seen them 
created in us as we are created, to say that they are also created in the Creator, for He is 
eternal. But we must say, since they are in reality from the Creator and are given to us as a 
loan, that they are eternal in Him. If they are temporal for us, they are eternal for Him, since 
in us they are shifting and transitory in this world.  
We also find the names “fatherhood” and “sonship” to be the most noble among 
these names, and they bring the greatest blessing to us, and they are most valued by us. 
Since the blessing of what we were given in these names, from one spirit [25a]// male and 
female, the world has become full of humans, males and females, and it has become a 
prosperous world, so that it is known that by virtue of them the world is multiplied and 
maintained. Even though the properties of the Creator who created the world did not start 
with them, He multiplied us by naming us by them. Without the blessing of what was loaned 
to us by these names, Adam would not have been called “living,” “knowledgeable,” 
“speaking,” and things like these. He would have died and his wife, too, and would have 
been obliterated. This whole world would have been obliterated, and on account of this 
eradication, the hereafter also would have been obliterated. Therefore, the blessing, growth, 
and maintenance of creatures is only by virtue of that by which we have been honored, by 
the Creator giving us of what He has in His essence of fatherhood and sonship. This is not 
from our essence, for if we return to it we will only find death and a return to that from which 
we originate: I mean, the dead earth.  
If it is because our sons are bodies, we inform them that fatherhood and sonship, 
according to us, mean that the Father and Son are not physical; they have nothing of that in 
their essence. At a specific time, a man may remain for a while without being called “father” 
until another body is created out of him, and so they both together are entitled to fatherhood 
and sonship. Then, the name of sonship is handed on from the son when he is named 
“father.” This is not removed from him by death. 
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Therefore, oh listener, why do you shrink from our mention of fatherhood and 
sonship? They are not physical. It is possible that a human proceeds from another human 
like him without the first being called a “father” and the second a “son.” Just as when Eve 
proceeded from Adam, she was not called his son, nor was he called her father.  Just as fruit 
comes from a tree, the tree is not called a father, nor the fruit a son. Also, when beasts give 
birth they are not called “fathers” and “sons.” Just as you say “lion cubs,” “dog pups,” and 
“sheep lambs”, they are not called “sons” and “fathers” lest they share with humans in the 
dignity [25b]// of fatherhood and sonship, which are two properties of the Creator. 
Therefore your Creator, O manーmay His praise be exaltedーhas honored you with 
what is not in your substance. You suppose that it is from your essence, and, according to 
you, it has become an imperfection. You have turned what ought to be worthy of praise into 
defamation and censure. After this, we inform you that the Son of God does not have a body, 
but He embraces everything; He is not limited, and cannot be comprehended by any rational 
mind.  
If it is because, according to them, the honor and the praise in the saying that He 
“does not beget and is not begotten,” let the one who says this know that if the exaltation is 
that it is said about Him that He “does not beget and is not begotten,” then he must have 
granted exaltation to the worms, bedbugs, mosquitoes, and nits, and all that becomes an 
embryo, and comes into being; and exaltation to the locusts for they plant something which 
has neither form nor life, then it takes form and comes into being shortly after that; and 
exaltation to the sparrows, swallows, wasps, chickens, hens and all kinds of birds which lay 
eggs, for birds do not give birth to birds; and exaltation to the trees, plants and herbs; yes, 
and to that which does not have lifeーgrains, seeds, rocks and stones; and to the totality of 
nature, animate and inanimate, (for instance, the earth, water, air and fire), since each of 
these components does not beget and is not begotten.  
If all these animate beings or inanimate things which we have mentioned are the 
most despicable in the world, and if human beings that have fatherhood and sonship are the 
most exalted in the world; yes, and if the animate beings which generate and are generated, 
(despite the fact that they are not called “fathers” and “sons” lest they share with human 
beings in this dignity), are more exalted than those things which neither generate nor are 
generated, therefore it becomes clear to them that deficiency and despicability are only found 
in that which [26a]// does not generate nor is generated; and  honor and high rank are found 
in that which was generated and generates. If that which was not  generated is the most 
exalted thing, then Eve, who was not generated, would have been the most exalted over all 
things; and Satan, who does not generate nor is generated, would have been more exalted 
than Abraham, the friend of the Most Merciful. Furthermore, if fatherhood and sonship were 
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deficiencies, then there would be nothing in the world more deficient than people who live in 
it, and nothing would be higher in rank than the beetles, worms, bugs, mosquitoes and 
everything we have described among such animate beings and inanimate things. Each of 
them does not beget and is not begotten.   
Since we have found that man is the most dignified of all things, and that he is more 
honored by God than them or even the angels, we know that dignity and loftiness are in what 
is generated and generates. If it depended on choice, He would have given those things high 
rank and dignity; yet He did not make him deficient or low, since despicability and deficiency 
are in that which does not beget and is not begotten. We are certain that our dignity and our 
high rank occur by the application of the names of fatherhood and sonship to us. They are 
properties of the Creatorーmay His praise be exaltedーas He said in His pure and holy Book 
which was confirmed in the world on account of the resurrection of the dead and the wonders 
which cannot be described. We know that our Creator has left none of His properties and 
noble names which He has in His essence, but He has called us by them, such as living, 
knowing, wise, forbearing, speaking, king, powerful, mighty, strong, able, generous, kind, 
merciful, and others like that in Him. A man is called by all of these names which only the 
Creator merits and not His creation. Praise be to Him for His favor, His beneficence and 
blessing!    
If it is because they see these in humans, and according to them it is not 
appropriate to attribute to God what belongs to humans, we say that if a human being is 
called living, knowing, beneficent, generous, gracious, favorable, [26b]// or the like, then they 
cannot call the Creator by them as well. 
If they say: “All of this belongs to the Creator, yet He has preferred and honored us 
by calling us by these names.” We say: “Why then do you not include fatherhood and 
sonship as well? Is this too amazing, or too human? It is through being amazing, and through 
the greatness of His status, and the blessing of His name that the world multiplied, and so we 
are found in it. Through our existence in this world we find the world which does not pass 
away.” 
If they say: “That is deficiency in us”; we have accounted for aspects of deficiency 
yet we have excluded them from fatherhood and sonship which are amazing, beyond 
comprehension, and are too exalted to be described. What is their argument, then, after we 
have removed the mention of deficiencies, in their neglecting to add them to these names 
which we have mentioned? I would like to oppose them over what, according to them, they 
find to be a deficiency, such as mercy, (which exists for them only through causing suffering 
and anguish to the heart), and anger, (which does not exist for them until it changes what 
comes before it), and contentment, (which only happens for them by means of advancing in 
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their knowledge of what is decreed for them afterwards), so that they exclude that and 
everything like it from the Creator. For if they find something to be deficient according to 
them, they do not attribute it to their Creator; so they must not attribute to Him mercy, 
contentment, discontent, anger, or the like. Yet if they do not attribute these to Him, surely 
their judgment from Him will descend upon themselves, for they do not believe in Him and 
His Books which say these things about Him. They may come back and say, “We name Him 
by these things, yet we exclude from Him any deficiency that appears in us.” I answer, “Why 
do you not attribute to Him fatherhood and sonship, while excluding from Him the deficiency 
which exists in us?” I do not think they have an argument, but they are afraid of this. Their 
hearts are not familiar [27a]// with Him because of their aversion to what might come to pass 
from the fear of the appearance of things, without the examination of their inmost secrets. 
 
Confirmation of the Incarnation 
As for the manifestation of our Creator to His creatures in a human being from among us, 
just as Heーhallowed be His namesーembraces heaven and earth and is not comprehended 
by the subtlety of the spiritual angels or the innermost thoughts of all humans; so the 
profundity of His direction, grace, generosity and kindness in His manifestation to His 
creatures is not known, and only His knowledge, which embraces all things, can comprehend 
this.  
However, in any event, we mention some of what His Books have indicated about 
Him regarding this [incarnation]. Nonetheless, we know that they only mentioned a few things 
which weak human beings might manage to understand. We will explain this in a way that 
should compel rational people to affirm it.  
Before we explain in detail the grace of the Creator to His creatures, we must 
mention the nature of His grace, kindness and generosity to them that preceded this, so that 
what we will explain about the beginning of these, (which our opponents join us in affirming), 
becomes a witness for us against their disagreement with us when we describe the 
completion of His grace towards His creatures,ーsince the beginning of God’s generosity, 
which they do not mention, and the completion of His favor, which they deny, are similar. 
These two similar actions signify the One who is known by them, who began by providing a 
little and then completed it with abundance, and made them advance gradually from 
smallness to greatness just as He made the mind and body of a human being gradually 
advance from being small to being great, and from having little to having much knowledge. 
 I say: The Creatorーmay His praise be exaltedーhas never ceased to be one, 
living, knowing, and independent of others. Out of His kindness and generosity He has made 
creatures which can be divided into two kinds: visible and invisible, physical and spiritual. 
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Both kinds are, in turn, divided into three types: the kind which is living and speaking, such 
as the spiritual beings; [and] the kind which is living but non-speaking, such as beasts, 
animals, birds, and insects; [27b]// [and] the kind which is inanimate, non-living, such as 
heaven, earth, water, fire, air and other inanimate things. Then He created human beings 
different from all of this, and established him as one whose spirit comes from the spiritual 
beings, and whose body comes from the physical ones. And in his body He gathered the 
powers of these four elements, such as heat, cold, dryness and humidity. So he, [the 
human], became representative of all the creatures, and the two types regarded as spiritual 
and physical were joined in him. The powers of the four different elements of which the world 
is composed are found in him in order to show, by the gathering together of different, 
contradictory things in him, that their Creator, despite the differences in them, is One, and 
that He gathered all of them in one thing which He made out of them all. And whenever He 
honors an individual person He includes all of His creatures, since he is their representative 
who is given something greatーjust as He acquired for him two great things, namely earth 
and heaven. He housed him at first in the lowest of these houses, (i.e., earth); having had it 
decorated with all the lights hanging from its roof, and set him up with servants, and provided 
him with food, drink, clothing and everything he needed. He made him king over everything 
on earth and subjected under him what is on the land and in the sea, in order to transfer him 
afterwards to heaven where he, on account of the difference between the two houses, may 
know the virtue of honor which he would attain over against that which he left behind, and 
this will be the basis of his joy. 
Having shown God's grace and generosity towards him, [the human], we now say: 
The Creatorーmay He be exalted and praisedーsince the beginning of humanity is Him 
gathering together in him all His creatures whether spiritual or physical, out of His generosity 
towards him, as we have described, it is therefore necessary that people of sound mind 
should know that the Creator will complete what He started, lest anything is left uncompleted 
by Him, since the Creator out of His generosity, not out of His need for him, created him. 
[28a]// And it is not possible to attribute to the Creator the beginning of an uncompleted 
grace, for He is generous and not grudging. The command of the One who ordered the 
beginning which we have described, and His making a house for us, urging its building and 
completion, must give witness concerning His generosity and kindness as He completes 
what He has started.  
Therefore, we will briefly mention four explanations concerning what are known as 
the reasons for the manifestation of the Creator to His creatures, to perfect what He had 
begun in humanity out of His generosity and kindness, thus manifesting His wisdom and 
justice. 
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The first of them shows His wisdom, justice and love for His creatures by bringing 
them gradually closer to knowing Him, and confirming Himself to them, for He cannot be 
comprehended by the way they comprehend and come to understand. As we have 
mentioned, this is attested to in His plan to manifest Himself in a body like ours. 
I say: Godーmay He be exalted and praisedーdid not imprint His knowledge in our 
substance, as He imprinted knowledge of things in that which has no “word” without them 
having learned these things, like the bee in which is imprinted the knowledge of collecting 
honey and of making hives where it puts the honey; and like the spider in which is imprinted 
knowledge of making a house for itself. This is done lest our praise for the knowledge of Him 
becomes worthless, just as praise of a lamb for its calmness and its stillness is worthless, 
since this is the lamb’s nature; and the censure of a wolf for its deceit and meanness is 
worthless, since these things are woven into its nature. Had God imprinted knowledge of Him 
in our substance, He would not have found anyone of us who is ignorant of Him or does not 
know Him, or anyone who ignores Him at one time then changes to knowing Him at another 
time, since our substance would be one. At this point, we needed our Creator to make 
Himself known to us, since He called us to know Him, and ordered us to worship Him. And 
He is not limited to a place, but He embraces all places. For He and all the angels and 
humans are comprehended by our senses, since we only comprehend things by them, and 
our minds only know what our senses indicate. Many people have also differed on the 
classification of what leads to them. However, what we comprehend by them, [our senses], is 
what seems correct to us, [while] that which our minds [28b]// deduce is unlike anything 
which reaches our senses. That which is not pictured in the imagination cannot stay firmly in 
the soul, and believing in it becomes very difficult, and it is only possible through words, and 
by the compulsion of evidences, and also by what is comprehended about it by the senses. 
If you reached the point of what you had previously deduced and wanted to verify it 
for yourself, and you did not find that it was according to your imagination, its existence 
would be invalidated by you. We see that people are united in confirming [the reality of] their 
bodies as they comprehend them by their senses; yet they disagree about their souls, since 
their souls are not comprehended by their senses, (despite the evidence of their souls’ logic, 
wisdom, direction, and closeness, since it indwells their bodies), with the result that many 
people deny and reject their souls, yet they speak with their souls’ logic. And many disagree 
about this, and discuss theories too lengthy to be mentioned. 
Godーmay His praise be exaltedーknew that our knowledge of Himself does not 
stand firm in our souls; and that our worship of Him is not pure; and that it is not agreeable to 
us since our eyes do not comprehend Him, and our imaginations do not reach Him till our 
souls find rest concerning His standing firm; and that doubt about Him is banished from our 
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hearts only through His appearance to us, by His speaking to us through what our senses 
can achieve, [through] His commanding and forbidding us and directing us to worship Him in 
one place, (as if He is only to be found there, as we cannot worship Him in every place). He 
spoke to Adam, Abel, Cain, Noah, and Abraham, as if He were human, just as the Torah 
says; He commanded them and forbade them, and they saw Him; He spoke to Moses from 
the bush, as our opponents admit; He also spoke to him from the cloud just as a man speaks 
to his friend, according to what the Torah says. Then, after that, He ordered the sons of 
Israel to build a house of stone and an ark of wood so that He may dwell in it, and speak to 
them from it, and receive their sacrifices [29a]// as if He were contained in it. He called it His 
house; since the house belonged to Him who was known by His familiarity with it, by His 
living in it, so that their eyes, their thoughts, their worship, and their supplications might be 
directed towards one place, as if it contained Him. This was so that their thoughts might not 
wander everywhere in search of Him without finding Him, since He is not visible, and 
imaginations do not reach Him so that He becomes contained or confined, and He is not 
affected by anything which depends on Him,ーthus people might return to denying Him and 
not believing in Him.  
We have seen that the ones who oppose our teaching refer to their Book 
concerning God’s directing what they should do, (which is similar to what we have described 
of people’s need for this), for God’s direction of them. They say that God said He is a Hear-er 
and See-er, not that He has “hearing” or “sight,” but because He spoke to people in a way 
which they can understand, He attributed the properties of hearing and seeing to Himself 
even though He is exalted far above them. Likewise, is His saying that, although He knows 
everything, He forgets, He provides, He is angered, and He is satisfied, and similar 
responses that belong to creatures and are not appropriate for the Creator. Likewise, is His 
saying that He has a house in the direction of which He ordered them to pray from every 
place, as if He were there and not anywhere else. The house is only known on account of its 
owner’s dwelling in it, and his familiarity with it. Thus, He led them to assume that the house 
confines Him so that He could confirm Himself to them, and He demonstrated that people 
need to turn their faces towards one place which He assigned for Himself. However, had He 
spoken to them from that house, or had He spoken to their prophet just as He spoke to 
Moses from the bush, or just as He spoke to the priests of the sons of Israel from the ark, this 
would have been a stronger confirmation of His existence to them, and it would have been 
more indicative of His kindness towards them, that the house was truly His, that He appeared 
in it, and spoke from it, just as He spoke from other places. There is no difference between 
us and them in what we have mentioned, and no defect in it. Indeed, He spoke to Moses 
from what is less [29b]// than this, I mean from a contemptible, dishonorable and fruitless 
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bush. 
Since we have shown people’s need for this, the direction of God for them as we 
have described, and the belief of our opponents in the same regard, they and all people of 
sound mind who acknowledge the Books must know that the appearance of God to people in 
a human being living among them, is a better likeness of His favor, His generosity, and His 
kindness to them, and is a much stronger confirmation of His permanent existence, and a  
clearer proof of His kindness to them and the honor He shows them in His appearing in the 
image and likeness of a human being, and in a stone house, and an ark of wood, and a 
contemptible tree, a cloud, and the like. He has not neglected to do what was better and 
more like Himself. Yet, they ask us to confirm this to them from His Books and from that 
which indicates to rational people that He has really done it, without them denying that He 
had done it, but instead by confessing that His favor is in it. This is confirmed to them, and 
they ought to accept it and believe in it. 
The second reason [for the manifestation of the Creator to His creatures] is that He 
demonstrates His love for His creatures, His pleasure in introducing joy to them, His removal 
of doubts from them, His showing them kindness, and giving them their needs and their 
desires; and this is what I say about it:  
What people love the most, what they find most delightful, and what they find most 
pleasing to their souls, is knowing everything to the point that nothing remains hidden. We 
have seen people going to great pains to calculate the stars, study alchemy, tell fortunes, 
watch acts of incantation, and the like. Moreover, they rush to watch tricks of magic and 
other things, they are so keen to understand and comprehend their reality. When it is 
reported to them that a prophet has appeared, they become eager to go and see him and 
find favor with him. What is of greater value to them, or more [30a]// significant and more 
desirable than all of this, than seeing their Creator, their originator, the One who is in charge 
of their wellbeing, the One who made heaven and earth for them? This is like when Moses, 
son of ‘Imrān, the prophet, wanted this, so he asked his Lord to show Himself to him; and it is 
like many of our opponents who say they will see God on the day of the Resurrection. There 
is no grace greater in value or more significant for them than seeing Him. Also, we have seen 
many people, out of their desire to see their gods which they name idols and see and 
worship by His name. As a result, people of sound mind must know that God, since He is not 
comprehended, out of love for His creatures and the care for them that He shows in His 
actions and reveals in His grace and generosity, is not grudging in giving His creatures their 
needs and desires by appearing to them in a body which their senses can grasp. All of this 
raises them up and benefits them, yet does not abase Him nor show any deficiencies in Him, 
but rather He shows His generosity and His action. Since He began by appearing to them in 
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human form without a real body, and in a bush, and within an ark of wood, and other things 
which are inferior to them, according to Him it is understandable that He would do this in a 
real body of theirs, which is more honorable for Him, and through which their honor is more 
abundant, and in which His grace is more manifest; and by His generosity and kindness He 
is more like them and yet worthier than them, and He has not stopped doing what was 
worthy of Him. 
If they ask us to prove the correctness of this to them, then surely it has never been 
denied by them, because such an action is better and more akin to God’s favor and 
generosity. He therefore does this, and they must accept it and believe in it.  
As for the third reason which demonstrates His favor and justice, we say: God 
ordered His servants to obey Him and forbade them from disobeying Him, and prepared for 
them His reward for obedience and His punishment for disobedience, and informed them that 
He judges every human being according to his deeds, and that He is not comprehended, and 
that eyes cannot see Him. [30b]// People of sound mind must know, (since according to them 
it is repugnant that the judge is veiled from those whom he will judge, and that this is not just 
according to them, that it is not good according to God as well), that at the point of reaching a 
judgment and verdict between heaven and hell, the judge sees the one whom he judges, but 
the one being judged does not see the judge. It is worthier for God that He does what is more 
appropriate and more agreeable than His creatures. They know that He spoke to us in His 
Books, not according to His power, but according to what we can comprehend by ourselves; 
He spoke to us about Himself by what was not obligatory for Him; and on the day of 
Resurrection, the day when He will judge us, He will not treat us according to His ability, but 
according to His justice. He must appear to us in something which our senses can reach, but 
since manifesting Himself in His essence is impossible, He therefore makes this thing a veil 
between us and Him. Thus, the hopeful and the fearful will fix their eyes on the One from 
whom the judgment will come, and they will gaze on Him. The one who obeys does not 
expect a decree concerning his reward where he cannot see anything; and the one who 
fears is condemned to punishment without seeing the One who makes that judgment. If this 
were the case, He would have contradicted what He informed us about in His Books, in His 
words to us which we can comprehend, before our coming before Him and our standing in 
His presence, and He would have impoverished us when we received what is due to us, and 
so we would be compelled to accept what is imposed on us. This is not like His acts, or His 
justice, or His wisdom. [Rather,] the worthiest, the noblest, the most honorable, and the most 
similar visible thing for His veiling is the substance of a human being.  
 As for the fourth reason, in which He shows the completion of His grace and 
generosity, we say:  
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Since our Creator created us, not out of His need, but to bestow His generosity on 
us and to make us honorable like Himself, there is nothing greater in value for us, or more 
profound concerning honoring us and the honoring all of His creatures which are included in 
us, (since He gave [31a]// us dominion in this perishable world over all which is in it), than for 
Him to bring this to completion by giving us dominion in the everlasting world. Since we have 
the names of kingship and dominion, which do not belong to us in our own essence, but our 
Creator has graciously given us what is His and what only He is entitled to, they will not be 
taken from us in the situation of our reward in the everlasting world. Through the 
enhancement of His dignity in the time of our reward in the everlasting world, we will be more 
worthy and more deserving of the full force of the meaning of this, and God will be even more 
like this by the completion of the generosity with which He began. 
Now that we have shown here how it can be possible that the names of kingship 
and dominion are established in one of us and so they include all, we have also mentioned 
some of the reasons which the Books of God indicate concerning the design of the 
manifestation of the Creator to His creatures in a human being from among humanity. And 
we have also compelled people of sound mind to know the truthfulness of this and to stop 
rejecting it, since it is more akin to the favor of the Creator and His blessing, His might, His 
justice and His wisdom. Now, from each chapter, we will produce an answer concerning the 
meaning of God’s design so that there will be a unified structure that does not look disjointed 
to the one looking at it, and so we say:  
Since Godーmay His praise be glorifiedーcreated humanity out of His generosity 
and kindness and knew that he, [humanity], would need to know Him and to have evidence 
of His generosity, (because his eyes do not comprehend Him and his mind cannot fully grasp 
Him), He made Himself known to him in a way that he could comprehend, that his senses 
could reach, and in which his soul could find rest. Therefore, He set out His design for doing 
this and at one time He appeared to him in his image, and in a bush at another time, and in a 
cloud at another, and in other ways too. Was there anything of greater value to him, 
[humanity], more significant and more highly desirable than His appearing to him in what was 
closer than the things in which He had appeared, [31b]// than in an image without form or 
change or the like? But instead [He appeared] in a real body of his own substance from 
which he, [the human], can know Him, and in which his soul can find rest; and by His 
appearing to him he is given dignity, honor, and dominion, just as the soul gives the body its 
life and speech. He completes the dominion that He gave him over some of His creatures by 
making it extend over the rest of His creatures, and thus he reaches the highest degree of 
honor. This is the reason He created him, not because He needed him. When He judges 
him, He will have a body which he can look at, and the judgment will not be rendered without 
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him knowing where the judgment comes from.  
Heーmay His praise be glorifiedーmanifested Himself for this and other reasons 
which are not mentioned by the majority of the varying opinions of the people of the world 
[who] differ in the search for Him, in their confusion concerning Him and in their remoteness 
from knowing Him, because the eyes do not comprehend Him, and the minds do not attain to 
Him, except through the design, the might, and the dominion. [He manifested Himself] 
without the moving of His essence from one place to another, or it having to go through one 
state to another, but through what is more honorable for Him than the things in which He had 
previously appeared, to bring the souls of people closer to His existence, [through] forms, 
visions, a bush, a cloud, an ark of wood, and a house of stones. In this way, His grace and 
generosity to His creatures are more evident and more visible, and He has honored them 
more and more. I mean: a man, His image, from the Virgin Mary, without an element of 
human seed. He spoke to the people of the world through him, and He addressed them by 
his tongue, and He put them at ease when they looked at him, and He brought them close to 
Himself, because they had been at a distance from Him on account of the deceit of Satan, 
and He removed them from their enemy, and gave them power over him, and called them to 
know Him without a messenger between Himself and them, by means of a tongue united 
with a body of theirs. This is rather like the soul that shows its logic and wisdom from [within] 
a lifeless body, without a messenger between itself and it, but through union with it and 
showing its life and its wisdom in it and benefiting [32a]// it with what it has, to the point that 
what it has of life and speech becomes essential and substantial to it, having come as a 
benefit to it without lacking anything, and without the body being separate from it. For this 
reason, one name has become inclusive of both of them, I mean the name of a human being 
and the meaning of it. So, if it is said that a human being “spoke,” “understood,” “knew,” “was 
able,” and “organized,” this all indicates the soul, since the origin of speech and wisdom is in 
its essence. And if it is said that a human being “ate,” “drank,” “grew taller,” “got broader,” 
and “died,” this all indicates the body which is sustained by food and drink, and grows, and 
increases in length and width, even though it’s essence is inanimate.  
Therefore, since a decree of God is above all other decrees, (none of which can be 
compared with it), the manifestation of the Creator in our body through design, and union 
with it by dominion and might without limitation happens in the same way as the limitation of 
the soul in the body. He has given it one name, along with the body in which He has veiled 
Himself from us: I mean, the name of Christ. 
When it is said that He is He, has always been and always will be, and that He is 
Creator and God, this indicates that the Creator who is invisible, and who, by His grace, has 
spoken to us from our body in which He veiled Himself, for by design He came closer to us 
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and spoke to us from our substance, (because He encompasses heaven and earth), [this He 
did] after He had been used to speaking to us from what was far from our substance, and 
remote from us.  
When it is said He is created, pertains to time, eats and drinks and the like, this 
refers to our body in which He veiled Himself from us. So, the name Christ became indicative 
of the Creator and His creature. He is Creator who is invisible in His divinity, and seen in his 
humanity as created; just as a human being indicates spirit and body, so he is spiritual in his 
spirit and bodily in his body. And since we have found this in the creature, even though the 
creature falls short of the perfection of the Creator, how much more appropriate is the 
perfection and loftiness of this in comprehending the Creator! And if the created soul which 
falls short of the perfection of power and generosity [32b]// gave the body in which it was 
veiled what it has of life and speech to the point that the body became one with it in living 
and speaking, how much more appropriate it is that we know that the Creator perfects the 
gift, perfects the honor, and bestows the gift and the grace in this to His creature. Moreover, 
by His generosity, with which no other generosity can be compared, after He was known to 
be dwelling in heaven and that He was called as such because of the honor of its location 
and the loftiness of its place, He became one who dwelt in our body with the plan to become 
closer to His creatures, without being limited or confined by it. But while He indwells it, He 
encompasses all things. He has shown His power, His design, and His dominion in it and He 
has spoken to the people of the world in their languages. And He told the people that He is 
their Creator who has always wanted to confirm His existence to them. He spoke to them 
from visible things and made this real by giving life to the dead, sight to the eyes of the blind, 
hearing to the ears of the deaf, speech to the mute, healing to the sick, and purity to the 
leprous, in order to make plain that, when He gave life to the dead by dominion and power, 
He was the One who made them dead, and when He gave sight, hearing, speech and 
healing, He was the One who had done this in the beginning when He made this person 
blind and that person deaf or mute or leprous, and he said, “If you do not believe in me, 
believe in my works.” He sent messengers to all the people of the world in their different 
languages which He had created for them, so that people would know that the One who 
divided the languages and made them different is the One who calls them to know Him, and 
that nobody else can do that but He Himself. He ordered them to preach His manifestation in 
a body of theirs and tell people what He has shown in it of His power, might, and dominion, 
and to preach what He has prepared for them in His Kingdom, and to call them to worship 
Him and obey Him, and to proclaim the life of their bodies after death, and their destination in 
the life which does not perish [33a]//. 
The messengers carried out His orders in the whole world, after He had forbidden 
 395 
them from carrying with them anything with which people of this earth strengthen 
themselves. He gave them the power to do great miracles, the like of which creatures cannot 
do. They proclaimed to the peoples of the world that their Creator, (about Whom they 
differed, and concerning Whom their teaching multiplied, and from Whom their desires were 
separated, and Whose name they gave to others among stars and idols and other 
things, and thus they opposed each other over Him, and the majority of them were confused 
concerning Him, because they neither saw Him nor comprehended Him), [He] appeared in a 
body of theirs and He spoke to the people from it, and He showed His power and might in it, 
and He took it with Him in His dignity and made it reign, and He gave it life after it was dead, 
and He took it up to heaven higher than His angels, and it will remain His veil between Him 
and them and the rest of His creatures for eternity. 
They, [the apostles], performed great miracles in His name, and thus they 
confirmed that He is their Creator. And the people of the world accepted what they 
proclaimed and their joy became greater as He honored them by appearing to them and by 
His raising of their substance. They stopped searching for the Creator. And they believed 
that He is one, known in three hypostases, that He is present in all places, that He is not 
contained in any place, that He appeared according to His design without any limitation, and 
that He established fellowship with them. They put aside the books which those who were 
confused about Him had written before His appearance, which called the stars, and the idols 
and other things by His name. They also started to worship Him, and they despised the lusts 
of the world for His sake, and were led to accept the sayings of the fishermen who were 
His apostles. Thus, their victory was not possible on account of the power or might of 
authority, but because of the appearance of great miracles by their hands.  
What greater grace, what more abundant favor, what more obvious generosity is 
there than this by which God has sealed His generosity and kindness which He initiated in 
us! And what conclusion concerning this situation more clearly indicates the initiation of His 
favor to us than that He began by creating us, to the extent that we fell short of praising His 
grace in this, that is, in making us. For He was in the universe by Himself yet He made a 
portion of the universe for us along with Himself. And while He was the only One who is living 
and speaking, He gave us [33b]// a share by making us, along with the angels, speaking 
beings. While He alone had dominion over what He had created, He gave us a portion by 
giving us dominion over what is on earth. Then, when He wanted to seal our situation by 
bringing His grace to completion, He brought us to the goal of His generosity and kindness 
so that we would know that He had created us for this reason and not because He needed 
us. There is no greater grace for us other than His manifestation to us, and His appearance 
in us, and His fulfilling the dominion which He had given us over what is on earth by giving us 
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dominion over what is in heaven. After the first man fell from rank due to his disobedience, 
and after his departure from paradise when he became the subject of wrath, being placed 
under death after having been cut off from any hope of life, He manifested Himself in a 
human being from among us and took him with Him in dominion and dignity. When he, 
[humanity] despaired of having any mercy or salvation from death, his Creator manifested 
Himself to him in his substance, so He has raised him from death, and made him a governing 
king over that which is in heaven and on earth.  
What greater grace is there for the creature than his Creator bringing him to this 
degree of honor, dignity, kingship, and dominion? And what ignorance is greater than the 
ignorance of the one who hates his own honor and dignity? For while he likes one of the 
angels to speak to him in the form of a human being, he hates his Creator speaking through 
a human being. And while he likes his Creator to speak to him from a bush, he hates the 
Creator speaking to him from his body. And while he likes kingship and dominion over this 
base earth, he hates them over the noble heaven. And while he likes dominion over some 
people in this perishable world, he hates dominion over the angels in the everlasting world. 
And while he likes to have a share of the permanence and eternity which his Creator has in 
His essence so that he may stay living, remain and not perish, he hates to have [34a]// a 
portion of his Creator’s kingship and dominion. And while he wants dignity and honor through 
the revelation of something from the unseen world through a servant from among the angels, 
he hates to know everything from the unseen world by the manifestation of the One who 
created the Angels. And while he wants to exaggerate the favor and kindness of his Creator, 
by describing Him as the One who gave him dominion over the beasts of the land and the 
fish of the sea, he hates to describe Him as the One who gave him dominion over the 
spiritual angels, all the humans, and all the creatures. So, the goal of his Creator has 
become related to the imperfection of his substance and the earthly nature of his body, and 
is not related to the favors and grace of his Creator and to His generosity and kindness to 
which He had made him accustomed. For, when He took one of the people into His dominion 
and kingship, all spiritual and physical beings entered into the honor and dignity of this, since 
he is one of the spiritual beings in his spirit and one of the physical beings in his body. Thus, 
he, [Christ] is king over them all, and this kingship is later confirmed to them by the most 
amazing wonders.  
Just as one after another of the sons of Israel ruled, it was said that kingship 
belongs to the sons of Israel. And when one after another of the non-Arabic speaking nations 
ruled, it was said that kingship belongs to the non-Arabic speaking nations. And when one 
after another of the Arabs ruled, it was said that kingship belong to the Arabs. He is king over 
them, and kingship for them is through him. That is so because he is from them, and his 
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dignity and honor fall on them. It is said that no one has advanced over the people of that 
kingdom, because the honor of one king falls on them all, since he is from their race.  
For this reason and for an even greater reason than this, the honor of the spiritual 
and physical creatures is through the honor of one human being from humanity, and by him 
they are raised in their souls above the lowliness of slaves’ souls, and their common people 
as well as their leaders are raised from slavery to the rank of sonship, since the honor and 
dignity that belongs to their Creator have become theirs [34b]// through a human being who 
is from them in his spirit and body. Their joy becomes greater in their eternal dwelling while 
the description of it becomes weaker, and even if all who are in heaven and earth and that 
which lies in between had one language, they would not arrive at the description of such 
great grace or the gratitude for it throughout all eternity.  
Why then do our opponents hate this great grace and immense honor of which 
creatures fall short in comprehending and in offering thanksgiving? What imperfection 
affected God when He manifested Himself in a base, fruitless bush, and spoke to Moses who 
was a mute shepherd? And what imperfection affected Him in His manifestation in a human 
being from among us, (who are more honorable and beloved than the bush which He had 
created for us!), and in His speaking to all the people of the world with its philosophers, wise 
men, kings, its powerful, good, and excellent people, since they are more numerous than a 
mute shepherd, who initially neither listened nor obeyed?   
Also, what imperfection affected God when He gave humans dominion over what is 
on earth, so that it will affect Him when He gives him dominion over what is in heaven? Is not 
the generosity greater in the eternal situation? Is not His initiating him in his dwelling on 
earth, even though it is perishable, a witness to the seal of His decree concerning him by 
transferring him to heaven, even though it is eternal? And is not His giving him dominion over 
what is on earth, even though this has an end, a witness that He has sealed and perfected it 
by giving him dominion over what is in heaven, even though it is eternal? But He did not 
bring together what He had intended all at once, but began with a little and sealed it with a 
lot. This is like a man who begins with milk in his infancy and later progresses to food. 
Why, O man, does your Creator intend honor and nobility for you, yet you want 
lowliness and baseness for yourself? Why [35a]// are you so miserly concerning His granting 
you the goal of His generosity and kindness? This does not lessen His kingship or dominion, 
just as what He offered you earlier of His kindness did not lessen Him. It is as if you want to 
make Him as stingy as you are. You may buy a slave with your money, and you may give 
him authority over your property and all that your hands possess. You may give him 
dominion over all your subjects, and inform them that whoever honors him honors you, and 
whoever obeys him obeys you, and whoever opposes him or does not subject himself to him 
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despises and opposes you. You do not trust Him concerning yourself and your dominion, and 
you do this in fear of Him, damaging yourself and diminishing your great dominion, but this is 
the very least of what your Creator made for you. How do you deny this for your God, perfect 
in kindness and complete in generosity, who does not fear passing diminishment for Himself 
nor the diminution of His kingdom, and who does not have your imperfection in doing what 
we have previously described concerning you? 
How much more appropriate it is for you to know that your Creator does what you 
fail to do, in a way that is indescribable and which words cannot explain! But it has become 
clear that He has not neglected to do this. These Books of His declare this, both before His 
doing it and after His revelation of it, and confirm your understanding of what your Creator 
granted to you, (despite your neglecting to look into His Books, and to understand His 
design), so that you will confess His majesty and magnificence and thank Him for His action, 
favor and grace.  
If you had not characterized the Books as altered and corrupt, I would have brought 
to you three prophecies about this. I mention them anyway so that whoever trusts that the 
Books are correct will look at them. 
The prophet Isaiah said: “This virgin shall conceive and bear a son, whose name 
will be ‘Emmanuel,’ which means ‘our God is with us.’” This means that God will manifest in a 
body of ours, and He will unite it with Him so that it will become [35b]// the one Christ. 
Therefore, our God is in a body of ours.   
The prophet Isaiah also said: “A child has been born to us; a son, a ruler, and a 
king. His authority is on his shoulder.” And the prophet David said: “Who is the man you have 
mentioned, and the son of man whom you have chosen, and made a little lower than the 
angels? Then with praise and glory you have crowned him, and given him dominion over 
everything your hands have made, and subjected everything under his feet.” He means that 
he was lower than the angels by his death, then after this he mentioned the majesty of the 
dominion.  
David also said: “He sent His word and healed them, and rescued them from the 
traps.” He means that God sent His son to the sons of Israel and to the rest of the nations 
and he healed them from the disease of sin, and delivered them from worshiping idols and 
from death, by what he stated to them concerning the knowledge of God.  
And the prophet Daniel said: “I saw coming on the clouds of heaven someone like a 
man, who went to the Ancient of Days and they led him into His presence. He gave him 
kingship and dominion and might so that the nations and tongues would worship him. His 
dominion is not a perishable dominion, and is not destroyed, nor pass away.”   
Prophecies about this are too numerous for us to count or mention in this book. 
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What is more beneficial to people than looking into the Books of God? They speak of this 
plan of God, and people will accept this and their souls will find rest in the presence of their 
Creator [who is] speaking to them from a body of theirs. There is no greater proof of His 
presence than this! Or else, they deny Him and stumble in seeking their Creator, who is 
everywhere and in a specific place without being comprehended, and they have, in truth, no 
plan by which they can ever be saved. Since the Creator is neither understood nor 
comprehended, some of them have come to a place of total unbelief and [36a]// denial 
concerning Him. Some of them adhere to the confession of two principles which are two 
visible bodies. Some of them say that God is primordial matter. Some of them adhere to idols 
to which they give His name and they worship them, since they have never seen Him, never 
comprehended Him, and never acknowledged His plan. Some of them, from a religious 
community in our time, (in order to confirm their Creator to themselves), represent Him 
among themselves as limited, seated on a throne, ascending from one heaven to another, 
and descending from one heaven to another. Some of them make Him limited to a known 
space and known forms, and they determine that He is not more than these. Some of them, 
while wanting to honor Him, make Him visible light that enlightens them from the light of the 
resurrection, and the day of reckoning of the awards of paradise and hell. Some of them, in 
order to know and understand Him, say that He has two hands like their hands, and two feet 
like their feet. Some of them are embarrassed by this, and say that He is not seen or 
comprehended. They deny the plan that God has made known, which confirms His presence 
in creation. They reduce the issue to what the Creator is in Himself without His plan by which 
He makes known His presence to His creatures in a way which they can understand. So, 
when their thoughts wandered in search of something that they could understand, they found 
nothing. Therefore, they approximated Him to things in their souls, without any admission 
from their mouths that there was no evidence to prove it. Their practice happens without love 
or fear, for love and fear only relate to things that can be imagined.  
In addition to this, they confess that they need God, since He sent a Book down to 
them to make His words about Himself like their words about their limited souls, with 
reference to hearing, seeing, satisfaction, [and] anger, that pertain to physical beings. In 
order to confirm Himself to them, He made necessary to Himself what is necessary to 
bodies. However, they do not [36b]// benefit from what they learned of this, and they neglect 
to practice what they were commanded to do, and do not accept the truth from us, which 
they were commanded to accept as a witness to them concerning this.  
If they had gathered to look into the Books of God, and if they knew His plan to 
manifest Himself in a human being from among them and to speak to them by him, then they 
would have stopped searching heaven and earth for Him, and they would have become 
 400 
aware of His presence in a body of theirs by means of the plan, and their souls would have 
found rest in this. And they would have accepted His saying that He is everywhere, and that 
He appeared according to the plan in a specific place. When their thoughts sought, they 
would have ended up at the body from which He speaks to them, and they would have 
stopped at it and would have achieved their quest and found rest in it. And they would have 
come to worship Him and they would have left whatever they had been content with in their 
search for an unseen Creator, who had already brought the search closer to them when He 
appeared in a body that can be seen. And they would not have been satisfied with the 
disagreements that we have described concerning their teaching, and the wrongness of their 
doctrine. 
If they say that Christians disagree, we say this only concerns the created body. 
Some of them call it a hypostasis, and others reject that. As for the Creator, they do not 
disagree about Him, and their teaching concerning Him is that He is One who is not 
comprehended. Their agreement concerning the Creator's manifestation in a body of theirs is 
much more important than their disagreement concerning the body itself. And their teaching 
is that He is one, known by three hypostases, and that He is everywhere, not limited, nor 
comprehended. Their disagreement concerns the body which they see, to the point that 
some of them say one hypostasis, and others say two hypostases; whereas their agreement 
is that the one in whom the Creator was manifested had a body and a soul. 
Surely the generosity of the Creator, His grace, favor, and gentleness towards His 
creatures, His blessing of His creatures, His benevolence to them, and His honoring them by 
His manifestation to them in the ways which we described, are obvious. And among these 
many ways, we made known [37a]// only some of them, because we dislike lengthy writing 
about them. Other people have much better knowledge than us, regarding them. And 
abundant thanks be to God for His grace and His benevolence! 
 
Discourse on the Crucifixion 
They condemn us for saying that Christ was crucified, and they accuse us of attributing 
weakness to God or deficiency to Christ, and they hold it against us that we slander God and 
attribute to Him what “makes the heavens almost split apart because of it, the earth crack 
open, and the mountains become completely flattened. “They” do not introduce weakness to 
God; “we” have done this to Him. How do we introduce weakness to God when we say that 
Christ was crucified, yet he, according to them, is a prophet lower than their prophet in rank, 
and is not so exalted by them that the heavens are almost split apart by this happening to 
him? Since he is exalted above what they accuse us of saying about God, then neither 
weakness nor imperfection has been attributed to God.  
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How do they accuse us of diminishing him in our report that he was crucified, when 
according to them, Christ is a prophet? They say that he was so much more honored by God 
than that he should be called “crucified.” I wish I knew what they would say of John, son of 
Zechariah; they confess that he was beheaded, and that his head was given to a slave-girl, a 
dancer, who had asked that it be given to her! Was it because of his insignificance to God 
that He neglected him until this happened to him? On the contrary, they recognize his being 
favored by God, and they do not attribute weakness to God concerning one whom they 
greatly praise. Yet they impose on others the same thing, according to what they say, 
attributing weakness to God through prejudice, bias and lack of justice.  
If our freedom from that of which we have been accused has been made clear, 
[then] we must show what we know of the plan of the crucifixion of Christ in his humanity, 
and the benefit it has for all humans. I say:  
Since most people before the coming of Christ were in error and unbelief, and 
philosophers and wise men, together with crude and ignorant people did not know that after 
death, (which separates their bodies from their souls), they will be raised from their graves 
[37b]// and come to life, (for they had never seen a man who conquered death, and remained 
alive, and was taken up to heaven, and did not return to death, something for them that 
cannot possibly be), then Godーhallowed be His Namesーout of love for His creation, wanted 
His creatures to rejoice by revealing to them life for their bodies, and releasing them from the 
dilemma of the fear of death which He had imposed upon them, for it is the greatest 
misfortune to befall them in this world. He also wanted to crush their enemy Satan, since he 
was the reason for the sin of Adam which caused death to enter the world. God wanted to 
remove it from them and lift them up from their fall, and to bestow on them His grace, and 
proclaim the good news of His kingdom which He had prepared for them in the everlasting 
world which never ends or passes away, where no evil overtakes them, where no hardship or 
misfortune affects them, where death does not reach them, or destruction, corruption or 
change. God wanted what He had prepared for all of them to come to pass in one of them, 
for the time of the resurrection of all of them had not yet come; and since one thing can be 
applied to all, then the resurrection of their substance is more certain for them than what is 
restricted to words, for action is better than speech.  
Therefore, with all that we have already explained, He appeared in a human body, 
veiled Himself in it, spoke to the world from within it, showed His goodwill to people, and 
honored them by veiling Himself in it and by uniting Himself in power and dignity with it. So 
he put it to death to give life to it ahead of them, and raised it to heaven, proceeding ahead of 
them.  
He made his death public, directly in front of their eyes, just as when a man wants 
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to make something public he makes it known in such a way that people can see it, raising it 
high above them and setting it in front of them. So when people looked at what the Creator 
veiled Himself with, which had died, his death became clear to them and they knew that it 
was from their substance that death happened in the substance [38a]// of his body, and what 
appeared of his suffering was known to be of their substance. Then, he arose from the tomb 
alive; he ascended into heaven to be there forever. They knew, then, with certainty, that all 
their substance will be raised from the tombs and will escape, like him, the power of death, 
because he was equal to them in their substance; and anyone who makes himself like him in 
righteousness and purity will reach heaven, just as he did. The joy will greatly increase of 
those afflicted by death, (which separates their bodies from their souls), of those who are 
immersed in agony over it, (in its clinging to them and in its permanence in all of them), when 
it is made certain that one of them has escaped from the fate of death for them. It, [death], 
becomes for them similar to sleep between this world and the one to come. This increases 
their hope, as they work in search of what has been prepared for them in His kingdom. Death 
is despised by them, as it becomes evident to them that its permanence has no hold over 
them. And their joy will greatly increase by what is related about life for them.  
So, O dying man, this is the grace of God and His gift to you by means of the 
crucifixion of Christ which you find distasteful, and you turn the thanksgiving which you 
should have, into unbelief and defamation! 
  
Discourse on Baptism 
As for that with which you mock us as you scorn baptism, (which we hold in high regard, and 
declare that it abolishes sin), I return to them and thoroughly wonder about the apparent 
thing which they have neglected: their own problem which they did not examine themselves. 
When sperm,ーin which man’s visible form is formed, (heaven and earth are created to 
[preserve] that form),ーis ejaculated from one of them, he does not simply wash the place 
from whence it came, as he does with his spoiled human waste, (from which nothing is really 
formed but worms and the like), but he washes from the top of the head to his feet. He calls 
this type of washing from that clean thing from which God created humans, purification! 
[38b]// He also claims that he expiates his sins according to the number of hairs [of the 
genitals?], and thus a good deed is counted to him. They have neglected to be surprised at 
this, which is the real wonder. And instead they wondered at baptism, which is an illustration 
of the resurrection from the dead. Christ our Lord, who in humility died in his humanity, was 
buried and was raised from the dead, wanted to confirm this to us, and to represent it for us 
in a way which makes us always remember him, and be reminded that, we too, will be 
resurrected from the grave.  
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Let it be known that the model represents the thing it signifies. It is not the thing 
itself. It is as if you wanted to exemplify a certain city built of stone, marble, teak and pine, 
[and] decorated with gold, silver and the like; so it is represented by you with ink and dyes on 
parchment skin. The city occupies a parasang of land, [3.5 square miles.] There will be no 
disparity between the city in its capacity, length, width, size, gold, silver and other 
decorations therein and its representation in ink and parchment skin. There is no disparity 
that prevents this representation from being a type of the city, despite its small size and 
unassuming form, [and] despite its, [the city’s], greatness and nobility.  
Likewise, just as Christ was buried in the ground and rose from it alive, having been 
delivered from death, [God], wanting to give us a type of thisーand there is no type like death 
in this world or any equivalent to life in the other worldーthere was nothing closer to us than 
water from this earth by which he could typify his burial and his resurrection. This is because 
we have been formed out of water and dust, and water in his body is closer to air than to 
earth and fire. 
And he, having been buried in the ground dead and raised from it alive, 
commanded us to remember this by burying our bodies in the water and rising from it. In this 
way we remember [39a]// his burial in the ground and resurrection. In this way we may learn 
that the resurrection is true, having its type in our bodies, for if the type of the thing is found, 
it indicates the truth of the thing which it typifies. 
Moreover, God created Adam from clay. He formed him from dust and water. Adam 
was pure, without sin; but Satan deceived him, and on account of his sin God condemned 
him to death. God loved to restore him from death to life. So, indeed, He did this in one who 
is a type for all men, and He did this, as a type for them all, until the time comes when He 
gives them life in Him, and thus their restoration will be a type of the life by the water which, 
alongside dust, started their creation. This is likened to the potter who, while making a vessel 
out of clay and water and the vessel is spoiled before it is put in the furnace, restores his 
handiwork with only water to repair the vessel. Correspondingly, when death corrupts us, the 
Creator, only through water, restored our nature on account of the type He has given us, until 
the time when He restores the creature by the true life. It is as if, having been baptized in 
water, we were made with the type of life and the end of death. 
We only expect the thing that the type exemplifies. Our Creatorーmay He be 
exalted and praisedーhas made us come to this world by two births: one birth from the loins 
of our fathers, and the other from our mothers’ wombs. Our birth from our fathers does not 
have the form of man, or life, or motion; and our birth from our mothers is through the 
completion of the human body and its form, and the perfection of its humanity through the 
soul. Likewise, God has made two births for us in the other world: one is above the other, 
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and it announces it. One is from the water, and it is a type of the resurrection from the earth 
and life from the dead; and the other is the birth from the belly of the earth through which is 
certainty, [39b]// truthful life, a perfect and completed work. The first birth from the loins of our 
fathers, which is far from the reality of humanity, is likened to the birth of baptism in relation 
to the reality of true life, of which it was a type. And the second birth, from the wombs of our 
mothers in the perfection of humanity and the truthful life, is likened to our birth from the 
earth in the perfection of our spiritual shape and the truth of the eternal life which we will 
attain, and to which we will be restored.  
Therefore we say that the abolition of sin is found in baptism, because it is a type of 
the death to this world which has sin, and [it is a type] of the life in another world where there 
is no sin. If the end of death is true in our bodies, then sin which was the cause of death is 
nullified. And thus we know that it is nullified, for the thing which was its cause and through 
which it entered, we have received a type of its end for all of us. In fact, one of us has 
abolished it. 
 
Discourse on the Eucharist 
As for what they also reject when we say that Christ has named the Eucharist that we 
receive [as] his Body and his Blood, we inform them that the Christ, our Lord and our God, 
since he wanted to give us confirmation of his body with his intelligence and his will, could 
have named himself with the names of others, and likewise he could have named others by 
his name. [This naming could have happened], just as Matthew wrote about him addressing 
the good ones on the Day of the Resurrection, when he will manifest [himself] to judge the 
good and the wicked: “I was begging and you gave to me, I was hungry and you made me 
full, I was sick and you visited me,” and similar sayings which are in the Gospel. As for the 
wicked, he, [Christ], mentions something similar yet contrary to what the good have done. So 
they say to him, “When were you thus, Lord?” and he says, “All that you [40a]// have done to 
one of these little ones, you have done to me, and you have done it to me.” There is nothing 
which demonstrates the mystery of his love for charity, [and] his joy in generosity and 
benevolence more than his considering himself in their place. This is not an imperfection on 
his part, but rather, out of his generosity and the abundance of his grace he took their name 
on himself in his saying, “Lend to God a beautiful loan.” He put himself in their places and put 
them in his place, for the lender is a rich giver, and the borrower is someone who is given 
what he lacks, as we have [previously] described.   
As it is legitimate that he named himself with the names of others, it is [also] 
legitimate that others be named with his name, for there is no difference in that.  Accordingly, 
he names the bread and the wine which he made as Eucharist, his body and his blood. The 
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[ultimate] aim of Christ, our Lord, was to show the world that which lasts: the resurrection 
from death. For there is no harder thing in this world for the people in it than death, and 
nothing more valuable for them than salvation from it, [death], and the attaining of a life which 
has no death and after which death does not come.    
And since Christ died in his humanity and rose again and ascended into heaven to 
prove by that [rising] the resurrection of those whose substances [are like his human 
substance] and whose human natures are like his, he wanted to leave them something by 
which they might remember his death on their behalf, and [might remember] that his 
resurrection shows theirs. And [thus] his death and resurrection will not be forgotten. This is 
the life of them all. He was not satisfied with reminding them by words only, without bringing 
them, [his words], into perceivable existence, into the form of a thing which they could take in 
their hands, on which he would put the name of his body which died, rose from the dead, and 
ascended into heaven. He gave the type of his death and resurrection in baptism. [So] as 
their hands take that which is named “his body,” which died and rose, they remember the 
resurrection and the life that lasts. Therefore, the remembrance of his death relieves them 
from sadness and they rejoice [40b]// as they remember life, as if they took the assurance of 
life by their hands; for the most sure thing to humans is that which they touch with their 
hands, and that which their palms can hold. For this reason, he, before his death [and] while 
he was still in flesh, gave his disciples bread which they did not doubt to be his body, and he 
said to them: “Eat, this is my body which is offered for the forgiveness of sins, and this is my 
blood that is shed for the pardon of transgression.” He did not mean that the essence of that 
bread and that wine was his body and blood, for his teaching refers to the meaning of the life 
which was revealed in his body being resurrected from the grave, and to his victory over 
death. Thus he says: “This which I give you is my body.” This means, “The life which 
appeared in the resurrection of my body from the grave and its victory over death, this [life] is 
what you may remember, and it appears to you as you partake of this bread to which I have 
given my name. It is my body as it appears to you, and it is [also] a remembrance of the 
[state] of everlasting life which my body has attained after it rose from the grave.” Therefore, 
he made our life after death and our resurrection from the grave into a [tangible] figure, and 
the form of bread and wine represents his body and blood before our eyes, by his death, his 
resurrection from the grave, and his ascension into heaven. [Thus], we know that we will rise 
from the grave and that we will overcome death, just as he did, because he died in our 
substance, and his ruling concerning death and life is ours.  
As for naming his body and his blood “an offering for the world,” this was [done] 
according to the law of God with the Children of Israel, who used to offer sacrifices to God for 
their sins. Because of the sin of Adam, the Creator decreed that death should fall on him, 
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and [thus] death passed to his seed until God restored the second Adam [41a]// without 
seed, whom He made as a veil between Him and His creature, as we formerly described. He 
acted in full accordance with righteousness, and no sin was found in him. The prophet Isaiah 
described him, [saying], “[When] God [showed] approval for His creature, he, [Christ], bore 
their curse and burned up the certificate of the debt of their sins.” It was necessary, on 
account of His righteousness, that by His justice He remove death from him, [Christ], as well 
as from those of his substance, just as He decreed death to Adam and to those of his 
substance on account of his, [Adam’s], disobedience. It is as if he, representing all those of 
his substance, had nullified sin, on account of which death entered into the sacrifices which 
were slaughtered and offered to God on behalf of the sins of the Children of Israel. [This 
happened] because it was necessary for him to nullify death and show life by his 
righteousness, just as death had been necessitated, and life was nullified on account of the 
disobedience of the first Adam.  
[Indeed] the nullification of death is not shown as he falls under it, [but through] 
overcoming it, and resurrecting from it. Thus he shows that it has no power or strength; 
instead, it was nullified, and life was established in its place. We know that man is still 
subjected to the decree of death, even if he has a long life. It is said that he is in the grip of 
death, similar to the rest of those of his substance. He, [Christ], did not show the nullification 
of death until after he had accepted it; then he revealed its abrogation. So he died on behalf 
of the creatures, not because death was decreed on him, since he did not sin, (unlike Adam 
who sinned and death was decreed on him), but instead he died so that the nullification of 
death for him and for those of his substance might be [publically] demonstrated. He died [in 
flesh] so that it might be known that he was of the [same] substance in which death ruled. 
Then he rose [from the dead] to show the nullification of death for him and them, and [to 
show] that death had not been decreed on him, (unlike the decree of death on those of his 
substance), since he had no sin. He rose to life and [thus] nullified the power of death as he 
overcame it. Therefore, those of his substance knew that what was decreed upon them of 
death on account of Adam’s sin was nullified for them on account of his victory over it, as he 
is equal to them in their substance; and that all of their substance [41b]// is collected in his, 
since all human substance is one. He, having demonstrated the nullification of sin by which 
death was necessitated for Adam’s children, took the place of the offerings which were 
presented to God in order that sins may be nullified. All of this was a type for him. But he, 
indeed, has nullified sin as he abrogated death which had entered on account of sin. For all 
of those offerings did not nullify death which had entered on account of sin, but he nullified it 




Discourse on the Cross  
As to what they mock when we venerate and honor the cross, we will turn the argument back 
on them. It is much more surprising to see them venerating a stone, which the polytheists 
had venerated and honored! Truly, the wood [of the cross] is closer to fruitfulness than the 
stone!  
If they say, “We do not mean the stone per se,” then we say, “Neither do we mean 
the wood itself.” As we have described, our reason for venerating this symbol is the 
manifestation of our Creator in flesh that was crucified on it, through which [He] showed us 
the resurrection, the life, and the obliteration of sin. By touching the symbol on which people 
crucified that which was our Creator’s veil, we magnify Him, and thus it brings us closer to 
Him, just as we honor the king by venerating even the hoof of his horse and the dust of his 
feet, in addition to his footwear and coat. Also, as you and we touch the coat of a goodly man 
who is close to God through devotion, we want to become close to our Creator by touching 
one of His servants who obeyed Him. If we touch the coat of a man who obeyed the Creator 
so that we may honor God Himself, how much more should we touch the sign on which the 
veil of the Creator and his body were crucified! Ignorance should not stop us from doing this 
which we do to that which is lower and smaller, as well as to [42a]// that which is more 
significant and greater,ーunless a certain force occurs in our substance that makes us too 
proud to venerate the hoof of the king's horse, the coat of the goodly worshipper, and the veil 
of the Creator! That would be ignorance and error.  
We have clearly explained our purpose in venerating the cross. If we go back and 
ask you the reason why you venerate the stone, what would be your answer? If you say, 
“That is because it came down from heaven,” then we say, “We heard that God has 
forbidden honoring the stones which He has created in this world, and that men have taken 
them as idols to worship. So, what makes honoring and venerating that which came down 
from heaven more worthy than that which is from the things of this world, for God is the 
Creator of it all? If they say, “It is because of Abraham,” then we respond, “So, you kiss a 
stone because of Abraham, and disown the cross on account of the veil of the CreatorーI 
mean, the body of Christ?!” If they say, “God required us to do so,” then we say, “You should 
not say God has prescribed it, since you confessed that He prohibited you from doing such a 
thing, and He ordered you to combat the polytheists over it. And if this is not so, what does 
worship by venerating the stone really mean?” We do not think they can give a reasonable 




Discourse on Eating and Drinking in hereafter  
As for what they reject of the Gospel concerning the abrogation of marriage, food, and drink 
in the everlasting life, (thinking that these are insufficient as a reward for good people), we 
will return to them with the contrary of what they mentioned, which people of sound mind 
deny. [What they mention of reward] is the imperfection, the deficiency, and abrogation of 
[reward], and what the Gospel mentioned is the correct reward, the comprehensible grace. 
This is because we know that Godーmay He be exalted and magnifiedーsince He put us in 
this low, passing, imperfect, and vile world in which afflictions, (such as sickness, diseases, 
[42b]// many blights and devastating death), encompassed  and made our bodies weak, 
imperfect, subjected to blights, [we know] that He made our life sustainable only with what 
comes from the fabric of the world and is woven out of it so that our weakness and need may 
be shown, and [so] that we may be forbidden from pride and arrogance which harm our 
souls. Our life is [ultimately] death, as, although while we are living and speaking we direct 
the whole world, it, [life], does not remain or become established except on account of 
something which comes from dust and is woven into it. When we lose that which sustains our 
life, I mean food and drink, [we know that] He will transfer us from this vile world and from 
this weak and needy body to a strong and honorable body; and that after this vile life which is 
not established except on account of something else other than itself, [He will transfer us] to 
an everlasting life which has no need and is not weak. Then we acknowledge the advantage 
of what we will attain over against what we were, since it is the ultimate reward which has 
been prepared for us. 
But our gladness and our joy in it are different than what we have experienced in 
this passing world, and of the weakness of our body while it was [living] in it. [It is also 
different] from our need for vile things which sustain our life, such as eating and drinking. Our 
reward is superior to this.  
Thus it has become evident that Godーmay His name be blessedーhas shown in 
His Book that He will magnify the place of His reward, away from any weakness or need, and 
that their, [the faithful], life is sustained by something other than themselves. And [it has 
become evident] that He makes their body in that world perfect strength, not weak, not 
sustained by food or drinking and not subjected to growth on that account, as it grows from a 
small state to a bigger one. Instead, it will remain [sustained] by the power of the Creator, 
and not by something weaker than itself which is inferior to it.  Therefore, the gladness of the 
creature with its Creator will last forever and ever; it will remain in one perfect state, a state 
that is not sustained with the taste of different kinds of food, or different kinds of drink, or the 
multiplicity of sexual intercourse, even if these things are different and multiple. Instead, 
[God] [43a]// will rejoin them in rank, power, dignity, endurance, and eternal joy with His holy 
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angels forever and ever.  
I do not think that our opponents claim that the reward of Gabriel, Michael and all 
the angels who are close [to God] is imperfect or vile, or that their, [the opponents’], pleasure 
in having sexual intercourse with women, and eating and drinking, is more than the pleasure 
of the angels in other things then these.  
As for what they mention concerning eating, drinking, and sexual intercourseーall of 
these things were put in this world for us as vile things by which we preserve our 
generations. In them we resemble the animals. [Therefore,] it is evident to people of sound 
minds that since they, [the opponents], place these things where there is no need for such 
things, (which are a gift yet defective), and since they speak of our need for them [in the 
other world], then they have made the reward of Godーmay He be exaltedーlow, as they 
[attribute] to it imperfection, and need, and all that the animals share with us. They have not 
spoken highly of the magnitude of the reward of God and the abundance of His reward, and 
[instead, they claim] that we have been comprised of these animal lusts which are shared 
between humans and animals. These [things] which are vile and low are for us as a need, 
which God put in us so that we may preserve our generations. We know that these things 
end up being compost manure and waste. 
If it were not for the length of the book as it is, I would have shown at length the 
imperfections in what they say. But we put [the argument] before him who understands. And 
to God, our Creator and our Lord, for what He has informed us from His Books, and for His 
guiding us concerning His economy, be abundant and eternal praise, forever and ever.  
May God forgive the reader of this book, and the one who hears it, and the one who 
owns it, and its scribe in the first place, and their parents, and the sons of baptism and the 
whole world. It was accomplished on the fourteenth of Hatur/Hatour in the year 1014 of the 
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